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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
	
“The	greatest	challenge	to	any	thinker	 is	stating	the	problem	
in	a	way	that	will	allow	a	solution”	
-	Bertrand	Russell	
	
1. INTRODUCTION  
2. HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
3. LEGAL METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS APPROACHES 
	
1. INTRODUCTION  
Technical	standards	represent	the	backbone	of	innovation	and	exert	a	direct	
effect	on	modernization,	competition	and	economic	development	as	a	whole.	This	
is	even	more	critical	in	the	context	of	ICT	industry,	where	the	main	objectives	are	
interoperability	and	compatibility	of	consumer	products	and	processes	in	markets	
featuring	 strong	 network	 effects.	 In	 particular,	 hi-tech	 markets	 would	 be	
unproductive	if	ICT	technologies	could	not	operate	across	multiple	platforms	and	
devices,	benefiting	consumer	welfare	and	the	economy	in	general.	Standards	are	
employed	 to	maximize	 the	 efficiency	 of	 processes	 and	 to	 found	 commonalities	
across	companies,	market	sectors,	countries	and	worldwide.		
It	is	thus	widely	recognized	that	standards	can	foster	technology	diffusion,		
innovation	 and	 international	 trade.	 Indeed,	 standards	 are	 key	 in	 virtually	 every	
single	product	we	use	and	process	 that	arranges	products	 for	consumption.	The	
global	 economy	 is	 extremely	 reliant	 on	 technical	 standards	 that	 enable	
interoperability	 and	 compatibility.	 Today,	 many	 widespread	 technologies	 are	
created	 by	 standards-setting	 activities	 and	 operate	 successfully	 thanks	 to	 the	
interaction	standards	allow.	
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Standards	 play	 three	 distinguished	 functions, 1 	which	 could	 be	 all	 re-
conducted	 to	 a	 wider	 regulatory	 purpose.	 First,	 standards	 exert	 a	 regulative	
function	 as	 they	 tend	 to	 conform	 and	 coerce	 firms’	 conduct	 on	 the	 market.	
Second,	 they	 have	 a	 cognitive	 function,	 granting	 specific	 qualities	 to	 certain	
technologies.	 Third,	 they	 have	 a	 fundamental	 normative	 function,	 as	 they	 favor	
cooperative	 strategies,	 which	 can	 in	 return	 engender	 long-lasting	 beneficial	
effects,	provided	that	the	choice	of	one	technology	over	another	is	made	in	a	fair	
and	 transparent	 manner,	 thus	 offsetting	 potential	 anticompetitive	 restrictions.	
Indeed,	 considering	 standardization	as	 a	 sort	of	 infrastructure,2	once	 in	place,	 it	
incentives	 market	 players	 to	 rely	 on	 it	 and	 use	 it,	 thus	 fostering	 further	
cooperation	 and	 spreading	 the	 advantages	 of	 network	 effects.	 Standards	 thus	
represent	 a	 decisive	 instrument	 for	 gauging	 and	 capitalizing	 on	 technological	
advances.	 	 In	 this	 respect,	 standards	 are	 constitutive	 of	 markets	 and	 a	 pivotal	
means	for	economic	growth.3	
On	the	other	side,	standards	are	becoming	essential	 in	sectors	outside	the	
ICT	segments,	such	as	smart	grid,	e-health,	intelligent	transport	systems,	mobile	
money	 and	 smart	 metering	 technologies	 for	 water,	 gas	 and	 electricity	
management.4		
Notwithstanding	 the	 policy-makers’	 increasing	 attention	 to	 ICT	
standardization,	 legal	 scholars,	 competition	 authorities	 and	 practitioners	 have	
started	 to	 be	 attracted	 by	 this	 phenomenon	 only	 in	 recent	 years,	 given	 the		
increased	 litigation	 in	 this	 field, 5 	often	 referred	 to	 as	 “patent	 wars”. 6 	These	
                                                
1	C.	Lane,	The	Social	Regulation	of	Inter-Firm	Relations	 in	Britain	and	Germany	:	Market	Rules,	Legal	
Norms	and	Technical	Standards,	21	CAMBRIDGE	JOURNAL	OF	ECONOMICS	(1997),	p.	197.	
2	D.	Acemoglu,	G.	Gancia,	F.	Zilibotti,	Competing	engines	of	growth:	 Innovation	and	standardization,	
147	JOURNAL	OF	ECONOMIC	THEORY	(2012),	p.	570.	
3	K.	Blind,	A.	Jungmittag,	The	 Impact	of	Patents	and	Standards	on	Macroeconomic	Growth	 :	A	Panel	
Approach	Covering	Four	Countries	and	12	Sectors,	29	JOURNAL	OF	PRODUCTIVITY	ANALYSIS	(2008),	p.	51.	
4	V.	 C.	 Gungor,	 D.	 Sahin,	 T.	 Koçak,	 S.	 Ergüt,	 C.	 Buccella,	 C.	 Cecati,	 G.	 P.	 Hancke,	 Smart	 Grid	
Communication	Technologies	and	Standards,	7	IEEE	TRANSACTIONS	ON	INDUSTRIAL	INFORMATICS	4,	(2011),	
pp.	529-539.	
5	See	Kai-Uwe	Kühn,	Fiona	Scott	Morton,	Howard	Shelanski,	Standard	Setting	Organisation	Can	Help	
Solve	the	Standard	Essential	Patent	Licensing	Problem,	CPI	ANTITRUST	CHRONICLE,	March	2013	(special	
issue)	 p.	 1,	 stating	 that	 	 “[i]n	 the	 ICT	 sector,	 rates	 of	 patenting	 have	 exploded	 and	 –	 with	 the	
convergence	 among	 communications	 technology,	 device	 hardware,	 and	 software	 –	 products	 have	
become	more	complex”.	
6	On	the	current	patents	wars,	see	Michael	A.	Carrier,	A	roadmap	to	the	smartphone	patent	wars	and	
FRAND	licensing,		CPI	ANTITRUST	CHRONICLE	2	(2012).	Patent	warfare	have	been	present	for	a	long	time.	
In	 the	 1850s	similar	disputes	characterized	 the	sewing	machine	sector.	See	R.	Lampe,	P.	Moser,	Do	
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numerous	proceedings	and	court	decisions	are	mainly	centered	on	injunctions	or	
fair,	reasonable,	and	non-discriminatory	(“FRAND”)	fees	suits,	having	their	crucial	
litigious	 point	 in	 the	 assertion	 of	 patents	 which	 are	 deemed	 essential	 to	 the	
implementation	of	 technical	standards	(i.e.	 standard-essential	patents	or	 “SEPs”)	
as	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 manufacture	 standard-compliant	 products,	 for	 instance	 a	
smartphones,	without	using	technologies	covered	by	one	or	more	SEPs.7		
The	 rise	 in	 litigation	 is	 mainly	 due	 to	 the	 amplified	 number	 of	 patents	
embedded	in	technical	standards	and	the	growing	intricacy	of	high	tech	devices,	
which	contain	a	vast	quantity	of	patents	and	standards.	As	noted,	the	patent	war	
in	the	ICT	sector	also	stemmed	from	the	merger	between	two	cluster	of	standards	
and	 patents	 under	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 smart	 phone,	 which	 implied	 a	 collision	
between	the	information	technology	sector	patent	galaxy	and	the	telecom	sector	
galaxy. 8 	The	 resulting	 smartphone	 industry	 features	 thickets	 of	 patents	 and	
lawsuits	 spanning	 several	 courts	 which	 are	 being	 launched	 between	 major	
corporations,	often	setting	as	rivals	manufacturers	of	Google’s	Android	operating	
systems	(HTC,	Motorola	Mobility,	Samsung)	on	one	side,	and	Microsoft	or	Apple	
on	 the	 other.9	Besides	 the	 smartphone	 industry,	 future	 technologies	 such	 as	
Internet	 of	 Things,	 which	 also	 encompasses	 technologies	 such	 as	Machine-to-
Machine,	 smart	 grids,	smart	 homes,	intelligent	 transportation	and	smart	 cities,	
will	 progressively	 more	 be	 dependent	 on	 patented	 technology	 standards.	
Accordingly,	 the	 quantity	 of	 patents	 claiming	 an	 invention	 related	 to	 these	
standards	is	relentlessly	growing	resulting,	to	an	extent,	in	some	level	of	standard	
capture,	 which	 seems	 inevitable	 given	 that	 a	 complex	 product	 such	 as	 a	
                                                                                                                                 
patent	pools	encourage	innovation?	Evidence	from	the	nineteenth	century	sewing	machine	industry,	70	
JOURNAL	OF	ECONOMIC	HISTORY	4	(2010),	pp.	898-920.	 	Later,	a	series	of	patent	 litigations	 in	multiple	
countries	was	instrumental	in	guaranteeing	to	Thomas	Edison	the	control	of	the	lightening	market,	
and	 establishing	 his	 incandescent	 light	 bulb	 as	 the	 industry	 standard,	 replacing	 gas	 lights.	 See	 L.	
Shaver,	 Illuminating	 innovation:	 From	 patent	 racing	 to	 patent	 war,	 69	 WASHINGTON	 AND	 LEE	 LAW	
REVIEW	3	(2012).	
7	EU	Competition	Policy	Brief,	Standard	Essential	Patents,	Issue	8,	June	2014.	
8	BJÖRN	LUNDQVIST,	STANDARDIZATION	UNDER	EU	COMPETITION	RULES	AND	US	ANTITRUST	LAWS:	THE	RISE	
AND	LIMITS	OF	SELF-REGULATION	(EDWARD	ELGAR	PUBLISHING	2014),	p.	66,	arguing	that	the	patent	war	in	
the	ICT	sector	stemmed	from	the	merger	of	the	IT	with	the	telecom	industry.		
9	Michael	A.	Carrier,	A	roadmap	to	the	smartphone	patent	wars	and	FRAND	licensing,		CPI	ANTITRUST	
CHRONICLE	2	 (2012).	 For	 a	 detail	 analysis	 of	 the	 main	 smartphone	 litigations,	 see	 Liguo	 Zhang,	
Standardization	and	Patent	Licensing	in	the	European	Union	(oy	Nord	Print	Ab	2012),	pp.	80	et	seq.			
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smartphone	 or	 tablets	 implements	 a	 multitude	 of	 SEPs	 and	 non-SEPs	
incorporated	in	underlying	technical	standards.10		
The	 inclusion	of	patented	technology	on	the	one	hand	enhance	standards’	
performance,	 interoperability	 and	 cost-effectiveness.	 Patent	 protection	 pushes	
innovation	 by	 incentivizing	 investment	 in	 R&D,	 it	 permits	 to	 the	 innovator	 to	
obtain	 return	on	his	 investment	by	using	 the	 innovation	himself	or	by	 licensing	
the	patent	to	other	companies.11	As	noted	in	the	Guidelines	on	the	applicability	of	
Article	101	of	the	TFEU	to	horizontal	co-operation	agreement	standards	“normally	
increase	competition	and	lower	output	and	sales	costs,	benefiting	economies	as	a	
whole”.12	
On	the	other	hand,	 incorporating	patented	technology	serves	the	strategic	
interests	of	market	players,	which	have	a	notable	benefits	to	having	their	patented	
technologies	 selected	as	part	of	 the	 standard.13	As	 a	matter	of	 fact,	 SEPs	holders	
often	 exert	 a	 market	 power	 generated	 by	 the	 lack	 of	 substitute	 technologies,	
which	 could	 allow	 compliance	 with	 the	 standard	 in	 which	 they	 are	 embedded.	
The	use	of	those	patents	and	compliance	with	those	standards	is	thus	essential	to	
uphold	 a	workable	 presence	 in	 the	market.	 Likewise,	 standardization	 reinforces	
the	 patent	 holders’	 bargaining	 leverage	 in	 the	 course	 of	 licensing	 negotiations,	
provided	 that	 their	 patents	 are	 essential	 for	 the	 implementation	of	 the	 adopted	
standard.	14		
In	this	vein,	SEPs	could	potentially	result	in	anti-competitive	behavior,	such	
as	 misuse	 of	 patents	 or	 a	 standard	 capture	 or	 hold-up.	 SEPs	 holders’	 market	
                                                
10	M.Gerst,		IPR	in	Standardisation,	Feb.	2016,	IP	KEY,	p.	14.	
11	K.	 BLIND,	 STANDARDISATION:	 A	 CATALYST	 FOR	 INNOVATION;	 INAUGURAL	 ADDRESS	 (ERASMUS	 UNIVERSITY	
ROTTERDAM,	2009).	
12	Guidelines	 on	 the	 Applicability	 of	 Article	 101	 of	 the	 Treaty	 on	 the	 Functioning	 of	 the	 European	
Union	to	Horizontal	Co-operation	Agreements,	OJ	C	11/1	(2011),	para	263.	See	also	the	White	Paper	by	
the	U.S.	
Department	of	Justice	and	the	FTC	mentioned	that	“standards	can	[…]	increase	innovation,	efficiency,	
and	 consumer	 choice;	 foster	 public	 health	 and	 safety;	 and	 serve	 as	 a	 fundamental	 building	 block	 for	
international	 trade.”	 U.S.	 Dep’t	 of	 Justice	 &	 Fed.	 Trade	 Comm’n,	 Antitrust	 Enforcement	 and	
Intellectual	Property	Rights:	
Promoting	Innovation	and	Competition	(2007).	
13	ITU,	UNDERSTANDING	PATENTS,	COMPETITION	AND	STANDARDIZATION	IN	AN	INTERCONNECTED	WORLD,	2014,	
p.	51.	
14	Mark	A	Lemley,	Antitrust	 and	 the	 Internet	 Standardization	 Problem,	 28	CONNECTICUT	LAW	REVIEW	
(1996),	p.	1041.	See	also	Janice	M	Mueller	Patent	Misuse	Through	The	Capture	Of	Industry	Standards,	
17	BERKELEY	TECHNOLOGY	LAW	JOURNAL	(2002),	p.	623.	
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power	 is	 determined	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 take	 advantage,	 sometimes	
opportunistically,	 from	 new	 revenue-generating	 opportunities	 in	 that	 every	
implementer	of	a	standard	is,	as	a	given,	infringing	the	related	SEPs,	except	if	they	
obtain	licenses	to	these	SEPs	from	their	owners.	When	patent	claims	are	asserted	
on	a	selected	standard,	any	producers	of	a	device	compliant	with	the	standard	will	
need	 to	 take	 out	 a	 license	 from	 the	 IP	 holder. 15 	SEPs	 can	 be	 tremendously	
profitable	 in	 terms	 of	 royalty	 income,	 but	 as	 well	 in	 terms	 of	 being	 strong	
bargaining	 chips	 in	 cross-licensing	 negotiations.	Moreover,	 also	 companies	 take	
advantage	 from	 incorporating	 patented	 technology	 in	 a	 standard,	 since	 the	
extensive	adoption	of	that	standard	might	indicate	a	shift	in	market	direction	that	
benefits	 a	 SEP	 owner’s	 expertise	 or	 existing	 products,	 platforms	 and	 clients,	
thereby	giving	 them	a	competitive	advantage	by	virtue	of	 their	having	 less	need	
than	their	competitors	to	remodel	their	product	offerings.16		
The	 concern	 is	 mainly	 due	 to	 the	 need	 to	 make	 sure	 that	 market	 power	
exerted	 by	 holding	 SEPs	 is	 not	 unduly	 exploited	 to	 the	 detriment	 of	 effective	
competition	as		a	single	SEP	is	sufficient	to	block	third	party	from	implementing	
the	 standard	 to	 which	 it	 relates.	 That	 is	 to	 say	 that	 SEPs	 holder	 may	 act	 ad	
gatekeepers	 to	 the	 market. 17 	In	 fact,	 markets	 based	 on	 innovation	 and	
interoperability	and	characterized	by	 strong	network	effects	assume,	 in	order	 to	
preserve	competition,	that	players	are	granted	access	technologies	vested	in	IPRs,	
especially	patents.	It	is	thus	necessary	that	when	a	technology	is	incorporated	into	
a	 standard,	 SEPs	 holders	 have,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 an	 obligation	 to	 disclose	 the	
patents	they	own	and,	on	the	other,	the	right	to	ask	for	fair,	reasonable,	and	non-
discriminatory	 fees.	 Nonetheless,	 SEPs	 holder	 often	 put	 into	 play	 opportunistic	
behaviors	 that	 are	 inconsistent	 with	 these	 obligations,	 such	 as	 by	 seeking	
injunctions	against	manufacturers	of	products	 that	comply	with	 the	standard	or	
by	asking	for	discriminatory	or	excessive	licensing	terms.	Competition	law	is	thus	
central	to	assure	that	SEPs	holders	do	not	abuse	their	market	power	engaging	in	
                                                
15	M.Gerst,		IPR	in	Standardisation,	Feb.	2016,	IP	KEY,	p.	4.	
16	ITU,	UNDERSTANDING	PATENTS,	COMPETITION	AND	STANDARDIZATION	IN	AN	INTERCONNECTED	WORLD,	2014,	
p.	52.	
17 	DAVID	 TELYAS,	THE	 INTERFACE	 BETWEEN	 COMPETITION	 LAW,	 PATENTS	 AND	 TECHNICAL	 STANDARDS	
(KLUWER	LAW	INTERNATIONAL	2014),	p.	7.	
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anticompetitive	 exploitative	 or	 exclusionary	 conduct	 in	 a	market	 locked-in	 to	 a	
specific	technical	standard.	
Nonetheless,	 we	 argue	 that	 an	 analysis	 of	 those	 phenomena	 limited	 to	 a	
merely	competition	law	perspective,	i.e.	the	risks	created	by	standardization	with	
respect	 to	 compliance	 with	 the	 antitrust	 rules,	 falls	 short	 of	 appreciating	 the	
implications	standardization	is	entailing	in	the	global	arena.	Conversely,	we	hold	
that	 they	 should	 be	 scrutinized	 in	 light	 of	 the	 inherent	 intertwined	 tension	
between	 patent	 rights	 embodied	 in	 technical	 standards,	 innovation	 and	 the	
international	 trade	 regime.	 Indeed,	 standards	could	constitute	a	barrier	 to	 trade	
as	they	mirror	regulatory	philosophies,	approaches,	and	values	of	a	specific	public,	
thus	 swelling	 compliance	 costs	 for	 firms.18	Hence,	 international	 standardization	
becomes	 central	 as	 it	 could	 reduce	 these	 costs	 while	 addressing	 network	
externalities	 and	 information	 asymmetries,19	turning	 into	 the	 favored	 level	 of	
regulation.20	Globalization	of	markets	upholds	this,	advocating	for	a	globalization	
of	standards	in	the	world’s	supply	chains.21		
Many	 commentators	 have	 noted	 the	 inadequateness	 of	 the	 present	 legal	
framework	 that	 disciplines	 the	 interactions	 of	 patent	 rights	 incorporated	 into	
standards,	 pointing	 out	 the	 degree	 of	 intellectual	 property	 (“IP”)	 employed	 as	
entry	deterrent	and	the	use	of	strategic	patenting	 in	this	sector.22	While	most	of	
the	attention	has	been	focused	on	analyzing	the	competition	issues	raised	by	this	
interaction,	 the	present	 study	assumes	 that	 the	 issues	and	gaps	within	 the	 legal	
regime	 governing	 the	 interface	 between	 IPRs	 in	 standards	 and	 competition	
concerns	 give	 raise	 to	 significant	 trade	 implications	 and	 ultimately	 impair	 the	
international	 trading	 system	 by	 raising	 barriers.	 This	 thesis	 thus	 endeavors	 to	
establish	 linkages	with	 competition,	 international	 trade	 and	 standards,	 drawing	
from	interactions	between	IP	and	competition	in	ICT	markets.		
                                                
18	R.	Staiger,	A.	Sykes,	International	Trade,	National	Treatment	and	Domestic	Regulation,	40	JOURNAL	
OF	LEGAL	STUDIES	(2011),	p.	149.	
19	See	WTO,	WORLD	TRADE	REPORT	2005.	
20	T.	 Büthe,	 W.	 Mattli,	 Setting	 International	 Standards	 –	 Technological	 Rationality	 or	 Primacy	 of	
Power	 ?,	 56	 WORLD	 POLITICS	 (2003),	 p.	 1;	 K.	 Tamm	 Hallström,	 Organizing	 International	
Standardization	–	ISO	and	the	IASC	in	QUEST	OF	AUTHORITY	(EDWARD	ELGAR,	2004).	
21	WORLD	 ECONOMIC	 FORUM	 (“WEF”),	 THE	 GLOBAL	 ENABLING	 TRADE	 REPORT	 2012	 –	 REDUCING	 SUPPLY	
CHAIN	BARRIERS,	2012.	
22	See	generally,	DIETER	ERNST,	INDIGENOUS	INNOVATION	AND	GLOBALIZATION:	THE	CHALLENGE	FOR	CHINA’S	
STANDARDIZATION	STRATEGY		(2011).	
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2. HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In	a	stimulating	book	(“The	World	Is	Flat”,	2006),	Thomas	Friedman	holds	
that	 the	 world	 has	 developed	 into	 a	 level	 playing	 field	 as	 an	 outcome	 of	
globalization,	 claiming	 that	 the	 global	 market	 has	 made	 historical	 and	
geographical	partitions	gradually	 irrelevant.23	Nonetheless,	 some	questions	 arise:	
does	 this	hold	 true	 for	 regulation	as	well	or	do	diverging	 legal	philosophies	and	
tactics	continue	to	play	a	crucial	role?	From	the	outset,	it	emerges	that	regulation	
appears	highly	fragmented,	as	different	rules,	expressing	different	values,	coexist,	
overlap	and	sometimes	cause	friction.		
Building	on	these	observations,	I	am	principally	interested	in	the	regulatory	
policies	 concerning	 technology	 standardization.	 The	 implications	 of	
standardization	cannot	be	overstated:	today,	the	global	economy	relies	heavily	on	
technical	 standards	 because	 they	 foster	 technology	 diffusion	 and	 economic	
growth.24	Yet	little	is	known	about	their	implications	for	global	competition	policy,	
innovation	and	trade.25	This	absence	in	legal	analysis	is	particularly	critical	in	the	
context	 of	 disruptive	 technological	 advancements	 featured	 in	 information	 and	
communication	 technology	 and	 other	 innovation-intensive	 sectors, 26	
characterized	 by	 strong	 network	 effects,	 inter-operability	 and	 compatibility	 of	
consumer	products	and	processes.27	In	 this	 respect,	 standards	are	constitutive	of	
development	and	pivotal	market	enablers,	as	they	represent	a	decisive	instrument	
for	gauging	and	capitalizing	on	technological	advances.28		Nevertheless,	technical	
standards	 can	 also	 serve	 the	 strategic	 interests	 of	 incumbents,	 which	 derive	
                                                
23 	THOMAS	 L.	 FRIEDMAN,	THE	 WORLD	 IS	 FLAT:	 THE	 GLOBALIZED	 WORLD	 IN	 THE	 TWENTY-FIRST	 CENTURY	
(LONDON:	PENGUIN	2006).	
24	See	generally,	KNUT	BLIND,	THE	ECONOMICS	OF	STANDARDS:	THEORY,	EVIDENCE,	POLICY	(Edward	Elgar	
Cheltenham	2004);	WIPO,	Standards	 and	 Patents,	 Standing	Committee	on	 the	Law	of	Patents,	 13th	
Session,	2009.	
25	Geoffrey	 A.	 Manne	 and	 Joshua	 D.	 Wright,	 Introduction	 to	 GEOFFREY	 A.	 MANNE	 AND	 JOSHUA	 D.	
WRIGHT	 (EDS.),	 COMPETITION	 POLICY	 AND	 PATENT	 LAW	 UNDER	 UNCERTAINTY:	 REGULATING	 INNOVATION	
(Cambridge	University	Press	2011).	
26	Brad	 Biddle	 et	 al.,	 The	 Expanding	 Role	 and	 Importance	 of	 Standards	 in	 the	 Information	 and	
Communications	 Technology	 Industry,	 52	 JURIMETRICS	 177	 (2012);	 Martin	 C.	 Libicki,	 Standards:	 The	
Rough	 Road	 to	 the	 Common	 Byte,	 in	 BRIAN	KAHIN	 AND	 JANET	ABBATE	 (EDS.),	 STANDARDS	 POLICY	 FOR	
INFORMATION	INFRASTRUCTURE	(Cambridge,	MA:	MIT	Press	1995).	
27		CARL	SHAPIRO	AND	HAL	R.	VARIAN,	INFORMATION	RULES,	(Harvard	Business	Press	2013);	JOHN	PALFREY	
AND	URS	GASSER,	INTEROP:	THE	PROMISE	AND	PERILS	OF	HIGHLY	INTERCONNECTED	SYSTEMS	(New	York:	Basic	
Books	2012).	
28	BJÖRN	LUNDQVIST,	STANDARDIZATION	UNDER	EU	COMPETITION	RULES	AND	US	ANTITRUST	LAWS:	THE	RISE	
AND	LIMITS	OF	SELF-REGULATION	(EDWARD	ELGAR	PUBLISHING	2014).	
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notable	benefits	 from	having	 their	patented	 technologies	 selected	as	part	of	 the	
standard.29	The	 concern	 is	mainly	due	 to	 the	need	 to	 ensure	 that	market	power	
exerted	by	holding	patents	which	are	deemed	essential	to	the	implementation	of	
technical	standards		–	i.e.	standard-essential	patents	–		is	not	abused,	hampering	
effective	competition.30	
The	 first	 legal	 issue	 that	 comes	 into	 play	 regards	 consequences	 of	 the	
growing	 importance	 of	 proprietary	 technologies	 in	 innovation-driven	markets,31	
combined	 with	 the	 lack	 of	 coherent	 competition	 policy	 and	 scrutiny	 of	
intellectual	 property	 (“IP”)	 rights	 incorporated	 in	 standards.	 In	 this	 regard,	 my	
hypothesis	 is	 that	 the	 uncertainty	 triggered	 by	 major	 divergences	 in	 legal	 and	
policy	 approaches	 established	 in	 different	 jurisdictions	 has,	 to	 some	 extent,	
enabled	 advanced	 countries	 to	 use	 standards	 as	 a	 strategic	 weapon	 to	 hinder	
competition	and	block	or	delay	access	to	the	market	to	new	entrants,	ultimately	
affecting	the	distribution	of	innovation	gains.	
However,	 the	 competition	 law32	outlook	 is	 only	 one	 side	 of	 the	 problem.	
Our	assumption	is	that	the	difference	of	views	and	uncertainty	that	characterized	
the	 tensions	 between	patents	 and	 standards	 from	a	 competition	 standpoint	 has	
allowed	developed	countries	to	use	standards	as	trade	barriers.	To	the	extent	that	
dissimilarities	 in	 laws	 and	 public	 policies	 concerning	 standardization	 pose	
significant	hindrances	for	cross-border	trade,33		this	has	pressed	latecomers	in	the	
                                                
29 	Miguel	 Rato,	 Nicolas	 Petit,	 Abuse	 of	 Dominance	 in	 Technology-Enabled	 Markets:	 Established	
Standards	 Reconsidered?,	 9	 EUROPEAN	 COMPETITION	 JOURNAL	 1	 (2013);	 Mark	 Lemley,	 Intellectual	
Property	Rights	and	Standard-Setting	Organizations,	90	CALIFORNIA	LAW	REVIEW	1889	(2002).	
30	See	Hanns	Ullrich,	Patent	Pools	–	Policy	and	Problems,	in	JOSEF	DREXL	(ED.),	RESEARCH	HANDBOOK	ON	
INTELLECTUAL	PROPERTY	AND	COMPETITION	LAW	(Edward	 Elgar	Publishing	 2008),	 pp.	 139	 et	 seq.;	 Carl	
Shapiro,	 Setting	 Compatibility	 Standards:	 Cooperation	 or	 Collusion?,	 in	 ROCHELLE	 DREYFUSS	 ET	 AL.	
(EDS.),	EXPANDING	THE	BOUNDARIES	OF	INTELLECTUAL	PROPERTY	(Oxford	University	Press	2001),	119	et	seq.	
See	 also	DAVID	TELYAS,	THE	INTERFACE	BETWEEN	COMPETITION	LAW,	PATENTS	AND	TECHNICAL	STANDARDS	
(KLUWER	LAW	INTERNATIONAL	2014).	
31	See	generally	Herbert	J.	Hovenkamp,	Competition	for	Innovation,	UNIVERSITY	OF	IOWA	LEGAL	STUDIES	
RESEARCH	PAPER	No.	13-26	(2012).	
32	Here	the	terms	“antitrust	law”	and	“competition	law”	are	used	to	refer	comprehensively	to	the	set	of	
rules	 regulating	 potential	 anticompetitive	 market	 behavior,	 although	 the	 two	 expressions	 are	 not	
identical;	 see	 Wolfang	 Pape,	 Socio-Cultural	 Differences	 and	 International	 Competition	 Law,	 5(4)	
EUROPEAN	LAW	JOURNAL	(1999),	p.	438.	
33	Yogesh	 Pai,	 Standards-Essential	 Patents:	 A	 Prolegomena,	 19	 JOURNAL	 OF	 INTELLECTUAL	 PROPERTY	
RIGHTS	 (2014),	 p.	 59;	Baisheng	An,	 Intellectual	 Property	 Rights	 in	 Information	 and	 Communications	
Technology	Standardization:	High	Profile	Disputes	and	Potential	for	Collaboration	between	the	United	
States	 and	 China,	 45	 TEXAS	 INTERNATIONAL	 LAW	 JOURNAL	 (2009),	 p.	 175;	 Christopher	 S.	 Gibson,	
Globalization	and	Technology	Standards	Games:	Balancing	Concerns	of	Protectionism	and	Intellectual	
Property	in	International	Standards,	22	BERKLEY	TECHNOLOGY	LAW	JOURNAL		(2007),	p.	1403.	
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international	economy	 to	 call	 for	 more	 penetrating	 government	 intervention,	
supporting	 the	 development	 and	 adoption	 of	 competing	 homegrown	
complementary	 standards	 as	 a	 source	 of	 economic	 catch-up,34	which,	 in	 return,	
could	gain	ground	as	a	novel	 type	of	substantial,	protectionist,	non-tariff	barrier	
to	trade.35		
The	second	issue	thus	relates	to	the	need	to	integrate	a	global	competition	
policy	perspective	 into	 international	economic	 law	 to	 intervene	and	restrain	 the	
exclusionary	 consequences	 created	 by	 an	 opportunistic	 use	 of	 standardization	
across	 several	 jurisdictions,	 coupled	 with	 unpredictable	 –	 occasionally	 lax	 –	
antitrust	 scrutiny.	 Accordingly,	 I	 plan	 to	 explore	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	
comprehensive	 competition	 policy	 framework	 matching	 the	 tenets	 of	
international	trade	and	IP	law.	
This	analysis	is	today	even	more	needed	cannot	be	deferred	anymore	as	the	
integration	 of	 developing	 countries	 into	 the	 global	 economy	 has	 exacerbated	
these	 potential	 conflicts.	 In	 fact,	 as	 markets	 are	 increasingly	 global	 and	
intertwined,	 standardization	 is	 becoming	 an	 important	 enabler	 in	 international	
trade.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 developing	 countries	 are	 facing	 increasingly	 trade	
barriers	 in	 the	 form	 of	 patents	 embodied	 into	 standards,	 which	 has	 been	
opportunistically	 used	 by	 developed	 countries	 as	 entry	 deterrents	 to	 the	 ICT	
markets.		
Despite	 its	 relevance	 in	 global	 economy,	 standards	 have	 been	 subject	 of	
debate	only	in	recent	past	from	an	international	trade	regulatory	standpoint.	As		a	
matter	 of	 fact,	 despite	 the	 WTO	 rules	 requiring	 that	 most	 standard	 must	 be	
                                                
34	Richard	 P.	 Suttmeier,	 Xiangkui	 Yao,	 and	 Alex	 Zixiang	 Tan,	 Standards	 of	 Power:	 Technology,	
Institutions,	 and	 Politics	 in	 the	Development	 of	 China’s	 National	 Standards	 Strategy,	 THE	NATIONAL	
BUREAU	OF	ASIAN	RESEARCH	(2006),	p.	11.	
35	See	 generally	 Branislav	Hazucha,	Technical	 Barriers	 to	 Trade	 in	 Information	 and	 Communication	
Technologies,	in	TRACEY	EPPS	AND	MICHAEL	J.	TREBILCOCK	(EDS.),	RESEARCH	HANDBOOK	ON	THE	WTO	AND	
TECHNICAL	 BARRIER	 TO	 TRADE	 (Cheltenham:	 Edward	 Elgar	 Publishing	 2014),	 	 pp.	 539–540;	 	 Robert	
Howse,	 	A	New	Device	 for	Creating	 International	Legal	Normativity:	The	WTO	Technical	Barriers	 to	
Trade	Agreement	 and	 “International	 Standards”,	 in	CHRISTIAN	JOERGES	AND	ERNST-ULRICH	PETERSMANN	
(EDS.),	 CONSTITUTIONALISM,	 MULTILEVEL	 TRADE	 GOVERNANCE	 AND	 SOCIAL	 REGULATION	 (Oxford:	 Hart	
Publishing	2006),	pp.	392–393.	
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“international”,	most	standards	still	originate	in	a	single	industrialized	country	or	
in	EU36	and	US’s	regional	standardization	bodies.37			
Given	the	extensive	literature	on	the	interactions	of	competition	law	issues	
raised	 by	 the	 assertion	 of	 SEPs	 and	 IPR	 issues	 in	 standardization,	 the	 present	
study	claims	no	ingenuity	in	detecting	the	teething	troubles	regarding	the	same,	
but	 to	 spur	 novel	 thoughts	 and	 to	 collect	 perspectives	 from	 an	 international	
competition	 standpoint.	 Taking	 an	 innovative	 stance	 with	 respect	 to	 previous	
scholarship,	my	research	project	proposes	new	solutions	by	using		a	novel,	multi-
practice	 approach.	 I	 collect,	 compare	 and	 evaluate	 perspectives	 from	 diverse	
practice	areas	to	ascertain	legal	gaps	and	conflicts	applying	to	existing	processes	
and	structures.	I	argue	that	analysis	limited	to	a	merely	antitrust	perspective,	i.e.	
the	 risks	 created	 by	 standardization	 with	 respect	 to	 compliance	 with	 the	
competition/antitrust	 rules,	 falls	 short	 of	 appreciating	 the	 implications	 that	
standardization	entails.	Conversely,	I	hold	that	they	should	be	scrutinized	in	light	
of	 the	 inherent	 intertwined	 tension	 between	 IP	 rights	 embodied	 in	 technical	
standards,	innovation	and	the	international	trade	regime,	within	and	outside	the	
World	 Trade	 Organization	 (“WTO”)	 system.	 This	 derives	 from	 the	 observation	
that	 there	 is	 a	 significant	 commonality	 of	 objectives	 between	 competition	 and	
trade	policy.38	
3. LEGAL METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS APPROACHES 
 
The	study	will	thus	adopt	a	three-fold	methodological	approach:	
I .  It	is	based	on	comparison,	investigating	how	differential	legal	and	
policy	 treatments	of	patented	technology	through	the	application	
of	national	competition	laws	are	at	the	root	of	 inter-jurisdictional	
normative	 friction.	 These	 divergences	 fail	 to	 prevent	 IP	 owners	
                                                
36	Mention	is	exclusively	made	of	the	European	Union	and	no	longer	of	the	European	Community,	as	
a	result	of	the	entry	of	the	Treaty	of	Lisbon	into	force.	See	Art.	1	para.	3	of	the	European	Union	Treaty.	
37	Craig	N.	Murphy,	Voluntary	Standard	Setting:	Drivers	and	Consequences,	29	ETHICS	&	INTERNATIONAL	
AFFAIRS	4	(2015),	p.	447.	
38	See	 generally	 Alden	 F.	 Abbott,	 Shanker	 Singham,	 Competition	 Policy	 and	 International	 Trade	
Distortions,	4	EUROPEAN	YEARBOOK	OF	INTERNATIONAL	ECONOMIC	LAW	(2013),	p.	23;	MARTYN	D.	TAYLOR,	
INTERNATIONAL	 COMPETITION	 LAW:	 A	 NEW	 DIMENSION	 FOR	 THE	 WTO?	 (Cambridge	 University	 Press	
2006).	
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from	exerting	their	market	power	using	incorporated	standards	as	
trade	 barriers,	 thus	 raising	 issues	 on	 the	 consistency	 of	 the	
international	trading	regime.	
I I .  It	 addresses	 the	 international	 dimension	 of	 tension	 between	 IP	
rights	 in	 standards	and	competition	 law,	 investigating	 the	 role	of	
international	 trade	 law	 –	 and	 the	 WTO	 in	 particular	 –	 (a)	 in	
enabling	 a	 status	 quo	 advantageous	 to	 incumbent	 IP	 holders	 in	
deterring	 new	 entrants	 and	 reaping	 monopoly	 rents,	 and	 (b)	 in	
addressing	 latecomers’	 efforts	 to	 create	 new	 technical	 barriers	 to	
trade.	An	 enlightening	 example	 is	China’s	 standardization	policy:	
Beijing’s	 authorities	 are	 inclined	 to	 rely	 on	 standards	 as	 a	 public	
policy	 regulatory	 tool	 for	 a	 variety	 of	 purposes,	 including	
promoting	 indigenous’	 industries	 and	 inbound	 technology	
transfer.39 	For	 this	 reasons,	 even	 if	 Chinese	 representatives	 are	
active	 members	 of	 several	 international	 SSOs,	 the	 central	
government	 also	 influences	 and	 puts	 emphasis	 on	 the	
development	of	domestic	standards	in	key	technology.	
I I I .  It	scrutinizes	the	proliferation	of	strategic	patenting	and	the	use	of	
these	 strategies	 as	 trade	 barriers,	 gauging,	 inter	 alia,	 the	
developing	 phenomena	 such	 as	 the	 rise	 of	 patent-avoiding	
latecomer	strategies.	
My	 purpose	 is	 to	 develop	 a	 conceptual	 framework	 for	 addressing	
competition	 and	 regulatory	 issues	 raised	 by	 standardization	 in	 innovation	
markets,	 with	 an	 emphasis	 on	 practical,	 policy-oriented	 research.	 Building	 on	
science	 and	 technology	 literature	 and	 theories	 of	 government	 regulation,	 I	 am	
interested	 in	 how	 diverging	 regulatory	 philosophies	 –	 especially	 in	 late-comer	
economies	 such	as	China	 –	 affect	 innovation.	Drawing	 from	different	models	of	
                                                
39	STEPHEN	 EZELL	 AND	 ROBERT	 D.	 ATKINSON,	 THE	MIDDLE	 KINGDOM	GALAPAGOS	 ISLAND	 SYNDROME:	 THE	
CUL-DE-SAC	 OF	 CHINESE	 TECHNOLOGY	 STANDARDS,	 Information	 Technology	 and	 Innovation	
Foundation	(2014);	Dan	Breznitz,	Michael	Murphree,	The	Rise	of	China	in	Technology	Standards:	New	
Norms	in	Old	Institutions,	Prepared	for	the	US-China	Economic	and	Security	Review	Commission	16	
(2013);	 DIETER	 ERNST,	 INDIGENOUS	 INNOVATION	 AND	 GLOBALIZATION:	 THE	 CHALLENGE	 FOR	 CHINA’S	
STANDARDIZATION	STRATEGY	(2011).	
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government	intervention,	my	research	investigates	the	advisability	of	establishing	
a	 coherent	 global	 competition	 framework	 integrated	 within	 international	
economic	 law	 so	 as	 to	 prevent	 global	 market	 distortions	 and	 foster	 welfare-
enhancing	 trading	 policies	 to	 be	 deployed	 in	 the	 consumer	 	 –	 and	 public	 –		
interest.			
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CHAPTER II 
 
STANDARDIZATION AND TECHNICAL STANDARDS 
AS REGULATORY TOOLS 
	
“Standards	 are	 essential	 for	 all	 human	 activity,	 but	 most	
people	 take	 them	 for	 granted.	 	 Only	 when	 products	 fail	 to	
work,	or	mishaps	occur,	does	the	average	person	think	about	
standards.	 	 Even	 in	 business,	 where	 money	 is	 at	 stake,	
standards	are	often	given	a	low	priority.		There	is	a	clear	need	
[…]	for	greater	attention	to	standards”.	
“Global	Standards:	Building	Blocks	for	the	Future”	
Congress	of	the	United	States,	Office	of	Technology	Assessment	(March	1992).		
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1. STANDARDIZATION AND TECHNICAL STANDARDS:  
TAXONOMICAL ISSUES  
	
Standards	 can	 generally	 be	 described	 as	 documents	 that	 provide	
requirements,	 specifications,	 guidelines	 or	 characteristics	 that	 can	 be	 applied	
consistently	 to	ensure	 that	materials,	products,	processes	and	services	are	 “fit	 for	
purpose”,40	increase	 the	 efficiency	of	 individual	processes	 and	 introduce	 common	
systems	 across	 divisions	 of	 individual	 companies.	 The	 main	 types	 of	 standards	
include:	 (i)	 vocabulary	 standards,	 which	 are	 particularly	 relevant	 in	 health	 and	
medical	 information,	 concern	 cover	 glossaries	 and	 defined	 terms,	 which	 provide	
uniformity	 and	 cohesion	 in	 the	 interpretation	 of	 terms	 to	 prevent	
misunderstandings	 and	 misinterpretations;	 (ii)	 measurement	 standards,	 which	
involve	definitions	of	measures	and	detail	basic	units	of	 the	International	System	
of	Units;	 (iii)	 safety	 standards,	designed	 to	guarantee	product,	activity	or	process	
safety	 either	 in	 a	 voluntary	 or	mandatory	manner;	 (iv)	product	 standards,	which	
contain	 specifications	 that	 cover	 the	 requirements	 for	 a	material	 or	 product	 and	
provide	 comprehensive	 guidance	 for	 producing,	 processing,	 selling,	 purchasing	
and	using	 the	product;	and	 (v)	 technical	 standards,	usually	most	predominant	 in	
the	ICT	sector	and	consumer	electronics,	but	are	also	widespread	 in	 ICT-enabled	
service	areas	such	as	healthcare,	transportation	and	energy.41	
The	present	work	 focuses	on	technical	 standards.	They	 target	compatibility	
and	 interoperability	 by	 “creating	 regulatory	 conditions	 able	 to	 stimulate	 socio-
economic	development”.42	Oddly,	just	like	standards	in	general,	technical	ones	lack	
a	 uniform	 definition.43	They	 are	 differentiated	 from	 other	 types	 of	 standards	 as	
they	 denote	 the	 creation	 of	 norms	 and	 requirements	 for	 technical	 systems,	
identifying	 standard	 engineering	 criteria,	 methodologies	 and	 processes.44	In	 the	
literature	the	terms	“compatibility	standards”	and	“interoperability	standards”	are	
                                                
40	INTERNATIONAL	ORGANIZATION	FOR	STANDARDIZATION	(ISO),	WHAT	IS	A	STANDARD?,	available	at	on	the		
ISO’s	website.	
41 	R.	 N.	 A.	 BEKKERS,	 M.	 DALAIS,	 A.	 DORE,	 N.	 VOLANIS,	 UNDERSTANDING	 PATENTS,	 COMPETITION	 &	
STANDARDIZATION	IN	AN	INTERCONNECTED	WORLD	(ITU,	2014),	p.	12.	
42	Ibid.	
43	Lea,	Gary	&	Hall,	Peter,	Standards	and	intellectual	property	rights:	an	economic	and	legal	perspective,	
INFORMATION	ECONOMICS	AND	POLICY,	Vol.	16,	2004,	p.	69.	
44	ITU,	UNDERSTANDING	PATENTS,	COMPETITION	AND	STANDARDIZATION	IN	AN	INTERCONNECTED	WORLD,	2014,	
p.	15.	
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also	found,	as	the	workability	of	systems	embedding	various	interconnecting	parts	
is	 predominantly	 reliant	 on	 conformance	 with	 common	 standards.	 Indeed,	
technical	 standards	 could	 be	 defined	 as	 common	 platforms	 of	 codified	 technical	
knowledge	empowering	products	to	work	together.	In	essence,	they	are	regulatory	
technical	 tools:	 information	 on	 product	 characteristics	 and	 features	 and	
information	that	allows	compatibility	and	interoperability,	given	that	through	their	
implementation,	 different	 parts	 and	 modules	 of	 a	 product	 may	 be	 produced	
separately.45	
In	an	effort	towards	further	clarifying	the	notion,	several	academic	specialists,	
standard	 setting	 organizations	 (“SSOs”),	 public	 policy	 documents	 and	 political	
institutions	have	provided	different	definitions.		
The	 International	 Organization	 for	 Standardization	 (the	 “ISO”)	 and	 the	
International	 Electrotechnical	 Commission	 (the	 “IEC”)	 define	 a	 standard	 as	 a	
“document,	 established	 by	 consensus	 and	 approved	 by	 a	 recognized	 body,	 that	
provides,	 for	 common	 and	 repeated	 use,	 rules,	 guidelines	 or	 characteristics	 for	
activities	or	their	results,	aimed	at	the	achievement	of	the	optimum	degree	of	order	
in	 a	 given	 context”.46	The	European	Commission	has	defined	 the	 term	as	a	 set	of	
technical	specifications	relating	to	a	product	or	an	operation,	which	is	recognized	
by	 a	 large	 number	 of	 manufacturers	 and	 users.47	A	 similar	 definition	 has	 been	
adopted	 by	 the	 WTO’s	 Agreement	 on	 Technical	 Barriers	 to	 Trade	 (the	 “TBT	
Agreement”),	which	 defines	 the	 term	 “standard”	 as	 a	 “[d]ocument	 approved	 by	 a	
recognized	 body,	 that	 provides,	 for	 common	 and	 repeated	 use,	 rules,	 guidelines	 or	
characteristics	 for	 products	 or	 related	 processes	 and	 production	 methods,	 with	
which	compliance	is	not	mandatory”.48		
                                                
45	Nari	 Lee,	 Yang	Li,	European	 Standards	 in	 Chinese	 Courts	 –	 A	 Case	 of	 Sep	 and	 Frand	Disputes	 in	
China,	 in	N.	LEE,	N.	BRUUN	&	M.	LI	(EDS.),	GOVERNANCE	OF	INTELLECTUAL	PROPERTY	RIGHTS	IN	CHINA	AND	
EUROPE	(EDWARD	ELGAR	PUBLISHING,	2016).	
46	ISO/IEC	Guide	2:2004,	Standardization	and	related	activities,	Definition	3.2.	
47	See	 European	 Commission,	Communication	 on	 Intellectual	 Property	 Rights	 and	 Standardization,	
COM	(92)	445,	published	on	27	Oct.	1992.	
48	World	 Trade	 Organization	 Agreement	 on	 Technical	 Barriers	 to	 Trade,	 Annex	 1,	 §	 2.	 See	 also,	
Yogesh	 Pai,	 The	 International	 Dimension	 of	 Proprietary	 Technical	 Standards:	 Through	 the	 Lens	 of	
Trade,	 Competition	 Law	 and	Developing	 Countries	 (July	6,	 2012),	 Society	of	 International	Economic	
Law	(SIEL),	3rd	Biennial	Global	Conference	Working	Paper	No.	2012/40,	p.	9.	
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These	definitions	are	all	 largely	aligned	with	standards	officially	 recognized	
by	SSOs,	yet	 they	 ignore	the	wide	spectrum	of	de	 facto	 standards	 that	arise	 from	
market-driven	forces,	as	it	will	be	explained	further.		
The	 academic	 literature	 has	 been	 more	 inclusive,	 preferring	 a	 broader	
definition	of	standards,	as	norms,	or	technical	specifications,49	that	seek	to	provide	
a	 communal	design	 for	 a	product	or	 a	process	by	 setting	out	 requirements	 and50	
that	are	regularly	and	constantly	used.51	Even	in	the	case	of	standards	developed	in	
the	framework	of	SSOs,	it	is	the	reiterated	and	widespread	use	of	that	standard	by	
the	 market	 that	 allows	 the	 transition	 from	 a	 plain	 technical	 specification,	 i.e.	 a	
mere	document	setting	out	the	technical	requirements	of	a	standard	that	the	SSOs’	
members	would	like	to	see	the	market	adopt,	to	a	proper	technical	standard.52			
In	 this	vein,	SSOs	do	not	 set	 standards,	but	purely	provide	a	 forum	for	 the	
selection	 of	 technical	 specifications,	 which	 the	 market,	 ultimately,	 will	 decide	
whether	 to	 regard	 as	 a	 standard.	Moreover,	 applying	 standards	 to	 products	 and	
processes	 needing	 repeated	 use	 in	 implementation	 is	 of	 relevance	 for	 realizing	
efficiencies	and	pro-competitive	advantages,53	as	“standards	should	be	based	on	the	
consolidated	 results	 of	 science,	 technology	 and	 experience,	 and	 aimed	 at	 the	
promotion	 of	 optimum	 community	 benefits”.54	Indeed,	 standards	 ultimately	 foster	
competition	 between	 companies	 by	 promoting	 technical	 specifications	 that	 are	
                                                
49	A	definition	of	“technical	specification”	is	found	in	Directive	98/34/EC	Article	1	as	“a	specification	
contained	 in	 a	 document	which	 lays	 down	 the	 characteristics	 required	 of	 a	 product	 such	 as	 levels	 of	
quality,	 performance,	 safety	 or	 dimensions,	 including	 the	 requirements	 applicable	 to	 the	 product	 as	
regards	 the	 name	 under	 which	 the	 product	 is	 sold,	 terminology,	 symbols,	 testing	 and	 test	 methods,	
packaging,	marking	or	labeling	and	conformity	assessment	procedures”.	Directive	98/34/EC	of	22	Jun.	
1998	laying	down	a	procedure	for	the	provision	of	information	in	the	field	of	technical	standards	and	
regulations,	as	amended	by	Directive	98/48/EC	of	20	Jul.	1998,	Directive	2006/96/EC	of	20	Nov.	2006	
and	Regulation	1025/2012	of	25	Oct.	2012.	
50	See	 Rolf	Weber,	Competition	 Law	 Versus	 FRAND	 Terms	 in	 IT	 Markets,	 34	WORLD	COMPETITION	
(2001).	
51	Daniel	J.	Gifford,	Developing	Models	for	a	Coherent	Treatment	of	Standard-Setting	Issues	Under	the	
Patent,	 Copyright,	 and	 Antitrust	 Laws,	 IDEA:	THE	JOURNAL	OF	LAW	AND	TECHNOLOGY,	Vol.	 43	 (2003):	
333.	
52 	DAVID	 TELYAS,	THE	 INTERFACE	 BETWEEN	 COMPETITION	 LAW,	 PATENTS	 AND	 TECHNICAL	 STANDARDS	
(KLUWER	LAW	INTERNATIONAL,	2014),	p.	18.	
53	SCP/13/2,	p.	8.	
54	ISO/TMB	Policy	and	Statement	(2004).	
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common	to	undertakings	active	in	a	certain	technological	field,	which	remain	free	
to	differentiate	their	products	by	means	of	non-standardized	features.55	
Definitional	uncertainty	and	the	lack	of	a	unique	definition,	while	fostering	a	
number	 of	 legal	 concerns,	 has	 not	 prevented	 standards	 and	 the	 phenomenon	 of	
standardization	to	grow	at	an	exceptionally	 fast	pace.	This	 is	a	direct	outcome	of	
globalization.	As	markets	become	more	global	and	interconnected,	it	is	crucial	that	
technological	devices	are	compatible	with	each	other.56		
2. THE SOURCES OF STANDARDS  
 
The	 ICT	 standardization	 landscape	 is	 a	 complex	 one,	 featuring	 several	
standards	and	standards-setting	entities.	As	a	result,	technical	standards	belong	to	
different	 categories,	 which	 are	 dependent	 on	 (i)	 the	 entities	 in	 charge	 of	 their	
development,	 (ii)	 their	 mandatory	 or	 voluntary	 nature	 (iii)	 and	 the	 degree	 of	
openness	 concerning	 participation	 in	 a	 standards-development	 process	 and	 the	
ability	to	access	and	implement	the	resulting	standards.57	
The	primary	aim	of	standardization	is	–	or	should	be	–	to	select	a	technology	
that	 will	 be	 adopted	 by	 all	 market	 players	 to	 ensure	 interoperability	 between	
products.	In	this	vein,	the	process	by	which	standards	are	set	is	extremely	dynamic	
and	complex.		
The	technology	selection	process	involves	identifying,	testing	and	comparing	
different	technical	solutions	to	detect	the	one	that	would	serve	the	market	better.	
The	selection	is	predominately	carried	out	by	companies	involved	in	different	ways	
in	 the	 standardization	 procedure.	 The	 nature	 of	 these	 companies	 has	 been	
categorized	by	the	European	Commission	in	 its	Guidelines	on	the	applicability	of	
Article	101	TFUE	as	follows:		
                                                
55 DAVID	 TELYAS,	THE	 INTERFACE	 BETWEEN	 COMPETITION	 LAW,	 PATENTS	 AND	 TECHNICAL	 STANDARDS	
(KLUWER	LAW	INTERNATIONAL,	2014),	p.	18.	
56	This	 aspect	 is	 underlined	 in	 the	Regulation(EU)	No	 1025/2012,	which	provide	 that	 “[t]he	 primary	
objective	of	standardisation	is	the	definition	of	voluntary	technical	or	quality	specifications	with	which	
current	 or	 future	 products,	 production	 processes	 or	 services	may	 comply.	 Standardisation	 can	 cover	
various	issues,	such	as	standardisation	of	different	grades	or	sizes	of	a	particular	product	or	technical	
specifications	 in	 product	 or	 services	 markets	 where	 compatibility	 and	 interoperability	 with	 other	
products	or	systems	are	essential”.56	
57 	R.	 N.	 A.	 BEKKERS,	 M.	 DALAIS,	 A.	 DORE,	 N.	 VOLANIS,	 UNDERSTANDING	 PATENTS,	 COMPETITION	 &	
STANDARDIZATION	IN	AN	INTERCONNECTED	WORLD	(ITU,	2014),	p.	12.	
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I. upstream-only	 companies.	 They	 solely	 develop	 and	 market	
technologies	 and	 derive	 their	 income	 exclusively	 from	 licensing	
revenue.	Accordingly,	their	incentive	is	to	maximize	their	royalties;		
II. downstream-only	companies.	They	solely	manufacture	products	or	
offer	 services	 based	 on	 technologies	 developed	 by	 other,	 but	 do	
not	hold	relevant	intellectual	property	rights.	For	these	companies,	
royalties	 represent	 a	 cost	 and	 not	 a	 source	 of	 revenue,	 and	 their	
incentive	is	to	reduce	or	avoid	royalties;	and	
III. vertically-integrated	companies	 that	both	develop	technology	and	
sell	products”.	Companies	 in	 this	category	have	mixed	 incentives.	
Indeed,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 they	 can	 draw	 licensing	 revenue	 from	
their	 intellectual	 property	 rights.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 they	 may	
have	 to	pay	royalties	 to	other	companies	holding	 IPR	essential	 to	
the	 standard”.	 As	 a	 result,	 these	 companies	 might	 cross-license	
their	own	essential	IPR	in	exchange	for	essential	IPR	held	by	other	
companies.58	
As	these	three	main	categories	of	companies	each	have	different	interests	in	
standard-setting,	 the	 interface	 between	 them	 can	 lead	 to	 tensions.	 Accordingly,	
policymakers	 and	 SSOs	 strive	 to	 strike	 a	 balance	 between	 these	 frequently	
conflicting	stakeholder	interests.59		
Standards	can	have	different	sources	and	can	be	developed	mainly	 through	
the	mechanisms	set	out	below.	
2.1. STANDARDS DEVELOPED BY STANDARD-SETTING ORGANIZATIONS: 
FORMAL STANDARD DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS, QUASI-FORMAL 
GROUPS, AND INFORMAL FORA  
 
Standards	may	be	enacted	through	governmental	or	administrative	decision-
making	 (so-called	 “de	 jure	 standardization”).	 This	 pattern	 is	 the	 ordinary	
                                                
58	Communication	from	the	Commission	–	Guidelines	on	the	applicability	of	Article	101	of	the	Treaty	
on	 the	 Functioning	 of	 the	 European	Union	 to	 horizontal	 co-operation	 agreements	 [2011]	OJ	 C	 11/1	
(2011	Guidelines),	para	267.	
59	M.	Gerst,		IPR	in	Standardization,	Feb.	2016,	IP	KEY,	p.		1.	
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mechanism	 in	 China,	 where	 general	 standards	 are	 set	 by	 national	 law,60	and	
administrated	and	enforced	by	the	Standardization	Administration	of	the	PRC	(the	
“SAC”).	 Standards	 are	 further	 governed]	 by	 the	 regulation	 for	 implementation.61	
From	a	regulatory	perspective,	de	jure	standards	empower	government	authorities	
to	oversee	the	assertion	of	IPRs	by	direct	regulation.		
Standards	can	be	cooperatively	created	in	the	framework	of	an	SSO.	For	the	
purposes	of	the	present	research,	an	SSO	indicates	any	cooperative	effort	between	
two	or	more	stakeholders	aimed	at	defining	common	technical	standards	that	the	
SSO’s	members	are	thus	strongly	incentivized	to	comply	with	in	order	to	develop	
new	products	and	new	markets.62	SSO	standards	are	usually	referred	to	as	“formal”	
standards,63	to	 indicate	 that	 the	process	 leading	 to	 their	adoption	 is	 in	 some	way	
formalized	and	represents	the	outcome	of	an	agreement	between	the	participating	
stakeholders.	 Examples	 of	 formal	 standards	 are	 the	 ones	 developed	 by	 	 the	
European	 Telecommunications	 Standards	 Institute	 (“ETSI”)	 in	 the	
telecommunications	sector,	such	as	GSM,	3G	and	4G.	
The	European	Commission	recognizes	three	broad	types	of		SSOs:64		
I. SSOs	 that	 are	 officially	 accredited	 standard	 development	 bodies	
(Standard	 Development	 Organizations,	 or	 “SDOs”),	 whose	
members	represent	a	large	portion	of	companies	operating	on	the	
relevant	 market. 65 	SDOs	 are	 responsible	 for	 handling	 and	
supervising	 the	 standardization	 process	 in	 a	 specific	 field	 of	
technology.		
                                                
60
中华人民共和国标准化法	(1988).	(Standardization	Law	of	the	People's	Republic	of	China,	1988).		
61 	7	 中华人民共和国标准化法实施条例 ,	 (1990)	 Regulations	 For	 The	 Implementation	 Of	 The	
Standardization	Law	Of	The	People’s	Republic	Of	China,	Promulgated	by	Decree	No.	53	of	the	State	
Council	 of	 the	 People’s	 Republic	 of	 China	 on	 April	 6,	 1990	 and	 effective	 as	 of	 the	 date	 of	
promulgation).	
62	Guillaume	Dufey,	Patents	and	Standardization:	Competition	Concerns	in	New	Technology	Markets,	
GLOBAL	ANTITRUST	REVIEW	2013,	p.	17.		
63	Pappalardo,	Kylie,	and	Nicolas	Suzor.	Standardization	and	patent	ambush:	Potential	 liability	under	
Australian	competition	law,	COMPETITION	AND	CONSUMER	LAW	JOURNAL	18	(2011)	p.	269.	
64	European	Commission,	Directorate-General	for	Enterprise	and	Industry,	Patents	and	Standards:	a	
Modern	Framework	for	IPR-based	standardization,	2014.	
65 	R.	 N.	 A.	 BEKKERS,	 M.	 DALAIS,	 A.	 DORE,	 N.	 VOLANIS,	 UNDERSTANDING	 PATENTS,	 COMPETITION	 &	
STANDARDIZATION	IN	AN	INTERCONNECTED	WORLD	(ITU,	2014),	p.	19.	
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Some	are	 formally	 recognized	by	 regional66	or	national	bodies,67	as	
most	 countries	 have	 government-recognized	 SDOs.	 They	 are	
generally	member-driven	bodies	that	gather	standardization	experts	
belonging	 to	 competing	 companies,	 public	 institutions	 and	
academia,	 to	define	 standards	 in	 response	 to	priorities	determined	
by	 public	 or	 private	 sector	members.	 They	 are	 also	 referred	 to	 as	
“voluntary	consensus	standards”.	
Some	standards	are	elaborated	by	 international	groups	such	as	the	
International	 Telecommunications	 Union	 (“ITU”)	 and	 the	
International	 Organization	 for	 Standardization	 (“ISO”).	 At	 the	
international	 level,	 international	 standards	 organizations	 foster	
cohesion	 and	 harmonize	 global	 practices	 on	 standards	 thereby	
facilitating	 international	cooperation	 in	standardization.	They	thus	
play	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 countering	 the	 potential	 risk	 of	 market	
protection	 and	 obstruction	 of	 market	 access	 that	 comes	 with	
unilaterally-developed	 standards,	 which	 can	 be	 used	 as	 a	 form	 of	
protectionism,	as	will	be	 further	 analyzed.	As	a	matter	of	 fact,	 the	
TBT	 Agreement	 prohibits	 governments	 from	 arbitrarily	 adopting	
standards,	 as	 the	 adoption	 of	 standards	 must	 be	 supported	 by	
“sound	 science”.	 As	 the	 adoption	 of	 international	 standards	 rather	
than	 national	 ones	 reduces	 the	 risk	 of	 trade	 barriers,	 the	 TBT	
agreement	 strongly	 encourages	 countries	 to	 develop	 and	 adopt	
international	standards.			
II. 	SSOs	that	are	“quasi-formal”	large	international	organizations	that	
share	many	 features	 of	 the	 characteristics	 of	 formally	 recognized	
groups.	 This	 category	 comprises,	 for	 instance,	 the	 International	
Internet	 Engineering	 Task	 Force	 (IETF)	 and	 the	 Institute	 of	
Electrical	and	Electronics	Engineers	(IEEE).	
                                                
66	For	instance,	at	the	EU	level,	in	the	sector	of	new	technologies,	the	European	Telecommunications	
Standards	Institute	(ETSI)	is	one	of	the	most	important	regional	standard-setting	organizations.		
67	For	instance,	China’s	National	Institute	for	Standardization	(CNIS).	
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III. finally,	besides	 traditional	SSOs,	 smaller,	 special	 interest	 informal	
industry-organized	 consortia	 or	 fora	 have	 flourished	 as	 a	 way	 to	
develop	 ICT	 standards.68	It	 is	 believed	 that	 informal	 cooperation	
among	 a	 reduced	 number	 of	 stakeholders	 that	 have	 a	 common	
interest	allows	standards	between	sector	specific	associations	to	be	
developed	 more	 quickly.	 Some	 consortia	 may	 be	 established	 to	
develop	 a	 specific	 standard,	 for	 a	 time-limited	 lifespan.	 For	
example	the	World	Wide	Web	Consortium	(W3C).69	Others	might	
instead	be	permanently	established	to	serve	a	wider	technological	
area.	 For	 example,	 the	 Full	 HD	 3D	 Glass	 Initiative	 of	 Panasonic,	
Samsung	 and	 Sony.70	Examples	 of	 standards	 created	 by	 consortia	
include	the	Universal	Serial	Bus	(“USB”)71	and	the	Digital	Versatile	
Disc	“DVD”	standard.72		
In	practice,	it	is	frequent	for	consortia,	informal	forums	and	SDOs	to	interact.	
Indeed,	 it	 is	common	for	consortia	 to	have	 their	 standards	subsequently	adopted	
by	 formal	 SDOs,73	suffice	 it	 to	mention,	 the	Compact	Disc	 (“CD”)	 standard74	and	
the	Common	Alerting	Protocol		(“CAP	1.1”)	standard.75		
This	 interaction	 should	 not	 come	 as	 a	 surprise	 as	 consortia	 are	 often	
composed	 of	 leading	 firms	 in	 specific	 technology	 markets.	 These	 firms	 leverage	
their	head	start	 in	the	standardization	phase	and	their	market	power	to	steer	the	
                                                
68 	Updegrove	 catalogs	 1025	 such	 organizations.	 See	 Andrew	 Updegrove,	 Standard	 setting	
organizations	and	Standards	List	(2015).	
69	See	www.w3c.org	
70	See	www.fullhd3dglasses.com	
71	The	USB	is	a	standard	hardware	interface	for	attaching	peripheral	devices	to	a	computer,	which	was	
developed	by	a	consortium	of	businesses	to	improve	physical	hardware	compatibility	by	launching	a	
specific	 connector	 and	 pin	 definition.	 ITU,	 UNDERSTANDING	 PATENTS,	 COMPETITION	 AND	
STANDARDIZATION	IN	AN	INTERCONNECTED	WORLD	(2014),	p.	21	
72	The	DVD	standard	for	the	digital	optical	storage	of	movies,	multimedia	content	or	other	data	on	a	
12cm	disc	 is	 standardized	by	a	membership-driven	 industry	association	known	as	 the	DVD	Forum.	
Ibid.	
73	Knut	 Blind	 and	 Stephan	 Gauch,	 Trends	 in	 ICT	 standards:	 The	 Relationship	 between	 European	
Standardisation	Bodies	and	Standard	Consortia,	32	TELECOMMUNICATIONS	POLICY	(2008),	p.	511.	
74	The	CD	standard	was	originally	developed	by	a	Philips-Sony	consortium	and	first	published	in	1980,	
was	formalized	as	an	IEC	International	Standard	in	1987	with	various	amendments	made	in	1996.	ITU,	
UNDERSTANDING	PATENTS,	COMPETITION	AND	STANDARDIZATION	IN	AN	INTERCONNECTED	WORLD	(2014),	p.	21	
75	The	CAP	 1.1	 standard	 is	 	 format	 for	exchanging	all-hazard	emergency	alerts	and	public	warnings,	
disseminated	 simultaneously	 over	 all	 kinds	 of	 networks.	 It	 was	 originally	 developed	 by	 the	
Organization	 for	 the	 Advancement	 of	 Structured	 Information	 Standards	 (“OASIS”),	 and	 later	
standardized	by	ITU	as	Recommendation	ITU-T	X.1303.Ibid.	
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relevant	 SDOs	 to	 adopt	 their	 technology	 standards.	 They	 often	 have	 the	 vast	
majority	of	voting	rights	in	the	relevant	technical	committees	of	the	SDOs.76		
Scholar	Knut	Blind	and	other	 scholars	have	argued	 that	 technology	 leaders	
are	likely	to	develop	standards	through	formal	SDOs	or	through	consortia,	as	the	
choice	reflects	different	 interests.77	In	particular,	a	 formal	procedure	within	SDOs	
is	more	appropriate	where	the	technology	decided	upon	needs	to	be	implemented	
with	 downstream	 customers	 or	 upstream	 suppliers,	 and	 the	 suppliers	 need	 to	
adapt	their	content,	product	and	services.	In	this	context,	the	formal	procedure	of	
SDOs	enables	 cooperation	between	all	 stakeholders.78	In	 contrast,	 it	 is	preferable	
to	 develop	 standards	 through	 a	 consortium	 when	 the	 focus	 is	 on	 a	 specific	
technology	that	 is	close	to	a	company’s	own	R&D	core	activity.	 Indeed,	consortia	
often	 operate	 at	 an	 early	 stage	 of	 the	 standardization	 phase,	when	 collaborating	
competitors	enter	into	small	consortia	joint	ventures	or	R&D	agreements		in	order	
to	develop	joint	solutions	to	be	adopted	as	standards.79		
Competition	 authorities	 are	 fully	 conscious	 that	 these	 collaborations	
constantly	 occur,	 especially	 in	network-driven	 innovation	markets,80	engendering	
what	is	usually	referred	to	as	“coopetition”.	This	phenomenon,	which	stems	from	a	
unitary	vision	of	competition	and	collaboration,	refers	to	the	fact	that	 firms	need	
to	compete	sternly	and	collaborate	deeply	at	the	same	time.81	It	thus	represents	a	
sort	 of	 cooperation	 between	 competitors,	 “collaborating	 in	 defining	 and,	 in	 some	
sense,	 pricing	 the	 technology,	while	 opening	up	 the	 opportunity	 for	 single	 firms	 to	
add	essential	patents	under	the	standard”.82	
                                                
76	Id.	
77	Id.	
78	Id.	
79	Maurits	Dolmans,	Standards	for	standards,	FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	26	(2002),	p.	171.	
80 	For	 instance,	 research	 and	 development	 joint	 ventures	 have	 been	 a	 widely-spread	 way	 of	
collaborating	under	competition	law.	According	to	US	antitrust	rules,	research	and	development	joint	
ventures	should	be	scrutinized	in	light	of	the	Rule	of	Reason,	see	US	Department	of	Justice,	Antitrust	
Guide	 Concerning	 Research	 Joint	 Ventures	 (1980),	 3	 et	 seq.	 In	 the	 EU,	 the	 Commission	 in	 its	 1968	
Notice	concerning	agreements,	decisions	and	concerted	practices	in	the	field	of	cooperation	between	
enterprises	 (O.J.	 C	 75/3,	 27.07.1968,	 3)	 remarked	 that	 research	 and	 development	 joint	 ventures	
generally	do	not	restrict	competition.	
81	Hanns	Ullrich,	Expansionist	Intellectual	Property	Protection	and	Reductionist	Competition	Rules:	A	
TRlPS	Perspective,	7	JOURNAL	OF	INTERNATIONAL	ECONOMIC	LAW	401(2004),	p.	420.	
82	BJÖRN	LUNDQVIST,	STANDARDIZATION	UNDER	EU	COMPETITION	RULES	AND	US	ANTITRUST	LAWS:	THE	RISE	
AND	LIMITS	OF	SELF-REGULATION	(EDWARD	ELGAR	PUBLISHING	2014)	p.		5.	
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2.2. DE FACTO STANDARDS DEVELOPED BY SINGLE COMPANIES  
 
Standards	can	also	be	developed	by	a	single,	dominant	firm,	which	manages	
to	 promote	 its	 “proprietary	 specifications”	 so	 that	 they	 become	 the	 general	
accepted	standard	for	that	technological	field,	given	that	they	are	widely	accepted	
by	 purchasers	 of	 goods	 or	 receivers	 of	 services.	 These	 standards,	 unlike	 formal	
standards,	stem	spontaneously	from	market	forces,	through	the	agreement	of	users	
and	 voluntary	 implementation.83	Specifically,	 in	 market	 sectors	 featuring	 strong	
network	effects,	where	the	value	of	a	good	hinges	on	the	quantity	of	users	of	 the	
same	good,	standardization	might	take	place	“as	the	market	tips	toward	a	standard,	
due	to	the	positive	reinforcement	of	the	consumer	desires	and	expectation”.84	Against	
this	 background,	 companies	 often	 engage	 in	 SSO	 standardization	 to	 prevent	 the	
risk	of	de	 facto	 standards,	which	can	slow	down	R&D	innovation	 founded	on	the	
standard	until	it	obtains	substantial	market	dominance.	Consumers	may	postpone	
their	purchases	until	a	de	facto	standard	arises	as	the	champion.	
De	 facto	 standards	are	often	vested	with	proprietary	 interests,	 so	 that	 their	
adoption	 is	 subject	 to	 the	 willingness	 of	 the	 rights	 holder,	 often	 including	 the	
company	 setting	 the	 standard,	 to	 promote	 and	 facilitate	 access.	 They	 are	 thus	
likely	 to	 create	 competition	 problems	 as	 many	 of	 them	 embody	 proprietary	
interests	in	the	form	of	patents.	On	the	other	side,	provided	that	the	patent	holder	
has	 granted	 licenses	 to	 its	 intellectual	 property	 rights,85	they	 can	 represent	 as	 a	
relevant	 source	of	 revenues.	Consequently,	 companies	developing	such	standards	
can	 optimize	 their	 benefits	 by	 creating	 a	 wider	 and	 more	 attractive	 market.	
Moreover,	companies	do	not	have	to	take	into	account	competing	interests,	unlike	
with	 collaboratively-developed	 standards.	 Nor	 is	 it	 subject	 to	 specific	 licensing	
constraints	 of	 its	 cooperative-based	 counterparts,	 such	 as	 FRAND	 obligations.	
                                                
83	An	 example	 of	 a	de	 facto	 standard	 is	 the	Orange	 Book	 of	 Philips.	 See	German	 Federal	 Supreme	
Court,	6	May	2009,	KZR	39/06	(Orange-Book-Standard).	
84	Nari	 Lee,	Yang	Li,	European	 Standards	 in	 Chinese	 Courts	 –	 A	 Case	 of	 Sep	 and	 Frand	Disputes	 in	
China,	 in	N.	LEE,	N.	BRUUN	&	M.	LI	(EDS.),	GOVERNANCE	OF	INTELLECTUAL	PROPERTY	RIGHTS	IN	CHINA	AND	
EUROPE	(EDWARD	ELGAR	PUBLISHING,		2016).	
85	Nonetheless,	 it	 should	be	noted	 that	 an	undertaking	 that	 has	 developed	 a	 specification	may	not	
always	 want	 to	 promote	 the	 standard,	 as	 it	 might	 make	 more	 economic	 sense	 for	 it	 to	 keep	 the	
specification	to	itself.	For	example	if	the	company	believes	that	it	can	serve	the	full	market	on	its	own.	
De	facto	standards	originate	from	a	purely	market-driven	process	and	their	popularity	represents	the	
parameter	of	their	importance,	as	opposed	to	formal	standards	that	need	to	be	approved	or	declared	
by	specific	authorities.		
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However,	 the	 value	 and	 efficacy	of	 a	de	 facto	 standard	depends	on	 the	 extent	 of	
market	 power	 exerted	 by	 the	 company	 and/or	 its	 technical	 superiority	 over	 its	
competitors.	
De	 facto	 standards	 are	 playing	 an	 increasingly	 important	 role.	 Most	
interoperability	standards	are	developed	within	the	private	sector.	In	the	US	there	
is	a	governmental	preference	for	privately-developed	standards	over	governmental	
ones.86	Some	widely	adopted	 interoperability	 standards,	 such	as	PDF87	and	VHS88	
are	 de	 facto	 standards.	 In	 the	 literature,	 however,	 it	 has	 been	 remarked	 that,	 as	
standardization	 frequently	 increases	 the	value	of	a	product,	private	actors	have	a	
hard	 time	 influencing	 the	 standardization	process.89	They	 therefore	 tend	 to	 seize	
the	value	of	a	standard	by	various	means,	including	by	IPR	assertion.	A	joint	effort	
is	 therefore	 needed	 to	 make	 the	 most	 of	 the	 potential	 of	 a	 market	 while	 also	
preventing	 it	 from	 being	 captured	 by	 a	 few	 pools	 of	 dominant	 actors	 forming	
SSOs.90	It	 is	 common	 that	 SSOs	–	 such	as	 the	 IEEE	and	ETSI	–	 although	derived	
completely	from	private	players,	“become	quasi-public	with	the	support	or	approval	
of	 governments”,	 thus	 “chang[ing]	 a	 de	 facto	 standardization	 to	 a	 semi	 de	 jure	
standardization	 as	 they	 set	 the	 standard	 through	 agreement	 and	 provide	 a	
structured	self-governance	through	the	membership	rules”.91		
	
                                                
86	Office	of	Management	and	Budget	(OMB)	Circular	A-119	(1998).	
87	Portable	Document	Format	(PDF),	developed	by	Adobe	Systems,	is	a	file	format	used	to	represent	
documents	in	a	manner	independent	of	application	software,	hardware	and	operating	systems.	Adobe	
made	the	PDF	specification	available	free	of	charge	in	1993	but	it	remained	a	proprietary	format	until	
2008	 when	 it	 was	 formalized	 as	 an	 international	 standard	 by	 the	 International	 Organization	 for	
Standardization	 (ISO)	 as	 ISO	 32000-1.	 By	 submitting	 PDF	 to	 ISO,	Adobe	made	 the	 standard	more	
attractive	to	governments,	among	others,	which	were	seeking	a	universal	open	document	format	for	
communications	and	archival	purposes.	 In	parallel,	Adobe	published	a	public	patent	 licence	to	ISO	
32000-1,	thereby	granting	royalty-free	rights	to	all	Adobe-owned	patents	necessary	to	make,	use,	sell	
and	distribute	PDF-compliant	implementations.	
88	A	well-known	example	 is	 the	Video	Home	Standard	 (VHS)	developed	by	 the	 Japanese	 company,	
JVC.	JVC	was	convinced	that	it	would	benefit	from	actively	promoting	its	standard,	not	only	among	
competing	 manufacturers	 of	 video	 deck	 players,	 but	 also	 among	 tape	 manufacturers	 and	 movie	
makers	able	to	provide	the	VHS	platform	with	valuable	content.	
89	Nari	 Lee,	Yang	Li,	European	 Standards	 in	 Chinese	 Courts	 –	 A	 Case	 of	 Sep	 and	 Frand	Disputes	 in	
China,	 in	N.	LEE,	N.	BRUUN	&	M.	LI	(EDS.),	GOVERNANCE	OF	INTELLECTUAL	PROPERTY	RIGHTS	IN	CHINA	AND	
EUROPE	(EDWARD	ELGAR	PUBLISHING,	2016).	
90	See	 also	 Nari	 Lee,	 Patented	 Standards	 and	 the	 Tragedy	 of	 Anti-Commons,	 TEOLLISOIKEUDELLISIA	
KIRJOITUKSIA,	2006.	
91	Nari	 Lee,	 Yang	Li,	European	 Standards	 in	 Chinese	 Courts	 –	 A	 Case	 of	 Sep	 and	 Frand	 Disputes	 in	
China,	 in	N.	LEE,	N.	BRUUN	&	M.	LI	(EDS.),	GOVERNANCE	OF	INTELLECTUAL	PROPERTY	RIGHTS	IN	CHINA	AND	
EUROPE	(EDWARD	ELGAR	PUBLISHING,	2016).	
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2.3. STANDARDS DEVELOPED BY OPEN SOURCES  
 
Finally,	standards	can	be	developed	form	open	source.92		The	notion	of	“open	
standard”	is	the	subject	of	extensive	debate,93	“with	definitions	revolving	around	the	
relative	 ‘openness’	 of	 the	 standards-development	 process,	 the	 resulting	 standards	
and	the	ownership	of	the	rights	attached	to	the	technologies	or	techniques	contained	
within	 a	 standard”. 94 	For	 instance,	 according	 to	 ITU,	 “open	 standards”	 are	
standards	made	 available	 to	 the	 general	 public	 and	 are	 developed	 (or	 approved)	
and	 maintained	 via	 a	 collaborative,	 consensus-driven	 and	 transparent	 process,	
from	which	materially	affected	and	interested	parties	are	not	excluded.		
It	has	been	remarked	that	“Open	standards”	foster	interoperability	and	data	
exchange	 among	 different	 products	 or	 services	 and	 are	 intended	 for	 widespread	
adoption.95	The	 notion	 of	 “openness”	 refers	 to	 a	 standards-development	 process	
open	 to	 participation	 by	 all	 materially	 affected	 interests.	 Conversely,	 “closed	
standards”	do	not	satisfy	this	criterion,	for	instance,		proprietary	specifications	for	
which	 the	 owner	 does	 not	 grant	 licenses,	 or	 standards	 which	 are	 created	 in	 a	
setting	accessible	by	invitation	only.96		
Table:	examples	of	international	SDOs	and	consortia	and	their	standards	of	relevance	to	ICTs97		
Standards	body	 Type	 Technology	focus	 Notable	standards	
International	
Organization	for	
Standardization	
(ISO)	
Formal	
SDO	
All	technological	
areas,	including	but	
not	limited	to	ICT	
ISO	 9660	 (CD	 File	 System);	
ISO	5800	(photographic	film	
speed);	 ISO/IEC	 11172,	 13818	
and	 14496	MPEG	 suite;	 ISO	
3166	 Country	 codes;	 ISO	
9000	 Quality	 management;	
ISO	 14000	 Environmental	
management	
International	
Electrotechnical	
Formal	
SDO	
Electrical,	electronic	
and	related	
ISO/IEC	 11172,	 13818	 and	
14496	MPEG	suite	
                                                
92	Marcus	 Glader,	 Open	 Standards:	 Public	 Policy	 Aspects	 and	 Competition	 Law	 Requirements,	 6	
EUROPEAN	COMPETITION	JOURNAL	(2010),	p.		611.	
93	K.	Krechmer,	The	Principles	of	Open	Standards,	50		Standards	Engineering	6	(1998),	pp.	1-6.	
94 	R.	 N.	 A.	 BEKKERS,	 M.	 DALAIS,	 A.	 DORE,	 N.	 VOLANIS,	 UNDERSTANDING	 PATENTS,	 COMPETITION	 &	
STANDARDIZATION	IN	AN	INTERCONNECTED	WORLD	(ITU,	2014).	
95	See	also	Resolution	GSC-12/05	of	the	12th	Global	Standards	Collaboration	meeting	(Kobe,	2007).		
96 	R.	 N.	 A.	 BEKKERS,	 M.	 DALAIS,	 A.	 DORE,	 N.	 VOLANIS,	 UNDERSTANDING	 PATENTS,	 COMPETITION	 &	
STANDARDIZATION	IN	AN	INTERCONNECTED	WORLD	(ITU,	2014).	
97 	ITU,	 UNDERSTANDING	 PATENTS,	 COMPETITION	 AND	 STANDARDIZATION	 IN	 AN	 INTERCONNECTED	 WORLD	
(2014).	
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Standards	body	 Type	 Technology	focus	 Notable	standards	
Commission	(IEC)	 technologies	 IEC	 62196	 for	 plugs	 and	
charging	 modes	 for	 electric	
vehicles	
International	
Telecommunicatio
n	Union	(ITU)	
Formal	
SDO	
Telecommunications	 ITU-T	E.164	Numbering	Plan;	
xDSL	 standards	 for	 Internet	
access	 over	 copper;	 Passive	
optical	networks	(PONs)	for	
fibre-to-the-home	 (FTTH)	
Internet;	 Synchronous	
Digital	 Hierarchy	 (SDH);	
Optical	 Transport	 Network	
(OTN);	 Fax	machines	 (ITU-
T	 T.30	 and	 ITU-T	 T.4);	
Video	 codecs	 (ITU-T	 H.264	
AVC	 and	 ITU-T	 H.265	
HEVC,	 developed	 with	
ISO/IEC	MPEG)	
European	
Telecommunicatio
ns	Standards	
Institute	(ETSI)	
Formal	
SDO	
Telecommunications	 Various	 mobile	 standards	
including	 2G	 GSM,	 3G	
UMTS/W-CDMA,	 4G	 LTE;	
Cordless	 telephony:	 DECT;	
Safety	 communications:	
TETRA;	Car	safety:	eCal	
Institute	of	
Electrical	and	
Electronics	
Engineers	(IEEE)	
Formal	
SDO	
Wide	range	of	
electro-technical	
areas	
IEEE	 802.3	 Ethernet;	 IEEE	
802.11	 Wireless	 Networking	
(‘Wi-Fi’);	 IEEE	 1394	
‘Firewire’;	 IEEE	 802.15.1	
‘Bluetooth’;	 IEEE	 802.16	
‘WiMax’	 wireless	
networking;	 IEEE	 802.15.4	
‘ZigBee’	 standard	 for	 low-
distance,	 low-power	
communications	
Internet	
Engineering	Task	
Force	(IETF)	
Consortium		 Internet	protocols	 Internet	Protocol	suite	
(TCP/IP);	Hypertext	transfer	
protocol	(HTTP)	
World	Wide	Web	
Consortium	(W3C)	
Consortium		 Web-related	
standards	
Hypertext	 Markup	 Language	
(HTML);	Extensible	Markup	
Language	(XML)	
Organization	for	
the	Advancement	
of	Structured	
Information	
Standards	(OASIS)	
Consortium		 Standards	for		
e-business	and	Web	
services	
Common	Alerting	Protocol	
(CAP);	Content	
Management	
Interoperability	Services	
(CMIS);	Electronic	Business	
using	XML	(ebXML);	Key	
Management	
Interoperability	Protocol	
(KMIP);	OpenDocument	
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3. THE STANDARD-SETTING PROCESS   
The	 focus	of	 these	 studies	will	be	on	 the	most	 common	 formal	 standards,	
those	that	are	negotiated	through	voluntary	consensus	process	in	SDOs.	It	should	
be	underlined	that,	as	for	the	implementation	phase	of	standards,	it	is,	generally,		
voluntary.	 This	 is	 the	 case	 also	 for	 standards	 developed	 by	 formal	 SDOs:	 even	
though	 they	 are	 formally	 acknowledged	 by	 national	 or	 regional	 authorities,	 the	
implementation	of	their	standards	is	left	to	a	voluntary	basis,	98	except	for	de	jure	
standards,	 whose	 implementation	 is	 commanded	 by	 law.	 As	 it	 has	 been	 noted,	
although	“[d]e	jure	standards	can	aim	to	limit	standards	battles	or	‘platform	wars’,	
attempting	to	impose	certainty	by	fiat”,	they	carry	the	risk,	in	case	implementation	
is	 imposed	 “too	 early,	 based	 on	 incomplete	 information,	 crowding	 out	 the	
opportunity	 for	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 superior	 standard”,	 to	 “hamper	 innovation,	
potentially	 also	 raising	 barriers	 to	 competition	 and	 trade	 in	 cases	 where	 the	
adoption	 of	 a	 standard	 works	 to	 grant	 market	 dominance	 to	 a	 small	 group	 of	
companies”.99		
Each	standardization	body	sets	its	own	rules,	adopt	its	own	procedures	and	
follow	its	own	practices	for	the	formalization	of	a	standard.	However,	in	almost	all	
of	the	processes	it	is	possible	to	find	a	common	paradigm.	According	to	the	model	
proposed	by	the	ISO,	100	each	process	follows	three	major	phases:	
I. reporting	and	evaluating	 the	need	 for	a	standard:	 “The	need	 for	 a	
standard	 is	 usually	 expressed	 by	 an	 industry	 sector,	 which	
communicates	 this	 need	 to	 a	 national	 member	 body.	 The	 latter	
proposes	the	new	work	item	to	ISO	as	a	whole.	Once	the	need	for	an	
International	Standard	has	been	recognized	and	formally	agreed,	the	
first	 phase	 involves	 definition	 of	 the	 technical	 scope	 of	 the	 future	
standard.	This	phase	is	usually	carried	out	in	working	groups	which	
                                                
98	Public	 authorities	may	 commission	 an	 SDO	 to	 develop	 a	 specific	 standard	 (so-called	 “mandated	
standard”.	For	example,	the	European	Commission	frequently	mandates	ETSI	or	another	recognized	
body	 to	 develop	 a	 specific	 standard,	 which	 is	 then	 approved	 as	 a	 European	 Standard	 (EN).	 A	
mandated	standards,	nonetheless,	is	not	mandatory	in	terms	of	implementation.	The	implementation	
can,	 however,	 have	 some	 advantages	 within	 the	 so-called	 European	 New	 Approach.	 See,	 S.	 FARR,	
HARMONISATION	OF	TECHNICAL	STANDARDS	IN	THE	EC	(JOHN	WILEY	&	SONS,	1996).	
99 	R.	 N.	 A.	 BEKKERS,	 M.	 DALAIS,	 A.	 DORE,	 N.	 VOLANIS,	 UNDERSTANDING	 PATENTS,	 COMPETITION	 &	
STANDARDIZATION	IN	AN	INTERCONNECTED	WORLD	(ITU,	2014),	p.	25.	
100	See	the	International	Organization	for	Standardization	(“ISO”)’s	website.	
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comprise	 technical	 experts	 from	countries	 interested	 in	 the	 subject	
matter;”101	
II. researching	 and	 consolidating	 the	 consensus	 on	 the	 standard	
features:	 “Once	 agreement	 has	 been	 reached	 on	 which	 technical	
aspects	are	to	be	covered	in	the	standard,	a	second	phase	is	entered	
during	which	 countries	 negotiate	 the	 detailed	 specifications	within	
the	standard.	This	is	the	consensus-building	phase;”102	and		
III. formal	 approval	 and	 publication	 of	 the	 document:	 “[t]he	 final	
phase	 comprises	 the	 formal	 approval	 of	 the	 resulting	 draft	
International	 Standard	 […],	 following	 which	 the	 agreed	 text	 is	
published	as	an	ISO	International	Standard.”103	
In	most	cases,	drafting	the	technical	standard	is	carried	out	within	technical	
committees	and	working	groups	made	up	of	“experts	representing	the	economic	
and	social	stakeholders	(e.g.,	producers,	suppliers,	customers,	users,	distributors,	
research	 centers,	 consumers,	public	 administration).”104	Therefore,	 the	 standards	
body	 plays	 more	 of	 a	 function	 for	 coordinating	 work	 and	 providing	 an	
organizational	 structure.	 Finally,	 there	 are	 increasingly	 frequent	 cases	 in	 which	
the	 international	 standardization	 bodies	 endorse	 technical	 standards	 that	 have	
been	previously	 formalized	by	other	standardization	bodies,	putting	into	place	a	
sort	 of	 second-degree	 standardization.	 This	 occurs	 particularly	 in	 very	 complex	
application,	 such	 as	 those	 that	 features	 the	 ICT	 market.	 In	 this	 sector,	
standardization	involves	lengthy	and	complex	technical	evaluations	that	are	best	
handled	by	specialized	standardization	bodies.		
Once	formalized,	the	standards	come	in	the	form	of	documents	containing	
all	 information	 necessary	 to	 reproduce	 the	 model:	 that	 is	 to	 say,	 the	 so-called	
standard	 specifications.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 companies	 interested	 in	 developing	 a	
product	 that	 complies	with	 the	 standard	must	 be	 able	 to	 access	 them	 in	detail.	
                                                
101	Id.	
102	Id.	
103	Id.	
104	UNI	(EDS.),	LE	REGOLE	DEL	GIOCO,	UNI,	2006.	
	
 29 
The	standards	bodies	usually	consider	the	documentation	they	have	actualized	as	
material	 that	 is,	 for	 all	 purposes,	 covered	by	 the	 IP	protection.	This	means	 that	
normally	 the	 standardization	 bodies	 do	 not	 spread	 their	 documentation	 freely,	
and	 to	 access	 it,	 the	 operators	 concerned	 must	 pay	 a	 royalty	 and	 acquire	 the	
necessary	permits.	
It	necessarily	 follows	that	the	standardization	body,	holding	such	property	
rights,	may	regulate	access	and	use	(as	well	as,	indirectly,	the	implementation)	of	
the	 final	 products.	However,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 clarify	 that	 these	 considerations	
relate	mostly	 to	 the	 stage	 of	 access	 to	 relevant	 documentation	 for	 the	 standard	
and	not	to	the	stage	of	implementation	for	the	same	standard.	In	fact,	in	addition	
to	 legal	protections	 for	access	 to	 the	documentation,	which	has	been	previously	
mentioned,	usually	the	technologies	that	are	selected	during	the	standards	setting	
process	 are	 covered	 by	 patents.	 Consequently,	 when	 a	 patented	 technology	 is	
used	 as	 part	 of	 a	 standard,	 those	 who	 have	 legitimately	 acquired	 such	
documentation	may	still	be	unable	to	adopt	and	implement	the	standard,	unless	
upon	 payment	 of	 an	 additional	 royalty	 to	 the	 patent	 holders,	 and	 the	 patent	
owner	 must	 agree	 to	 license	 its	 patent	 to	 other	 members	 of	 the	 organization.	
Much	of	 the	 revenue	 of	 standardization	 organizations	 is	 derived	 from	access	 to	
standardization	 documentation	 and	 standards	 licensing	 activities	 –	 as	 well	 as	
from	membership	fees.	As	we	shall	see,	 in	order	to	avoid	excessive	royalties,	 the	
patent	owner	must	ask	 for	reasonable	 fees	when	 licensing	 its	patent,	 i.e.	 it	must	
give	access	to	its	technology	on	FRAND	terms	and	conditions.	
3.1 CORE PRINCIPLES GOVERNING FORMAL STANDARDIZATION 
PROCESSES  
Although	various	SDOs	apply	their	own	standards-development	principles,	
a	number	of	entrenched	best	practices	in	standards	development	can	be	identified.	
These	core	principles	are	particularly	described	by	ITU:105		
                                                
105 	R.	 N.	 A.	 BEKKERS,	 M.	 DALAIS,	 A.	 DORE,	 N.	 VOLANIS,	 UNDERSTANDING	 PATENTS,	 COMPETITION	 &	
STANDARDIZATION	IN	AN	INTERCONNECTED	WORLD	(ITU,	2014),	p.	23-25.	
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  Consensus:	 agreement	 (i.e.	 an	 absence	 of	 sustained	 opposition	 to	
substantive	issues,	but	not	forced	unanimity)	by	all	relevant	stakeholders	
on	the	final	composition	of	standards.106		
  Transparency,	which	concerns	 the	availability	 in	regards	 to	 the	proposal,	
development	 and	 approval	 of	 a	 technical	 standard	 in	 order	 to	 enable	
informed,	equal	participation	by	all	stakeholders.		
  Balance	 and	 openness:	 all	 stakeholders’	 interests	 should	 be	 equally	
pondered,	 ensuring	 that	 no	 specific	 interest	 dominates	 the	 standards-
development	 process.	 Moreover,	 the	 standards-development	 process	
should	be	open	to	participation	by	all	affected	interests,	on	equal	footing.	
  Due	 process,	 which	 requires	 that	 the	 standards-development	 process	
allow	 all	 stakeholders	 to	 equally	 express	 their	 interests,	 have	 them	
weighted	 and,	 eventually,	 appeal	 an	 outcome	 adversely	 affecting	 their	
position.		
The	WTO’s	 Committee	 on	 TBT,	 besides	 supporting	 these	 core	 principles,	
also	 recommends	 further	 principles	 in	 order	 to	 reinforce	 the	 notion	 of	
international	standards	development:107		
  Impartiality:	 the	 standards-development	 process	 should	 guarantee	 equal	
participation	 to	 all	 entities,	 warranting	 that	 standards	 do	 not	 favor	 or	
protect	any	particular	industries,	markets	or	countries.108		
  Effectiveness	 and	 relevance:	 standards	 should	 be	 adopted	 exclusively	
when	 they	 respond	 to	 a	 need	 stemming	 from	 some	 technological	
advancement		or	regulatory	or	market	need.109	
                                                
106	For	 instance,	 the	 ISO/IEC	 describe	 the	 concept	 of	 consensus	 as	 that	 of	 a	 “General	 Agreement,	
characterized	by	the	absence	of	sustained	opposition	to	substantial	 issues	by	any	 important	part	of	
the	concerned	interests	and	by	a	process	that	 involves	seeking	to	take	into	account	the	views	of	all	
parties	concerned	and	to	reconcile	any	conflicting	arguments”,	although	observing	that	“Consensus	
need	not	 imply	unanimity”.	 ISO/IEC	Guide	2:2004,	 	 standardization	and	related	activities	-	General	
vocabulary	(2004).	
107	World	Trade	Organization	(WTO)	Committee	on	Technical	Barriers	 to	Trade	(2002)	Decision	of	
the	 committee	 on	 principles	 for	 the	 development	 of	 international	 standards,	 guides	 and	
recommendations	with	relation	to	articles	2,	5	and	annex	3	of	the	agreement,	G/TBT/1/Rev.8,	23	May,	
Section	IX.	
108	Id.	
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  Coherence:	standard-developing	organizations	should	cooperate	amongst	
themselves	 to	 prevent	 conflicting	 standards	 at	 the	 international	 level,	 as	
well	as	duplications	or	overlaps.110		
  Development	 dimension:	 interestingly,	 in	 our	 research	 we	 found	 that	 a	
core	 principle	 sustained	 by	 the	 WTO	 concerns	 the	 circumstance	 that	
international	standards	should	consider	the	need	to	embolden	developing	
countries’	 involvement	 in	 the	 international	 standards-development	
process.111		
4. STANDARDIZATION REGIMES  
 
4.1. THE EUROPEAN STANDARDIZATION SYSTEM  
The	EU	standardization	has	advanced	through	two	main	phases:	 (i)	 the	so-
called	 “Old	 Approach”,	 featuring	 extremely	 detailed	 legislation	 on	 standards	
requirements	and,	 from	1985	onward,	(ii)	 the	“New	Approach”,	which	 limited	the	
content	of	 legislation	 to	 “essential	 requirements”,	 leaving	 the	 technical	details	 to	
European	harmonized	standards.		
4.1.1. THE “OLD APPROACH”  
The	Old	 Approach	 to	 standardization	 comprised	 exhaustive	 texts	 covering	
all	 necessary	 technical	 and	 administrative	 requirements.	 This	 aspect,	 along	 with	
the	 unanimity	 required	 in	 this	 field,	made	 the	 adoption	 of	 such	 legislation	 very	
cumbersome.	
The	first	effort	to	move	on	from	this	impasse	was	done	with	the	adoption	of	
Directive	83/189/EEC	in	1983,	which	established	an	information	procedure	between	
the	Member	States	and	the	Commission	to	prevent	the	formation	of	new	technical	
barriers	to	the	free	movement	of	goods.112	This	procedure	was	codified	initially	by	
Directive	98/34/EC	in	1998	and	modified	by	Directive	98/48/EC	in	1998,	mainly	to	
                                                                                                                                 
109	Id.	
110	Id.	
111	Id.	
112	Directive	 83/189/EEC	 has	 now	 been	 superseded	 by	 Directive	 (EU)	 2015/1535	 of	 the	 European	
Parliament	 and	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 9	 September	 2015	 laying	 down	 a	 procedure	 for	 the	 provision	 of	
information	in	the	field	of	technical	regulations	and	of	rules	on	Information	Society	services	(OJ	L	241,	
17.9.2015,	p.	1).	
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extend	its	application	to	Information	Society	services.	Most	recently,	the	procedure	
was	codified	for	the	second	time	by	Directive	(EU)	2015/1535	in	2015.113		
Together	with	legislative	initiatives	to	avoid	new	barriers	and	encourage	the	
free	 movement	 of	 goods,	 the	 efficient	 application	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 mutual	
recognition	 cherished	 in	 EU	 law	 was	 also	 followed.	 Indeed,	 national	 technical	
regulations	 are	 subject	 to	 the	 requirements	 of	 Articles	 34	 to	 36	 TFEU,	 which	
proscribe	 quantitative	 restrictions	 or	measures	 that	 have	 an	 equivalent	 effect.	 In	
this	vein,	the	case	law	of	the	European	Court	of	Justice,	particularly	the	Cassis	de	
Dijon	 case,114	encouraged	 the	 mutual	 recognition	 principle	 and	 altered	 the	 EU	
approach	to	technical	harmonization	by	affirming	that	Member	States	could	only	
justify	 forbidding	 or	 restricting	 the	 marketing	 of	 products	 from	 other	 Member	
States	on	the	basis	of	non-conformity	with	“essential	requirements”.	This	 laid	the	
foundation		in	support	of	the	New	Approach.		
4.1.2 THE “NEW APPROACH”  
The	New	Approach	was	launched	by	the	Council	of	Ministers	on	7	May	1985	
in	its	Resolution	for	a	new	approach	to	technical	harmonization	and	standards.115	It	
constitutes	 a	 regulatory	method	 according	 to	which	 (i)	 legislative	harmonization	
should	be	reserved	to	those	essential	requirements	that	products	positioned	on	the	
EU	market	must	meet	if	they	are	to	profit	from	free	movement	within	the	EU,	(ii)	
the	 technical	 specifications	 for	 products	 satisfying	 the	 essential	 requirements	
ironed	out	in	legislation	should	be	laid	down	in	harmonized	standards	that	can	be	
applied	 together	 with	 the	 legislation,	 (iii)	 products	manufactured	 in	 compliance	
with	 harmonized	 standards	 benefit	 from	 a	 presumption	 of	 conformity	 with	 the	
corresponding	 essential	 requirements	 of	 the	 applicable	 legislation,	 and,	 in	 some	
cases,	 the	 manufacturer	 may	 benefit	 from	 a	 simplified	 conformity	 assessment	
procedure	 and	 (iv)	 the	 application	 of	 harmonized	 or	 other	 standards	 remains	
voluntary,	and	the	manufacturer	can	always	apply	other	technical	specifications	to	
meet	 the	 requirements,	 but	 will	 carry	 the	 burden	 of	 demonstrating	 that	 these	
                                                
113	OJ	L	316,	14.11.2012,	p.	12.		
114	Case	120/78,	20.2.1979,	Rewe-Zentral	AG	v	Bundesmonopolverwaltung	 für	Branntwein,	ECR	1979,	p.	
649.	
115	OJ	C	136,	4.6.1985,	p.	1.	
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technical	specifications	answer	the	needs	of	the	essential	requirements,	more	often	
than	not,	through	a	process	involving	a	third	party	conformity	assessment	body.116		
The	principles	of	the	New	Approach	for	European	standardization	paved	the	
way	 to	 further	 harmonization.	 The	 role	 of	 harmonized	 standards	 legislation	 and	
the	 duties	 of	 the	 European	 SSOs	 are	 now	 defined	 in	 Regulation	 (EU)	 No	
1025/2012 117 ,	 which	 gives	 the	 Commission	 the	 prospect	 of	 inviting,	 after	
consultation	 with	 the	 Member	 States,	 the	 European	 SSOs	 to	 draft	 harmonized	
standards	and	institutes	procedures	to	assess	and	object	to	harmonized	standards.	
In	 adopting	 a	 systemic	 perspective,	 it	 can	 be	 remarked	 that,	 although	
European	 and	 international	 standards	 are	 voluntary	 in	 nature,	 the	 EU	
standardization	system	is	aimed	at	greater	integration	as	well	as	the	development	
of	the	Single	Market.			
The	EU	standardization	regime	has	been	defined	as	“coordinated,	 regulated,	
subsidized	and	inclusive”.118		Overall,	the	EU	standardization	regime	does	not	imply	
the	 direct	 intervention	 of	 the	 governments.	 In	 other	 words,	 EU	 standardization	
(whilst	not	as	informal	and	industry-led	as	in	the	US,	where	consortia	prevail	over	
institutionalized,	hierarchical	SSOs)	remains	a	 fundamentally	private	 initiative.	 It	
                                                
116	For	an	overview	of	the	Old	and	New	Approach,	see	European	Commission,	Commission	Notice	-	
The	‘Blue	Guide’	on	the	implementation	of	EU	products	rules	2016	(2016/C	272/01).	
117	OJ	 L	 316,	 14.11.2012,	 p.	 12.	 The	 2015/1535	 notification	 procedure	 allows	 the	 Commission	 and	 the	
Member	States	of	the	EU	to	examine	the	technical	regulations	Member	States	intend	to	introduce	for	
products	 (industrial,	 agricultural	 and	 fishery)	 and	 for	 Information	 Society	 services	 before	 the	
adoption.	The	aim	is	to	ensure	that	these	texts	are	compatible	with	EU	law	and	the	Internal	Market	
principles.	 Specifically,	 According	 to	 Directive	 (EU)	 2015/1535	 Member	 States	 must	 inform	 the	
Commission	 of	 any	 draft	 technical	 regulation	 prior	 to	 its	 adoption.	 Starting	 from	 the	 date	 of	
notification	of	the	draft,	a	three-month	standstill	period	–	during	which	the	notifying	Member	State	
cannot	adopt	the	technical	regulation	in	question	–	enables	the	Commission	and	the	other	Member	
States	to	examine	the	notified	text	and	to	respond	appropriately.	Where	it	emerges	that	the	notified	
drafts	may	 create	 barriers	 to	 the	 free	movement	 of	 goods	 or	 to	 the	 free	 provision	 of	 Information	
Society	 services	or	 to	EU	secondary	 legislation,	 the	Commission	and	 the	other	Member	States	may	
submit	a	detailed	opinion	to	the	Member	State	that	has	notified	the	draft.	The	detailed	opinion	has	
the	 effect	 of	 extending	 the	 standstill	 period	 by	 additional	 three	 months	 for	 products	 and	 by	
additional	one	month	for	services.	In	the	event	of	a	detailed	opinion	being	issued,	the	Member	State	
concerned	has	to	explain	the	action	that	 it	 intends	to	take	in	response	to	the	detailed	opinion.	The	
Commission	and	the	Member	States	can	also	make	comments	about	a	notified	draft	that	appears	to	
comply	with	European	Union	 law	but	 that	 requires	clarification	on	 its	 interpretation.	The	Member	
State	concerned	shall	 take	such	comments	 into	account	as	 far	as	possible.	Finally,	 the	Commission	
can	also	block	a	draft	for	a	period	of	12	to	18	months	if	European	Union	harmonization	work	is	to	be	
undertaken	or	is	already	underway	in	the	same	field.		
118	Richard	P.	Suttmeier	and	Yao	Xiangkui,	China’s	Post-WTO	Technology	Policy:	Standards,	Software,	
and	 the	 Changing	 Nature	 of	 Techno-Nationalism,	 NBR	 SPECIAL	 REPORT,	 NAT’L	 BUREAU	 OF	 ASIAN	
RESEARCH	NO.	7,	at	25	(May	2004).	
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is	 left	 to	 industry	 to	select	which	 technology	better	 serves	 its	 interests,	while	 the	
government	merely	outlines	priorities	 and	guidelines,	without	however	 imposing	
an	intrusive	overarching	policy	in	this	regard.119		
The	 EU	 standardization	 regime	 includes	 national	 standardization		
organizations	 (e.g.	 in	 Italy,	 the	 Ente	 nazionale	 italiano	 di	 unificazione	(“UNI”).	
These	 organizations	 are	 subject	 to	 government	 regulation.	 They	 represent	 an	
ample	 spectrum	 of	 interest	 groups,	 scientific	 organizations	 and	 public	 agencies.	
They	 acknowledge	 the	 centrality	 of	 standards	 for	 regional	 economic	 benefit	 and	
the	diffusion	of	innovation.120	
The	EU	 standardization	 regime	also	 includes	 a	 regional	 layer,	 composed	of	
three	 standardization	 organizations.	 Namely,	 the	 European	 Telecommunications	
Standards	 Institute	 (ETSI), 121 	the	 European	 Committee	 for	 Standardization	
(CEN), 122 	and	 the	 European	 Committee	 for	 Electrotechnical	 Standardization	
(CENELEC).123	They	promote	economic	integration	among	member	countries.	The	
rules	for	cooperation	between	these	organizations	and	national	SSOs	are	explicitly	
set	 out	 in	 Directive	 98/34/EC.124	At	 the	 international	 level,	 cooperation	 between	
the	European	standardization	organizations	and	their	corresponding	international	
SSOs	 is	 governed	 by	 formal	 agreements. 125 	The	 resulting	 highly	 detailed	 and	
institutionalized	system	reflects	the	EU’s	“interest	 in	 international	standardization	
                                                
119Similarly,	“it	is	also	not,	and	should	not	be,	an	antitrust	agency’s	role	to	interfere	with	the	nature	of	
the	standard-setting	process”	unless	anticompetitive	conducts	are	present”.	Grazyna	Piesiewicz,	Ruben	
Schellingerhout,	 Intellectual	 property	 rights	 in	 standard	 setting	 from	 a	 competition	 law	 perspective.	
The	 fact	 that	 the	 EU	 perceives	 standardization	 as	 a	 private	matter	 does	 not	 imply,	 however,	 that	
FRAND	conditions	and	the	TFEU	101	guideline	should	not	be	taken	into	account.	On	May	1
	
2014,	the	
European	 Commission	 adopted	 new	 rules	 for	 the	 assessment	 of	 technology	 transfer	 agreements	
according	 to	 EU	 competition	 law	 in	 order	 to	 facilitate	 the	 sharing	 of	 IP	 and	 provide	 guidance	 on	
licensing	 agreements	 that	 fuel	 competition.	 The	 new	 rules	 comprise	 two	 legal	 tools:	 (a)	 the	 new	
Technology	Transfer	Block	Exemption	Regulation	(Commission	Regulation	EU	No.	316/2014),	and	(ii)	
the	Technology	Transfer	Guidelines	(Commission	Communication	2014/C	89/03).		
120	Id.	
121	See	ETSI’s	website.		
122	Translated	from	French	“Comité	européen	de	normalisation”,	CEN.	
123	Translated	from	French	“Comité	Européen	de	Normalisation	Électrotechnique”,	CENELEC.	
124	See	Directive	98/34/EC	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	22	June	1998	laying	down	
a	procedure	for	the	provision	of	information	in	the	field	of	technical	standards	and	regulations.			
125	This	is	primarily	the	case	for	the	links	between	CEN-ISO	and	CENELEC-IEC;	but	not	so	much	the	
case	for	ETSI	and	the	ITU-T.			
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because	 of	 its	 potential	 to	 eliminate	 technical	 barriers	 to	 trade	 and	 to	 increase	
market	access	for	all.”126		
Table:	the	EU	standardization	system		
	
4.2 THE CHINESE STANDARDIZATION SYSTEM  
 
The	 Chinese	 standardization	 system	 is	 extremely	 different	 from	 the	
European	one.	
It	developed	under	the	aegis	of	a	planned	economy	regime,	with	substantial	
influence	from	the	former	Soviet	Union.127	Under	the	system	of	a	planned	economy,	
the	 central	 government	 articulated	 and	 managed	 overarching	 nationwide	
standardization.		
After	 an	 economic	 standstill,	 which	 also	 affects	 the	 standardization	milieu	
and	 characterized	 the	 “Cultural	 Revolution”	 period	 beginning	 in	 1966,	 Deng	
Xiaoping’s	reform	and	opening-up	policy	pushed	the	central	government	to	pursue	
                                                
126	European	 Commission’s	 2001	 Staff	 Working	 Paper,	 European	 Policy	 Principles	 on	 International	
Standardization,	SEC(2001,	p.	1296.	
127	On	the	Chinese	standardization	system,	see	Wang	Ping,	Wang	Yiyi,	and	John	Hill,	Standardization	
Strategy	 of	 China	 -	 Achievements	 and	 Challenges,	 EAST-WEST	 CENTER	 WORKING	 PAPER-ECONOMICS	
SERIES	107	(2010),	pp.	1-3.	
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a	more	intense	modernization	drive.	The	ensuing	economic	recovery	also	impacted	
China’s	 standardization	 efforts,	which	were	 substantially	 resumed	 and	 advanced.	
Accordingly,	 in	 1978,	 the	 State	General	 Bureau	 for	 Standardization	 (“SGBS”)	was	
established	and	began	 to	 set	up	 “national	 standardization	 technical	 committees”.	
China	applied	for	and	regained	its	membership	in	the	ISO	at	this	time.		
Today,	 the	 standardization	 administration	 system	 of	 the	 Chinese	
government	 is	 still	 the	 one	 formed	 under	 the	 planned	 economy	 system	 through	
which	 the	 central	 government	 exercised	 centralized	 control,	while	 each	different	
ministry	 was	 responsible	 for	 standardization	 of	 the	 industry	 that	 was	 under	 its	
jurisdiction.	 This	 system	 was	 further	 strengthened	 by	 the	 Standardization	 Law	
promulgated	 in	 1988.	 According	 to	 the	 Standardization	 Law	 standards	 in	 China	
include	both	voluntary	and	mandatory	standards	and	are	classified	into	four	levels,	
all	of	which	should	be	registered	with	the	SAC.	Namely,	the	levels	are	designated	
as	national	standards,	sector	standards,	local	standards	and	enterprise	standards.128	
In	 the	current	 standardization	 system,	 standard-setting	 is	 a	matter	of	State	
and	 the	Government	 effectively	 conducts	 first	 hand	 standardization	 through	 the	
Standardization	Administration	of	China	(the	“SAC”).		
The	 SAC	 is	 in	 charge	 of	 approving	 and	 enacting	 standards129 	under	 the	
management	of	the	General	Administration	of	Quality	Supervision,	Inspection	and	
Quarantine	 (the	 “AQSIQ”).	 The	 AQSIQ	 is	 a	 ministerial	 administration	 that	
operates	 directly	 under	 the	 supervision	 of	 the	 State	 Council.	 The	 SAC	 also	
represents	China’s	interests	internationally	before	the	ISO	and	the	IEC	and	it	is	in	
charge	of	managing	51	national	mirror	groups	of	IEC	Technical	Committees	(“TCs”)	
and	Sub-Committees	(“SCs”),	and	ISO/IEC	Joint	TC1	(“JTC”)	and	SCs.130	This	task	is	
carried	out	with	China	Electronics	Standardization	Institute	(the	“CESI”).	The	CESI	
plays	a	relevant	role	in	ICT	standardizations	and	is	administered	by	the	Ministry	of	
Industry	and	Information	Technology	(the	“MIIT”).		
                                                
128	State	Council,	Standardization	Law	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China,	1988,	Item	6,	Chapter	2.	
129	See	 Brian	 J.	 Delacey,	 Kerry	 Herman,	 David	 J.	 Kiron,	 Josh	 Lerner,	 Wai-Shun	 Lo,	 Government	
Intervention	in	Standardization:	The	Case	of	WAPI,	Harvard	Bus.	School	–	Fin.	Unit	&	Nat’l	Bureau	of	
Econ.	Research	(Sept.	2006),	p.		8.	
130	M.	Gerst,		IPR	in	Standardization,	Feb.	2016,	IP	KEY,	p.		22.	
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Another	entity	involved	in	ICT	standard-setting	is	the	China	Communication	
Standards	 Association	 (the	 “CCSA”).	 The	 CCSA	 is	 the	 Chinese	 member	 of	 the	
Global	 Standards	 Collaboration,	 the	 association	 of	 national	 and	 regional	 SDOs	
active	 in	 the	 area	 of	 telecommunications.	 The	 CCSA	 also	 operates	 under	 the	
administration	of	the	MIIT.	
Table:	the	Chinese	standardization	system		
	
AQSIQ:	General	Administration	of	Quality	Supervision,	Inspection	and	Quarantine	
MIIT:	Ministry	of	Industry	and	Information	Technology	
SAC:	Standardization	Administration	of	China	
CESI:	China	Electronic	Standardization	Institute	
CCSA:	China	Communications	Standards	Association	
Overall,	 the	 European	 and	 Chinese	 standardization	 systems	 differ	 deeply,	
although	 both	 have	 adopted	 a	 strong	 and	 centralized	 top-down	 approach	 to	
standards. 131 	In	 the	 EU,	 standard-setting	 stems	 from	 voluntary	 cooperation	
between	 public	 authorities,	 industry	 stakeholders,	 research	 centers	 and	 other	
actors.	Although	the	European	Commission,	by	means	of	its	New	Approach,	aims	
to	 harmonize	 EU	 standards	 and	 influence	 the	 contest	 between	 European	
standardization	 organizations	 and	 their	 international	 counterparts,	 there	 is	 no	
direct	 government	 intervention.	 Conversely,	 in	 China,	 the	 government	 directly	
                                                
131	See	generally,	Christopher	S.	Gibson,	Globalization	and	 the	 technology	 standards	game:	Balancing	
concerns	of	 protectionism	and	 intellectual	property	 in	 international	 standards,	BERKELEY	TECHNOLOGY	
LAW	JOURNAL	22.4	(2007),	p.	1403-1484.		
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supervises,	manages	and	shapes	standardization,	reflecting	its	industrial	policies:132	
it	is	the	only	main	body	to	organize	and	preside	over	standardization	activities.	
On	the	contrary,	China’s	standardization	system	remains	in	the	hand	of	the	
central	 Government’	 control	 and	 administration,	 as	 set	 out	 in	 the	 1988	
Standardization	Law,	which	was	designed	to	serve	economic	development	at	a	time	
when	 China	was	 developing	Deng	 Xiaoping’s	 progressive	 opening	 up	 of	 Chinese	
markets.	133	
Other	 differences	 between	 the	 EU	 and	 Chinese	 standardization	 regimes	
concern	 stakeholders	 playing	 a	 primary	 role.	 In	 the	 EU	 standardization	 process	
technology	manufacturers	are	pre-eminent,	while	in	China,	researchers	and	public	
research	institutions	prevail.134	As	will	be	analyzed	in	this	study,	both	the	EU	and	
the	Chinese	standardization	regimes	remain	reluctant	to	recognize	the	legitimacy	
of	standards	developed	and	adopted	by	industry-led	consortia	and	other	informal	
standard-setting	 entities.	 Although	 such	 entities	 are	 predominant	 in	 the	 US	
standardization	 scenario,	 both	 the	 EU	 and	 its	 Chinese	 counterparts	 still	 prefer	
institutionalized	 standard-setting	 organizations. 135 	Nowadays,	 the	 process	 of	
standardization	 remains	 opaque	 and	 foreign	 firms	 in	 China	 do	 not	 have	
appropriate	advance	notice	to	comment	on	new	standards.136	Accordingly,	“To	the	
extent	that	foreign	companies	are	involved	in	the	drafting	of	standards,	their	role	is	
usually	 that	 of	 observer,	 with	 the	 Chinese	 side	 being	 especially	 reluctant	 to	 invite	
foreign	participation	in	high-tech	areas.”	137		
                                                
132 	D.	 Breznitz,	 M.	 Murphree,	 The	 Rise	 of	 China	 in	 Technology	 Standards:	 New	 Norms	 in	 Old	
Institutions,	 Research	 Report	 Prepared	 on	 Behalf	 of	 the	 US-China	 Economic	 and	 Security	 Review	
Commission,	2013,	p.		7.	
133	Wang	 Ping,	 Wang	 Yiyi,	 and	 John	 Hill,	 Standardization	 Strategy	 of	 China	 -	 Achievements	 and	
Challenges,	EAST-WEST	CENTER	WORKING	PAPER-ECONOMICS	SERIES	107	(2010),	pp.	2-3.	
134	M.	 RONGPING,	W.	 ZHUOLIANG,	 THE	 ROLE	 OF	 STANDARDS	 IN	NATIONAL	 TECHNOLOGY	 POLICY	 IN	 CHINA,	
2005.	
135	Richard	P.	Suttmeier,	Xiangkui	Yao,	Alex	Zixiang	Tan,	Standards	of	Power:	Technology,	Institutions,	
and	 Politics	 in	 the	 Development	 of	 China’s	 National	 Standards	 Strategy,	 THE	NATIONAL	 BUREAU	OF	
ASIAN	RESEARCH	(2006).			
136 	Brian	 J.	 Delacey,	 Kerry	 Herman,	 David	 J.	 Kiron,	 Josh	 Lerner,	 Wai-Shun	 Lo,	 Government	
Intervention	in	Standardization:	The	Case	of	WAPI,	Harvard	Bus.	School	–	Fin.	Unit	&	Nat’l	Bureau	of	
Econ.	Research	(Sept.	2006),	p.	9.	
137	Richard	P.	Suttmeier,	Yao	Xiangkui,	China’s	Post-WTO	Technology	Policy:	Standards,	Software,	and	
the	 Changing	 Nature	 of	 Techno-Nationalism,	 NBR	 Special	 Report,	 THE	NATIONAL	 BUREAU	OF	ASIAN	
RESEARCH	No.	7,	at	26	(May	2004).	However,	it	must	be	noted	that	today	some	industrial	associations	
in	China	 (for	 instance	 the	CCSA,	 the	CEEIA	 and	 the	 IRGSA),	 play	 a	 prominent	 role	 in	 developing	
national	 and	 sector	 standards.	However,	 they	 remain	 subject	 to	 the	 leadership	of	 the	Government.	
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4.2.1. PROSPECTIVE CHALLENGES FOR STANDARDIZATION IN CHINA 
 
However,	over	the	past	four	decades	of	reform,	and	upon	opening	up,	China	
has	 been	 shifting	 from	 a	 planned	 economy	 to	 a	market-based	 economic	 system.	
This	 suggests	 that	 its	 standardization	 management	 should	 reflect	 a	 change	 of	
paradigm	 by	 innovating	 and	 potentially	 embracing	 a	 system,	 similar	 to	 those	 of	
develop	 countries,	where	most	 technical	 standards	 are	 voluntary	 and	 formulated	
based	 on	 a	 market	 mechanism	 and	 where	 implementation	 of	 standards	 mainly	
relies	 on	 the	 lock-in	 effect	 of	 market	 competition	 instead	 of	 governmental	
enforcement.138		
Policy	makers	 are	 aware	 of	 the	 relevance	 of	 standards	 in	 today’s	 economy.	
Accordingly,	in	the	last	few	years,	China	has	progressively	“placed	the	development	
of	 standards	 at	 the	 center	 of	 its	 national	 strategy	 to	 emerge	 as	 a	 world	 leader	 in	
science	 and	 technology	 by	 the	 year	 2020.”139	A	 long-term	 standards	 strategy	 was	
launched	 in	 2002	 with	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 technical	 standards	 development	
strategy	and	the	establishment	of	a	national	technical	standards	system.	Strategic	
objectives	to	be	achieved	were	divided	into	three	phases.	Namely:	
I. forming	 a	 new	 voluntary	 technical	 standards	 system	 and	
enhancing	the	market	adaptability	of	technical	standards	by	2010;		
II. completing	 and	 perfecting	 the	 technical	 standards	 system	 and	
raising	 the	 level	 of	 Chinese	 technical	 standards	 development	 by	
2020;	and		
III. ensuring	that	Chinese	technical	standards	hold	a	pre-eminent	and	
prominent	international	status	by	2050.140		
                                                                                                                                 
Wang	 Ping,	 Wang	 Yiyi,	 and	 John	 Hill,	 Standardization	 Strategy	of	China		 -	
Achievements	and	Challenges,	East-West	Center	Working	Papers,	Economics	Series,	No.	107,	p.	14.	
138	Wang	Ping,	Wang	Yiyi,	John	Hill,	Standardization	Strategy	of	China	-	Achievements	and	Challenges,	
EAST-WEST	CENTER	WORKING	PAPER-ECONOMICS	SERIES	107	(2010),	p.	14.		
139	R.P.	Suttmeier,	X.	Yao,	A.Z.	Tan,	Standards	of	Power?	Technology,	 Institutions,	and	Politics	 in	 the	
Development	of	China’s	National	Standards	Strategy,	THE	NATIONAL	BUREAU	OF	ASIAN	RESEARCH,	2006,	
p.	27.	
140	Teresa	Cendrowska,	Enabling	 US-Chinese	 Cooperation	 in	 Standards	 and	 Conformity	 Assessment,	
ASTM	STANDARDIZATION	NEWS,	referring	to	comments	of	Liu	Fei,	Director	of	Operations	in	the	Beijing	
office	of	the	Consortium	for	Standards	Conformity	and	Assessment	(the	“CSCA”).		
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China	is	gradually	becoming	more	aware	of	the	fact	that	the	country’s	role	in	
the	 global	 setting	 is	 shifting	 from	 a	mere	 standards	 implementer	 to	 a	 standards	
developer	and	innovator.	Some	observers	have	gone	so	far	as	to	identify	China	as	
the	 likely	 global	 technology	 standards-setter	 of	 the	 21st	 century. 141 	This	 has	
prompted	an	urgent	need	for	China	to	comprehensively	reform	its	standardization	
system	 in	order	 to	meet	 the	requirements	of	 the	market-based	economic	system,	
which	has	been	established	and	gradually	improved	in	China	over	the	past	35	years.	
In	 light	 of	 this	 China	 has	 launched	 a	 systematic	 redesign	 of	 its	 entire	
standardization	architecture	in	order	to	become	one	of	the	most	important	players	
in	global	standardization	by	2020.		
A	 first	 step	 would	 be	 to	 launch	 a	 thorough	 reform	 of	 standardization,	
starting	 with	 the	 amendment	 of	 the	 1988	 Standardization	 Law,	 which	 has	 its	
origins	in	a	planned	economy	system.	This	reform	would	align	the	development	of	
China’s	 market	 economy	 and	 government	 institutions	 with	 a	 modern	
standardization	 regime.	This	modernization	 is	 also	 fostered	by	 the	 State	Council	
reform	proposal	circulated	in	March	2015.142
	
The	reform	involves	numerous	action	
points, 143 	such	 as	 (i)	 redefining	 the	 role	 of	 standards	 in	 promoting	 industrial	
transformation	and	improving	the	quality	and	efficiency	of	economic	production;	
(ii)	 focusing	 on	 fostering	 competition	 for	 domestic	 use	 and	 on	 things	 being	
“created	 in	China”	 for	 global	markets;	 (iii)	stating	 that	 standards	 shall	 also	 serve	
diplomacy	 and	 trade;	 and	 (iv)	 emphasizing	 industry-driven	 standardization,	
including	consortia	(social	group	standards)	and	enterprise	standards.		
This	 strategy	 reflects	 and	 responds	 to	 the	 efforts	 made	 by	 the	 Chinese	
Government	to	move	towards	the	next	stage	of	economic	development	as	outlined	
in	 its	 13th	 five-year	 plan	 and	 supported	 in	 the	 country’s	 ten-year	 national	 plan,	
“Made	 in	 China	 2025”.	 “Made	 in	 China	 2025”	 aims	 to	 reinforce	 industrial	
competitiveness	 by	 upgrading	 the	manufacturing	 sector	 to	 the	 next	 level	 of	 the	
                                                
141	See	Bob	McDowell,	China	Technology	Standards?,	Fortune	(Mar.	5,	2004);	Peter	Lewis,	China	Sets	
the	Standards,	CNN	Money	(Feb.	23,	2004).	
142	SESEC	III,	Bi-monthly	Newsletter	March	2015.			
143	SESEC	III	China	Situation	Monthly	Newsletter,	March	2015;	Ziegler	“A	Chinese	Perspective	on	the	
Role	of	Standards	in	International	Trade	–	A	European	Perspective”,	SIIT	2015.			
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value	 chain	 and	 putting	 greater	 emphasis	 on	 advanced	 information	 technology,	
innovation	and	efficiency.144		
	
	 	
                                                
144	M.	Gerst,	“Made	in	China	2025”	and	What	it	Means	for	European	SMEs,	EUROBIZ,	EUCCC,	April,	2016.		
The	plan	is	to	transform	China’s	manufacturing	industry	from	“made	in	China”	to	“made	by	China”,	
emphasizing	 product	 quality	 and	 sustainability,	 and	 developing	 brands	 to	 become	 a	 “world	
manufacturing	power”.	M.	Gerst,		IPR	in	Standardization,	Feb.	2016,	IP	KEY,	p.	18.	
 42 
CHAPTER III 
 
REGULATING NEW TECHNOLOGY MARKETS 
	
“The	 Fourth	 Industrial	 Revolution	 is	 unfolding	 at	 an	
exponential	rather	than	a	linear	pace”.		
China	President	Xi	Jinping			
Opening	address	delivered	at	the	World	Economic	Forum	in	Davos	(2017)	
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1. FOCUS ON ICT: NETWORK EFFECTS AND INTEROPERABILITY  
This	part	 focuses	on	the	relationship	between	 	 technical	standards,	 IP	and	
competition	 in	 the	 information	 and	 communications	 technology	 (“ICT”)	 sector.	
This	 relationship	has	 emerged	 in	 the	 ICT	 sector	 because	 in	 this	 sector	 strategic	
patenting	is	predominant.	Technology	developers	rely	on	IPRs,	especially	patents,	
to	 recoup	 or	 to	 fund	 R&D	 investments.	 This	 often	 leads	 to	 technologies	 being	
incorporated	 into	 standards.	 Firms	 seeking	 to	 implement	 standards	 or	 develop	
enhanced	 technologies	 trespass	 the	 patents	 incorporated	 in	 these	 standards	 if	
they	do	not	obtain	a	license.		
The	ICT	sector,	carrying	a	value	of	around	USD	2	trillion	per	year,	145		plays	
an	 important	 role	 in	 the	 development	 of	 standards.	 Indeed,	 the	 convergence	 of	
products	 and	 services	 in	 the	 mobile	 communications	 and	 Internet	 sector	 has	
changed	our	daily	lives.	The	majority	of	mobile	phones	access	the	internet	using	
wireless	 technology	 and	 complex	microelectronic	devices	 interconnect	with	one	
another	 thanks	 to	hundreds	of	 interoperability	 standards.	These	 interoperability	
standards	almost	always	embed	patented	technology..		
The	 ICT	 sector	 has	 two	 main	 features:	 (I)	 network	 effects	 and	 (II)	
interoperability.		
I. Network	effects	are	generally	viewed	as	a	particular	set	of	market	
mechanisms,	 which,	 by	 their	 presence,	 tend	 to	 have	 specific	
positive	 economic	 features	 not	 found	 in	 conventional	 markets.	
Interestingly,	while	the	early	studies	on	network	effects	focused	on	
long-distance	 telephony, 146 	today	 network	 effects	 are	 usually	
acknowledged	as	 a	 crucial	 feature	of	many	 industries,147	including	
the	ICT	sector.		
                                                
145	United	 Nations	 Conference	 on	 Trade	 and	 Development	 (UNCTAD)	 (2014),	 Global	 imports	 of	
information	technology	goods	approach	$2	trillion,	UNCTAD	figures	show.		
146	Jeffrey	Rohlfs,	A	theory	of	 interdependent	demand	for	a	communications	service,	THE	BELL	JOURNAL	
OF	ECONOMICS	AND	MANAGEMENT	SCIENCE	(1974),	pp.	16-37.	
147	Empirical	 evidence	 of	 network	 effects	 has	 been	 found	 in	 product	 categories	 as	 diverse	 as,	 for	
instance,	 spreadsheets	 (see	 Erik	 Brynjolfsson,	 Chris	 F.	 Kemerer,	 Network	 Externalities	 in	
Microcomputer	 Software:	An	Econometric	Analysis	 of	 the	 Spreadsheet	Market,	MANAGEMENT	SCIENCE	
Vol.	42,	No.	12	(Dec.,	1996),	pp.	1627-1647),	and	databases	(see	Neil	Gandal,	Competing	Compatibility	
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A	product	generates	direct	network	effects	when	its	 increased	use	
by	any	user	directly	increases	its	value.148	Network	effects	may	also	
be	 indirect,	 where	 increased	 use	 of	 the	 product	 increases	 the	
invention	 of	 progressively	 more	 valuable	 complementary	 goods,	
thereby	indirectly	increasing	the	value	of	the	original	product.	For	
example,	 standards	 allowing	 file	 compatibility	 with	 Windows,	
result	 in	 increased	 quality	 and	 availability	 of	 complementary	
applications’	software.149	
Additionally,	 empirical	 evidence	 concerning	 e-marketplaces,	
reader/writer	 software	 pairs,	 hardware/software	 platforms	 and	
matching	 services	 has	 proven	 the	 existence	 of	 two-sided	network	
effects.	This	is	where	an	increase	in	use	of	a	product	by	one	set	of	
users	 increases	 the	 value	 of	 a	 complementary	product	 to	 another	
distinct	set	of	users,	and	the	other	way	around.150		
Finally,	 network	 effects	 can	 be	 local,	 as	 other	 features	 of	 the	
primary	network	of	connections,	rather	than	an	increase	in	the	size	
of	a	product’s	user	base	in	general,	can	impact	on	the	relevance	of	
network	effects.	A	good	example	 showing	 local	network	effects	 is	
instant	messaging.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	 scope	 of	 clustering	 in	 the	
network,	as	well	as	the	amount	of	information	that	each	consumer	
holds,	 may	 come	 to	 be	 relevant	 as	 each	 consumer	 is	 directly	
affected	 by	 the	 choices	 of	 even	 a	 small	 subgroup	 of	 other	
                                                                                                                                 
Standards	 and	 Network	 Externalities	 in	 the	 PC	 Software	 Market,	 THE	 REVIEW	 OF	 ECONOMICS	 AND	
STATISTICS	Vol.	77,	No.	4	(Nov.,	1995),	pp.	599-608.		
148This	 is	 the	 sort	 of	 network	 effect	modeled	 by	most	work	 in	 this	 area,	 see	Michael	 L.	 Katz,	 Carl	
Shapiro,	Network	 externalities,	 competition,	 and	 compatibility,	 THE	AMERICAN	ECONOMIC	REVIEW	75.3	
(1985),	 pp.	 424-440;	 	 see	 also	 JOSEPH	FARRELL,	GARTH	SALONER,	ECONOMIC	 ISSUES	 IN	 STANDARDIZATION	
(1985).	
149		For	an	early	analysis	of	the	economics	of	indirect	network	effects	see	Nicholas	Economides,	Steven	
C.	 Salop,	 Competition	 and	 integration	 among	 complements,	 and	 network	 market	 structure,	 THE	
JOURNAL	OF	INDUSTRIAL	ECONOMICS	(1992),	Pp.	105-123.	
150On	this	kind	of	network	effect	see	 Jean-Charles	Rochet,	 Jean	Tirole,	Platform	competition	 in	 two-
sided	markets,	JOURNAL	OF	THE	EUROPEAN	ECONOMIC	ASSOCIATION	1.4	(2003),	pp.	990-1029.	
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consumers,	e.g.	those	that	the	consumer	is	connected	to	through	a	
social	or	business	network.151		
II. Regarding	interoperability,	although	a	clear	definition	is	absent,	it	
can	be	defined	as	the	linking	of	systems,	networks	and	services	so	
that	they	can	work	together	successfully	and	be	compatible.152	This	
compatibility	 prerequisite	 is	 what	 constitutes	 “interoperability”,	
that	 is	 “the	 ability	 of	 two	 systems	 to	 interoperate	 using	 the	 same	
communication	 protocol”.153	The	 European	 Court	 of	 Justice	 (the	
“ECJ”)	 further	 clarified	 that	 “interoperability	 is	 a	 matter	 of	 degree	
and	 that	 various	 software	 products	 in	 a	 system	 ‘interoperate’	 (at	
least	 partially)	 when	 they	 are	 able	 to	 exchange	 information	 and	
mutually	to	use	the	information	which	has	been	exchanged”.154		
Interoperability	is	above	all	vital	in	the	telecommunications	sector	
where	 it	 produces	 a	 network	 of	 technologies	 that	 can	 interrelate	
between	each	other.	Interoperability	is	thus	critical	for	the	advance	
of	 new	 technologies	 and	 the	 advantages	 for	 consumer	 welfare.	
Nonetheless,	 interoperability	 is	 at	 the	 source	 of	 potential	
competition	 concerns,	 as	 shown	 in	 the	 landmark	 ECJ	 Microsoft	
case.	 In	 this	 case,	Microsoft	 had	 refused	 to	 provide	 its	 computer	
protocols	and	patents	to	its	competitors,	in	order	to	prevent	facing	
competition	 from	 other	 software	 designers.	 The	 ECJ	 found	 that	
this	conduct	prevented	competitors	from	generating	programs	that	
                                                
151	On	 local	 network	 effects	 and	 complex	network	 structure,	 see	Arun	 Sundararajan,	Local	 Network	
Effects	and	Complex	Network	Structure	(August	2006).	On	the	current		growing	literature	addressing	
more	 general	network	 games,	 see	 Andrea	 Galeotti	 et	 al,	Network	 games,	 THE	 REVIEW	OF	 ECONOMIC	
STUDIES	77.1	(2010):	218-244.	These	new	models	rely	heavily	on	the	so-called	“science	of	networks”,	see	
Mark	E.J.	Newman,	The	structure	and	function	of	complex	networks,	SIAM	REVIEW	45.2	(2003),	pp.	167-
256.		
152	See	 generally	 Shin,	Dong-Hee,	Hongbum	Kim,	 and	 Junseok	Hwang.	Standardization	 revisited:	 A	
critical	literature	review	on	standards	and	innovation,	COMPUTER	STANDARDS	&	INTERFACES	38	(2015),	pp.	
152-157.	
153	Thomas	 Hoehn	 and	 Alex	 Lewis,	 Interoperability	 Remedies,	 FRAND	 Licensing	 and	 Innovation:	 a	
review	of	recent	case	law,	34(2)	EUROPEAN	COMPETITION	LAW	REVIEW	(2013),	p.	101.	
154	Case	T-201/04	Microsoft	v	Commission	[2007]	ECR	II-3601	(Microsoft	I),	para	158.	
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could	 interoperate	 with	 Microsoft’s	 servers	 and	 was	 thus	 in	
violation	of	Article	102	TFEU.155	
Network	 effects	 assume	 the	 existence	 of	 interoperability,	 as	 ICT	 products	
will	 not	 be	 able	 to	 extract	 any	 benefit	 from	 the	 network	 effects	 unless	 they	 are	
compatible.	 Vice	 versa,	 the	 demand	 for	 interoperability,	 	 the	 interface	 between	
different	products	and	technologies,	is	network-driven,	given	that	when	a	market	
adopts	 an	 technical	 standard,	 demand	 tends	 to	 migrate	 towards	 one	 solution,	
which	becomes	 the	de	 facto	 standard,	 if	no	standard	 is	elaborated	de	 iure	by	an	
SSO. 156 	Additionally,	 guaranteeing	 the	 advancement	 of	 shared	 technology	
standards	 is	 decisive	 in	 network	 industries.	 However,	 shared	 technology	
standards	can	be	difficult	to	achieve	when	technology	businesses	each	want	their	
own	R&D	to	be	prioritized	or	at	least	well-represented.	These	are	crucial	issues	in	
the	standardization	contest,	as	 the	standardization	contest	 frequently	 imposes	a	
compromise	on	economic	operators	between	the	performance	and	compatibility	
of	 ever-innovating	 products,	 and	between	 openness	 and	 exclusionary	 control	 of	
underlying	technologies.157	
2. LOCK-IN AND HOLD-UP 
There	is	a	fundamental	friction	between	the	interests	of	the	R&D	inventors,	
who	pursue	economic	yields	on	their	investments,	and	users	of	novel	technology,	
who	seek	access	on	reasonable	and	affordable	terms.	These	contrasting	aims	are	
even	 more	 blatant	 in	 the	 context	 of	 standards,	 whose	 existence	 and	 value	 is	
strictly	 dependent	 on	 widespread	 acceptance.	 If	 patented,	 these	 standards	may	
hamper	effective	competition	through	(i)	lock-in	and	(ii)	hold-up.	
I .  “Lock-in”	 describes	 the	 situation	 where	 a	 standard	 is	 adopted	 or	
approved	 by	 an	 SDO	 and	 market	 participants	 make	 substantial	
investments	on	the	basis	of	 the	standard.	Substantial	 investments	
include	contractual	commitments,	purchasing	 durable	 goods	 and	
                                                
155	Ibid.	
156	Bjorn	Lundqvist,	Competition	Law	as	the	Limit	to	Standard-Setting,	 in	 JOSEF	DREXL	AND	FABIANA	DI	
PORTO	(ED),	COMPETITION	LAW	AS	REGULATION	(EDWARD	ELGAR	2015),	pp.	6-7.	
157	For	an	analysis	of	network	effects	 in	the	information	technology	sector,	see	CARL	SHAPIRO,	HAL	R.	
VARIAN,	INFORMATION	 RULES:	 A	 STRATEGIC	 GUIDE	 TO	 THE	 NETWORK	 ECONOMY	 (HARVARD	 BUSINESS	 PRESS	
1998).	
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capital	 equipment,	 training	 employees,	 developing	 or	 procuring	
information	 technology,	 identifying	 suppliers,	 and	 building	 up	
customer	 loyalty. 158	 	
I I .  In	these	circumstances,	another	anticompetitive	phenomenon	may	
take	place,	referred	to	as	patent	“hold-up”.	Patent	“hold-up”	occurs	
when	the	cost	of	switching	from	the		standardized		technology		to		
an		alternative		technology		is	unaffordable,	thereby	enhancing	the	
patent	holder’s	power	in	any	ensuing	negotiation.159	 	
Indeed,	ICT	devices	comprise	a	high	number	of	patented	technology	owned	
by	 different	 entities. 160	In	 order	 to	 develop	 new	 high-tech	 devices	 it	 is	 thus	
necessary	 to	 obtain	 the	 agreement	 of	 all	 patent	 owners	 through	 licensing	
agreements.	Owners	will	ask	for	fees,	which	generally	reflect	the	market	value	of	
their	patents.	Moreover,	given	that	documents	for	standards	are	frequently	rather	
lengthy	 and	 intricate,	 numerous	 inventive	 concepts	 are	 often	 incorporated	 into	
the	 same	 standard,	 leading	 to	 the	 possibility	 of	 multiple	 patents	 covering	 any	
given	 standard.161	The	 accumulation	 of	 royalty	 demands	 by	 numerous	 patent	
holders	 could	 lead	 to	 cost-prohibitive	encumbrances	on	the	implementation	of	
products	that	comply	with	the	standards,	 leading	to	a	situation	termed	“royalty	
stacking”,	which	is	extensively	explored	in	the	literature.162		
3. THE CONCEPT OF STANDARD-ESSENTIAL PATENTS (“SEPS”)  
The	potential	 friction	between	 standardization	 and	patents	 emerges	when	
the	 implementation	 of	 a	 standard	 requires	 the	 inclusion	 of	 a	 proprietary	
technology.	Indeed,	most	of	the	standards	rely	on	core	technology	that	does	not	
                                                
158	Id.	
159	Mark	A.	Lemley,	 Carl	 Shapiro,	Patent	Holdup	 and	Royalty	 Stacking,	 85	TEX.	L.	REV.	(2007).	
160	For	example,	Blind	et	al.	report	large	numbers	of	patents	that	are	essential	to	several	standards,	i.a.	
WCDMA,	LTE,	and	optical	disk	drive.	KNUT	BLIND	ET	AL.,	STUDY	ON	THE	INTERPLAY	BETWEEN	STANDARDS	
AND	INTELLECTUAL	PROPERTY	RIGHTS	(IPRS),	FINAL	REPORT,	2011.	
161	Jorge	 L.	 Contreras,	 Patents,	 Standards	 and	 Borders:	 Addressing	 National	 Disparities	 among	
Holders	 of	 Standard-Essential	 Patents,	 EAST-WEST	CENTER	WORKSHOP	ON	MEGA-REGIONALISM	 -	NEW	
CHALLENGES	FOR	TRADE	AND	INNOVATION,	2016.	
162	Mark	A.	Lemley,	 Carl	 Shapiro,	Patent	Holdup	 and	 Royalty	 Stacking,	 85	TEX.	L.	REV.	(2007);	Jorge	
L.	 Contreras,	 Patents,	 Technical	 Standards	 and	 Standard-Setting	 Organizations:	 A	 Survey	 of	 the	
Empirical,	 Legal	 and	 Economics	 Literature	 in	 PETER	 	 S.	 	MENELL,	DAVID	 SCHWARTZ	 (EDS.),	 RESEARCH	
HANDBOOK	ON	THE	ECONOMICS	OF	INTELLECTUAL	PROPERTY	LAW,	VOL.	II	-	ANALYTICAL	METHODS	(EDWARD	
ELGAR,	2016).	
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have	 any	 equivalent.	 The	 implementer	 thus	 needs	 to	 use	 the	 very	 specific	
proprietary	technological	solution	in	order	to	make	the	product	compatible	with	
the	 standard.	 If	 the	 core	 technology	 is	 protected	 by	 patents,	 the	 patents	 are	
defined	 as	 “essential”,	 meaning	 that	 “it	 is	 not	 possible	 on	 technical	 (but	 not	
commercial)	grounds,	taking	into	account	normal	technical	practice	and	the	state	
of	 the	 art	 generally	 available	 at	 the	 time	 of	 standardization,	 to	make,	 sell,	 lease,	
otherwise	 dispose	 of,	 repair,	 use	 or	 operate	 equipment	 or	methods	 which	 comply	
with	a	standard	without	infringing	that	intellectual	property	right”.163	
SEP	holders	are	subject	to	stricter	IP	and	competition	rules.	These	rules	aim	
to	 strike	 a	 balance	 between	 the	 interests	 of	 innovators	 who	 own	 the	 SEPs	 and	
invest	 in	 chancy	 technological	 improvements	 for	 developing	 standards,	 and	 the	
interests	 of	 the	 implementers	 who	 seek	 to	 adopt	 the	 standards	 and	 take	
advantage	of	such	innovative	technology	through	licenses.		
SEPs	 lie	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 competition	 issues	 in	 this	 domain	 as	 they	
provide	their	owners	with	the	power	to	prevent	their	competitors	from	employing	
certain	 technology	 or	 to	 request	 excessive	 royalties,	which	may	 outstrip	 normal	
competition.	However,	assessing	and	identifying	which	patents	are	“essential”	for	
a	standard	is	not	an	easy	task,	and	is	sometimes	impossible,	due	to	the	extremely	
large	patent	portfolios	of	some	firms	and	the	wide-range	of	patents	incorporated	
into	 high-tech	 devices.	 Therefore,	 antitrust	 concerns	 may	 arise,	 particularly	
concerning	the	obligation	to	reveal	SEPs	during	the	standardization	process.		
The	large	number	of	patents	is	fuelled	by	the	practice,	which	is	widespread	
in	the	ICT	sector,	to	apply	for	patents	that	cover	merely	minor	improvements	of	
former	 patented	 technologies.	 This	 has	 created	 a	 series	 of	 issues,	 with	
accompanying	efforts	 to	solve	 them	at	different	stages:	at	 the	 institutional	 level,	
through	 IPR	 policies,	 at	 the	 policy	 level,	 in	 terms	 of	 competition,	 IPR,	 and	
standardization	policy,	and	in	other	multilateral	contexts,	 for	example	by	means	
of	patent	pooling	and	other	licensing	schemes.	
                                                
163	ETSI,	Intellectual	property	rights	policy	(2012).	The	definition	of	SEPs	provided	by	the	IPRs	policy	
of	 the	 ETSI	 is	 cited	 as	 it	 represents	 one	 of	 the	 most	 important	 SSOs	 in	 the	 field	 of	
telecommunications.	
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4. INNOVATION, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND STANDARDIZATION: 
DETECTING TENSIONS 
The	relationship	between	IPRs	and	standards	is	inherently	characterized	by	
a	 conflict	 stemming	 from	 their	 diametrically	 opposed	 functions,	 as	 explained	
below.		
4.1. DIFFERENTIATION VS. HARMONIZATION 
The	chief	goal	of	IP	is	to	allow	differentiation	among	products,	services	and	
the	whole	business	that	constitutes	the	background	of	products	and	services.	IPRs	
are	destined	for	private	exclusive	use.164	This	is	clear	when	analyzing	the	rationale	
of	 patents,	 which	 represent	 the	 most	 relevant	 area	 of	 IP	 for	 technology	
standardization. 165 	The	 WTO	 Agreement	 on	 TRIPS	 specifies	 the	 minimum	
standards	that	member	states	must	apply	to	patents,	curtailing	the	discretion	that	
states	exert	in	the	regulation	and	enforcement	of	IPRs.166	Patents	for	an	invention	
are	 conceived	 as	 a	 statute-created	 monopoly,167	granting	 specific	 rights	 to	 the	
applicant	for	the	use	of	the	technological	invention.	Generally,	they	allow	a	trade-
off	between	the	investors’	disclosure	of	detailed	information	about	the	invention	
against	 others	 using	 information	 about	 the	 invention	 for	 the	 time	 and	
geographical	 area	 for	which	 the	patent	 is	 in	 force.168	This	 right	 to	 exclusivity,	 as	
also	mirrored	 in	 the	 TRIPS	 Agreement,169	is	 the	 crucial	 legal	 entitlement	 in	 the	
patent	system,170	as	it	allows	the	patent	holder	to	recover	returns	from	the	market.	
                                                
164	Karsten	Meinhold,	The	ETSI	IPR	Policy,	EC	Workshop	on	IP	Rights	in	Standardization	(2008).	
165	For	a	holistic	analysis	of	concerns	related	 to	standardization	that	 touches	upon	all	 IP	rights,	not	
simply	patents,	see	generally	Nuno	Pires	de	Carvalho,	Technical	Standards,	Intellectual	Property,	and	
Competition	-	A	Holistic	View,	47	WASH.	U.	J.	L.	&	POL’Y	061	(2015).	
166	Agreement	 on	 Trade-Related	 Aspects	 of	 Intellectual	 Property	 Rights,	 Apr.	 15,	 1994,	 Marrakesh	
Agreement	Establishing	the	World	Trade	Organization,	Annex	1C,	Legal	Instruments	-	Results	of	the	
Uruguay	Round,	 1869	U.N.T.S.	 299,	 33	 I.L.M.	 1197	 (1994)	 (the	 “TRIPs	Agreement”).	 See	Laurence	R.	
Helfer,	Regime	Shifting,	The	TRIPs	Agreement	and	New	Dynamics	of	International	Intellectual	Property	
Lawmaking,	29	YALE	JOURNAL	OF	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	1	(2004).	
167	Yogesh	Pai,	The	 International	Dimension	of	Proprietary	Technical	Standards:	Through	 the	Lens	of	
Trade,	 Competition	 Law	 and	Developing	 Countries	 (July	6,	 2012).	 Society	of	 International	Economic	
Law	(SIEL),	3rd	Biennial	Global	Conference	Working	Paper	No.	2012/40,	p.	11.	
168	K.	 Blind,	 N.	 Thumm,	 E.	 Iversen,	 K.	 Hossain,	 R.	 van	 Reekum,	 B.	 Rixius,	 R.	 Bierhals,	 J.	 Sillwood,	
Interaction	 between	 Standardization	 and	 Intellectual	 Property	 Rights,	 TECHNICAL	REPORT,	EUR	21074	
EN,	2004,	pp.	40-41.	
169	See	Article	28	TRIPS:	“Rights	Conferred	
1.	A	patent	shall	confer	on	its	owner	the	following	exclusive	rights:	
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Pursuant	 to	 this	 approach,	 the	 patent	 system	 has	 been	 perceived	 as	
performing	 (I)	 an	 appropriation	 function	 and	 (II)	 a	 knowledge	 distribution	
function	in	contexts	featuring	market	failures:171		
I. the	 appropriation	 function	 of	 the	 patenting	 mechanism	 aims	 at	
creating	 an	 incentive	 for	 private	 R&D,	 promoting	 inventive	
activities	and	new	economically	valuable	knowledge	where	market	
forces	 are	 not	 sufficient.	 The	 incentive	 purpose	 is	 based	 on	 the	
assurance	for	the	investor	of	the	possibility	to	not	only	recoup	R&D	
costs,	but	also	to	appropriate	the	profits	accruing	to	the	invention;	
II. the	 knowledge	 distribution	 function	 allows	 the	 diffusion	 of	 the	
technology	by	means	of	disclosure	of	the	invention.		
All	 technologies	 are	 vested	 with	 the	 shielding	 apparatus	 of	 the	 patent	
regime,	 in	 so	 far	 as	 they	 are	 patent	 eligible	 and	 satisfy	 the	 three	 patentability	
requirements	 of	 inventive	 step,	 novelty	 and	 utility,	 which	 represent	 the	 major	
criteria	pursuant	to	the	WTO	Agreement	on	TRIPS.172	The	patenting	system	thus	
caters	to	the	investors’	desire	to	enjoy	the	profits	deriving	from	the	economically	
valuable	knowledge	incorporated	in	the	invention.	The	investor	will	thus	be	able	
to	obtain	the	profits	either	by	developing	and	commercializing	the	invention,	or	
by	 licensing	 the	 right	 to	 third	 parties	who	will	 then	 commercialize	 it.173	By	 and	
large,	 patenting	 regimes	 can	 therefore	 be	 viewed	 as	 a	 mechanism	 “designed	 to	
create	a	market	for	knowledge	by	assigning	propriety	property	rights	to	innovators	
                                                                                                                                 
	(a)	where	 the	 subject	matter	of	 a	patent	 is	 a	product,	 to	prevent	 third	parties	not	having	 the	
owner’s	consent	from	the	acts	of:	making,	using,	offering	for	sale,	selling,	or	importing	for	these	
purposes	that	product;	
	(b)	where	 the	 subject	matter	 of	 a	 patent	 is	 a	 process,	 to	 prevent	 third	 parties	 not	 having	 the	
owner’s	consent	from	the	act	of	using	the	process,	and	from	the	acts	of:	using,	offering	for	sale,	
selling,	or	importing	for	these	purposes	at	least	the	product	obtained	directly	by	that	process.	
2.	Patent	owners	shall	also	have	the	right	to	assign,	or	transfer	by	succession,	the	patent	and	to	
conclude	licensing	contracts”.	
170	On	this,	see	Case	238/87	Volvo	NA	v	Erik	Veng	(UK)	Ltd.	4	CMLR	122	(1989).	
171	For	a	pivotal	discussion	on	patents	as	an	appropriation	or	knowledge	distribution	mechanism,	see	
K.	Arrow,		Economic	Welfare	and	the	Allocation	of	Resources	for	Invention,	in	R.	R.	NELSON	(ED),	THE	
RATE	AND	DIRECTION	OF	THE	INVENTIVE	ACTIVITY:	ECONOMIC	AND	SOCIAL	FACTORS	(PRINCETON	1962).	
172	See	Article	27(1)	TRIPS,	requiring	the	grant	of	patents	to	“any	invention”	in	“all	fields	of	technology”.	
Consequently,	the	only	set	of	exclusions	are	mentioned	in	Article	27(2)	and	(3).	
173	K.	 Blind,	 N.	 Thumm,	 E.	 Iversen,	 K.	 Hossain,	 R.	 van	 Reekum,	 B.	 Rixius,	 R.	 Bierhals,	 J.	 Sillwood,	
Interaction	 between	 Standardization	 and	 Intellectual	 Property	 Rights,	 TECHNICAL	REPORT,	EUR	21074	
EN,	2004,	p.	41.	
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which	enable	them	to	overcome	the	problem	of	non-excludability	while,	at	the	same	
time,	encouraging	the	maximum	diffusion	of	knowledge	by	making	it	public”.174	
It	 is	 nonetheless	 noted	 that	 patentability	 requirements	 have	 been	
interpreted	dissimilarly	in	different	patent	regimes.	This	is	clear	when	examining	
the	patentability	of	computer	programs,	i.e.	software,	in	different	jurisdictions.	In	
the	 EU,	 the	 European	 patent	 office,	 flexibly	 interpreting	 the	 European	 patent	
convention,	allows	patents	to	be	granted	for	minor	technological	inventions,	also	
in	the	software	sector,	provided	they	 imply	a	physical	hardware	 incorporation.175	
Likewise,	 China	 does	 not	 permit	 software	 as	 such	 to	 be	 patented,176	although	 it	
does	not	exclude	patentability	for	inventions	correlated	to	computer	programs.177	
As	 for	 the	 US,	 in	 1981	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 first	 recognized	 that	 a	 computer	
program	may	deserve	 patent	 protection.	 The	 Supreme	Court	 explained	 that	 the	
presence	 of	 a	 software	 element	 did	 not	 render	 a	 patent-eligible	 process	 non-
patentable.178	
The	 differentiation	 enabled	 by	 the	 IP	 systems	 is	 key,	 given	 that	 it	 is	
conducive	 to	 both	 the	 appropriation	 function	 and	 the	 knowledge	 distribution	
                                                
174	P.	Geroski,	Markets	for	Technology:	Knowledge,	Innovation	and	Appropriability,	in	P.	STONEMAN	(ED)	
HANDBOOK	 OF	 THE	 ECONOMICS	 OF	 INNOVATION	 AND	 TECHNOLOGICAL	 CHANGE	 (BLACKWELL:	 CAMBRIDGE,	
USA	1995).	
175	On	 the	 patentability	 of	 software,	 see	 T-258/03	 Auction	 Method/Hitachi	 [2004],	 Decision	 of	 a	
Technical	Board	of	Appeal	of	the	European	Patent	Office.	
176	Specifically,	Article	25(2)	of	the	Chinese	Patent	Law	sets	out	a	series	of	exceptions	to	patentability.	
One	of	 these	 exceptions	 concerns	 the	 rules	 and	methods	 for	performing	mental	 activities	 and	 it	 is	
often	relied	upon	to	advance	non-patentable	subject	matter	objections	against	inventions	concerning	
software.	 The	 claims	 concerning	 one	 of	 the	 following	 are	 usually	 considered	 as	 defining	 rules	 and	
methods	 for	 performing	 mental	 activities:	 methods	 of	 calculation	 or	 rules	 of	 mathematical	
calculation;	 computer	 programs	 as	 such	 or	 computer	 programs	 recorded	 on	 computer-readable	
media;	 and	 rules	 and	 methods	 for	 playing	 games.	 Pursuant	 to	 Article	 2.2	 of	 the	 Chinese	 Patent	
Law,	software	patent	applications	may	also	be	precluded	for	lack	of	a	“technical	solution”,	defined	in	
the	 Guidelines	 for	 Patent	 Examination	 of	 the	 Chinese	 Patent	 Office	 as	 “aggregation	 of	 technical	
means	applying	the	laws	of	nature	to	solve	a	technical	problem”.		Computer	programs	are	described	as	
“coded	 instruction	 sequences	 executable	 by	 an	 information	 processing	 device,	 e.g.,	 a	 computer,	 to	
obtain	certain	 results”,	or	“symbolized	 instruction	sequences	or	 symbolized	statement	 sequences	 that	
can	be	automatically	transformed	into	coded	instruction	sequences”;	a	software	invention	is	defined	as	
“a	solution	to	an	identified	problem,		which	is	wholly	or	partly	based	on	processes	of	computer	programs,	
for	controlling	or	processing	external	or	 internal	objects	of	a	computer	via	execution	of	 the	computer	
programs	by	 a	 computer”.	See	Patent	Law	of	 the	People’s	Republic	of	China	(as	amended	up	to	the	
Decision	of	December	27,	2008,	regarding	the	Revision	of	the	Patent	Law	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	
China),	 in	 Chinese:中华人民共和国专利法	 (根据 2008 年 12 月 27 日全国人民代表大会常务委员会
《关于修改〈中华人民共和国专利法〉的决定》修正).		
177	Pursuant	to	Article	25(2)	of	the	Chinese	Patent	Law,	in	case	of	a	claim	reciting	technical	features	
on	top	of	content	concerning	methods	for	performing	mental	activities,	patentability	of	the	software	
cannot	be	automatically	excluded.	Id.	
178	Diamond	v	Diehr	[1981]	450	US	175.	
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function.	 None	 of	 these	 purposes	 could	 be	 achieved	 without	 eliminating	 the	
homogeneity	of	products,	i.e.	if	products	were	entirely	substitutable.	For	instance,	
if	we	consider	a	Samsung	Galaxy	and	an	Apple	 iPhone	 they	are	 substitutable	 to	
the	extent	that	they	are	both	smartphones.	Nonetheless,	they	are	not	identical	as	
they	perform	different	 functions	 that	 exclude	absolute	 interchangeability.	Given	
the	difference	in	products,	sellers	have	more	power	to	set	prices	without	worrying	
that	consumers	might	react	by	shifting	from	one	product	to	another	as	a	reaction	
to	 the	 price	 increase.	 Consumers	may	 ultimately	 be	 bound	 to	 their	 preferences	
and,	 in	 some	 way,	 not	 responsive	 to	 price	 changes,	 as	 the	 introduction	 of	
differentiating	features	in	a	product	may	have	the	effect	of	locking	them	in.	In	fact,	
the	 less	homogenous	 the	 two	smartphones	are,	 the	more	willing	consumers	will	
be	to	pay	a	higher	price	and	stay	loyal	to	their	current	device.179		
The	 role	 standardization	plays	 is	 inherently	different	 from	the	one	carried	
out	by	 the	 IPR	system	described	above.	Standards	do	not	aim	at	differentiating,	
but	 rather	at	harmonizing	products,	 services	and	processes.	They	are	elaborated	
by	different	interests	to	create	a	common	ground	for	the	further	compatibility	of	
different	 technology. 180 	In	 this	 vein,	 the	 literature	 has	 constantly	 associated	
standardization	 with	 the	 reduction	 of	 uncertainty	 to	 allow	 the	 ICT	 industry	 to	
benefit	 from	 network	 externalities. 181 	Standards	 are	 conducive	 to	 minimizing	
transaction	costs,	 in	particular	 if	 related	 to	 compatibility	 and	 interoperability	 in	
network-based	 technologies.	 In	 these	 markets	 standardization	 functions	 as	 a	
selection	mechanism	that	applies	to	diverse	technology,	allowing	the	ICT	industry	
to	 extract	 the	 beneficial	 consequences	 of	 network	 externalities. 182	If	 possible,	
                                                
179	This	 refers	 to	 the	 theory	 of	 monopolistic	 competition	 elaborated	 by	 Edward	 Chamberlian.	 See	
EDWARD	CHAMBERLIN,	THE	THEORY	OF	MONOPOLISTIC	COMPETITION,	 56–70	 (1933).	 Theodore	 Levitt	 held	
that	there	are	two	ways	of	introducing	differentiation	of	products:	by	augmenting	the	product	or	by	
lowering	 prices.	 Product	 augmentation	 can	 come	 in	 numerous	 ways,	 e.g.	 through	 alterations	 in	
technical	structures	and	design,	or	in	external	services	that	complement	the	product.	Theodore	Levitt,	
Marketing	Success	through	Differentiation	-	Of	Anything,	HARVARD	BUSINESS	LAW	REVIEW	83	(Jan.	1980),	
pp.	84,	87.		
180	K.	 Blind,	 N.	 Thumm,	 E.	 Iversen,	 K.	 Hossain,	 R.	 van	 Reekum,	 B.	 Rixius,	 R.	 Bierhals,	 J.	 Sillwood,	
Interaction	 between	 Standardization	 and	 Intellectual	 Property	 Rights,	 TECHNICAL	REPORT,	EUR	21074	
EN,	2004,	p.	40.	
181	J.	Farrell,	G.	Saloner,	Standardization,	Compatibility	 and	 Innovation,	RAND	JOURNAL	OF	ECONOMICS:	
Vol.	16,	1	(1985),	pp.	70-82.		
182	On	the	relevance	of	the	selection	mechanism	in	order	to	benefit	from	network	externalities	see	M.	
L.	 Katz,	 C.	 Shapiro,	 Network	 Externalities,	 Competition,	 and	 Compatibility,	 AMERICAN	 ECONOMIC	
REVIEW,	 Vol.	 75,	 (1985)	 pp.	 424-440;	 P.	 A.	 David,	 Some	 New	 Standards	 for	 the	 Economics	 of	
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standards	work	 for	 the	attainment	of	 the	collective	 interest	of	all	actors.	Hence,	
they	provide	a	type	of	public	good.183			
4.2. PRIVATE VS. PUBLIC GOOD  
Standards	 are	 by	 nature	 “public	 goods”	 as	 they	 satisfy	 the	 two	
characteristics	 that	 economics	 usually	 attaches	 to	 public	 goods:	 non-rivalry	 in	
consumption	(i.e.	public	goods	are	not	depleted	by	an	additional	user)	and	non-
excludability	(i.e.	it	is	generally	difficult	or	impossible	to	exclude	people	from	its	
benefits,	 even	 if	 they	 are	unwilling	 to	pay	 for	 them).184	Indeed,	 the	 fundamental	
tension	between	standards	and	IP	can	be	envisaged	as	a	 tension	between	public	
goods,	 embodied	 by	 standards,	 and	 private	 goods,	 represented	 by	 patents.	 In	
particular,	 the	 goal	 of	 patents	of	 securing	private	property	 and	 the	 exclusionary	
effect	 of	 patents	 concerning	 the	 use	 of	 information	 by	 patent	 owners,	 although	
the	 information	 they	 protect	 may	 include	 some	 public	 good	 elements	 such	 as	
non-excludability,	which	 reflects	 the	character	of	knowledge	as	a	public	good.185	
While	 technical	 standardization	 is	meant	 to	 transform	 ideas	 into	a	public	good,	
patent	protection	transforms	them	into	a	private	good.	
The	 literature	 emphasizes	 that	 standards	 import	 into	 the	 innovation	
process	 a	 body	 of	 technological	 knowledge,	 i.e.	 a	 store	 of	 useful	 technological	
knowledge	 that	 is	 shared	 by	 those	 working	 in	 the	 particular	 area,186	which	 is	
spread	more	widely	as	public	information,	as	a		“public	good”.187		
The	 conflicting	 characteristic	 of	 public	 good	 and	 private	 good,	 which	
translates	into	a	contraposition	between	public	interests	and	private	interests,	lies	
                                                                                                                                 
Standardization	 in	 the	 Information	 Age,	 in	 DASGUPTA	 &	 STONEMAN	 (EDS.)	 ECONOMIC	 POLICY	 AND	
TECHNOLOGICAL	PERFORMANCE	(CAMBRIDGE;	CAMBRIDGE	UNIVERSITY	PRESS	1987),	pp.	206-234.	
183	C.	P.	Kindleberger,	Standards	as	Public,	Collective	and	Private	Goods,	in	KYKLOS	(1983):	VOL.	36,	pp.	
377-396.	
184	W.	J.	BAUMOL,	A.	S.	BLINDER,		ECONOMICS:	PRINCIPLES	AND	POLICY,	5TH	ED.	FORT	WORTH,	TX:	HARCOURT	
BRACE	JOVANOVICH,	1991,	p.	617.	
185	J.	STIGLIZ,	KNOWLEDGE	AS	A	GLOBAL	PUBLIC	GOOD,	CASE	STUDIES:	KNOWLEDGE	AND	INFORMATION,	1999,	p.	
308.	
186	R.	R.	Nelson,	What	is	public	and	what	is	private	about	technology?,	CCC	Working	Paper	No.	90-9,	
Center	for	Research	in	Management,	University	of	California,	Berkeley,	1990.	
187	K.	 Blind,	 N.	 Thumm,	 E.	 Iversen,	 K.	 Hossain,	 R.	 van	 Reekum,	 B.	 Rixius,	 R.	 Bierhals,	 J.	 Sillwood,	
Interaction	 between	 Standardization	 and	 Intellectual	 Property	 Rights,	 TECHNICAL	REPORT,	EUR	21074	
EN,	2004,	p.	54.	
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at	 the	heart	of	 the	controversies	 that	characterize	 the	role	of	patents	 in	 the	 ICT	
standards	sector.			
4.3. TECHNOLOGICAL VARIETY VS. SELECTION  
It	 is	 also	 possible	 to	 interpret	 the	 tension	 between	 standards	 and	 IP	 as	 a	
contested	 interface	between	 the	need	 to	 assure	 the	 creation	of	 technical	 variety	
assured	 by	 the	 patent	 regime	 and	 the	 selection	 process	 entailed	 by	
standardization.	 Technical	 variety	 assured	 by	 the	 patent	 regime	 “conveys	
efficiencies	 in	 specialization	 and	 customization	 (of	 network	 technology)	 that	 are	
offset	 by	 the	 failure	 to	 achieve	 network	 externalities	 and	 other	 economies	 of	
scale”.188	The	selection	process	entailed	by	standardization,	“[i]n	reducing	diversity,	
[…]	 curtails	 the	 potentialities	 for	 the	 formation	 of	 new	 combinations	 and	 the	
regeneration	 of	 variety	 from	 which	 further	 selection	 will	 be	 possible.” 189 	The	
economic	 literature	 has	 understood	 this	 intersection	 as	 a	 dynamic	 trade-off	
enabling	a	“virtuous	circle	of	generation	and	distribution	of	new	knowledge”.190	
This	ongoing	 interaction	and	constant	rebalancing	assures	 that	 in	markets	
characterized	by	innovation,	where	the	market	plays	the	role	of	ultimate	selection	
tool,	 a	 surplus	 of	 technological	 variety	 would	 impair	 innovation	 and	 the	
distribution	 of	 new	 knowledge. 191 	Commentators	 have	 indeed	 warned	 against	
unfettered	diversity	in	network	technology	based	on	interconnection	as	the	value	
of	 network	 technology	 is	 ultimately	 linked	 to	 its	 user	 base.192	Consequently,	 too	
much	diversity	would	likely	create	a	highly	fragmented	market	unsustainable	for	
                                                
188	W.	 E.	 Steinmueller,	The	 political	 economy	 of	 data	 communication	 standards,	 	 in	 R.	HAWKINS,	R.	
MANSELL,	J.	SKEA	(EDS.)	STANDARDS,	INNOVATION	AND		COMPETITIVENESS	(ALDERSHOT,	1995),	pp.	172-191.	
189	P.	A.	David,	D.	Foray,	Accessing	 and	 expanding	 the	 science	 	 and	 technology	 knowledge	 base,	 STI	
REVIEW	(1995).	
190	D.	Foray,	The	economics	of	intellectual	property	rights	and	systems	of	innovation:	the	persistence	of	
national	 practices,	 in	 HAGEDOORN	 (ED)	TECHNICAL	CHANGE	AND	 THE	WORLD	ECONOMY	 (EWARD	ELGAR	
1995),	pp.	109-133.	
191	In	this	vein,	Foray	holds	that	too	much	change	prevents	innovations	from	diffusing	widely.	Id.	
192		On	 the	 relevance	 of	 interconnections,	 see	 Metcalfe’s	 law,	 which	 holds	 that	 the	 value	 of	 a	
telecommunications	network	 is	 proportional	 to	 the	 square	 of	 the	number	 of	 users	 of	 the	network.	
The	law	was	named	by	George	Gilder	in	the	1990s.	G.	Gilder,	Metcalfe’s	Law	and	legacy,	Forbes	ASAP,	
Sept.	 13,	 1993.	For	a	critique,	Andrew	Odlyzko,	Benjamin	Tilly,	A	 refutation	of	Metcalfe’s	 Law	and	a	
better	estimate	 for	 the	value	of	networks	and	network	 interconnections,	Manuscript,	March	2	(2005):	
2005.	
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manufacturers,	 service	providers	 and	 customers.193	This	 extremely	 varied	market	
would	 simply	 be	 overwhelmed	 with	 incompatible	 technology,	 which	 could	
ultimately	shrink	the	value	of	technological	innovation	for	consumers.	Moreover,	
simultaneously,	 the	 provision	 of	 new	 ideas	would	 similarly	 be	 hindered	 for	 the	
reason	that	market	prospects	would	be	a	deterrent	to	potential	investors.194		
The	 issue	 can	 thus	 be	 framed	 as	 follows:	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	 balance	 the	
structures	 aimed	 at	 fostering	 the	 generation	 of	 further	 technological	 variety,	
protecting	 IP,	 and	 the	 structures	 that	 foster	 the	 wider	 distribution	 of	 new	
knowledge	 into	 the	 public	 sphere.	 The	 equilibrium	 between	 private	 and	 public	
knowledge	is	a	continuous	issue	for	SSOs,	government	agencies	and	industry,	as	
conflicts	may	 result	 in	 greater	 costs.195	The	most	 common	 issues	 in	 this	 context	
are	 licensing	of	 IPRs	 incorporated	 in	 standards	and	 infringement	of	undisclosed	
and	 unknown	 IPRs.	 For	 instance,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 ex-post	 disclosure	 of	 IPRs	 in	 a	
“patent	 ambush”.196	This	 occurs	 when	 the	 owner	 of	 a	 proprietary	 technology	
intentionally	 disguises	 a	 SEP	 during	 the	 standard-setting	 process	 to	 extract	
artificially	inflated	royalties	for	his	or	her	patented	technology	after	the	standard	
has	been	set.197		
4.4. IP AND STANDARDIZATION: COMPLEMENTARY INSTITUTIONAL 
DEVICES OF MARKET REGULATION  
Against	 this	 background,	 the	 conflict	 between	 IP	 and	 standardization	 is	
mainly	potential	in	nature.	The	inherent	tension	derives	from	the	fact	that	these	
two	mechanisms	perform	 functions	 that	do	not	 conflict	 but	 rather	 complement	
each	 other	 within	 the	 innovation	 process.	 Their	 relationship	 should	 indeed	 be	
envisaged	as	complementary	as	ideally	the	incentive	function	of	IPRs	and	the	role	
of	 reducing	 uncertainty	 usually	 associated	with	 standards,	 works	 collectively	 in	
                                                
193	K.	 Blind,	 N.	 Thumm,	 E.	 Iversen,	 K.	 Hossain,	 R.	 van	 Reekum,	 B.	 Rixius,	 R.	 Bierhals,	 J.	 Sillwood,	
Interaction	 between	 Standardization	 and	 Intellectual	 Property	 Rights,	 TECHNICAL	REPORT,	EUR	21074	
EN,	2004,	p.	52.	
194	Ibid.	
195	G.	 Lea,	 P.	 Hall,	 Standards	 and	 intellectual	 property	 rights:	 an	 economic	 and	 legal	 perspective,	
INFORMATION	ECONOMICS	AND	POLICY	16	(2004),	p.	71.	
196	K.	 Blind,	 Standardization:	 a	 catalyst	 for	 innovation,	 THE	 REVIEW	OF	 ECONOMIC	 STUDIES.	 ERASMUS	
RESEARCH	INSTITUTE	OF	MANAGEMENT	(28	August	2009).	
197	Communication	from	the	Commission	to	the	European	Parliament,	the	Council	and	the	European	
Economic	and	Social	Committee,	An	Industrial	Property	Rights	Strategy	for	Europe,	COM	(2008)	465	
final,	9.	
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the	interest	of	all	stakeholders.198	Working	in	tandem	allows	these	mechanisms	to	
set	the	foundations	for	sustainable	innovation.199		
This	 does	 not	 imply	 that	 the	 tensions	 highlighted	 do	 not	 exist.	 These	
tensions	stem	from	divergences	between	the	investors’	interests	and	the	collective	
interests	 of	 the	 market	 sectors	 affected	 by	 the	 technology	 in	 question.	 More	
generally,	 they	 stem	 from	 the	 need	 to	 ensure	 technological	 variety	 and	 allow	 a	
technology-selection	 mechanism	 in	 the	 interests	 of	 manufacturers,	 service	
providers	and	consumers.	The	potentially	conflicting	relationship	is	an	important	
part	 of	 the	 innovation-process,	 understood	 in	 evolutionary	 terms.	The	 interplay	
between	patents	and	standardization	spurs	a	co-evolution	of	both	technology	and	
the	 institutional	 framework.	The	 institutional	 framework	 is	 forced	to	evolve	and	
its	evolution	directly	affects	and	 influences	 the	development	of	 technology.200	In	
this	vein,	the	literature	has	clarified	that	“evolution	 is	 the	result	of	 two	seemingly	
contradictory	processes:	the	creation	of	variety	and	its	successive	reduction	through	
selection.	Effective	 long-term	adaptation	requires	that	these	two	processes	be	kept	
in	balance”.201	
This	 conclusion	 finds	 support	 in	 a	 conceptual	 framework	 that	 places	
standards	 in	 the	broader	 technological	and	economic	development	context.	The	
literature	on	the	role	of	innovation	and	IPRs	envisages	economic	development	as	
“catching-up”,	defined	as	“the	process	 in	which	a	developing	 country	narrows	 the	
                                                
198	The	 literature	 has	 categorized	 the	 relationship	 between	 patents	 and	 formal	 standardization	 as	
institutional	 elements	 of	 the	 technology	 infrastructure,	 which	 includes	 institutional	 arrangements	
that	 legitimate,	 regulate	 and	 standardize	 new	 technology,	 public	 resource	 endowments	 of	 basic	
scientific	 knowledge,	 financing	mechanisms	 and	 a	 pool	 of	 competent	 labor,	 as	 well	 as	 proprietary	
R&D,	 manufacturing,	 marketing,	 and	 distribution	 functions	 that	 are	 required	 to	 develop	 and	
commercialize	innovation.	Andrew	H.	Van	de	Ven,	The	Emergence	of	an	Industrial	Infrastructure	for	
Technological	 Innovation,	 JOURNAL	OF	COMPARATIVE	ECONOMICS	17(1993),	p.	339.	Other	commentators	
have	envisaged	their	complementary	role	as	components	of	a	wider	 institutional	set-up	or	as	 infra-
technologies.	K.	Blind,	The	Role	of	Technical	Standards	for	the	National	Innovation	System:	Empirical	
Evidence	 from	 Germany,	 Proceedings	 of	 the	 Conference	 “Innovation	 and	 Enterprise	 Creation	 -	
Statistics	and	Indicators”	in	Sophia	Antipolis,	November	2000,	pp.	2-9.	
199	K.	 Blind,	 N.	 Thumm,	 E.	 Iversen,	 K.	Hossain,	 R.	 van	 Reekum,	 B.	 Rixius,	 R.	 Bierhals,	 J.	 Sillwood,	
Interaction	 between	 Standardization	 and	 Intellectual	 Property	 Rights,	 TECHNICAL	REPORT,	EUR	21074	
EN,	2004,	p.	44.	
200	On	 the	 co-evolution	 phenomenon,	 see	 R.	 R.	 Nelson,	 The	 co-evolution	 of	 technology,	 industrial	
structure,	and	supporting	structure,	3(1)	INDUSTRIAL	AND	CORPORATE	CHANGE	(1994),	pp.	47-63.	
201	B.	Carlsson,	R.	Stankiewicz,	On	the	Nature,	Function	and	Composition	of	Technological	Systems,	in	
HORST	HANUSCH	(ED),	THE	LEGACY	OF	JOSEPH	A.	SCHUMPETER.	VOLUME	1	(1999)	INTELLECTUAL	LEGACIES	IN	
MODERN	ECONOMICS,	VOL.	4	(CHELTENHAM,	U.K.	AND	NORTHAMPTON,	MASS.:	ELGAR	1999),	pp.	488-513.	
 57 
gap	in	productivity	and	income	relative	to	a	leading	country”.202	In	this	catching-up	
context,	 technological	 advancement	 is	 key	 to	 successful	 advancements.	
Nonetheless,	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 IPRs	 and	 innovation	
clarifies	the	non-sufficiency	of	IPRs	as	an	incentive	to	innovate.	In	fact,	economic	
development	must	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 complex	 process	 striving	 to	 develop	 the	
innovative	 capabilities	 of	 firms	 in	 order	 to	 broaden	 innovation	 regimes,	 which	
include	standards.	
This	duality-complementarity	is	vested	in	the	larger	context	concerning	the	
economic	organization	of	society.	 It	can	 in	 fact	be	argued	that	 IP	and	standards	
are	both	the	result	of	market	regulation.	Standards	are	in	the	form	of	government	
regulation	or	industry	self-regulation	and	aim	at	reducing	variety	in	technological	
innovation.	They	thereby	restrict	the	choices	available	to	business	and	consumers.	
This	 restriction	 on	 the	 dynamics	 of	 the	 free	 market	 paradigm	 by	 means	 of	
regulation	 is	 nonetheless	 limited,	 as	 standards	 are	 often	 justified	 by	 economic,	
technical	efficiency,	which	generally	has	beneficial	effects	on	competition.203	
IP	 is	 also	 the	 product	 of	 regulation,	 as	 exclusive	 rights	 are	 granted	 by	
intervention	of	the	 law.	IP	and	standardization	must	therefore	be	understood	as	
complementary	 institutional	 devices	 of	 market	 regulation,	 interfering	 with	 the	
free	market.	In	general,	it	can	be	said	that	the	impact	of	standardization	on	IP	is	
dictated	by	the	interference	of	regulation	in	free	markets.	Relying	on	Nuno	Pires	
de	Carvalho’s	analysis,	given	that	IP	protects	differentiation,	and	granted	that	free	
markets	prosper	when	differentiation	 is	 in	place,	market	 regulation	distorts	 free	
markets	and,	as	a	 result,	 logically	distorts	 IP.	Consequently,	 standardization	can	
be	understood	as	being	the	most	radical	form	of	market	regulation,	as	it	distorts	
IP	by	impacting	on	the	way	in	which	IPRs	are	acquired	and	used;	including	on	the	
exercise	 of	 the	 right	 to	 exclude	 others	 from	 unauthorized	 use,	 and	 the	
countervailing	right	to	license.		
                                                
202 	H.	 ODAGIRI,	 A.	 GORO,	 A.	 TSUNAMI,	 AND	 R.	 R.	 NELSON	 (EDS.),	 	 INTELLECTUAL	 PROPERTY	 RIGHTS,	
DEVELOPMENT,	AND	CATCH-UP	(LONDON:	OXFORD	UNIVERSITY	PRESS,	2012),	Chapter	1.	
203	See,	e.g.,	Ruben	Schellingerhout,	Standard-setting	from	a	competition	law	perspective,	COMPETITION	
POL’Y	NEWL.	 1,	 3	 (2011):	 “Standards	 have	 a	 positive	 effect	 in	 the	 economy	 insofar	 as	 they	 promote	
economic	 interpenetration	 in	 the	common	market	or	encourage	 the	development	of	new	markets	and	
improved	supply	conditions.	Standards	tend	to	 increase	competition	and	allow	lower	output	and	sales	
costs,	thus	benefiting	the	economy	as	a	whole”.	
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5. COMPETITION CONCERNS AND IP IN INNOVATIVE MARKETS 	
The	nature	of	competition	 in	 innovative	markets	should	be	assessed	vis-à-
vis	 standardization.	 The	 legal	 and	 economic	 literature	 has	 stressed	 the	 role	 of	
standards	 as	 trade	 facilitators	 and	 innovation	 enablers	 as	 they	 can	 foster	
economic	 growth	 by	 curtailing	 transaction	 costs	 and	 allowing,	 by	 means	 of	
interconnectivity,	economies	of	scale.204	Nevertheless,	standards	may	also	be	used	
as	 a	 tool	 to	 hinder	 competition	 and	 block	 access	 to	 the	 market.205	Moreover,	
standards,	by	 freezing	a	given	 innovative	technology,	give	stability	and	certainty	
to	market	players	and,	more	generally,	 to	 international	 trade.	At	 the	same	time,	
stability	is	constantly	challenged	and	fine-tuned	by	new	products	that	incorporate	
valuable	knowledge.		
5.1. COMPETITION AS A DISCOVERY PROCESS OF CREATIVE DESTRUCTION 
A	 useful	 theoretical	 framework	 assessing	 the	 relationship	 between	
innovation,	competition	and	standards	is	provided	by	Joseph	Schumpeter’s	theory	
on	 capitalism	 as	 an	 evolutionary	 process	 of	 creative	 destruction. 206 	For	
Schumpeter,	 capitalism	 is	 by	 nature	 a	 form	 or	 method	 of	 economic	 change.	
Change	represents	the	central	urge	underpinning	the	capitalist	system,	 in	which	
newcomers	 constantly	 outcompete	 the	 established	 economic	 structure	 from	
within,	constantly	crafting	a	new	way	of	doing	business.207	The	salient	 feature	of	
capitalism	 is	 not	 “	 how	 [it]	 administrates	 existing	 structures,	 […]	 the	 relevant	
problem	is	how	it	creates	and	destroys	them.”	In	other	words,	what	is	important	is	
how	 to	maintain	markets	 as	 competitive	by	preserving	 the	 faculty	of	destroying	
old	structures	to	create	new	ones.208		
                                                
204	As	research	on	economic	standardization	has	pointed	out,	“	[s]tandards	affect	the	R&D,	production,	
and	market	penetration	stages	of	economic	activity	and	therefore	have	a	significant	collective	effect	on	
innovation,	 productivity,	 and	 market	 structure”.	 G.	 Tassey,	 Standardization	 in	 Technology-based	
Markets,	RESEARCH	POLICY	29	(2000),	p.	587.	
205	Mark	A.	Lemley,	Intellectual	property	rights	and	standard-setting	organizations,	90	CALIFORNIA	LAW	
REVIEW	6	(2002),	pp.	1889-1980.	
206	JOSEPH	 SCHUMPETER,	 CAPITALISM,	 SOCIALISM	 AND	DEMOCRACY	 (GEORGE	ALLEN	&	UNWIN,	 1976,	 p.	 82;	
JOSEPH	SCHUMPETER,	CAPITALISM,	 SOCIALISM	AND	DEMOCRACY	 (BOSTON,	MA:	HARVARD	UNIVERSITY	PRESS	
1942).	
207	Id.,	p.	81.	
208	BJÖRN	LUNDQVIST,	STANDARDIZATION	UNDER	EU	COMPETITION	RULES	AND	US	ANTITRUST	LAWS:	THE	RISE	
AND	LIMITS	OF	SELF-REGULATION	(EDWARD	ELGAR	PUBLISHING	2014),	p.	98.	
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Zooming	 into	 the	patent	system,	 the	patent	system	provides	 the	discovery	
process	with	competition	by	 infusing	exclusivity.	The	patenting	regime	could	be	
interpreted	 as	 working	 similarly	 to	 a	 “lottery”	 mechanism,	 by	 which	 the	
innovation	 process	 is	 infused	 with	 unpredictability,209	as	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 to	
assess	 which	 goods	 are	 plagued	 by	 scarcity,	 before	 they	 are	 exposed	 to	
competition.	According	to	Friedrich	A.	Hayek’s	theory	of	the	discovery	process,	if	
the	 unpredictability	 characterizing	 this	 framework	 was	 not	 in	 place,	 and	 for	
instance	there	was	a	system	where	some	authority	decided	which	goods	were	to	
be	 considered	 scarce	 or	 innovative,	 it	would	not	 be	possible	 to	 reach	 as	 good	 a	
decision	as	a	decentralized	process	of	competition	based	on	consumers,	a	process	
better	able	to	allocate	resources.210			
In	 the	 context	 of	 innovation,	 competition	 therefore	 seems	 better	
understood	 as	 a	 discovery	 process	 of	 creative	 destruction,	 to	 which	 the	 central	
concern	 is	 not	 represented	 by	 a	 supra-competitive	 process,	 but	 rather	 in	 the	
incentive	 of	 the	 entrepreneur	 to	 perpetuate	 and	 evolve	 the	 process	 itself.	 This	
notion	of	competition	coincides	with	a	“trial	and	error”	conceptual	framework,	i.e.	
a	notion	of	competition	corresponding	to	the	continual	game	or	struggle	of	two	or	
more	 parties	 acting	 autonomously	 to	 secure	 the	 business	 of	 third	 parties	 by	
offering	the	most	favorable	terms.211		
However,	 while	 Hayek’s	 and	 Schumpeter’s	 models	 of	 competition	 as	 a	
discovery	 process	 and	 as	 creative	 destruction	 have	 the	 merit	 of	 providing	 a	
conceptual	 framework	 concerning	why	 and	how	 initial	 decisions	 lead	 to	 certain	
innovation	 trajectories	 and	 exclude	 other	 alternatives,	 they	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 be	
applied	 to	 certain	 standard-setting	procedures.	This	 is	because	 they	often	entail	
collective	 or	 cumulative	 cooperative	 efforts	 rather	 than	 a	 competitive	 process.	
When	innovation	is	mainly	cooperation-driven,	cumulative	changes	might	result	
                                                
209	On	 the	 patent	 system	 as	 a	 lottery-like	 regime	 characterized	 by	 unpredictability,	 see	 Fredric	
Scherer,	The	 Innovation	 Lottery,	 in	 ROCHELLE	DREYFUSS	 ET	 AL.	 (EDS.),	 EXPANDING	 THE	BOUNDARIES	OF	
INTELLECTUAL	PROPERTY	(OXFORD	UNIVERSITY	PRESS,	2000),	pp.	4	et	seq.		
210	See	 FRIEDRICH	 A.	 HAYEK,	 NEW	 STUDIES	 ON	 PHILOSOPHY,	 POLITICS,	 ECONOMICS,	 AND	 THE	 HISTORY	 OF	
IDEAS	(ROUTLEDGE	AND	K.	PAUL,	1978),	pp.	185	et	seq.		
211Dominick	Armentano,	Competition	Theory	and	the	Market	Economy,	in	JACK	HIGH	AND	WAYNE	GABIE	
(EDS.),	 A	 CENTURY	 OF	 THE	 SHERMAN	 ACT:	 AMERICAN	 ECONOMIC	 OPINION,	 1890-1990	 (GEORGE	 MASON	
UNIVERSITY	PRESS,	1992),	p.	202.	
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in	 a	 “dominant	 design”, 212 	ultimately	 decreasing	 incentives	 for	 exploring	
alternative	innovation	trajectories.	
5.2. PATENT THICKETS 
The	number	of	patent	applications	 received	by	national	patent	offices	and	
the	number	of	patents	granted	by	such	offices	have	been	increasing	dramatically	
since	the	1980s	and	have	remained	constant	in	the	2000s.213	The	reason	for	these	
exponential	 growth	 rates	 is,	 chiefly,214	the	 increasing	development	of	 technology	
innovation	 markets,	 where	 new	 technological	 products	 rely	 on	 thousands	 of	
components,	 almost	 all	 protected	 by	 patents.	 In	 these	markets	 innovative	 firms	
systematically	apply	for	patents	every	time	they	invent	an	incremental	innovation	
that	essentially	represents	a	marginal	advancement	 in	the	sector.	 In	this	context	
innovation	 is	 essentially	 cumulative215	and	 cumulative	 changes	might	 result	 in	 a	
“dominant	 design”,216	ultimately	 decreasing	 incentives	 for	 exploring	 alternative	
innovation	trajectories.	
Hence,	 the	 proliferation	 of	 patented	 innovations	 has	 triggered	 the	
flourishing	of	“patent	thickets”,	defined	as	a	“dense	web	of	overlapping	intellectual	
property	 rights	 that	 a	 company	 must	 hack	 its	 way	 through	 in	 order	 to	 actually	
commercialize	 new	 technology”.217	Patent	 thickets	 are	 especially	 predominant	 in	
                                                
212	J.	M.	Utterback,	W.	 J.	Abernathy,	A	 dynamic	model	 of	 process	 and	 product	 innovation,	OMEGA,	 3	
(1975),	pp.639-56.	
213	According	to	the	International	Telecommunications	Union	(the	“ITU”),	from	2003	to	2012	the	total	
number	 of	 patents	 granted	 by	 the	 world’s	 five	 largest	 patent	 offices	 almost	 doubled,	 rising	 from	
500,000	 to	 924,000.	 ITU,	 Understanding	 patents,	 competition	 and	 standardization	 in	 an	
interconnected	world,	2014,	p.	35,	reporting	statistics	elaborated	by	five	IP	offices	(2013)	2012	key	IP5	
statistical	data.	
214	The	literature	has	explored	in	depth	the	reasons	underlying	the	PROLIFERATION	OF	PATENT	THICKETS.	
For	example,	B.H.	Hall	et	al,	A	Study	of	Patent	Thickets	(UK	Intellectual	Property	Office	2013),	pp.	17	
et	seq,	has	identified	the	following	reasons:	(i)	the	strengthening	of	patent	rights	in	the	US;	(ii)	the	
cumulative	 nature	 of	 science	 and	 the	 extension	 of	 technology;	 (iii)	 shifts	 in	 the	 degree	 of	
technological	 opportunity	 in	 various	 key	 technologies;	 (iv)	 strategic	 patenting	 and	 the	 increase	 in	
PAEs;	(v)	the	lack	of	resources	and	misaligned	incentives	at	patent	offices;	and	(vi)	growth	in	trade	of	
high	technology	products.	
215	FTC,	To	Promote	 Innovation:	The	Proper	Balance	of	Competition	and	Patent	Law	and	Policy	(FTC	
2003),	pp.	25	et	seq.	
216	J.	M.	Utterback,	W.	 J.	Abernathy,	A	 dynamic	model	 of	 process	 and	 product	 innovation,	OMEGA,	 3	
(1975)	pp.	639-656.	
217	Carl	Shapiro,	Navigating	the	Patent	Thicket:	Cross	Licenses,	Patent	Pools	and	Standard	Setting,	in	
ADAM	JAFFE	ET	AL.	(EDS.),	INNOVATION	POLICY	AND	THE	ECONOMY	(MIT	PRESS	2001),	p.	119.	See	also	Pierre	
Regibeau	 and	 Katharine	 Rockett,	Assessment	 of	 Potential	 Anticompetitive	 Conduct	 in	 the	 Field	 of	
Intellectual	 Property	 Rights	 and	 Assessment	 of	 the	 Interplay	 Between	 Competition	 Policy	 and	 IPR	
Protection,	in	COMP/2010/16	(ED)	(EUROPEAN	UNION,	2011),	pp.	12	et	seq.	
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the	 ICT	 sector	 in	which	 innovation	 is	 reflected	 in	 products	 protected	by	 a	 high	
number	of	patents	that	are	fragmented	among	several	holders.	In	fact,	ICT	firms	
file	 patent	 applications	 even	 covering	 minor	 advancements	 or	 modifications	 of	
prior	 innovations.	 Patent	 offices	 are	 thus	 required	 to	 assess	whether	 the	 patent	
applications	concern	an	improvement	that	is	new	and	contain	an	innovative	step	
over	the	state	of	the	art,	so	as	to	justify	the	granting	of	protection	ensured	by	the	
exclusive	 rights	 afforded	 by	 a	 patent.218 	Lowering	 the	 burden	 of	 proof	 for	 a	
patent’s	 credentials	 concerning	novelty	 and	 the	 inventive	 step	poses	 a	 threat	 of	
proliferation	of	low	quality	patents,	thus	increasing	patent	thickets.	Actually,	it	is	
believed	 that	 lenient	 control	 over	 the	 innovative	 step	 and	 novelty	 requirement	
has	 contributed	 to	 the	 increase	 in	 patent	 thickets,	 as	 patent	 thickets	 are	 often	
composed	of	patents	of	 	poor	quality.	219	Patent	thickets	can	be	eliminated	at	the	
root	by	ensuring	that	patent	offices	only	grant	patent	protection	to	genuine,	high-
quality	 inventions.	 This	 would	 also	 reduce	 the	 number	 of	 patents	 likely	 to	 be	
invalidated,	 thus	 decreasing	 patent	 offices’	 backlog	 and,	 as	 a	 consequence,	
increasing	certainty	 for	patent	applicants	and	potential	competitors	 in	 their	 ICT	
sector	strategy,	which	concerns	the	lifecycle	of	strategic	products.220	
The	 proliferation	 of	 patents	 can	 also	 be	 explained	 in	 light	 of	 the	 greater	
collaboration	 in	 R&D,	 the	 growth	 of	 international	 trade	 and	 the	 further	
globalization	of	markets.	It	has	also	been	pointed	out	that	the	increased	number	
of	 patents	 is	 caused	 by	 the	 improvement	 in	 patent	 holders’	 standing	 in	 patent	
infringement	lawsuits,	generated	by	changes	in	jurisprudence,	which,	in	turn	has	
brought	about	an	increase	in	IP	claims.221	
                                                
218	For	instance,	only	half	of	the	patent	applications	filed	with	[the	European	Patent	Office	(the	“EPO”)	
are	granted,	with	the	other	half	either	being	refused	or	withdrawn	during	the	examination	process.	
Of	the	patents	granted,	approximately	half	have	their	scope	reduced	by	the	EPO.		
219	BJÖRN	LUNDQVIST,	STANDARDIZATION	UNDER	EU	COMPETITION	RULES	AND	US	ANTITRUST	LAWS:	THE	RISE	
AND	LIMITS	OF	SELF-REGULATION	(EDWARD	ELGAR	PUBLISHING	2014),	p.	30.	
220	ITU,	Understanding	patents,	competition	and	standardization	in	an	interconnected	world	(2014)	p.	
36.	 BJÖRN	 LUNDQVIST,	 STANDARDIZATION	UNDER	 EU	COMPETITION	RULES	 AND	US	ANTITRUST	 LAWS:	 THE	
RISE	AND	LIMITS	OF	SELF-REGULATION	(EDWARD	ELGAR	PUBLISHING,	2014),	p.	 30,	 stressing	 that	 it	 should	
nonetheless	 be	 noted	 that	 “in	 certain	 industries	 the	 complexity	 and	 specialization	 in	 R&D	 have	
increased	to	a	point	where	patent	thickets	can	evolve	‘naturally’,	since	incumbent	firms	cannot	develop	
'whole	technologies’,	but	only	different	fragments	of	the	same”.	
221	See	 for	 instance	A.	B.	JAFFE,	J.	LERNER,	INNOVATION	AND	ITS	DISCONTENTS:	HOW	OUR	BROKEN	PATENT	
SYSTEM	 IS	 ENDANGERING	 INNOVATION	 AND	 PROGRESS,	 AND	 WHAT	 TO	 DO	 ABOUT	 IT	 (PRINCETON,	 NJ:	
PRINCETON	UNIVERSITY	PRESS,	2006).			
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Moreover,	 the	 spread	 of	 intersecting	 patents	 is	 also	 caused	 by	 the	 greater	
transparency	 that	 characterizes	 certain	 industries	 today.	 In	 particular	 industries	
featuring	 research	 and	 development	 relying	 on	 technological-standards. 222	
Research	 and	 development	 objectives	 are	 discussed,	 and	 disclosed,	 during	 the	
pre-standardization	phase	within	the	technical	committees	of	SS0s,223		at	an	early	
stage	 of	 the	 life	 cycle	 of	 the	 technology,224	in	 a	 collective	 attempt	 to	 produce	
innovation.225	The	multiplication	of	standards	may	thus	generate	patent	thickets,	
as	 they	 act	 as	 arrangements	 between	 competitors	 regarding	 where	 to	 conduct	
research	and	development	activities	and	file	for	patents.	
The	multiplication	of	patents	and	patent	applications	also	poses	a	challenge	
to	 the	 identification	of	 infringements,226	as	 it	 can	 function	as	 an	entry	deterrent	
for	new	companies	 and	products.	The	 concern	 is	 that	potential	 competitors	 are	
deterred	from	entering	the	market	as	they	lack	a	patent	portfolio	in	which	several	
patents	are	essential	to	a	technology	or	standard.	Patents	within	a	patent	thicket	
are	often	used	 to	block	entry,	due	 to	 the	difficulty	of	 identifying	all	overlapping	
sets	 of	 patents,	 requiring	 those	 who	 enter	 the	 market	 commercializing	 new	
technology	 to	 obtain	 licenses	 from	 multiple	 patentees.227	This	 strategic	 use	 of	
patents	 today	 represents	 a	 common	 business	 practice	 for	 undertakings	 in	 the	
network	 industries,	where	 they	 are	 used	 as	 “bargaining	 chips”.228	The	 larger	 the	
patent	 portfolios,	 the	 stronger	 the	 bargaining	 position	 of	 the	 firms,	 which	 will	
more	easily	defect	infringement	claims.	This	pre-emptive	patenting	model	in	the	
context	of	patent	 thickets	 triggers	an	 incentive	 for	 firms	 to	apply	 for	even	more	
                                                
222	Maurits	Dolmans,	Standards	 For	 Standards,	 26	FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 163	 (2002),	
pp.	171	et	seq.,	especially	p.	172.	
223	Id.	
224	Carl	Cargill,	Intellectual	Property	Rights	and	Standard	Setting	Organizations:	An	Overview	of	Failed	
Evolution,	 	 27	March	 2012	 	 FTC/DOJ	Hearings	 on	 Competition	 and	 Intellectual	 Property	 Law	 and	
Policy	in	the	Knowledge	Based	Economy,	l,	pp.	2	et	seq.	
225 	Josef	 Drexl,	 Anti-competitive	 Stumbling	 Stones	 on	 the	 Way	 to	 a	 Cleaner	 World:	 Protecting	
Competition	 in	 Innovation	Without	 a	Market,	8	JOURNAL	OF	COMPETITION	LAW	&	ECONOMICS	(2012),	p.	
507.	
226	J.	BESSEN,	M.	J.	MEURER,	PATENT	FAILURE:	HOW	JUDGES,	BUREAUCRATS,	AND	LAWYERS	PUT	INNOVATORS	AT	
RISK	(PRINCETON,	NJ:	PRINCETON	UNIVERSITY	PRESS	2008).	
227	Guillaume	Dufey,	Patents	and	Standardization:	Competition	Concerns	in	New	Technology	Markets,	
GLOBAL	ANTITRUST	 REVIEW	 2013,	 at	 13;	 Carl	 Shapiro,	Navigating	 the	 Patent	 Thicket:	 Cross	 Licenses,	
Patent	 Pools	 and	 Standard	 Setting,	 in	ADAM	JAFFE	ET	AL.	(EDS.),	INNOVATION	POLICY	AND	THE	ECONOMY	
(MIT	PRESS	2001),	p.	119.	
228	The	 concept	 of	 patents	 as	 “bargaining	 chips”	 has	 been	 elaborated	 by	 John	 Barton,	 Antitrust	
Treatment	of	Oligopolies	with	Mutual	Blocking	Patent	Portfolios,	69	ANTITRUST	LAW	JOURNAL	(2002)	p.	
854.	See	also	Michael	Katz	and	Carl	Shapiro,	Systems	Competition	and	Network	Effects,	8	JOURNAL	OF	
ECONOMIC	PERSPECTIVE	(1994)	93,	pp.	105	et	seq.	
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patents,	 flooding	 the	 high-technology	 markets	 with	 patents, 229 	in	 order	 to	
preserve	 their	 dominance	 in	 the	 industry.230	Potential	 competitors	 will	 then	 be	
excluded	from	entering	a	market	until	they	achieve	a	mutual	assured	destruction	
(“MAD”)	capability,231	i.e.	 a	 large	patent	portfolio	 to	be	used	as	a	defense	 tool	 to	
maintain	 their	 dominant	 position	 on	 the	 relevant	markets.	 The	 research	 shows	
that	 without	 MAD	 capability,	 the	 entrants	 may	 not	 be	 able	 to	 fend	 off	
infringement	claims	from	the	incumbent	firm.232	
A	 high-technology	 company	 could	 also	 be	 used	 as	 a	 commercial	 tool	 to	
extract	 high	 royalties	 or	 access	 to	 other	 technology	 in	 return	 for	 licensing	
agreements.233	Patent	 thickets	 carry	 with	 them	 the	 downside	 of	 increasing	 the	
price	 of	 production,	 given	 the	 sheer	 number	 of	 licenses	 that	 are	 likely	 to	 be	
obtained.		
5.3 PATENT ASSERTION ENTITIES 
In	the	context	of	patent	thickets,	we	often	encounter	technology-only	firms,	
commonly	 known	 as	 patent	 assertion	 entities	 (“PAEs”	 or	 patent	 trolls).234	Their	
business	 model	 involves	 purchasing	 patents,	 often	 in	 large	 numbers,	 and	
obtaining	 revenues	 by	 asserting	 those	 patents,	 with	 no	 conventional	 lines	 of	
business.235	While	some	of	those	entities	do	exercise	patents	that	they	have	earned,	
it	 is	more	common	that	they	merely	focus	on	acquiring	and	monetizing	patents,	
as	 the	 primary	 business	 model	 of	 PAEs	 is	 to	 license	 their	 patent	 portfolio	 to	
                                                
229	For	the	notion	of	“patent	flooding”,	although	with	specific	reference	to	the	biotechnology	sector,	
see	 Dietmar	 Harhoff	 et	 al.,	 The	 Strategic	 Use	 of	 Patents	 and	 its	 Implications	 for	 Enterprise	 and	
Competition	Policies,	in	final	report	to	the	Commission	in	Tender	for	ENTR/05/82,	(July	8,	2007),	p.	
175.	
230	On	the	capacity	of	incumbent	firms	to	preserve	their	dominance	through	strategic	patenting,	see	
Richard	Gilbert	and	David	Newberry,	Preemptive	Patenting	and	the	Persistence	of	Monopoly,	72	THE	
AMERICAN	 ECONOMIC	 REVIEW	 (1982)	 p.	 514,	 which	 defines	 such	 strategic	 patenting	 as	 pre-emptive	
patenting.			
231	Id.	
232	Id.	
233	Guillaume	Dufey,	Patents	and	Standardization:	Competition	Concerns	in	New	Technology	Markets,	
GLOBAL	ANTITRUST	REVIEW	2013,	p.	13.	
234	The	 notion	 of	 PAEs	 must	 be	 distinguished	 from	 “Non-Practicing	 Entities”	 (“NPEs”),	 which	 by	
contrast	refers	to	any	organization	that	holds	patents	but	does	not	use	them	in	any	of	its	own	practice	
or	services.	NPEs	are	frequently	remnants	of	practicing	entities	that	do	not	provide	products	on	the	
market	anymore.	ITU,	Understanding	patents,	 competition	and	standardization	 in	an	 interconnected	
world,	2014,	p.	37.	While	NPEs,	just	like	PAEs,	do	not	use	patents	to	provide	goods	and	services,	they	
may	 nonetheless	 engage	 in	 innovation	 and	 technology	 transfer.	 See	 Fiona	 Scott	Morton	 and	
Carl	Shapiro,	Strategic	Patent	Acquisition,	79	ANTITRUST	LAW	JOURNAL	463	(2014),	p.	465.	
235	Ibid.,	p.	464.	
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industrial	actors	to	obtain	licensing	fees	and,	in	some	cases,	to	threaten	to	enforce	
their	patent	rights	against	alleged	infringers,	in	an	effort	to	extort	licensing	fees.		
PAEs	adopt	diverse	business	strategies	to	exploit	these	opportunities,	 inter	
alia:	
I. some	PAEs	 aggregate	 thousands	 of	 patents	 by	 purchasing	masses	
of	 them,	 thereby	 boosting	monetization	 through	 litigation	 based	
on	 the	 combined	 portfolio,	 which	 is	 extremely	 profitable.	 This	
mechanism	 allows	 PAEs	 to	 attain	 a	 rather	 innovative	 kind	 of	
economies	of	scale;	
II. some	PAEs	assert	a	small	amount	of	patents	against	many	targets.	
One	 version	 of	 this	 involves	 assertions	 that	 have	 elements	 of	
nuisance	 suits,	 where	 targets	 can	 settle	 for	 less	 than	 the	 cost	 of	
litigation.236	
PAEs	profit	 from	 the	 excessively	 elevated	expenses	 suffered	by	defendants	
in	patent-infringement	proceedings,	as	well	as	the	business	risks	connected	to	the	
modification	 of	 a	 good	 or	withdrawal	 from	 a	market	 as	 a	 result	 of	 a	 successful	
litigation.237	In	 fact,	 PAEs	 often	 	 stay	 dormant,	 	waiting	 for	 industrial	 players	 to	
research	and	develop,	design	and	eventually	produce	new	goods,	 and	 then	hold	
up	 the	 innovative	 product	 by	 taking	 legal	 action	 for	 patent	 infringements	 or	
requesting	 excessively	 high	 licensing	 fees.	 Faced	 with	 these	 options,	 industrial	
players	find	themselves	forced	to	pay	the	PAEs,	therefore	divesting	the	market	of	
the	financial	resources	that	could	be	employed	for	more	advantageous	objectives,	
for	instance	investments	in	further	research	and	development	endeavors.238	
While	patent	aggregation	is	not	a	new	trend,	current	empirical	evidence	on	
patent	 litigation	 and	 data	 on	 ICT	 cases239	shows	 a	 noticeable	 increase	 in	 how	
                                                
236	Fiona	Scott	Morton,	Carl	Shapiro,	Strategic	Patent	Acquisitions,	(July	2,	2013).	
237	ITU,	Understanding	patents,	 competition	and	 standardization	 in	an	 interconnected	world,	2014,	p.	
37.	
238	Subramanian	 gives	 the	 example	 of	 the	 Blackberry	 case,	 where	 RIM	 was	 sued	 by	 the	 patent	
assertion	entity	New	Technologies	Products	and	finally	entered	into	a	$612.5	million	settlement.	See	
Sujitha	 Subramanian,	 Patent	 Trolls	 in	 Thickets:	 Who	 is	 Fishing	 Under	 the	 Bridge,	 30	 EUROPEAN	
INTELLECTUAL	PROPERTY	REVIEW	(2008),	p.	182.	
239	Robin	 Feldman,	 Tom	 Ewing,	 and	 Sara	 Jeruss,	 The	 AIA	 500	 Expanded:	 The	 Effects	 of	 Patent	
Monetization	Entities,	17	UCLA	J.L.	&	TECH.	1,	7	(2013),	pointing	out	that	Patent	Monetization	Entities	
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patents	are	purchased	and	asserted	by	specialists,	such	as	PAEs,	leaving	no	doubt	
about	the	growing	role	that	these	entities	are	playing	in	the	patent	ecosystem.240		
Yet,	 the	 role	 of	 PAEs	 is	 not	 unequivocal.	 Some	 commentators	 have	
interpreted	 the	 role	 of	 PAEs	more	 favorably,	 envisaging	 PAEs	 as	 intermediaries	
between	firms	and	inventors	in	the	market	for	innovation.	241	Indeed,	PAEs	could	
help	the	inventor	–	who	often	lacks	the	assets	to	exploit	the	invention	–	to	(i)	find	
downstream	 firms	 to	 which	 the	 technology	 can	 be	 transferred,	 (ii)	 detect	 the	
dishonest	 firms	 that	 are	 illegally	 employing	 the	 patented	 technology	 without	
paying	 royalties,	 and	 (iii)	 negotiate	 reasonable	 royalties,	 thanks	 to	 its	 litigation	
know-how.	According	to	this	perspective,	PAEs	may	play	a	crucial	role	in	assuring	
returns	to	inventors,	thus	promoting	innovation	and	competition.242	
This	 favorable	 view	 of	 the	 role	 of	 PAEs	 seems	 confirmed	 in	 the	 current	
patent	market,	which	features	a	greater	opportunity	to	monetize	patent	portfolios,	
hence	 fostering	 the	 upsurge	 of	 institutions	 capable	 to	 ease	 the	 process	 of	
commercializing	this	asset243	in	an	effort	to	further	diversify	risk	since	the	return	
on	IP	may	not	be	strictly	connected	with	returns	on	other	assets	such	as	stocks	or	
commodities:244	“In	response	to	the	demand	for	this	new	asset,	PAEs	have	created	
investment	 vehicles.	 […]	 Many	 companies	 holding	 patents	 naturally	 look	 for	
opportunities	 to	 “unlock	 value”	 and	 obtain	 cash	 by	 selling	 their	 patents	 to	 PAEs.	
This	in	turn	fuels	further	patenting,	creating	more	raw	material	for	PAEs.”245		
                                                                                                                                 
filed	58.7%	of	all	patent	cases	in	2012,	up	from	24.6%	in	2007.	52%	of	the	asserted	patents	had	been	
transferred	from	their	original	owner.		
240	Qualcomm	was	accused	of	being	a	patent	troll	in	the	telecommunications	industry:	ibid.	116,	et	seq.	
See	also	EU	Commission’s	Memo/Press	Release,	MEMO/07/389,	dated	1	October	2007	“Commission	
Initiates	 Formal	 Proceedings	 against	 Qualcomm”.	 Beyond	 the	 ICT	 standardization	 realm,	 in	 the	
biotechnology	 industry	 there	 is	a	phenomenon	 termed	 “reach-through”	 licenses,	 i.e.	 royalty	clauses	
that	 are	 based	 on	 the	 success	 of	 the	 products	 invented	 by	 the	 inventor	 using	 the	 technology	
protected	by	the	upstream	patent.	See	
	Michael	 Heller	 and	 Rebecca	 Eisenberg,	 Can	 Patents	 Deter	 Innovation?	 The	 Anticommons	 in	
Biomedical	Research,	(1998)	280	SCIENCE,	pp.	698	et	seq.	
241	ASHISH	ARORA,	ANDREA	FOSFURI,	ALFONSO	GAMBARDELLA,	MARKETS	 FOR	TECHNOLOGY:	THE	ECONOMICS	
OF	INNOVATION	AND	CORPORATE	STRATEGY	8	(2001).		
242	Fiona	Scott	Morton	and	Carl	Shapiro,	Strategic	Patent	Acquisition,	79	ANTITRUST	LAW	JOURNAL	463	
(2014),	p.	479.	
243 		 See	 Andrei	 Hagiu,	 David	 B.	 Yoffie,	 The	 New	 Patent	 Intermediaries:	 Platforms,	 Defensive	
Aggregators,	and	Super-Aggregators,	JOURNAL	OF	ECONOMIC	PERSPECTIVES,	Winter	2013,	p.	45.	
244	Fiona	Scott	Morton	and	Carl	Shapiro,	Strategic	Patent	Acquisition,	79	ANTITRUST	LAW	JOURNAL	463	
(2014),	p.	479.	
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5.4 ANTICOMMONS 
An	assessment	of	the	role	of	patent	thickets	cannot	disregard	the	matter	of	
anticommons,	which	 some	 scholars	perceive	as	one	of	 the	 issues	 created	by	 the	
overlap	of	interlocking	patents	on	a	thicket.	246	The	tragedy	of	anticommons	refers	
to	the	impossibility	for	companies	to	obtain	all	the	rights	they	need	from	multiple	
gatekeepers,	 each	 of	 whom	 must	 grant	 permission	 before	 the	 resource	 can	 be	
used.	These	excessive	property	rights	stifle	innovation	as	the	resource	will	not	be	
used	to	its	full	extent,	or	“under-used”,	and	left	economically	idle.	This	problem	is	
preeminent	in	industries	such	as	the	ICT	industry,	which	requires	the	aggregation	
of	 hundreds	 of	 thousands	 of	 components,	 each	 of	 them	 patented	 by	 different	
individuals,	to	make	one	single	device.247	Companies	holding	SEPs	request	supra-
competitive	 royalties	 for	 each	 of	 their	 essential	 patents,	 generating	 a	 stack	 of	
royalties	which,	altogether,	are	too	onerous	for	the	product	markets	to	endure.	248	
The	 concept	 of	 anticommons,	 however,	 stems	 symmetrically	 from	 the	
previous	concept	elaborated	by	 the	 literature	and	defined	as	 the	 “tragedy	of	 the	
commons”.249	This	refers	to	the	over-use	of	shared	resources	(such	as	clean	water	
or	fishing	grounds)	if	not	protected	by	adequate	property	rights	and	incentives	for	
their	 preservation.	 Interestingly,	 the	 tragedy	 of	 anticommons	 represents	 the	
outcome	 of	 the	 solution	 proposed	 for	 the	 tragedy	 of	 the	 commons,	 namely,	
privatization.	 Indeed,	 solving	 the	 tragedy	 of	 the	 commons	 by	 withdrawing	
resources	 from	 the	 public	 domain	 and	 placing	 them	 into	 private	 ownership	
restricts	the	right	of	use	in	favor	of	those	who	are	the	owners	and	gives	them	the	
right	 to	 exclude	 anyone	 else,	 thereby	 internalizing	 the	 costs	 of	 the	 use	 of	 the	
                                                
246	For	 an	 overview	 on	 anticommons,	 see	 Michael	 A.	 Heller,	 The	 Tragedy	 of	 the	 Anticommons:	
Property	 in	 the	Transition	 from	Marx	 to	Markets,	 111	HARV.	L.	REV.	621	(1998)	and	Michael	A.	Heller,	
Rebecca	S.	Eisenberg,	Can	Patents	Deter	Innovation?	The	Anticommons	in	BIOMEDICAL	RESEARCH,	280	
SCI.	698	(1998).	The	origin	of	the	term	and	the	concept	is	from	Frank	I.	Michelman,	Property,	Utility,	
and	Fairness:	Comments	on	the	Ethical	Foundations	of	“Just	Compensation”	Law,	80	HARV.	L.	REV	1165	
(1967).	
247	For	examples	of	technological	devices	comprising	innumerable	patents,	see	Mark	A.	Lemley,	Carl	
Shapiro,	Patent	Holdup	and	Royalty	Stacking,	85	TEXAS	LAW	REVIEW	(2007).	The	transaction	becomes	
even	 more	 complex	 in	 the	 moment	 in	 which	 a	 product	 comprises	 various	 technologies	 and	 a	
considerable	 number	 of	 patents.	 	 Suffice	 to	 consider	 what	 is	 needed	 to	 produce	 a	 smartphone,	
including,	 licenses	 for:	 the	 operating	 system,	 the	 touch-screen	 technology,	 data	 traffic	 and	 the	
telephone	network.	
248	See	Rudi	Bekkers	et	 al.,	Case	 studies	 on	 the	 interface	 between	 research	 and	 standardization,	 and	
case	studies	on	patent	pools	as	a	coordination	mechanism,	in	(INTEREST	CONSORTIUM	PRIORITY	8	NO.	
CONTRACT	503	594,	EU	6TH	SPECIFIC	TARGETED	RESEARCH	PROJECT,	2006),	pp.	105	et	seq.		
249	Garrett	Hardin,	The	tragedy	of	the	commons,	SCIENCE		(1968),	pp.	1243-1248.	
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resource	through	privatization.250	However,	just	trying	to	tackle	the	tragedy	of	the	
commons	through	forms	of	privatization,	thus	attributing	ownership	of	a	resource	
to	parties	 fragmenting	 it,	 leads	 to	 the	 tragedy	of	 the	anticommons.	 In	 this	vein,	
although	 “private	 ownership	 usually	 creates	 wealth,”	 “too	 much	 ownership	 […]	
creates	gridlock”;	“too	many	people	own	too	many	pieces	of	one	thing,	cooperation	
breaks	 down	 and	wealth	 disappears,	 and	 everybody	 loses”.251	It	 is	 thus	 sensible	 to	
interpret	anticommons	as	the	highest	form	of	obstruction	to	third	parties’	market	
access.252		
To	put	together	all	the	needed	patents,	one	must	obtain	the	consent	of	the	
fragment-holders.	Where	each	piece	 is	being	protected	by	 IP	 rights	 each	holder	
must	agree	to	this	union,	and	can	also	request	a	value	at	will.	The	main	obstacles	
are	therefore	related	to	the	transaction	costs	of	the	union	that	will	be	put	in	place	
by	the	parties	concerned.	
Given	 the	 extensive	 presence	 of	 patent	 thickets,	 industry	 operators	 have	
started	 to	 look	 for	 solutions	 that	 often	 require	 cooperation	 with	 other	 parties	
operating	 in	 the	 same	market,	 in	order	 to	prevent,	 and	eventually	 settle,	patent	
litigation.	 The	 ultimate	 effort	 is	 to	 find	 a	 way	 to	 eliminate	 the	 inefficiency	
connected	 to	 multiple	 blocking	 patents.	 Drawing	 from	 the	 classic	 economic	
theory	 of	 components	 investigated	 by	Cournot,253	it	 appears	 evident	 that	 patent	
holders	 have	 a	 strong	 incentive	 to	 join	 forces	 and	 cooperate	 through	 various	
commercial	tactics,	such	as	cross-licensing	or	patent	pools,	as	these	solutions	are	
infinitely	 attractive	 where	 two	 companies	 would	 not	 otherwise	 be	 able	 to	
                                                
250	See	 S.	 Kopelman,	 T.	 A.	 Turk,	 C.	 E.	 Ybarra,	 Too	 many	 spoil	 the	 broth:	 how	 the	 tragedy	 of	 the	
anticommons	emerges	in	organizations,	Economic	Science	Institute	working	papers	(2012),	pp.1-40.	
251 	MICHAEL	 HELLER,	 THE	 GRIDLOCK	 ECONOMY:	 HOW	 TOO	 MUCH	 OWNERSHIP	 WRECKS	 MARKETS,	 STOPS	
INNOVATION,	AND	COSTS	LIVES	(BASIC	BOOKS,	2010).	
252	M.	Brede,	F.	Boschetti,	Commons	and	anticommons	in	a	simple	renewable	resource	harvest	model,	
ECOLOGICAL	COMPLEXITY	6	(2008),	pp.	56-63.	This	situation	represents	the	classic	complements	issue	
studied	by	Cournot	 in	 1838.	He	considered	 the	problem	 faced	by	a	brass	manufacturer	who	had	 to	
purchase	 two	 key	 inputs	 (namely	 copper	 and	 zinc)	 that	were	 each	 held	 by	 a	monopolist.	 Cournot	
demonstrated	that	the	resulting	price	of	brass	was	higher	than	would	arise	if	a	single	firm	controlled	
trade	in	both	inputs,	and	sold	these	inputs	to	a	competitive	brass	industry.	To	make	things	worse,	the	
combined	profits	of	the	producers	were	also	lower	in	the	presence	of	complementary	monopolies.	A	
similar	 detrimental	 effect	 on	 consumers	 and	 producers	 applies	 when	 multiple	 companies	 control	
blocking	 patents	 for	 a	 particular	 product,	 process,	 or	 business	 method.	 AUGUSTIN	 COURNOT,	
RECHERCHES	SUR	LES	PRINCIPES	MATHEMATIQUES	DE	LA	THEORIE	DES	RICHESSES	(PARIS:	HACHETTE,	1838).	
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manufacture	and	sell	products,	nor	operate	a	specific	process	or	business	method	
without	infringing	on	the	other’s	patents.		
In	 the	 next	 paragraphs	 the	 main	 characteristics	 of	 these	 forms	 of	
cooperation	 will	 be	 analyzed,	 focusing	 on	 the	 business	 arrangements	 that	 are	
being	used	to	cut	through	patent	tickets.254	
5.5 CROSS-LICENSING 
Companies	 can	 decide	 to	 cross-license	 their	 patents	 by	 means	 of	 an	
agreement	 through	which	 they	exchange	a	plethora	of	 licenses	 through	a	 single	
transaction	thereby	avoiding	unnecessary	duplication	of	transaction	costs.	These	
firms	may	propose	to	license	some	patents	included	in	their	IP	portfolio	in	order	
to	 gain	 in	 return	 the	 right	 to	 use	 patents	 of	 other	 firms,	 without	 disbursing	
royalties.	 This	 scheme	 allows	 parties	 to	 use	 both	 their	 own	 patents	 and	 their	
competitors’,	 enabling	 the	 sharing	 of	 technology	 and	 useful	 combination	 of	
technologies	 within	 devices.	 Patent	 holders	 resort	 to	 cross-licensing	 in	 cases	
where	a	firm	is	interested	in	different	patents	belonging	to	another	firm,	which	is	
also	 interested	 in	 patents	 held	 by	 the	 undertaking.	 Instead	 of	 launching	
negotiations	 for	 each	 individual	 patent,	 cross-licensing	 agreements	 allow	
negotiations	 on	 the	 pricing	 of	 large	 patent	 portfolios,	 reducing	 the	 overall	 time	
and	 costs	 of	 the	 negotiations.	 This	 type	 of	 agreement	 offers	 solutions	 to	 the	
tragedy	of	anticommons	to	the	extent	 that	 it	helps	 to	avoid	situations	of	under-
use	 of	 knowledge	 and	 reduce	 problems	 linked	 to	 negotiating	 single	 licenses.255	
Indeed,	cross-licensing	also	allows	competitors	to	“clear	blocking	patent	positions	
amongst	 themselves”,	 as	 	 it	 gives	 them	 access	 to	 the	 technology	 of	 their	
competitors.256		
                                                
254	See	generally,	for	patent	pools,	Hanns	Ullrich,	Patent	Pools:	Approaching	a	Patent	Law	Problem	via	
Competition	 Policy,	 in	 CLAUS-DIETER	 EHLERMANN	&	 ISABELA	 ATANASIU	 (EDS.),	 EUROPEAN	COMPETITION	
LAW	 ANNUAL/2005:	 THE	 INTERACTION	 BETWEEN	 COMPETITION	 LAW	 AND	 INTELLECTUAL	 PROPERTY	 LAW	
(HART	 PUBLISHING,	 2007),	 p.	 322.;	 for	 patent	 thickets,	 Carl	 Shapiro,	Navigating	 the	 Patent	 Thicket:	
Cross	Licenses,	Patent	Pools	and	Standard	Setting,	in	ADARN	JAFFE	ET	AL.	(EDS.),	INNOVATION	POLICY	AND	
THE	ECONOMY	(MIT	PRESS,	2001),	pp.	119	et	seq.	
255	M.	Bednarek,	M.	Ineichen,	Patent	pools	as	an	alternative	to	patent	wars	in	the	emergent	sectors,	16	
INTELLECTUAL	PROPERTY	AND	TECHNOLOGY	LAW	JOURNAL	7	(2004),	p.	3.	
256	Carl	Shapiro,	Navigating	 the	Patent	Thicket:	Cross	 Licenses,	 Patent	 Pools,	 and	 Standard	 Setting	 1	
INNOVATION	POLICY	AND	THE	ECONOMY	119	(2001).	
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Often,	companies	resort	to	cross-licensing	as	a	result	of	an	infringement	in	
the	effort	to	solve	the	problem	of	damages,	as	frequently	the	company	whose	IPR	
was	infringed	is	also	interested	in	the	patents	of	the	infringing	counterpart.	In	this	
case,	 cross-licensing	 agreements	 act	 as	 remedies,	 often	 coupled	 with	 pecuniary	
compensation	counting	as	redress.	This	type	of	solution	is	often	also	used	by	PAEs,	
which	 being	 interested	 in	 certain	 patents	 simply	 seize	 the	 infringement	 as	 an	
opportunity	to	offer	this	form	of	exchange.257	
5.6 PATENT POOLS 
A	 patent	 pool	 is	 a	 sophisticated	 variant	 of	 cross-licensing,	 an	 agreement	
whereby	 two	or	more	patent	holders	decide	 to	 license	 their	 patents	 together	 as	
one	 package.	 Licensees	 can	 be	 both	 patent	 holders	 themselves,	 third	 parties	 or	
both.	258	A	pool	is	usually	run	by	a	single	entity	who	plays	the	role	of	intermediary	
between	patent	holder	 and	businesses	 that	want	 to	use	 its	patented	knowledge,	
executing	a	single	transaction.259	
Lundqvist	remarked	that	patent	pools	are	multifaceted	contracts	that	often,	
openly	or	indirectly,	imply	four	agreements:	(i)	a	clear	pool	agreement,	where	the	
contributors	of	patents	agree	on	the	definition	of	the	technology	and	the	royalty	
rates	 at	 which	 downstream	 product	 manufacturers	 should	 get	 access	 to	 the	
essential	IP	concerned;	(ii)	standard	licensing	agreements	from	the	pool	to	third	
party	 licensees;	 (iii)	 an	 agreement	 to	 exchange	 licenses	 between	 the	 patent	
providers	 that	 are	 also	 active	 in	 the	 downstream	 product	 market;	 and	 (iv)	 an	
agreement	 on	 where	 to	 develop	 the	 technology	 further	 through	 grant-back	
clauses	or	cross-licensing	covenants	for	future	innovations	and	patents.260	
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Den	Uijl,	Bekkers	and	De	Vries	have	pointed	out	the	main	characteristics	of	
patent	pools:261		
I. All	of	the	pool’s	patents	are	available	to	all	enterprises	that	adhere	
to	 this	 form	 of	 agreement,	 as	 well	 as	 to	 any	 potential	 external	
licensee.	
II. The	patent	pool	offers,	first,	a	disclosure	service,	additional	to	that	
which	is	provided	by	the	patent	office,	and	it	goes	on	the	market	as	
a	single	entity.	With	the	exception	of	the	members,	who	of	course,	
have	access	to	all	of	the	pool’s	patents,	any	external	licensee,	who	
asks	the	patent	pooler	for	and	concludes	a	licensing	agreement	will	
get	the	set	of	knowledge	managed	by	the	same	pool	without	having	
to	individually	deal	with	each	patent	holder.262		
III. The	 licenses	 are	 offered	 through	 a	 set	 of	 patents	 related	 to	 each	
other	 and	 they	 are	 divided	 according	 to	 standard	 terms	 and	 set	
prices.	This	standardization	allows	transaction	costs	related	to	the	
negotiation	of	the	terms	of	the	agreement	to	be	minimized.	
IV. The	 returns	arising	 from	 licenses	are	distributed	 to	each	member	
of	the	patent	pool.	This	is	done	following	a	precise	pattern	that	is	
defined	 ex	 ante.	 Given	 that	 the	 allocation	 of	 returns	 is	 pre-
determined,	 once	 the	 patent	 pool	 is	 established	 there	 will	 be	 no	
possibility	of	conflict	about	allocation	as	 it	will	have	already	been	
accepted	by	the	members.		
Patent	 pools	 carry	 a	 number	 of	 advantages:	 they	 provide	 transparency,	
facilitate	 the	 flow	 of	 information	 and	 enable	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	 technology	
standard.263	In	an	environment	where	fragmentation	emerges	as	the	main	obstacle	
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to	 the	use	of	knowledge,	patent	pools	 are	proposed	as	 an	effective	 and	efficient	
solution	to	address	the	complexity	that	fragmentation	brings.	The	task	of	a	patent	
pool	 is	 to	 bring	 together	 a	 group	 of	 patents	 from	 different	 patent	 holders	 to	
facilitate	 their	 use	 by	 the	 market,	 in	 general,	 and	 downstream	 producers,	 in	
particular.	Otherwise,264	fragmentation,	which	occurs	 in	the	IP	scenario,	 leads	to	
the	 non-use	 of	 knowledge,	 an	 effect	 described	 by	 Heller	 in	 the	 tragedy	 of	 the	
anticommons.265	
However,	 the	patent	pool,	 as	well	 as	 facilitating	 the	 adoption	of	 and	 then	
allowing	the	proper	use	of	knowledge,	 improves	 the	development	prospects	due	
to	network	externalities,	which	are	present	 in	technological	sectors	and	learning	
economies.	In	the	presence	of	network	externalities,	users	benefit	from	a	greater	
number	of	adopters,266	which	means	 that	 the	user	can	also	benefit	 from	a	 lower	
price	of	products	that	incorporate	the	same	technology.	Speeding	up	the	process	
of	innovation	may	make	the	occurrence	of	discontinuity	in	technology	more	likely	
and	 therefore	 further	 shorten	 technology	 cycles. 267 	Although	 this	 will	 have	
adverse	effects	on	the	players	that	operate	in	these	areas,	it	should	bring	benefits	
for	 the	community	as	 it	 stimulates	 the	production	of	new	knowledge.	From	this	
perspective,	the	IPR	protection	mechanism	allows	those	who	have	contributed	to	
this	 development	 to	 benefit	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	 improves	 social	 well-being	
through	applications	resulting	from	improved	knowledge.	
6. STRATEGIC STANDARDIZATION BY ADVANCE COUNTRIES AND 
INDIGENOUS STANDARDIZATION BY LATECOMERS   
6.1 CHINA: THE PROS AND CONS OF BEING A LATECOMER IN A 
GLOBALIZED TECHNOLOGY-DRIVEN ECONOMY 
From	 the	 perspective	 of	 a	 globalizing	 economy,	 China	 has	 grown	 very	
rapidly	and	accumulated	significant	innovation	capabilities,268	participating	in	the	
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globalization	of	the	economy.	Production	in	China	is	currently	mostly	structured	
in	worldwide	value	chains,	and	even	 innovation	 is	progressively	becoming	more	
organized	in	transnational	networks.	The	integration	of	formerly	relatively	closed	
national	 economies	 into	 a	 globalized	 economy	 must	 be	 assessed	 against	 an	
analysis	 of	 what	 it	 means	 to	 be	 a	 latecomer.	 Indeed,	 China,	 as	 well	 as	 other	
developing	 economies	 in	 Asia	 such	 as	 India,	 did	 not	 increase	 their	 innovation	
capabilities	 in	 isolation;	 they	 learnt	 from	 the	 leaders	 in	 Europe	 and	 other	 early	
industrializers.	This	raises	a	fundamental	question:	what	are	the	repercussions	of	
the	 participation	 of	 latecomers	 in	 globalized	 innovation	 processes	 and	 how	 are	
they	going	to	differ	from	or	converge	with	those	in	industrialized	countries?	
The	 literature	 on	 divergence	 and	 convergence	 in	 the	 innovation	 path,	
especially	 that	 focusing	 on	 inter-country	 comparisons,	 is	 particularly	 helpful	 in	
detecting	 the	 downsides	 and	 benefits	 of	 being	 a	 latecomer. 269 	Latecomers	
substantially	lag	behind	early	advanced	nations	in	establishing	sound	enterprises	
and	 supportive	 institutions	 in	 order	 to	 foster	 	 innovation.	 However,	 being	 a	
latecomer	 carries	 some	 benefits.270	Late-coming	 countries	 and	 enterprises	 can	
take	 advantage	 of	 their	 late	 arrival	 on	 the	 global	 economic	 scene	 and	 gradually	
insert	themselves	into	global	value	chains,	without	having	to	reproduce	the	whole	
prior	 technological	 path.	 They	 can	 incorporate	 advanced	 technologies,	 for	
example,	 through	 inward	 foreign	 direct	 investments	 (“FDI”),	 goods’	 imports,	
licensing,	 technology	 transfer	 mechanisms	 and	 even	 acquiring	 businesses	 from	
advanced	 countries	 and	 establishing	 their	 own	 R&D	 facilities	 in	 established	
industry	clusters	abroad.271	
The	 substantial	 literature	 on	 the	 innovation	 paths	 followed	 by	 latecomers	
has	shown	how	these	countries	mainly	rely	on	catching	up	and	imitating	firms	in	
earlier	industrializers	in	order	to	acquire	innovation	and	production	capabilities.	
It	 has	 been	 observed	 that	 imitation	 involves	 adaptive	 innovation,	 which	 rarely	
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results	 in	 latecomers	 creating	 their	 own	 new	 innovation	 trajectories 272 	or	
“breakthroughs”.273	While	 this	 holds	 true	 for	 the	 earlier	 phase	 of	 the	 catch-up	
process,	 the	 latest	 literature	now	acknowledges	that	this	 is	changing	as	systemic	
innovation	 emerges	 from	 latecomers. 274 	This	 shift	 from	 mere	 imitation	 to	
indigenous	 innovation,	 however,	 is	 still	 being	 profoundly	 influenced	 by	
technology	imports	from	early	industrialized	nations.275		
The	growing	role	of	China	in	the	innovation	landscape	also	derives	from	the	
trends	towards	outsourcing	and	offshoring	of	the	innovation	process	in	the	global	
economy.	 In	 the	 last	 decades,	 multinational	 corporations	 have	 progressively	
decentralized	their	R&D	activities.	They	have	often	relocated	to	China	and	other	
latecomer	countries.276	Sometimes	they	have	even	developed	specific	products	for	
ICT	markets	to	satisfy	the	particular	necessities	of	their	middle	class	consumers.277	
Progressively,	 latecomer	 countries,	 instead	 of	 remaining	 instrumental	 to	
multinational	companies,	have	started	to	embark	on	their	own	innovation	path,278	
bespoke	to	their	national	conditions.	By	the	same	token,	so-called	“organizational	
decomposition” 279 	in	 the	 innovation	 process	 has	 played	 a	 significant	 role.		
Pursuant	 to	 organizational	 decomposition,	 R&D	 activities	 that	 used	 to	 be	
operated	 in-house	 by	 innovating	 companies	 themselves	 are	 now	 carried	 out	 by	
independent	 suppliers	 of	 knowledge-intensive	 business	 services,	 or	 are	
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transferred	to	key	suppliers.280	The	literature	has	stressed	the	global	implications	
of	 organizational	 decomposition	 for	 innovation:	 the	 greater	 spreading	 of	
innovation	 activities	 has	 backed	 the	 establishment	 of	 innovation	 capabilities	 in	
latecomer	firms,	particularly	in	China.281	
The	 origins	 of	 China’s	 role	 as	 a	 technology	 competitor	 began	 in	 the	 late	
1970s	and	early	1980s,	when	it	opened	its	domestic	market	to	the	external	world.	
The	 policy	 commitments	 made	 by	 Deng	 Xiaoping	 in	 the	milestone	 March	1978	
National	 Science	Conference	in	Beijing,	 and	 subsequently	 reaffirmed,282	involved	
the	introduction	of	FDIs,	imported	goods,	and	technology	transfer.		
China’s	strategy	for	science	and	technology	development	approved	a	series	
of	 measures	 to	 exploit	 resources	 from	 the	 international	 environment,283	thus	
leading	 to	wider	 knowledge	 diffusion	 and	 innovation.	 The	new	policy	 included,	
inter	 alia,	 the	 revitalization	 of	 the	 higher	 education	 system,	 through	 measures	
aimed	 at	 intensifying	 the	 interactions	 with	 the	 international	 community	 by	
sending	 scholars	 abroad	 for	 advanced	 education	 and	 signing	 agreements	 with	
foreign	governments	for	science	and	technology	cooperation.	
As	 the	 domestic	 market	 gradually	 opened	 up	 and	 embraced	 foreign	
companies,	 FDIs	 started	 to	 flood	 the	 Chinese	 market	 in	 the	 form	 of	 joint	
ventures		 (“JVs”).	 This	 resulted	 not	 just	 in	 investments	 and	 imported	 products,	
but	 also	 in	 the	 introduction	 of	 relevant	 technologies	 being	 transferred	 from	
foreign	 companies	 to	 these	 new	 business	 entities.284		 Examples	 of	major	 foreign	
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companies	 that	have	gained	access	 to	 the	Chinese	market	as	 JVs	 include	Beijing	
International	Switching	System	Corporation	(jointly	with	Siemens),	Beijing	Nokia	
Hangxing,	 Nanjing	 Ericsson,	 Jiangsu	 Fujitsu,	 and	 Guangdong	 Nortel.	285	It	 has	
been	observed	 that	 these	 trade	 intersections	and	knowledge	exchanges	with	 the	
international	 business	 community	 allowed	 China	 to	 gradually	 acquire	 policies,	
industrial	designs	and	managerial	practices	that	proved	indispensable	to	capture	
value	from	the	country’s	science	and	technological	progress.286		
Nonetheless,	 the	 swift	 growth	 of	 FDIs	 exponentially	 increased	 China’s	
reliance	 on	 foreign	 technology,	which	 has	 since	 then	 been	 a	 salient	 trait	 of	 the	
country’s	 industrial	 scenario.	 Although	 the	 huge	 FDI	 flow	 and	 consequent	
technology	transfer	had	raised	technology	 levels	of	Chinese	companies	since	the	
1980s,	some	concerns	started	to	be	raised.	In	particular,	that	the	mere	production	
of	 goods	 based	 on	 foreign	 technology,	 without	 any	 additional	 innovation,	 and	
assembly	 of	 imported	 high-value	 components	 for	 export,	 would	 undermine	 the	
development	of	an	advanced	domestic	innovative	society	and	economy.	In	a	sort	
of	catch-22	situation,	the	more	China	lacked	innovative	capacity	the	more	it	was	
led	 to	 import	 advanced	 technologies	 from	 abroad	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 its	
competitiveness.	 Chinese	 domestic	 manufacturers	 have	 indeed	 long	 agonized	
over	 what	 has	 been	 defined	 as	 the	 “technology	 trap,”	 to	 be	 understood	 as	 the	
situation	where	“while	developing	countries’	competitiveness	has	been	undercut	as	
the	wages	rise	in	labor-intensive	sectors,	the	laggard	innovation	makes	it	difficult	to	
continue	high	 rates	of	 economic	growth	and	shift	 economic	activities	 into	higher-
skilled	sectors”.	287	
It	 became	 obvious	 that	 the	 extreme	 dependence	 of	 China	 on	 foreign	
technology	 left	 the	country	at	 the	 low-value	added	end	of	the	global	production	
network.	 In	 particular,	 in	 the	 ICT	 sector,	 which	 had	 gained	 the	 status	 of	 “the	
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leading	 sector	 in	 the	 contemporary	global	political	 economy”,	 innovation	was	not	
even	the	optimal,	ultimate	goal	to	be	hoped	for,	as	this	dynamic	sector	gradually	
moved	 “beyond	 competition	 over	 technological	 innovation	 per	 se”288 	as	 “[t]he	
technological	 winner	 is	 now	 the	 one	 who	 manages	 to	 control	 de	 facto	 market	
standards	while	at	the	same	time	protecting	intellectual	property	rights”.289	
If	one	evaluates	China’s	position	in	the	highly	fragmented	global	production	
landscape,290 	the	 underlying	 reasons	 for	 its	 technological	 dependence	 clearly	
emerge.	 China’s	 industry	 is	 (still,	 although	 increasingly	 less)	 mainly	 export-
oriented	and	it	relies	heavily	on	foreign	proprietary	technology.	It	thus	appears	to	
be	more	vulnerable	 to	 the	 impact	of	 international	 technology	standards	and	the	
different	 strategic	 patenting	 strategies	 used	 by	 patent	 holders	 to	 capitalize	 on	
their	 de	 facto	 standards	 and	 associated	 royalties.291	Ultimately,	 caught	 in	 the	
technology	 trap,	 in	 China	 “royalties	 and	 rigid	 licensing	 terms	 associated	 with	
international	 technology	 transfer	 significantly	 undercut	 the	 profit	 margins	 of	
manufacturers”.292	
The	same	consideration	applies	to	virtually	all	 late-industrialized	countries	
acting	as	manufacturers	or,	at	the	most,	as	fast	followers	in	innovation,	but	which	
are	 nonetheless	 increasingly	 intertwined	 with	 international	 trade	 and	 global	
production	 and	 innovation	 networks.	 They	 are	 “naturally	 disadvantaged	 in	 the	
world	of	international	standards	as	they	have	not	contributed	the	‘core	technology’	
on	 which	 these	 standards	 are	 based”.293	Not	 being	 able	 to	 shape	 the	 standards	
regime	architecture	these	countries’	firms	are	thus	“forced	to	accept	standards	and	
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pay	royalties	as	decided	by	the	dominant	economic	players”.294	These	countries	face	
strong	 competition,	 which	 leads	 to	 reductions	 in	 unit	 prices,	 while	 the	 cost	 of	
royalties	 per	 unit	 stays	 constant,	 becoming	 one	 of	 the	 most	 burdensome	 cost	
items	to	bear.	
It	 is	 thus	 evident	 that,	 notwithstanding	 the	 advantages	 deriving	 from	
standards,	 which,	 as	 seen	 above,	 allow	 manufacturers	 to	 secure	 trade	 and	
knowledge	 sharing	 among	 geographically	 dispersed	 participants	 in	 the	
contemporary	 global	 market,295	the	 relative	 gains	 deriving	 from	 the	 standards	
greatly	 favor	 dominant	 economic	 players.	 Namely,	 advanced	 and	 early-
industrialized	countries,	which	advocate	heavily	to	ensure	that	their	technological	
solutions	 are	 codified	 in	 SEPs	 having	 strong	market	 power.	 In	 short,	 given	 the	
crucial	role	that	patents	play	in	standardization,	latecomers	like	China	might	find	
themselves	 trapped	 in	 patents	 that	 exclusively	 reflect	 the	 interests	 of	 advanced	
nations.	This	patent-trap	scenario	refers	to	“a	paradoxical	situation	that	the	more	
products	a	developing	country	with	low	technology	consumes	or	exports,	the	more	
royalties	it	pays	to	advanced	countries	where	the	patents	are	created”.	296	
If	follows	that	standardization	patent	strategies	used	by	large	patent	holders	
to	extract	rents	by	controlling	industry	standards	can	asphyxiate	competition	and	
impair	late-industrializing	countries’	access	to	international	markets.297	
6.2 INNOVATION POLICIES AS A REGULATORY TOOL: AT THE CROSSROADS 
OF IP, COMPETITION AND TRADE 
In	an	effort	to	fill	the	gap	with	Western	counterparts,	alarmed	policymakers	
in	 latecomer	 countries,	 such	 as	 China,	 adopted	 domestic	 innovation	 policies	
comprising	a	number	of	regulatory	and	policy	measures	aimed	at	backing	science	
and	 technology	 developments,	 including	 subsidies,	 public	 procurement	 rules,	
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D.	 S.	 GREWAL,	 NETWORK	 POWER:	 THE	 SOCIAL	 DYNAMICS	 OF	 GLOBALIZATION	 (NEW	 HAVEN,	 CT:	 YALE	
UNIVERSITY	PRESS,	2008).	
296	Ping	Wang,	 Jooyoung	Kwak,	Heejin	 Lee,	The	 latecomer	 strategy	 for	 global	 ICT	 standardization:	
Indigenous	innovation	and	its	dilemma,	38	TELECOMMUNICATIONS	POLICY	10	(2014),	p.	933.	
297 	Dieter	 Ernst,	 Heejin	 Lee,	 Jooyoung	 Kwak,	 Standards,	 innovation,	 and	 latecomer	 economic	
development:	Conceptual	issues	and	policy	challenges,	38	TELECOMMUNICATIONS	POLICY	10	(2014),	p.	854.	
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standards,	 IPR-related	 policies	 and	 antitrust	 rules. 298 	In	 particular,	 in	 China,	
standards	have	been	perceived	as	a	critical	instrument	to	catch	up	with	advanced	
countries’	competition	in	terms	of	productivity.	In	this	regard,	the	incorporation	
of	 Chinese-owned	 patents	 in	 indigenous	 standards	 represents	 an	 effort	 to	
rearrange	the	standing	of	 its	domestic	manufacturers	 in	the	global	supply	chain.	
The	WAPI	and	EVD	saga,	which	will	be	explored	later	(see	next	chapter),	provide	
vivid	 illustrations	 of	 homegrown	 standards’	 initiatives	 construed	 as	 part	 of	 the	
Beijing	 government’s	 overall	 attempt	 to	 narrow	 the	 gap	 between	 China	 and	
advanced	countries	in	high-tech	sectors.	
Facing	the	perspective	of	 finding	itself	as	a	subordinate	actor	 in	the	global	
trade	network,	since	2006	the	Chinese	government,	in	its	National	Mid-Term	and	
Long-Term	Science	and	Technology	Development	Plan	(2006-2020)	(also	known	
as	“MLP-2006-2020”),299	started	promoting	the	development	of	national	standards	
incorporating	self-owned	IP,300	supporting	“Indigenous	Innovation”	(in	Chinese自
主创,	pinyin	Zìzhǔ	 chuàngxīn)301	as	a	main	policy	on	both	 the	national	and	 local	
level.302		
The	goal	of	the	Indigenous	Innovation	push	is,	according	to	the	MLP-2006-
2020,	 to	 reduce	 dependence	 on	 foreign	 technology	 from	 an	 estimated	 60%	 in	
2006	to	less	than	30%	by	2020.303	It	therefore	emphasizes	home-gown	innovative	
technologies.	As	will	be	 further	 explored	 in	 the	next	 section,	 a	 further,	 implicit,	
                                                
298	See	 Jorge	 Niosi	 et	 al.,	 National	 Systems	 of	 Production:	 In	 Search	 of	 a	 Workable	 Concept,	 15	
TECHNOLOGY	IN	SOCIETY	207	(1993).	
299	Guo	 jia	 zhong	 chang	qi	 ke	 ji	 fa	 zhan	gui	hua	 (2006-20)	(The	National	Mid-Term	and	Long-Term	
Science	and	Technology	Development	Plan).		
300	C.	Cao,	R.	P.	Suttmeier,	D.	F.	Simon,	 China’s	 15-year	 science	 and	 technology	 plan,	PHYSICS	TODAY	
(2006),	 pp.	 38-43;	 S.	 KENNEDY,	 R.	 P.	 SUTTMEIER,	 J.	 SU,	 STANDARDS,	 STAKEHOLDERS,	 AND	 INNOVATION.	
SEATTLE	(WA:	NATIONAL	BUREAU	OF	ASIAN	RESEARCH,	2008).	
301	James	McGregor,	China’s	drive	for	‘indigenous	innovation’:	A	web	of	industrial	policies,	US	Chamber	
of	Commerce	(2010),	p.	13.	
302	Id.,	 pp.	 17-19.	 On	 this	 point,	 scholar	 Daniele	 Brombal	 points	 out:	 “Recently,	 the	 ideological	 and	
political	 significance	 of	 science	 [and	 technology]	 have	 strengthened.	 It	 would	 suffice	 to	 think	 to	 the	
expression	 “scientific	 vision	 of	 development”	 (in	 Chinese,	科学发展观,	 pinyin	 kexue	 fazhan	 guan),	
coined	by	former	President	Hu	Jintao	and	former	Premier	Wen	Jiabao	to	emphasize	the	need	to	balance	
economic	 growth,	 social	 development	 and	 environmental	 protection.	 Likewise,	 post-reform	
transformations	 have	 resulted	 in	 radical	 changes	 in	 the	 uses	 of	 science	 and	 technology,	 in	 line	 with	
opening	to	market	mechanisms	and	the	outside	world.	Before	1979	the	major	research	field	was	defense,	
however	 after	 1979	 it	 expanded	 to	 include	 all	 fundamental	 sectors	 of	 the	 country’s	 development”.	
Daniele	 Brombal,	 Scienza	 e	 tecnologia	 in	 Cina.	 Molti	 successi,	 grandi	 speranze	 (e	 qualche	 fondata	
perplessità),	OrizzonteCina,	vol.	7,	n.	5	(Sept.	–	Oct.	2016),	p.	3.	
303	See	Sylvia	Schwaag	Serger,	Magnus	Breidne,	China’s	Fifteen-Year	Plan	for	Science	and	Technology:	
An	Assessment,	44	ASIA	POLICY	(2007),	p.	147.	
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objective	 of	 this	 policy	 is	 to	 reduce	 licensing	 fees	 and	 royalties	 paid	 to	 foreign	
companies.		
The	MLP-2006-2020’s	goal	 is	to	transform	China	into	an	innovative	nation	
by	2020	and	a	global	leader	by	2050304	through	the	development	and	adoption	of	
several	regulatory	measures.	Standards	constitute	one	of	the	main	measures,	and	
this	segment	is	then	greatly	supported	by	the	government,	which	allocates	public	
funds	for	the	development	of	indigenous	standards	in	strategic	industries,	among	
which	the	ICT	sector	central.	Another	measure	includes	the	“Indigenous	Products	
Catalogues”,	 which	 grant	 preferential	 treatment	 to	 indigenous	 innovation	
products	in	government	procurement,	and	give	tax	incentives	to	eligible	firms.305	
The	standardization	boost	is	noteworthy,	with	indigenous	innovations	including,	
for	 example,	 EVD,	 WAPI,	 Time	 Division	 Synchronous	 Code	 Division	 Multiple	
Access	(TD-SCDMA),	Audio	Video	Coding	Standard	(AVS),	and	Unified	Charger	
for	 Mobile	 Telecommunications	 Terminal	 Equipment	 (UCMT)	 (YD-T/1591-
2006).306	
China’s	 indigenous	 standardization	 determination	 can	 therefore	 be	
observed	 as	 a	 reaction	 to	 advanced	 countries’	 aggressive	 patenting	 strategies,	
which	have	pre-empted	vital	technology.		
In	the	context	of	the	present	research,	it	 is	 important	to	analyze	the	scope	
of	Indigenous	Innovation	in	parallel	to	the	strategic	use	of	patenting	carried	out	
by	advanced	nations.	 In	particular,	 the	Chinese	government	has	strived	to	assist	
its	 ICT	 firms	 in	 moving	 up	 the	 global	 value	 chain	 by	 reducing	 the	 burden	 of	
royalties.307		
                                                
304	In	 late	 2010,	 the	 State	 Council	 issued	 the	 “Decision	 to	 Accelerate	 the	Development	 of	 Strategic	
Emerging	Industries”.	This	order	planned	to	increase	the	selected	strategic	industries’	share	of	gross	
domestic	product	(GDP)	to	15%	by	2020,	while	the	overall	dependence	on	foreign	technology	would	
be	reduced	to	30%.	See	Shin-Yi	Peng,	Standards	as	a	Means	to	Technological	Leadership?	China’s	ICT	
Standards	 in	 the	Context	of	 the	 International	Economic	Order,	 in	Lisa	Toohey	et	al.	(EDS.),	CHINA	IN	
THE	 INTERNATIONAL	 ECONOMIC	 ORDER:	 NEW	 DIRECTIONS	 AND	 CHANGING	 PARADIGMS	 (CAMBRIDGE:	
CAMBRIDGE	UNIVERSITY	PRESS,	2015),	p.	128-130.	
305	Id.,	p.	131.	
306	See	James	McGregor,	China’s	Drive	for	“Indigenous	Innovation”:	A	Web	of	Industrial	Policies,	(2011),	
p.	28–29.	See	also	Han-Wei	Liu,	Shin-Yi	Peng,	Managing	Trade	Conflicts	 in	the	ICT	Industry:	A	Case	
Study	of	EU-Greater	China	Area,	19	JOURNAL	OF	INTERNATIONAL	ECONOMIC	LAW	3,	(2016).	
307	Liu	Han-Wei,	 Shin-Yi	Peng,	Managing	 Trade	 Conflicts	 in	 the	 ICT	 Industry:	 A	 Case	 Study	 of	 EU-
Greater	China	Area,	19	JOURNAL	OF	INTERNATIONAL	ECONOMIC	LAW	3	(2016),	pp.	629-656.	
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As	assessed	above,	in	ICT	strategic	patenting	is	often	employed	as	a	weapon	
to	engage	 in	anti-competitive	behavior	using	a	 range	of	conduct,	 such	as	patent	
hold	 ups,	 patent	 ambush,	 and	 strategic	 injunctive	 relief.	 In	 particular,	 patent	
holders	can	boost	their	market	power	when,	in	violation	of	FRAND	commitments,	
they	 “demand	 ‘unreasonable’	 royalties	 for	 their	 patents	 that	 are	 embedded	 in	
standards.	 Thus,	 standards	 generate	 a	 market	 power	 far	 beyond	 the	 power	 of	
exclusion	 and	 the	 freedom	 of	 contract	 granted	 by	 patent	 law”.308	Consequently,	
strategic	 patenting	 is	 likely	 to	have	 a	major	detrimental	 effect	 on	 the	 economic	
development	of	 latecomer	 countries,	ultimately	hindering	 innovation	and	 trade.	
The	industries	of	latecomer	countries,	which	are	inherently	dependent	on	foreign	
patented	technologies,	are	more	exposed	to	strategic	patenting	behavior	adopted	
by	patent	holders,	who	are	essentially	advanced	nations’	market	participants,	 to	
get	the	most	out	of	their	standards.		
In	this	context,	the	Government-supported	policy	of	Indigenous	Innovation	
has	contributed	to	triggering	China’s	transition	from	a	mere	manufacturer	at	the	
lowest	 level	of	 the	global	 supply	chain,	 to	a	path-following	 learning	actor,	 to	an	
innovator.309	As	mentioned	above,	a	central	aspect	of	 the	 Indigenous	 Innovation	
policy	is	the	development	and	implementation	of	the	standardization	capacity	of	
national	 firms, 310 	ultimately	 promoting	 the	 shift	 from	 reliance	 on	 foreign	
technology	 to	 setting	 home-gown	 standards	 as	 international	 standards. 311	
International	 standardization	 of	 domestic	 standards	 is	 thus	 perceived	 as	 a	
strategic	 tool	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 late-industrializing	 countries,	 representing	 a	
response	to	 the	strategic	patenting	carried	out	by	advanced	countries,	aimed,	 in	
due	 course,	 at	 overcoming	 the	 natural	 disadvantage	 of	 late-industrializing	
countries	on	the	global	market.312		
                                                
308	Y.	A.	Pai,	The	international	dimension	of	proprietary	technical	standards:	Through	the	lens	of	trade,	
competition	 law	 and	 developing	 countries,	 1	 LAW,	 POLICY	 &	 ECONOMICS	 OF	 TECHNICAL	 STANDARDS	
EJOURNAL,	1	(2013),	p.	5.	
309	Ping	Wang,	 Jooyoung	Kwak,	Heejin	 Lee,	The	 latecomer	 strategy	 for	 global	 ICT	 standardization:	
Indigenous	innovation	and	its	dilemma,	38	TELECOMMUNICATIONS	POLICY	(2014),	p.	934.	
310Wang	 Ping,	 Wang	 Yiyi,	 and	 John	 Hill.,	 Standardization	 Strategy	 of	 China	 -	 Achievements	 and	
Challenges,	EAST-WEST	CENTER	WORKING	PAPER-ECONOMICS	SERIES	107	(2010).	
311 	J.	 Kwak,	 H.	 Lee,	 D.B.	 Chung,	 The	 evolution	 of	 alliance	 structures	 in	 China’s	 mobile	
telecommunications	 industry	 and	 implications	 for	 international	 standardization,	 36	
TELECOMMUNICATIONS	POLICY	(2012),	pp.	966-976.	
312Id.	
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Having	 assessed	 the	 industrial	 interests	 underpinning	 the	 Indigenous	
Innovation	policy,	it	can	be	concluded	that	this	policy	and	the	strategic	patenting	
policy	carried	out	by	IP-rich	advanced	nations	represent	two	alternative	strategic	
industrial	policy	tools	to	achieve	an	optimal	positioning	in	innovation	technology,	
a	 market	 segment	 that	 represents	 today’s	 leading	 sector	 in	 the	 global	 political	
economy.	These	policy	tools	are	deployed	to	gain	control	of	the	market	through	
influencing	the	standardization	process	and	reaping	supracompetitive	rents	from	
IP	assets.313	In	the	context	of	standardization,	to	solve	the	problems	connected	to	
Indigenous	 Innovation,	 it	 is	 important	 not	 to	 overlook	 the	 antitrust	 concerns	
raised	by	standards.		
While	 the	 literature	 focuses	 on	 either	 one	 of	 the	 two	 sides	 (IP	 and	
competition	 law),	 we	 maintain	 that	 the	 investigation	 of	 standards	 and	
competition	 must	 also	 be	 examined	 from	 an	 international	 trade	 regulatory	
standpoint.	 The	 apparently	 protectionist	 behavior	 of	 some	 countries,	 such	 as	
China,	 is	 a	 response,	 a	 consequence,	 and	 not	 the	 cause,	 of	 the	 current	
opportunistic	 behavior	 of	 patent	 holders	 who	 own	 patents	 on	 technology	
essential	to	a	standard.	This	has	also	been	fuelled	by	diverging	interpretations,	in	
different	 jurisdictions,	 of	 the	 ambiguous	meaning	 of	 disclosure	 obligations	 and	
the	 difficulties	 in	 getting	 FRAND	 compensation.	 In	 so	 far	 as	 the	 uncertainties	
around	these	legal	concepts,	the	use	of	competition	policy,	and	the	strategic	use	
of	standards,	as	trade	barriers,	are	not	settled	internationally,	 latecomer,	 laggard	
innovation	 countries,	 will	 be	 compelled	 to	 establish	 competing	 and	
complementary	 standards.	 Namely,	 standards	 having	 a	 domestic	 nature,	
ultimately	serving	the	interests	of	domestic	industrial	policies	and	acting	as	non-
tariff	barriers	to	international	trade.	314		
Arguably,	 international	 competition	 law	and	policy	 can	play	 an	 important	
role	 in	 a	 progressively	more	 globalized	 economy.	This	 can	 be	 achieved	 through	
voluntary	 efforts	 aimed	 at	 creating	 inter-jurisdictional	mutual	 understanding	 in	
                                                
313	Id.	
314	Yogesh	Pai,	Private	Proprietary	Standards	and	Public	Law:	Invoking	WTO’s	Competition	Dimension	
to	 Avoid	 Global	 Market	 Distortion,	 (November	 16,	 2012).	 See	 also	 P.	 Gao,	 Counter-networks	 in	
Standardization:	a	perspective	from	developing	countries,	17	INFO	SYSTEMS	JOURNAL	(2007),	pp.	391-420.	
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order	 to	 gradually	 shape	 best	 practices	 in	 the	 ICT	 sector.315	The	 success	 of	 this	
approach	 requires	 communal	 efforts	 to	 reorganize	 and	 implement	 competition	
policies.	As	 it	will	be	seen	below,	the	WTO	framework	should	play	a	key	role	 in	
these	efforts.	
	 	
                                                
315	Alden	F.	Abbott	and	Shanker	Singham,	Competition	Policy	and	international	trade	distortions,	in	C.	
HERRMANN	ET	AL.	(EDS.),	EUROPEAN	YEARBOOK	OF	INTERNATIONAL	ECONOMIC	LAW	(EYIEL),	VOL.	4	 (2013),	
p.	25.	
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1. EX ANTE DISCLOSURE OF SEPS AND FRAND TERMS: PRECAUTIONARY 
MEASURES TO DETER ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT 
Having	 outlined	 the	 principal	 characteristics	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	
innovation	 markets,	 standards	 and	 IP,	 it	 is	 now	 important	 to	 focus	 on	 the	
different	 competition	 concerns	 identified	 in	 the	 area	 of	 standardization.	 This	
chapter,	 rather	 than	 focusing	 on	 whether	 standardization	 is	 inherently	 pro-
competitive	or	not,	analyzes	the	conduct	through	which	dominant	undertakings	
exert	market	power	in	the	context	of	standardization.		
As	 observed	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 exclusivity	 granted	 by	 the	 patent	
regime	 fosters	 innovation	 by	 incentivizing	 investment	 in	 R&D,	 as	 it	 enables	
innovators	 to	 gain	 returns	 on	 their	 investment.	 Divergently,	 standardization	
fosters	innovation	by	instituting	interoperability	between	products	and	by	easing	
market	adoption	of	innovative	technologies.	
SSOs,	in	order	to	overcome	the	conflict	between	patents	and	standards	and	
the	underlying	 interests,	 to	enhance	efficacy	and	 to	 restrain	abuses,	have	put	 in	
place	 rules	 for	 the	 disclosure	 of	 patents,	 as	 well	 as	 licensing	 commitments	 and	
royalty	recommendations	on	FRAND	terms.	Disclosure	policies	generally	require	
participants	in	the	standards	development	process	to	disclose	the	SEPs	that	they	
hold.	Licensing	policies	normally	oblige	participants	to	grant	licenses	under	their	
SEPs	to	implementers	on	terms	that	are	“fair,	reasonable	and	nondiscriminatory”	
(“FRAND”)	or	 royalty-free	 (“RF”).	 In	 the	meantime,	 governmental	 agencies	 such	
as	competition	authorities	are	also	engaged	in	thwarting	abuses	of	IPR	related	to	
standards.	
The	different	policies	embedded	in	SSOs	concerning	the	treatment	of	IPRs,	
especially	 patents,	 in	 standards,	 and	 the	 inter-jurisdictional	 normative	 conflict	
caused	by	diverging	 legal	 and	policy	 treatment	of	 SEPs	 in	different	 jurisdictions	
through	 the	 application	of	 competition	 law,	negatively	 impact	on	 trade.	 In	 fact,	
the	 problems	 courts	 have	 to	 face	 are	 global	 and	 reach	 beyond	 the	 single	 case	
adjudicated,	 as	 they	 impact	 on	 companies	 that	 operate	 in	 multiple	 markets.	 It	
follows	 that	 courts	 hearing	 disputes	 on	 SEPs	 need	 to	 balance	 the	 principle	 of	
territoriality	 of	 law	 and	 the	 underlying	 rights	 with	 the	 need	 to	 respect	 a	
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commercial	 commitment	 affecting	 global	 businesses.	 In	 fact,	 inconsistencies	 in	
the	 treatment	 of	 IPRs	 in	 standards	 allow	 incumbent	 innovative	 firms	 and	
advanced	nations	to	use	the	standardization	process	as	a	market	barrier	enabler	
in	the	form	of	patents	embedded	into	standards	by	imposing	unreasonable	royalty	
payments	and	patent	hold-ups.	
In	the	standardization	process,	two	key	contractual	requirements	feature	in	
SSO	policies:	
I. before	 the	 negotiations	 to	 choose	 a	 standard	 are	 carried	 out,	 to	
disclose	all	relevant	patents	for	the	use	and	implementation	of	the	
standard;316	
II. after	 the	 standard	has	been	 selected,	 to	 license	 SEPs	on	 specified	
terms,	 which	 imposes	 an	 obligation	 on	 patent	 holders	 to	 declare	
the	 terms	 governing	 the	 licensing.	 There	 are	 two	 main	 types	 of	
licensing	 obligations:	 a	 commitment	 to	 license	 on	FRAND	 terms,	
or	on	RF	terms,	that	do	not	allow	rights	holders	to	charge	a	royalty.	
The	logic	behind	FRAND	commitments	for	SEPs	is	two-fold:	to	enable	SEP	
holders	 to	 obtain	 acceptable	 gains	 from	 their	 innovation	 and	 to	 prevent	 SEP	
holders	 from	 exercising	market	 power	 that	 they	 have	 attained	 by	 virtue	 of	 the	
standardization	by	demanding	supra-competitive	royalties.	
	Although	 SSOs’	 IPR	 policy	 often	 contains	 FRAND	 commitments,	 these	
policies	do	not	specify	the	actual	FRAND	royalty	rate,	nor	how	it	should	be	set.	317		
                                                
316	In	 the	 EU,	 ETSI,	 has	 such	 an	 IPR	 policy,	 comprising	 disclosure	 and	 licensing	 commitments.	
Specifically,	each	member	of	ETSI	has	to	“use	its	reasonable	endeavors	to	timely	inform	ETSI	of	SEPs	it	
becomes	 aware	 of”.	 In	 particular,	members	 submitting	 a	 technical	 proposal	 for	 a	 standard	have	 an	
information	obligation,	as	they	“shall,	on	a	bona	fide	basis,	draw	the	attention	of	ETSI”	(see	ETSI	IPR	
policy,	on	the	ETSI’s	website)
	
to	any	IPRs	that	they	believe	might	be	essential	in	case	of	acceptance	of	
the	proposal.	(Id.	Art.	4.1).
	
However,	this	does	not	entail	any	obligation	on	a	member	to	conduct	an	
IPR	 search.	 Regarding	 licensing	 commitments,	 specific	 licensing	 terms	 and	 negotiations	 are	
commercial	 issues	 between	 companies,	 and	 are	 decided	 by	 the	 companies,	 hence	 they	 are	 not	
addressed	 within	 ETSI.	 The	 ETSI	 IPR	 policy	 attempts	 nonetheless	 to	 minimize	 the	 risk	 that	
standardization	 efforts	 are	 frustrated	 by	 ensuring	 that	 SEPs	 are	 made	 available	 to	 implementers	
under	FRAND	terms	and	conditions.	
317	Opinion	of	AG	Wathelet,	CJEU	Case	C-170/13	Huawei	Technologies	 v	ZTE	ECLI:EU:C:2014:2391,	at	
para	25.	
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Many	 SSOs	 positively	 disown	 any	 role	 in	 establishing,	 interpreting,	 or	
adjudicating	 the	 reasonableness	 of	 FRAND	 licensing	 terms,318	thus	 leaving	 the	
specific	identification	of	the	meaning	of	FRAND	to	bilateral	negotiations	between	
the	parties	or,	when	disputes	arise,	to	the	courts.319		
These	 policies,	 although	 flawed	 by	 lack	 of	 global	 consistency	 and	
application,	 represent	 an	 effort	 to	 out-match	 issues	 created	 by	 the	 risky	
fragmentation	 that	 afflicts	 technical	 standardization	 in	 sectors,	 such	 as	 ICT,	
where	a	single	device,	for	example	a	smartphone,	implements	a	plethora	of	SEPs	
and	 non-SEPs	 entrenched	 in	 underlying	 technical	 standards.	 In	 this	 context,	 ex	
ante	disclosure	requirements	and	ex	post	FRAND	licensing	principles	represent	a	
self-regulatory	means	of	“market	oriented	private	ordering”,	“through	the	adoption	
of	 instruments”	 that	ease	 the	 teething	 troubles	 that	 industry	participants	 face	 in	
terms	 of	 assessing	 the	 value	 of	 a	 patent,	 and	 guarantee	 transparency	 in	 patent	
disclosure.320	Consequently,	 most	 SSOs	 have	 very	 clear	 IPR	 policies	 aimed	 at	
efficient	licensing.	
In	 the	 following	 sections,	 the	 EU’s	 and	 China’s	 policies	 for	 SSOs	 are	
discussed.	
2. THE EU APPROACH  
2.1 EX ANTE DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS: THE CHALLENGES OF PATENT 
AMBUSH  
Ex	ante	disclosure	of	SEPs	is	inherent	to	the	standardization	process,	which	
is	 ultimately	 aimed	 at	 identifying	 a	 technology	 that	 will	 be	 incorporated	 in	 a	
standard,	 consequently	 dismissing	 every	 other	 alternative	 technology	 available.	
Once	 potential	 viable	 substitutes	 are	 abandoned,	 firms	 invest	 in	 the	
implementation	of	the	selected	standard,	becoming	locked-in	to	the	standard,	as	
                                                
318	Jorge	L.	Contreras,	Patents,	Standards	and	Borders:	Addressing	National	Disparities	among	Holders	
of	 Standard-Essential	 Patents,	East-West	Center	Workshop	on	Mega-Regionalism	-	New	Challenges	
for	Trade	and	Innovation,	2016.	
319	Jorge	L.	Contreras,	Fixing	FRAND:	A	Pseudo-Pool	Approach	to	Standards-Based	Patent	Licensing,	
79	ANTITRUST	L.J.	(2013),	p.	 47-97.	Many	SSOs,	 such	as	ETSI,	do	not	 consider	 the	 regulation	of	 and	
negotiations	 on	 specific	 licensing	 terms	 to	 fall	within	 their	 role.	 See	 para	 4.1	 of	 the	ETSI	Guide	 on	
Intellectual	Property	Rights.		
320	NARI	 LEE,	 NIKLAS	 BRUUN,	 AND	 MINGDE	 LI	 (EDITED	 BY),	 GOVERNANCE	 OF	 INTELLECTUAL	 PROPERTY	
RIGHTS	IN	CHINA	AND	EUROPE	(ELGAR	INTELLECTUAL	PROPERTY	AND	GLOBAL	DEVELOPMENT	SERIES,	2016),	
p.	285.	
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switching	 to	 another	 technology	 is	 no	 longer	 possible.321	The	 ex	 ante	 disclosure	
obligation	 thus	 allows	 upstream	 negotiations	 and	 prevents	 patent	 infringement	
once	the	standard	is	set.322	
In	 particular,	 ex	 ante	 disclosure	 aims	 at	 preventing	 individual	 firms	 that	
hold	essential	patents	from	being	able	to	hold-up	or	patent	ambush	the	efficient	
exploitation	 of	 a	 technology	 on	 the	 market.	 Hold-up	 or	 patent	 ambush	 occurs	
when	 a	 patentee,	member	 of	 an	 SSO,	 fails	 to	 reveal	 essential	 patents	 or	 patent	
applications	 during	 the	 standard-setting	 process,	 which	 become	 “submarine”	
patents.	This	conduct	allows	the	reticent	patentee	to	trap	the	other	members	 in	
the	 technology	 standard	 that	 coincides	 with	 its	 patents	 or	 patent	 applications.	
Leveraging	 this	 position,	 the	 ambusher	 can	 sue	 competing	 firms	 for	 patent	
infringement	 in	order	 to	reap	supra-competitive	 licensing	 fees.	Conversely,	once	
SEPs	have	been	disclosed,	the	negotiations	on	the	technology	standard	can	begin	
with	full	knowledge	of	the	position	of	each	SSO	member	and	its	patents.	The	ex	
ante	disclosure	is	particularly	relevant	given	the	sheer	number	of	patents	granted	
in	 innovative	 markets.	 It	 is	 difficult	 to	 provide	 effective	 notice	 for	 all	 patent	
disclosures.	Additionally,	patents	are	published	only	when	they	are	granted,	but	
protection	starts	from	the	filing	date.	This	implies	that	SEPs	may	remain	secretly	
pending	until	they	are	granted.323	
Given	 this	background,	 if	 SSO	members	were	allowed	 to	deliberately	hide	
their	 relevant	 essential	 patents	 until	 a	 standard	 was	 agreed,	 firms	 would	 be	
deterred	 from	 joining	 the	 standardization	 process.	 SSOs	 have	 therefore	 often	
adopted	disclosure	obligations	in	their	IP	policies.324	
Nonetheless,	patent	ambush	is	still	likely	to	take	place	because:	
                                                
321	Daniel	 Culley,	 Malik	 Dhanani,	 Maurits	 Dolmans,	 Learning	 From	 Rambus:	 How	 to	 Tame	 Those	
Troublesome	Trolls,	57	THE	ANTITRUST	BULLETIN	(2013).	
322	Guillaume	 Dufey,	 Patents	 and	 Standardization:	 Competition	 Law	 Concerns	 in	 New	 Technology	
Markets,	GAR	2013,	p.	24.	
323	Daniel	Culley,	Malik	Dhanani	and	Maurits	Dolmans,	Learning	From	Rambus:	How	to	Tame	Those	
Troublesome	Trolls,	57	THE	ANTITRUST	BULLETIN	(2013).	
324	For	instance,	ETSI,	which	is	the	major	European	standards	organization	in	the	telecoms	sector,	has	
issued	 an	 IPR	 policy,	 which	 contains	 this	 obligation	 in	 its	 Article	 4:	 “[E]ach	 Member	 shall	 use	 its	
reasonable	 endeavors,	 in	 particular	 during	 the	 development	 of	 a	 Standard	 or	 Technical	 Specification	
where	 it	 participates,	 to	 inform	 ETSI	 of	 Essential	 IPRs	 in	 a	 timely	 fashion.	 In	 particular,	 a	Member	
submitting	a	 technical	 proposal	 for	a	Standard	or	Technical	 Specification	 shall,	 on	a	bona	 fide	basis,	
draw	 the	 attention	of	 ETSI	 to	 any	of	 that	Member’s	 IPR	which	might	 be	Essential	 if	 that	 proposal	 is	
adopted”.	ETSI	Intellectual	Property	Rights	Policy	(No.	31).	
 88 
I. not	 all	 SSOs	 have	 adopted	 identical	 IPR	 policies.	 Although	 a	
number	 of	 international	 SSOs	 in	 the	 framework	 of	 World	
Standards	Cooperation	(“WSC”)325	have	adopted	common	policies	
on	 this	 point	 and	 industry	 consortia	 are	 generally	 aligned	 with	
other	formal	SSO	IPR	policies,	there	are	exceptions;	
II. participating	 in	 an	 SSO	 is	 not	 mandatory	 and	 IP	 policies	 only	
bind	parties	that	have	agreed	to	participate	in	the	SSO.	Outsiders	
cannot	be	placed	under	an	obligation	regarding	patent	disclosure,	
as	 they	 fall	 outside	 the	 SSO’s	 jurisdiction. 326 	Non-members,	
especially	if	patent	PAEs	not	involved	in	R&D	and	manufacturing,	
may	therefore	find	patent	ambush	an	efficient	leverage	to	extract	
revenue	from	their	patent	portfolio;	
III. another	element	undermining	SSOs’	early	disclosure	provisions	is	
the	fact	that	this	disclosure	obligation	is	generally	perceived	as	an	
expression	 of	 “good	 faith”,327	as	 it	 seems	 to	 have	 a	 persuasive	
nature,	 rather	 than	 a	 prescriptive	 one.	 Indeed,	 it	 appears	 that	
there	is	no	compelling	motivation	for	SEP	holders	taking	part	in	
the	drafting	of	a	technology	standard	to	disclose	if	the	incentives	
not	to	disclose	are	stronger.	
Given	 these	 major	 defects	 that	 nullify	 the	 SSO	 approach	 on	 ex	 ante	
disclosure,	 and	 the	 several	 cases	 in	 the	 patent	 war	 concerning	 patent	 ambush,	
policy	makers	have	often	relied	on	competition	law	to	tackle	these	practices.	
Under	EU	competition	law,	the	concern	of	dominance	is	crucial	in	assessing	
whether	 the	 conduct	 of	 an	 undertaking	 restricts	 competition	 under	 Article	 102	
TFEU.	 Indeed,	 EU	 courts	 and	 competition	 authorities	 investigate	whether	 there	
                                                
325	The	 World	 Standards	 Cooperation	 (the	 “WSC”)	 was	 established	 in	 2001	 by	 the	 International	
Telecommunications	Union	 (the	 “ITU”),	 the	 International	Organization	 for	Standardization	 (“ISO”)	
and	 the	 International	Electrotechnical	Commission	 (“IEC”)	 in	order	 to	 strengthen	and	advance	 the	
voluntary	consensus-based	international	standards	systems	of	the	ITU,	ISO	and	IEC.	The	WSC	also	
promotes	 the	 adoption	 and	 implementation	 of	 international	 and	 consensus-based	 standards	
worldwide;	 and	 resolves	 any	outstanding	 issues	 regarding	cooperation	 in	 the	 technical	work	of	 the	
three	organizations.		
326	Guillaume	 Dufey,	 Patents	 and	 Standardization:	 Competition	 Law	 Concerns	 in	 New	 Technology	
Markets,	GAR	2013,	p.	24.	
327	Id.		
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has	been	an	abuse	only	after	it	has	been	established	that	the	alleged	perpetrator	
holds	a	dominant	position	on	a	relevant	market.328		
Patents	 incorporated	 in	 technology	 standards	 often	 confer	 upon	 their	
holder	 a	 dominant	 position.329	This	 is	 mainly	 due	 to	 sunk	 costs330	and	 network	
effects, 331 	which	 deter	 manufacturers	 from	 adopting	 alternative	 competing	
standards	 or	 technologies	 not	 included	 in	 a	 standard,	 even	 if	 they	 face	 supra-
competitive	licensing	demands	from	the	patent	owner.		
It	 is	 important	to	assess	the	conditions	under	which	an	SEP	holder	can	be	
said	to	occupy	a	dominant	position	within	the	meaning	of	Article	102	TFEU.	The	
Commission	has	not	devoted	much	effort	to	provide	any	precise	guidance	on	this	
matter.	According	to	established	EU	case	law,	a	dominant	position	is	“a	position	
of	 economic	 strength	 enjoyed	 by	 an	 undertaking	 which	 enables	 it	 to	 prevent	
effective	 competition	 being	 maintained	 on	 the	 relevant	 market	 by	 giving	 it	 the	
power	 to	 behave	 to	 an	 appreciable	 extent	 independently	 of	 its	 competitors,	
customers	and	ultimately	of	its	consumers”.332	In	this	respect,	the	power	to	behave	
                                                
328	This	is	different	from	US	antitrust	law,	where	the	assessment	of	a	dominant	position	is	not	always	
required,	 as	 Section	2	of	 the	Sherman	Act	 and	Section	5	of	 the	Federal	Trade	Commission	Act	 are	
applied	 to	 conduct	 to	 acquire,	 create	 or	 maintain	 a	 dangerous	 probability	 of	 creating	 monopoly	
power.	Additionally,	also	the	attempt	to	create	a	monopoly	can	be,	in	specific	circumstances,	deemed	
unlawful	antitrust	conduct.	Spectrum	Sports	 v.	McQuillan,	506	U.S.	447,	456	(1993).	The	concept	of	
“dominance”	in	connection	with	patents	has	also	been	a	concern	under	US	antitrust	law.	In	particular,	
a	patentee	was	 traditionally	presumed	to	be	dominant	 regarding	 the	scope	of	 the	patent	 in	certain	
cases	under	Sec.	2	of	the	Sherman	Act.	This	was	the	case	until	it	was	overruled	by	Illinois	Tool	Works,	
Inc.	v.	Independent	Ink,	547	U.S.	28	(2006).		
329	Also	the	European	Commission	seemed	to	recognize	this	general	circumstance	in	an	open	letter	to	
ETSI:	 “[o]nce	 an	 essential	 technology	 is	 included…in	 a	 standard,	 particularly	 one	 that	 is	 made	
mandatory	pursuant	to	Community	legislation,	the	owner	of	the	IPR	relating	to	that	technology	in	most	
if	 not,	 all	 situations	 occupies	 a	 dominant	 position…vis-à-vis	manufacturers	 requiring	 licenses”.	Open	
letter	 from	 the	Commission	 to	 ETSI	 and	 the	CBEMA,	 February	 1994	 (not	 published).	 The	 letter	 is	
cited	 in	Maurits	Dolmans,	Standards	 for	 standards,	26	FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	(2002),	
footnote	84.	
330	Specifically	 “sunk	 costs”	 refer	 to	 the	 significant	 non-recoverable	 (that	 is,	 “sunk”)	 costs,	 which	
manufactures	may	have	invested	in	the	development	of	a	standard	and	in	adapting	their	business	to	
the	production	of	standard	compliant	products.	 Joseph	Farrell	et	al.,	Standard	 Setting,	 Patents,	 and	
Hold-Up,	74	ANTITRUST	LAW	JOURNAL,	3	(2007),	p.	616.	Also	see	Ruikka,	Timo,	“FRAND”	Undertakings	
in	Standardization	-	A	Business	Perspective,	Paper	presented	at	the	Fordham	IP	Conference,	New	York	
City,	28	Mar.	2008,	p.	6.	
331	“Network	 effects”	 indicate	 the	 singular	 characteristics	 of	 markets	 where	 standards	 are	 set	 to	
stimulate	interoperability	and	compatibility	between	products	from	different	manufactures.	In	such	
markets	consumers	are	frequently	unwilling	to	choose	products	that	are	not	attuned	to	widespread	
standards.	 Sunk	 costs	 and	 network	 effects	 may	 act	 to	 deter	 manufactures	 from	 accepting	 rival	
standards	 or	 non-standardized	 technologies,	 even	 though	 they	 may	 face	 unreasonable	 licensing	
burdens	from	SEP	holders.	Id.	
332	CJEU,	C-27/76	United	 Brands	 v	 Commission,	 ECLI:EU:C:1978:22,	para	65.	 See	also	CJEU,	C-85/76	
Hoffmann-La	Roche	v	Commission,	ECLI:EU:C:1979:36,	paras	38-40.	
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independently	refers	to	the	market	power	necessary	to	unilaterally	 influence	the	
parameters	of	competition	to	its	advantage.	In	the	context	of	SEPs	this	means	that	
the	degree	to	which	the	patentee	enjoys	the	independence	to	advantageously	set	
excessive	 or	 discriminatory,	 i.e.	 non-FRAND,	 royalty	 rates	 or	 other	 licensing	
conditions,	must	first	be	assessed.333	
The	assessment	of	dominance	takes	place	on	the	relevant	market,	which	is	
limited	 to	 the	 SEPs.	 In	 particular,	 when	 patents	 are	 used	 in	 a	 standard,	 and	
become	 essential	 to	 competition	 in	 the	 market	 connected	 with	 the	 standard,	
three	separate	market	dimensions	can	be	acknowledged:	
I. technological	 markets,	 where	 a	 specific	 technology	 denotes	 a	
market	(which	is	the	case	for	Wi-Fi	or	USB	technologies);		
II. product	markets,	where	 competition	 exists	with	 regard	 to	 certain	
products	(smartphones	or	chipsets,	to	name	but	a	few);	and	
III. SEP	 markets,	 where	 each	 and	 every	 SEP	 amounts	 to	 a	 separate	
market.334		
Although,	 as	 previously	 pointed	 out,	 SEPs	 often	 confer	 on	 SEP	 owners	
appreciable	market	power	in	any	of	these	three	markets,	which	are	characterized	
by	sunk	costs	and	network	effects,	the	Commission	has	always	adopted	a	case-by-
case	 analysis	 in	 determining	 whether	 an	 SEP	 holder	 is	 dominant	 or	 not.	 The	
Commission	 has	 explicitly	 stated	 that	 “there	 is	 no	 presumption	 that	 holding	 or	
exercising	 IPR	 essential	 to	 a	 standard	 equates	 to	 the	 possession	 or	 exercise	 of	
                                                
333	See	Communication	from	the	Commission,	Guidance	on	the	Commission’s	enforcement	priorities	in	
applying	 Article	 82	 of	 the	 EC	 Treaty	 to	 abusive	 exclusionary	 conduct	 by	 dominant	 undertakings,	OJ	
2009/C	 45/02,	 24	 Feb.	 2009,	 paras	 10-11.	 In	 general	 the	 Commission	 defines	 market	 power	 as	 the	
“ability	 to	 profitably	 maintain	 prices	 above	 competitive	 levels	 for	 a	 period	 of	 time	 or	 to	 profitably	
maintain	 output	 in	 terms	 of	 product	 quantities,	 product	 quality	 and	 variety	 or	 innovation	 below	
competitive	 levels	 for	a	period	of	time”,	See	Communication	from	the	Commission,	Guidelines	on	the	
applicability	of	Article	101	of	the	Treaty	on	the	
Functioning	of	the	European	Union	to	horizontal	co-operation	agreements,	OJ	2011/C	11/1,	14	Jan.	2011,	
para	39.	
334	See	the	analysis	of	the	European		Commission’s	2011	Guidelines	(2011	Commission	Guidelines	(No.	1)	
261)	 and	 the	 Google/Motorola	 merger	 decision	 (Google/Motorola	 Mobility	 (Case	 COMP/M.6381)	
(Commission	Decision	2012/1068	[2012]	OJ	C	75/01).	
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market	power.	The	question	of	market	power	can	only	be	assessed	on	a	case	by-case	
basis”.335		
The	concept	of	relevant	market	has	been	defined	by	the	Commission	in	its	
notice	on	the	definition	of	relevant	market,	where	it	gives	the	following	definition:	
“a	relevant	product	market	comprises	all	those	products	and/or	services	which	are	
regarded	 as	 interchangeable	 or	 substitutable	 by	 the	 consumer	 by	 reason	 of	 the	
products’	characteristics,	their	prices	and	their	intended	use”.336		
When	 assessing	 the	 substitutability	 of	 a	 product	 both	 demand-side	
substitution	 and	 supply-side	 substitution	 must	 be	 considered.	 In	 particular,	
demand-side	 substitution	 concerns	 the	 variety	 of	 products	 that	 are	 regarded	 as	
substitutes	by	the	consumer.	
In	essence,	market	definition	is	employed	to	identify	the	sources	of	effective	
substitutes	 to	 which	 a	 licensee	 will	 seek	 recourse	 if	 the	 product’s	 price	 is	 to	
permanently	increase	by	5	to	10%.337	
Supply-side	 substitution	 emphasizes	 the	 suppliers’	 aptitude	 to	 switch	
production	to	the	relevant	products	and	market	them	in	the	short	term	without	
sustaining	 substantial	 supplementary	 costs.	 These	 situations	 characteristically	
arise	when	firms	produce	an	extensive	variety	of	qualities	of	a	given	product.	Even	
if	 those	 qualities	 are	 not	 substitutable	 for	 the	 final	 consumer,	 they	 will	 be	
clustered	into	one	product	market	as	long	as	most	suppliers	are	able	to	offer	and	
sell	 the	 different	 qualities	 in	 the	 short	 term	 and	 without	 substantial	
supplementary	costs.		
                                                
335	2011	Commission’s	Guidelines	(No.	1)	269.	
336 	Commission	 notice	 on	 the	definition	 of	 relevant	 market	for	 the	 purposes	 of	 Community	
competition	law,	OJ	C	372	of	9	Dec.	1997.	
337	This	 test,	defined	as	 the	SSNIP-test	or	 “small	 but	 significant	 and	 non-transitory	 increase	 in	 price	
test”,	 is	 used	 in	 the	 Commission	 notice	 on	 the	 definition	 of	 relevant	 market	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	
Community	competition	law	(OJ	1997/C	372/5,	9	Dec.	1997,	para	17),	and	confirmed	in	the	Commission	
Guidelines	on	the	application	of	Article	101	of	the	Treaty	on	the	Functioning	of	the	European	Union	to	
technology	transfer	agreements	(OJ	2014/C	89/03,	28	Mar.	2014,	para	22),	where	the	SSNIP	test	applies	
in	the	context	of	licensing.	The	SSNIP	test	aims	to	identify	the	smallest	relevant	market	within	which	
a	 hypothetical	monopolist	 could	 implement	 a	 lucrative	 noteworthy	 increase	 in	 price.	 The	relevant	
market	is	 thus	 represented	 by	 a	 group	 of	 goods	 or	 services	 that	 are	 deemed	 substitutes	by	 the	
customer.	 Such	group	 is	 evaluated	 as	being	worth	monopolizing	where,	 if	 only	one	 single	 supplier	
were	to	provide	it,	that	supplier	could	profitably	increase	its	price	without	its	customers	turning	away	
and	selecting	other	goods	and	services	from	other	suppliers.	
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The	market	concerned	with	regard	to	ICT	standardization	is	the	technology	
market,	 which	 is	 generally	 envisaged	 as	 including	 all	 technologies	 that	 are	
regarded	 by	 licensees	 as	 interchangeable	 with	 or	 substitutable	 for	 the	 licensed	
technology	by	reason	of	their	characteristics,	royalties	and	intended	use.338		
Given	this	conceptual	framework	for	defining	markets,	the	EU	case	law	has	
specified	 that	 holding	 a	 patent	 does	 not	 automatically	 equate	 to	 holding	 a	
dominant	 position.339	This	 is	 so	 because	 the	 exclusivity	 conferred	 concerns	 only	
the	 specific	 implementation	 set	 out	 in	 the	 patent,	 and	 not	 also	 alternative	
implementations	 that	 could	 achieve	 the	 same	 result.	 It	 follows	 that	 substitute	
technologies,	 patented	 or	 non-proprietary,	 may	 exist	 and	 exert	 competitive	
pressure	 upon	 the	 patentee.340	However,	 when	 dealing	 with	 SEPs,	 a	 patentee’s	
competitors	have	no	other	option	than	to	use	the	innovation	vested	in	the	SEP	in	
order	to	comply	with	the	standard.	In	other	words,	no	substitute	technologies	are	
available	for	that	purpose.341		
The	 existence	 of	 competing	 technologies	 to	 which	 a	 licensee	 may	 seek	
recourse	may	strongly	reduce	the	SEP	holder’s	market	power.342	In	this	vein,	it	is	
necessary	to	investigate	the	real	market	power	enjoyed	by	the	SEP	holder	also	in	
                                                
338	Commission	 Guidelines	 on	 the	 application	 of	 Article	 101	 of	 the	 Treaty	 on	 the	 Functioning	 of	 the	
European	Union	to	technology	transfer	agreements,	OJ	2014/C	89/03,	28	Mar.	2014,	para	22.	
339	See	for	instance	CJEU,	Joined	Cases	C-241/91	P	and	C-242/91	P,	RTE	and	ITP	v.	Commission	(Magill),	
6	Apr.	1995,	para	46.	
340 	DAVID	 TELYAS,	 THE	 INTERFACE	 BETWEEN	 COMPETITION	 LAW,	 PATENTS	 AND	 TECHNICAL	 STANDARDS	
(KLUWER	LAW	INTERNATIONAL,	2014),	p.	53.	
341	This	argument	was	upheld	by	the	Commission	in	Google’s	acquisition	of	Motorola’s	SEPs,	where	
it	stated	that	“each	SEP		can	be	considered	as	a	separate	market	in	itself	as	it	is	necessary	to	comply	
with	 a	 standard	 and	 thus	 cannot	 be	 designed	 around,	 i.e.	 there	 is	 by	 definition	 no	 alternative	 or	
substitute	 for	 each	 such	patent”	 (Case	COMP/M.6381,	Google/Motorola	Mobility,	 13	Feb.	2012,	para	
61).	By	this	the	Commission	sidestepped	the	issue	related	to	the	difficulties	in	assessing	dominance	
and	 it	de	 facto	 set	 a	 presumption	 that	 every	 SEP	 holder	per	 se	 holds	 a	 dominant	 position	 in	 the	
distinct	upstream	technology	market	that	is	deemed	to	exist	for	every	patent	essential	to	a	standard.	
It	follows	that	SEP	owners	enjoy	market	power,	holding	a	100%	share	on	that	market,	with	no	need	
to	 delineate	 the	 relevant	market	 first.	 BJÖRN	LUNDQVIST,	STANDARDIZATION	UNDER	EU	COMPETITION	
RULES	AND	US	ANTITRUST	LAWS:	THE	RISE	AND	LIMITS	OF	SELF-REGULATION	(EDWARD	ELGAR	PUBLISHING,	
2014),	 at	 303;	 and	DAVID	TELYAS,	THE	INTERFACE	BETWEEN	COMPETITION	LAW,	PATENTS	AND	TECHNICAL	
STANDARDS	(KLUWER	LAW	INTERNATIONAL,	2014)	at	35.	Considering	that	according	to	the	Commission	
(Case	 C-62/86,	 AKZO	 v.	 Commission,	 3	 Jul.	 1991,	 para	 60,	 and	 Case	 T-228/97,	 Irish	 Sugar	 v.	
Commission,	7	Oct.	1999,	para	70)	a	presumption	of	dominance	is	set	once	an	undertaking	holds	a	
market	 share	 that	 is	 above	 50%,	 this	 is	 a	 strong	 indication	 of	 dominance.	 Yet,	 it	 is	 not	 to	 be	
interpreted	 as	 decisive	 evidence	 overruling	 the	 Commission’s	 Horizontal	 Guidelines’	 explicit	
statement	 that	 holding	 an	 SEP	 does	 not	 translate	 into	 dominance	 (Communication	 from	 the	
Commission,	Guidelines	 on	 the	 applicability	 of	 Article	 101	 of	 the	 Treaty	 on	 the	 Functioning	 of	 the	
European	Union	to	horizontal	co-operation	agreements,	OJ	2011/C	11/1,	14	Jan.	2011,	para	269).	
342	Maurits	Dolmans	&	Daniel	 Ilan,	European	 Antitrust	 and	 Patent	 Acquisition:	 Trolls	 in	 the	 Patent	
Thickets,	8	JOURNAL	OF	THE	ANTITRUST	COMMITTEE	OF	THE	INTERNATIONAL	BAR	ASSOCIATION	2	(2012),	p.	8.		
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the	 downstream	 product	market.	 If	 there	 is	 competitive	 pressure	 deriving	 from	
alternative	 technology,	 i.e.,	 if	 customers	 in	 the	 downstream	 market	 can	 easily	
switch	 to	 substitute	 technologies,	 this	 may	 diminish	 the	 capability	 of	 the	 SEP	
holder	to	exercise	market	power.343	
	Therefore,	it	appears	manifest	that	an	assessment	of	the	relevant	market,	in	
the	case	of	standards,	must	take	into	account	both	the	upstream	and	downstream	
market.344	In	the	context	of	standards,	the	relevant	market	is	represented	by	both	
the	upstream	standard	setting	market,	 in	which	undertakings	seek	to	have	 their	
proprietary	 technology	 integrated	 in	 a	 standard,	 and	 the	 downstream	 product	
market,	where	products	 that	 incorporate	 the	 standard	are	 sold.345	Consequently,	
although	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	 standard	 may	 put	 an	 end	 to	 effective	 competition	
between	 rival	 technologies	 for	 inclusion	 in	 the	 specific	 standard,	 this	 is	 not	
sufficient	 to	 infer	 market	 power.	 Indeed,	 in	 cases	 in	 which	 the	 licensee	 of	 the	
standardized	technology	can	shift	to	alternative	technologies,	the	IPR	holder	will	
not	 be	 able	 to	 exert	 monopoly	 power.	 Furthermore,	 lacking	 substitutes	 on	 the	
upstream	 technology	 market,	 if	 customers	 on	 the	 downstream	 market,	 where	
products	 integrating	 the	 standard	 are	 sold,	 can	 effortlessly	 shift	 to	 alternative	
                                                
343	GINEVRA	BRUZZONE,	MARCO	BOCCACCIO,	CHAPTER	5:	STANDARDS	UNDER	EU	COMPETITION	LAW:	THE	OPEN	
ISSUES;	COMPETITION	LAW	AND	INTELLECTUAL	PROPERTY	(KLUWER	LAW	INTERNATIONAL,	Vol.	 50)	 2012.	The	
Commission	has	 stressed	 the	 relevance	of	competing	standards	 for	 the	definition	of	market	power:	
“in	 the	 case	 of	 several	 competing	 standards	 or	 in	 the	 case	 of	 effective	 competition	 between	 the	
standardized	solution	and	non-standardized	solution	a	limitation	of	access	may	not	produce	restrictive	
effects	 on	 competition”.	 Communication	 from	 the	 Commission,	 Guidelines	 on	 the	 applicability	 of	
Article	 101	 of	 the	 Treaty	 on	 the	 Functioning	 of	 the	 European	 Union	 to	 horizontal	 co-operation	
agreements,	 OJ	 2011/C	 11/1,	 14	 Jan.	 2011,	 para	 294.	 By	 the	 same	 token,	 the	 Commission	 in	 its	
Google/Motorola	merger	decision	stressed	the	relevance	of	competing	standards	 for	 the	assessment	
of	 market	 power.	 Case	 COMP/M.6381	 -	 Google/Motorola	Mobility,	 13	 Feb.	 2012,	 para	 53,	 where	 it	
states	 that:	 “once	 a	 standard	 has	 been	 adopted	 and	 widely	 implemented	 by	 the	 industry	 and	 in	 the	
absence	 of	 competing	 standards,	 firms	 that	 use	 these	 technologies	 may	 be	 severely	 limited	 in	 their	
ability	to	use	another	technology”.		
344	The	relevance	of	downstream	competition	in	limiting	the	market	power	that	licensors	derive	from	
their	position	on	the	upstream	technology	market	has	been	acknowledged	by	the	Commission.	Thus,	
the	 Commission	 in	 its	 Technology	 Transfer	 Guidelines	 states	 that	 “[i]f	 the	 downstream	 product	
market	 is	 competitive,	 competition	at	 this	 level	may	effectively	constrain	 the	 licensor”	and	highlights	
that	market	shares	on	the	technology	market	may	be	calculated	by	reference	to	the	sales	of	products	
incorporating	the	licensed	technology.	Commission	Guidelines	on	the	application	of	Article	 101	of	the	
Treaty	on	the	Functioning	of	the	European	Union	to	technology	transfer	agreements,	OJ	2014/C	89/03,	
28	Mar.	2014,	para	88.	
345	GINEVRA	BRUZZONE,	MARCO	BOCCACCIO,	CHAPTER	5:	STANDARDS	UNDER	EU	COMPETITION	LAW:	THE	OPEN	
ISSUES;	COMPETITION	LAW	AND	INTELLECTUAL	PROPERTY	(KLUWER	LAW	INTERNATIONAL,	2012)		
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products	that	do	not	embody	the	standard,	this	may	be	enough	to	prevent	the	IPR	
holder	from	exerting	significant	market	power.346		
Given	 the	 difficulties	 in	 applying	 Article	 102	 TFEU	 in	 the	 standards	
framework,	it	does	not	come	as	a	surprise	that	establishing	the	abusive	nature	of	
patent	 ambush	 conduct	 is	 not	 without	 problems.	 Additionally,	 there	 is	 little		
guidance	available	as,	at	the	time	of	writing,	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	
Union	 (“CJEU”)	has	not	yet	assessed	 the	 issue	of	patent	ambush.	The	only	basis	
for	assessing	the	EU	approach	on	this	matter	is	the	Rambus	case,	dealt	with	by	the	
European	 Commission.	 The	 case	 is	 also	 particularly	 interesting	 as	 the	
Commission’s	Statement	of	Objections	containing	a	preliminary	finding	of	abuse	
by	Rambus	followed	just	a	few	months	after	the	US	Federal	Trade	Commission’s	
(“FTC”)	 findings	 that	 the	 American	 technology	 company	 called	 Rambus	 had	
violated	 Section	 2	 of	 the	 Sherman	 Act	 and	 its	 conduct	 constituted	 an	 illegal	
monopolization.347	It	 is	 informative	 to	 examine	 how	 the	 parallel	 EU	 and	 US	
proceedings	developed	differently	and	how	the	Commission	and	the	FTC	assessed	
the	 applicability	 of	 EU	 competition	 and	 US	 antitrust	 law	 in	 patent	 ambush	
conduct.	
The	 EU	 Commission,	 on	 30	 July	 2007,	 sent	 a	 Statement	 of	 Objections	 to	
Rambus	 alleging	 that	 it	had	 infringed	Article	 102	TFEU	by:	 (i)	not	disclosing	 its	
patents	 and	 patent	 applications	 essential	 to	 the	 standard	 in	 the	 field	 of	
semiconductors	during	the	standardization	process	before	a	US	SSO;	and	(ii)	later	
imposing	unreasonable	royalties.348	
The	 Commission	 decided	 to	 settle	 the	 case	 relying	 on	 Article	 9(1)	 of	
Regulation	 1/2003	 as	 Rambus	 committed	 to	 cap	 its	 royalty	 fees	 for	 products	
compliant	with	the	standard.349	However,	the	proceeding	still	sheds	some	light	on	
the	EU	approach	with	regards	to	patent	ambush.	According	to	the	Commission,	
                                                
346	Id.	
347	See	Case	No.	07-1086,	Rambus	Incorporated	v	Federal	Trade	Commission,	22	Apr.	2008.	
348	Commission	press	release	 in	Case	COMP/38.636,	Rambus,	MEMO/07/330	(Commission	confirms	
sending	a	Statement	of	Objections	to	Rambus),	23	Aug.	2007.	
349	Yves	Botteman,	Agapi	Patsa,	Towards	a	more	sustainable	use	of	commitment	decisions	in	Article	102	
TFEU	cases,	1	JOURNAL	OF	ANTITRUST	ENFORCEMENT	2	(2013),	pp.	347-374.	Given	that	Article	9	decision	
do	 not	 involve	 an	 in-depth	 legal	 assessment	 of	 the	 alleged	 abuse,	 they	 are	 not	 conducive	 to	 legal	
certainty,	especially	in	the	field	of	ICT	standardization,	where	the	market	is	in	great	need	of	further	
guidance.		
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the	abuse	did	not	consist	in	the	patent	ambush	itself,	but	rather	in	the	claiming	of	
fees	at	a	 level	higher	than	those	that	Rambus	would	have	been	able	to	charge	 if	
the	patents	had	been	disclosed.350		
Specifically,	 the	 Commission	 focused	 on	 the	 licensing	 terms	 imposed	 by	
Rambus	 ex	 post,	 rather	 than	 on	 the	 ex	 ante	 deceptive	 practices.	 Although	 the	
deceptive	 tactics	 were	 held	 to	 have	 excluded	 competing	 non-proprietary	
technology	 and	 the	 conduct	 “necessarily	 influenced	 the	 standards	 process,	 in	 a	
context	 where	 suppression	 of	 the	 relevant	 information	 necessarily	 distorted	 the	
decision	 making	 process	 within	 a	 standard-setting	 body”,351	the	 Commission	 did	
not	 consider	 such	 conduct	 as	 an	 abuse	 under	 Article	 102	 TFEU.352	According	 to	
the	Commission,	the	fact	that	Rambus	breached	the	SSOs	policy	concerning	the	
duty	to	act	in	good	faith,		to	disclose	patents	and	patent	applications	in	a	timely	
manner	is	inherent	to	the	standard-setting	process,353	and	it	should	not	generally	
be	viewed	as	a	precondition	for	establishing	an	abuse	under	Article	102	TFEU.354	
The	focus	of	the	Commission	on	the	ex	post	phase,	after	the	phase	in	which	
the	 standard	 incorporating	 Rambus’s	 SEPs	 was	 adopted,	 is	 reasonable,	
considering	the	unusual	nature	of	patent	ambush.	The	supposed	abuse	consists	in	
an	 SEP	 holder	 deliberately	 concealing	 its	 patent	 and	 subverting	 the	 standard-
setting	 process	 to	 push	 for	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	 standard	 that	 mirrors	 its	 hidden	
patents.355	The	 unusual	 point	 here	 is	 that	 the	 alleged	 abuse,	 i.e.	 the	 deceptive	
conduct,	occurs	when	the	patent	holder	is	not	yet	dominant.	Indeed,	a	patentee’s	
dominance	will	at	the	earliest	be	acquired	when	the	SSO	adopts	the	standard,	i.e.,	
when	 the	 market	 becomes	 locked-into	 the	 standard	 and	 the	 patent	 holder	
acquires	 market	 power.	 This	 abuse-dominance	 sequence	 poses	 an	 issue	 as	 EU	
                                                
350	Commission	decision	in	Case	COMP/C-3/38.636,	Rambus,	9	Dec.	2009,	para	28.	
351	Rambus	(Case	COMP/38.636)	Commission	Decision	[2009],	para	39.	
352	The	 reasoning	 of	 the	 Commission	 assumes	 that	 there	 were	 alternative	 technologies	 that	 could	
have	been	selected	for	inclusion	in	the	standards	that	would	have	led	to	lower	fees	being	imposed	in	
the	ex	post	phase.	Rambus	(Case	COMP/38.636)	Commission	Decision	[2009],	para	46.	
353 	DAVID	 TELYAS,	 THE	 INTERFACE	 BETWEEN	 COMPETITION	 LAW,	 PATENTS	 AND	 TECHNICAL	 STANDARDS	
(KLUWER	LAW	INTERNATIONAL,	2014),	p.	78.	
354	Commission	decision	in	Case	COMP/C-3/38.636,	Rambus,	9	Dec.	2009,	para	39.	
355	Rambus	 had	 amended	 its	 patent	 application	 in	 compliance	 with	 the	 discussion	 in	 the	 SSO	
technical	 committee	 so	 as	 to	 ensure	 that	 once	 granted	 the	 patent	 would	 cover	 the	 standard.	
Commission	decision	in	Case	COMP/C-3/38.636,	Rambus,	9	Dec.	2009,	paras		40-42.	
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competition	 law	prohibits	 the	 abuse	 of	 a	 dominant	 position,	 thus	 presupposing	
that	dominance	occurs	before	abuse,	not	vice	versa.356	
Indeed,		Article	102	TFEU	would	not	capture	the	abusive	nature	of	Rambus’s	
deceptive	 conduct	 at	 the	 outset,	 as	 Rambus	 arguably	 did	 not	 hold	 a	 dominant	
position	at	 the	time	when	the	ambush	 itself	 took	place.	 It	 thus	appears	 that	 the	
Commission	 made	 an	 effort	 to	 by-pass	 the	 issue	 of	 establishing	 dominance	 ex	
ante.357	
In	light	of	the	Rambus	decision,	it	is	not	possible	to	affirm	whether	patent	
ambush	 amounts	 to	 an	 abuse	 under	 Article	 102	 TFEU.	 It	 could	 amount	 to	 an	
abuse	 under	 Article	 102	 TFEU	 if	 the	 Commission	 could	 demonstrate	 that	 the	
patentee	has	charged	unreasonable,	i.e.	non-FRAND,	fees,	after	the	standard	was	
adopted.	 In	 this	 regard,	 the	 Commission	 could	 base	 its	 argument	 on	 the	
exploitative	use	of	excessive	pricing	as	an	anti-competitive	harm.358	Nonetheless,	
the	 literature	has	 emphasized	 the	 shortcoming	of	 this	 conceptual	 framework	 in	
the	 standardization	 context. 359 	Indeed,	 given	 that	 the	 anticompetitive	 harm	
descends	from	the	SEP	holders	ex	ante	deceptive	conduct,	it	seems	inappropriate	
                                                
356	BJÖRN	LUNDQVIST,	STANDARDIZATION	UNDER	EU	COMPETITION	RULES	AND	US	ANTITRUST	LAWS:	THE	RISE	
AND	LIMITS	OF	SELF-REGULATION	(EDWARD	ELGAR	PUBLISHING,	2014),	p.	303.	See	also	BELLAMY	AND	CHILD,	
EUROPEAN	UNION	LAW	OF	COMPETITION	(OXFORD	UNIVERSITY	PRESS,	2013),	p.	756.	
357	Interestingly,	in	the	US	twist	of	the	Rambus	case,	the	Federal	Trade	Commission	did	not	face	the	
same	challenges	as	the	Commission	given	that	Section	2	of	the	Sherman	Act,	in	contrast	to	Article	102	
of	 the	 TFEU,	 prohibits	 unlawful	 monopolization,	 hence,	 the	 FTC	 did	 not	 lack	 the	 legal	 basis	 for	
assessing	the	deception	itself	to	be	unlawful.	Consequently	it	was	argued	that	Rambus	had	unlawfully	
obtained	monopoly	power	because	absent	the	deception	 its	patent	would	have	been	excluded	from	
the	 standard.	 On	 appeal	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeals	 from	 the	 District	 of	 Columbia	 Circuit,	 however,	
disagreed	as	there	was	insufficient	evidence	to	support	the	accusation.	See	Case	No.	07-1086,	Rambus	
Incorporated	 v	 Federal	 Trade	 Commission,	 22.4.2008,	 p.	 11.	 See	 also	 DAVID	 TELYAS,	 THE	 INTERFACE	
BETWEEN	COMPETITION	LAW,	PATENTS	AND	TECHNICAL	STANDARDS	(KLUWER	LAW	INTERNATIONAL,	2014),	p.	
105.	
358	It	 has	 been	 observed	 that	 as	 the	 abuse	must	 be	 established	 ex	 post,	 the	 Commission	 bears	 the	
burden	 of	 proof	 to	 establish	 a	 connection	 between	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 deceit	 ex	 ante	 (when	 the	
patentee	was	 not	 dominant)	 and	 the	 royalty	 level	 charged	 ex	 post	 (when	 the	 patentee	 acquired	 a	
dominant	position).	DAVID	TELYAS,	THE	INTERFACE	BETWEEN	COMPETITION	LAW,	PATENTS	AND	TECHNICAL	
STANDARDS	(KLUWER	LAW	INTERNATIONAL,	2014),	p.	105.	
359	Andreas	Fuchs,	Patent	 ambush	 strategies	 and	Article	 102	TFEU,	 in	 JOSEF	DREXL	ET	AL	(EDS.),	MORE	
COMMON	GROUND	 FOR	 INTERNATIONAL	 COMPETITION	 LAW?	 (EDWARD	 ELGAR,	 2011),	 pp.	 177	 et	 seq.	 See	
Josef	Drexl,	 Intellectual	 property	 in	 competition:	How	 to	 promote	 dynamic	 competition	 as	 a	 goal,	 in	
JOSEF	 DREXL	 ET	 AL	 (EDS.),	 MORE	 COMMON	 GROUND	 FOR	 INTERNATIONAL	 COMPETITION	 LAW?	 (EDWARD	
ELGAR,	2011),	pp.	210	et	seq.	
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to	remedy	it	by	a	finding	of	excessive	pricing,	which	would	at	most	impose	on	the	
SEP	holder	an	obligation	to	lower	the	licensing	fees.360		
2.2 INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND ABUSIVE LITIGATION: CHRONICLES FROM THE 
PATENT WAR  
The	 debate	 concerning	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 EU	 competition	 law	 restricts	
the	 prerogative	 of	 rights’	 holders	 to	 assert	 their	 IPRs	 against	 third	 parties	 has	
increased	in	 light	of	the	so-called	“patent	war”	 in	the	smartphone	market.	Many	
of	the	leading	ICT	companies,	which	own	large	IPR	portfolios,	are	enforcing	their	
patents,	 some	 of	which	 are	 essential	 to	 underlying	 standardized	 technology,	 by	
asking	 courts	 to	 grant	 injunctive	 relief	 preventing	 the	 sale	 of	 unlicensed	 rival	
products.	In	this	contest,	an	SEP	holder	should	not	be	allowed	to	take	advantage	
of	the	injunctions	as	leverage	to	obtain	anti-competitive	benefits.	To	this	end,	an	
undertaking	 against	which	 an	 injunction	 is	 sought	 or	 enforced	 should	 have	 the	
chance	to	raise	a	compulsory	licensing	defense	on	the	basis	of	competition	law,	i.e.	
to	make	a	claim	that	the	SEP	holder	has	violated	Article	102	TFEU	by	refusing	to	
grant,	or	even	to	negotiate,	a	license	on	FRAND	terms.361	Patent	implementers	are	
indeed	 fighting	 against	 injunctions	by	 raising	 allegations	of	unlawful	 abuse	 as	 a	
counterclaim	in	the	several	patent	infringement	lawsuits	brought	against	them	or	
by	 lodging	 complaints	 of	 abuse	 of	 a	 dominant	 position	 with	 competition	
authorities.362	If	this	defense	is	denied	and	discarded	as	inadmissible,	the	alleged	
infringers	 facing	 the	 prospects	 of	 an	 injunction,	 may	 be	 impelled	 to	 accept	
excessive	or	discriminatory	licensing	terms.		
                                                
360	Some	 scholars	 have	 suggested	 that	 the	Commission	 could	have	made	use	 of	 its	 creative	 skill	 to	
delineate	a	line	of	argumentation	aimed	at	considering	patent	ambush	“to	the	effect	that	a	dominant	
patent	owner	must	not	demand	royalties	in	a	situation	where	its	failure	to	speak	was	part	of	a	hold-up	
plan	 and	 led	 to	 a	 chain	 of	 events	 leading	 to	 dominance	 in	 the	 relevant	 technology	 market”.	 Daniel	
Culley,	 Malik	 Dhanani	 and	 Maurits	 Dolmans,	 Learning	 From	 Rambus:	 How	 to	 Tame	 Those	
Troublesome	 Trolls,	 57	THE	ANTITRUST	BULLETIN	(2013),	 p.	 155.	Recognizing	patent	 ambush	 as	 being	
itself	 abusive	 might	 not	 find	 a	 favorable	 response,	 given	 that	 the	 Commission	 tends	 to	 assess	
unilateral	 conduct	 under	 Article	 102	 of	 the	 TFEU	 using	 an	 effects-based	 approach,	 focused	 on	 the	
economic	impact	on	the	market,	which	seems	to	be	more	consistent	with	the	general	objectives	of	EU	
competition	law.	See	the	OECD,	What	is	competition	on	the	merits?,	Policy	Brief,	June	2006.	
361	For	a	comprehensive	analysis	of	standards	and	FRAND	commitments,	see	Damien	Geradin,	Miguel	
Rato,	Can	Standard-Setting	Lead	to	Exploitative	Abuse?	A	Dissonant	View	on	Patent	Hold-up,	Royalty	
Stacking,	and	the	Meaning	of	FRAND,	3	EUR.	COMPETITION	J.	101	(2007).	
362	Nicolas	 Petit,	Injunctions	 for	 FRAND-Pledged	 SEPs:	 The	 Quest	 for	 an	 Appropriate	 Test	 of	 Abuse	
Under	Article	102	TFEU,	9	EUR.	COMPETITION	J.		677	(2013).	
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In	 this	context,	 it	 is	 fundamental	 to	appreciate	 that	FRAND	commitments	
are	construed	as	a	“precautionary	measure”	to	deter	anticompetitive	conduct	“by	
ensuring	 that	 essential	 IPR	 is	 made	 available	 to	 all	 third	 parties	 on	 FRAND	
terms”.363	A	 FRAND	 obligation	 has	 three	main	 components:	 (1)	 an	 obligation	 to	
license,	and	a	ban	on	obtaining	injunctive	relief	against	licensees	to	force	them	to	
submit	to	the	licensor’s	demands	regardless	of	whether	the	demands	are	fair	and	
reasonable;	(2)	an	obligation	not	to	charge	monopoly	rent,	and	to	limit	demands	
to	what	the	licensor	would	have	been	able	to	obtain	in	a	competitive	market	had	
there	been	an	auction	before	the	standard	was	set,	with	technologies	competing	
for	 the	 standard;	 (3)	 an	 obligation	 not	 to	 discriminate	 between	 licensees,	 or	
between	licensees	and	the	licensor’s	own	downstream	business.	
The	 recent	upsurge	 in	patent	 litigation	 and	 the	 several	 complaints	 lodged	
before	 EU	 and	 US	 competition	 authorities	 alleging	 the	 abusive	 nature	 of	 these	
lawsuits	should	not	be	oblivious	to	the	legal	framework	elaborated	by	the	courts	
on	vexatious	or	abusive	 litigation.	This	constitutes	 the	conceptual	 framework	 to	
assess	under	which	circumstances	the	assertion	of	SEPs	establishes	an	abuse.	
The	 legal	 test	 for	 vexatious	 litigation	was	 elaborated	 in	 the	 ITT	 Promedia	
case,364	where	the	General	Court	held	that,	given	that	 forbidding	applying	for	an	
injunction	was	“an	exception	to	the	general	principle	of	access	to	the	courts,	which	
ensures	the	rule	of	law”,365	initiation	of	legal	action	may	amount	to	an	abuse	under	
Article	102	TFEU	only	in	“wholly	exceptional	circumstances”.366	More	precisely,	the	
General	 Court	 implicitly	 endorsed367	the	 two	 criteria,	 which	 the	 Commission	
elaborated,	 that	 must	 be	 satisfied	 in	 order	 to	 find	 that	 the	 initiation	 of	 legal	
                                                
363 	DAVID	 TELYAS,	 THE	 INTERFACE	 BETWEEN	 COMPETITION	 LAW,	 PATENTS	 AND	 TECHNICAL	 STANDARDS	
(KLUWER	LAW	INTERNATIONAL,	2014),	p.	222.	
364	CJEU,	Case	T-111/96	ITT	Promedia	NV	v.	Commission	[1998]	ECR	II-2937.	
365	Id.	para	61.	
366	Id.	para	60.	
367 	Although	 the	 General	 Court	 did	 not	 rule	 on	 the	 conformity	 of	 the	 two	 criteria	 with	 EU	
competition	 law,	 it	 applied	 them,	 thus	 implicitly	 validating	 them.	 See	 CGEU,	 Case	 T-111/96,	 ITT	
Promedia	 v.	Commission,	 17	 Jul.	 1998,	paras	57-58.	Many	scholars	support	 the	 implicit	endorsement	
interpretation	of	the	two	cumulative	criteria.	See	ALISON	JONES,	BRENDA	SUFRIN,	EC	COMPETITION	LAW	-	
TEXT,	 CASES	 AND	 MATERIALS	 (3RD	 ED.,	 OXFORD	 UNIVERSITY	 PRESS,	 2008),	 p.	 582;	 and	 ERIK	 ØSTERUD,	
IDENTIFYING	 EXCLUSIONARY	 ABUSES	 BY	 DOMINANT	 UNDERTAKINGS	 UNDER	 EU	 COMPETITION	 LAW:	 THE	
SPECTRUM	OF	TESTS,	(KLUWER	LAW	INTERNATIONAL,	INTERNATIONAL	COMPETITION	LAW	SERIES,	45,	2010),	p.	
137.	 The	 validity	 of	 the	 test	 	 was	 later	 explicitly	 confirmed	 by	 the	 General	 Court	 in	 the	 Protégé	
International	case.	CGEU,	Case	T-119/09,	Protégé	 International	v.	Commission,	13	Sep.	2012,	paras	51-
68.	 On	 this	 point,	 see	 Bo	 Vesterdorf,	 IP	 Rights	 and	 Competition	 Law	 Enforcement	 Questions,	 4	
JOURNAL	OF	EUROPEAN	COMPETITION	LAW	&	PRACTICE	2	(2013),	pp.	109-111.	
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proceedings	 can	 be	 construed	 as	 abusive:	 “the	 action	 (i)	 cannot	 reasonably	 be	
considered	 as	 an	 attempt	 to	 establish	 its	 rights	 and	 can	 therefore	 only	 serve	 to	
harass	the	opposite	party”;	and	(ii)	“it	is	conceived	in	the	framework	of	a	plan	whose	
goal	is	to	eliminate	competition”.368		
These	criteria	are	cumulative369	and	must	be	construed	narrowly,	given	the	
centrality	of	the	right	of	access	to	court.370	Indeed,	the	ITT	Promedia	case	pointed	
out	 that	 competition	 law	 generally	 cannot	 be	 used	 as	 a	 tool	 to	 prevent	
undertakings	 from	 asserting	 their	 rights	 before	 the	 court.	 This	 finding	 has	 also	
been	 applied	 in	 the	 IP	 context.371	Indeed,	 competition	 law,	 should	 instead	 be	 a	
basis	 to	 prevent	 patentees	 from	 obtaining	 an	 injunction,	 although	 legally	
provided,	 only	 where	 the	 injunction	 is	 exclusively	 employed	 to	 carry	 out	
anticompetitive	 conduct	 detrimental	 to	 the	 public	 interest	 as	 a	whole,	which	 is	
the	very	goal	of	competition	law.	If,	conversely,	competition	law	were	used	in	an	
unfettered	way	to	curtail	the	scope	of	IP,	this	would	pose	a	risk	not	only	for	the	
fundamental	 right	 of	 access	 to	 court,	 but	 it	would	 undermine	 the	 incentive	 for	
undertakings	to	invest	in	research,	development	and	innovation,	jeopardizing	the	
ultimate	objective	of	effective	competition	as	promoted	by	competition	law.372	
It	logically	follows	that	the	assertion	of	IPR	will	only	be	deemed	abusive	in	
exceptional	circumstances,	where	the	reliance	on	statutory	rights	may	amount	to	
an	 abuse	 of	 dominance.	 In	 particular	 where,	 in	 light	 of	 the	 finding	 of	 the	
Commission	 and	 the	 General	 Court	 in	 the	 ITT	 Promedia	 case,	 a	 FRAND	
commitment	 serves	 exclusively	 to	 harass	 the	 defendant	 and	 eliminate	
competition.373		
                                                
368	Ibid,	 para	 55.	 See	 also	 paras	 55-57	 and	 72.	 For	 an	 exhaustive	 analysis	 of	 these	 two	 criteria,	 see	
Nicolas	Petit,	Injunctions	for	FRAND-Pledged	SEPs:	The	Quest	for	an	Appropriate	Test	of	Abuse	Under	
Article	102	TFEU,	9	EUROPEAN	COMPETITION	JOURNAL		677	(2013).	
369	Id.	para	59.	
370	Id	para	61.	
371 	David	 Hull,	 The	 EC’s	 Investigation	 into	 the	 Pharmaceutical	 Sector:	 Trouble	 Ahead	 at	 the	
IP/Competition	Intersection?,	11	COMPETITION	POLICY	INTERNATIONAL	1	(2008),	p.	5.	
372	This	role	for	competition	law	has	been	acknowledged	by	both	the	Commission	and	the	CJEU.	See,	
e.g.,	CJEU,	Case	T-201/04,	Microsoft	Corp	v.	Commission,	17	Sep.	2010,	paras	704-719.	
373	This	 approach,	 as	 noted,	 also	 stems	 from	 the	 relevance	 of	 the	 fundamental	 right	 to	 access	 to	 a	
court	 and	 to	 achieve	 an	 effective	 remedy,	 which	 represents	 both	 a	 general	 principle	 of	 law	 and	 a	
fundamental	right	enshrined	in	Article	6	of	the	Convention	for	the	Protection	of	Human	Rights	and	
Fundamental	 Freedoms,	 1950	 (the	 “ECHR”),	 which	 states:	 “[e]veryone	 whose	 rights	 and	 freedoms	
guaranteed	by	the	 law	of	the	Union	are	violated	has	the	right	to	an	effective	remedy	before	a	tribunal	
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2.2.1 THE “GOOD FAITH” POTENTIAL LICENSEE 
The	Commission	has	expressly	acknowledged	that	there	are	circumstances	
where	the	seeking	and	enforcement	of	injunctions	may	be	deemed	abusive	within	
the	 meaning	 of	 Article	 102	 TFEU.	 In	 the	 2012	 approval	 decision	 on	 Google’s	
acquisition	of	Motorola	Mobility,374	the	Commission	found	that	“depending	on	the	
circumstances,	it	may	be	that	the	threat	of	injunction,	the	seeking	of	an	injunction	
or	 indeed	 the	 actual	 enforcement	 of	 an	 injunction	 granted	 against	 a	 good	 faith	
potential	 licensee,	 may	 significantly	 impede	 effective	 competition”. 375 	The	
Commission’s	decision	was	taken	in	conformity	with	the	reasoning	underlying	the	
ITT	 Promedia	 judgments,	 reaffirming	 that	 it	 is	 only	 in	 “wholly	 exceptional	
circumstances”	that	bringing	legal	proceedings	is	capable	of	constituting	an	abuse	
within	the	meaning	of	Article	102	TFEU.	According	to	the	Commission,	even	the	
mere	 “threat”	 of	 seeking	 and	 enforcing	 an	 injunction	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 FRAND-
pledged	patents	might	amount	 to	an	abuse.	The	menace	of	 facing	an	 injunction	
might	 indeed	 “forc[e]	 the	 potential	 licensee	 into	 agreeing	 to	 potentially	 onerous	
licensing	terms	which	it	would	otherwise	not	have	agreed	to”.376		
Moreover,	 the	 Commission	 has	 recognized	 that	 seeking	 and	 enforcing	 an	
injunction	 or	 threatening	 to	 do	 so	 may	 be	 anticompetitive,	 particularly	 where	
such	 remedies	 are	 used	 to	 prompt	 a	 “good	 faith”	 licensee	 to	 accept	 onerous	
licensing	 terms	 that	 otherwise	 would	 have	 been	 rejected.	 The	 Commission,	
despite	 making	 the	 notion	 of	 “good	 faith”	 potential	 licensee	 a	 key	 point	 in	 its	
reasoning,	did	not	provide	a	definition	of	this	requirement.	One	approach	could	
                                                                                                                                 
[…]”.	A	similar	right	has	since	been	codified	in	Article	47	of	the	Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights	of	the	
European	Union,	2000	O.J.	C	364/1,	18	Dec.	2000.	Similarly,	the	right	to	achieve	an	effective	remedy,	
comprising	preliminary	injunctions,	against	an	infringement,	is	enshrined	in	a	number	of	obligations	
set	 out	 in	 the	 TRIPS	 agreement	 and	 in	 Directive	 2004/48	 on	 the	 enforcement	 of	 IPRs.	 See	WTO	
Agreement	 on	 the	Trade	Related	Aspects	 of	 Intellectual	 Property	Rights,	 (the	 “TRIPS	Agreement”)	
and	 Directive	 2004/48/EC	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament	 and	 of	 the	 Council	 on	 the	 enforcement	 of	
intellectual	property	rights,	29	Apr.	2004.	
374	Case	COMP/M.6381,	Google/Motorola	Mobility,	13	Feb.	2012.	The	merger	was	cleared	in	accordance	
with	 the	 EC	Merger	 Regulation.	 See	 Council	 Regulation	 (EC)	No.	 139/2004	 of	 20	 Jan.	 2004	 on	 the	
control	of	concentrations	between	undertakings	(the	“EC	Merger	Regulation”).		
375	Id.	(No.	35)	107.	
376	Google/Motorola	Mobility	(No.	35)	107.	Similar	issues	have	been	addressed	in	the	US,	where	the	US	
Federal	 Trade	 Commission	 remarked	 that	 “[s]eeking	 and	 threatening	 injunctions	 against	 willing	
licensees	of	FRAND-encumbered	SEPs	undermines	 the	 integrity	and	efficiency	of	 the	 standard-setting	
process	and	decreases	the	incentives	to	participate	in	the	process	and	implement	published	standards”.	
Federal	 Trade	Commission,	Motorola	Mobility	 LLC	 and	Google	 Inc.;	Analysis	 of	 Proposed	 Consent	
Order	to	Aid	Public	Comment,	File	No.	121-120,	3	Jan.	2013.	
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be	to	refer	to	the	level	of	royalty	fee	and	deem	in	good	faith	a	licensee	who	offers	
to	 pay	 fees	 that	 are	 FRAND.	Nonetheless,	 the	 uncertainty	 about	 the	 concept	 of	
FRAND	and	the	difficulty	 in	assessing	whether	a	royalty	 is	acceptable	make	this	
approach	not	effective	in	establishing	whether	a	would-be	licensee	is	in	good	faith.		
The	issue	is	that	the	Commission	places	a	huge	burden	on	the	SEP	holder	to	
conduct	a	successful	negotiation,	but	leaves	little	room	for	injunctions.	In	fact,	by	
stating	“[i]n	the	event	licensing	discussions	fail,	the	SEP	holder	may	ultimately	take	
its	 counterparty	 to	 court	 and	 seek	 an	 injunction”	 the	 Commission	 has	 arguably	
implied	that	such	action	is	only	acceptable	as	a	last	resort	mechanism,	where	the	
potential	licensee	is	not	genuinely	willing	to	take	a	license.	377	Along	the	same	line,	
the	Commission	has	 affirmed	 that	while	 owners	 of	 FRAND-pledged	 patents	 are	
obliged	 to	 provide	 a	 license	 on	 FRAND	 terms,	 they	 “have	 the	 right	 to	 conduct	
negotiations	with	 interested	 parties	 concerning	 the	 exact	 terms	and	 conditions	 of	
the	 license,	 including	 the	 exact	 level	 of	 royalties	 and	 the	 right	 to	 enforce	 such	
agreements	by	means	of	litigation”.	It	has	thereby	acknowledged	that	injunctions,	
in	 the	 context	 of	 standardization	 involving	 SEPs,	 represent	 an	 exception,	 rather	
than	the	rule.378	
Against	this	background,	the	findings	of	the	Commission	suggest	that	it	has	
adopted	 a	 notion	 of	 “good	 faith”	 licensee	 that	 exclusively	 emphasizes	 the	
obligation	 of	 the	 SEP	 holder	 to	 initiate	 and	 conduct	 licensing	 negotiations,	
overlooking	 the	 obligation	 of	 the	 potential	 licensee	 to	 actively	 seek	 a	 license	 in	
the	 first	 place.	 Conversely,	 this	 obligation	 of	 the	 potential	 licensee	 should	 be	
taken	into	consideration	in	the	assessment	of	the	“good	faith”	of	the	licensee.	An	
alleged	 infringer	who	passively	waits	 for	proceedings	 to	be	 started	 can	arguably	
not	 be	 deemed	 a	 “good	 faith	 potential	 licensee”,	 willing	 to	 take	 a	 license	 on	
FRAND	terms.	
It	is	safe	to	conclude	that	the	Commission	has	regarded	injunctions	as	a	last	
resort	 tool,	where	 the	potential	 licensee	 is	not	 in	good	 faith.	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	
legal	 standard	 supported	 by	 the	 Commission	 in	 Google/Motorola	 Mobility,	
appears	 to	 be	 quite	 strict	 on	 SEP	 owners.	 Indeed,	 it	 follows	 that	 threatening,	
                                                
377	Case	COMP/M.6381,	Google/Motorola	Mobility,	13	Feb.	2012,	para	106.	
378	Id.,	para	55.	
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seeking	or	enforcing	an	injunction	will	run	counter	to	Article	102	TFEU	for	as	long	
as	 the	 potential	 licensee	 is	willing	 to	 negotiate	 a	 license	 on	 FRAND	 terms.	 The	
Commission	 seems	 to	 consider	 that	 obstructing	 licensing	 negotiations	 is	 a	
sufficient	element	for	establishing	abusive	conduct	of	the	patentee.		
In	conclusion,	some	authors	have	pointed	out	that	the	Commission	is	about	
to	introduce	a	new,	independent	form	of	abuse	in	EU	competition	law,	although	
within	the	existing	legal	framework	established	by	ITT	Promedia.379	
2.2.2 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S PERSPECTIVE ON INJUNCTIONS FOR 
SEPS: CHANGING APPROACHES  
There	 is	 an	 increasingly	 widespread	 trend	 to	 construe	 the	 seeking	 of	
injunctions	 for	FRAND-pledged	SEPs	as	a	sui	 generis	abuse,380	subject	to	a	novel	
test	which	relies	on	whether	the	injunction	is	sought	against	a	“willing	licensee”	or	
not.	 Accordingly,	 the	 seeking	 of	 an	 injunction	will	 only	 amount	 to	 an	 abuse	 of	
dominance	where	it	is	sought	against	a	“willing	licensee”.	
The	European	Commission	 (or	 the	 “Commission”)’s	 approach	 to	SEPs	and	
the	 “good	 faith”	 regime	 has	 been	 further	 demystified	 by	 two	 Commission	
decisions	 adopted	 on	 April	 29,	 2014,	 concerning	 the	 assertion	 of	 SEPs.	 These	
decisions,	 although	 failing	 to	 allay	 the	 many	 doubts	 on	the	point,	arguably	
contributed	to	shedding	some	light	on	the	notion	of	“willing	licensee”	and	on	what	
conduct	is	to	be	deemed	abusive	in	the	context	of	licensing	SEPs.	
2.1.2.1 THE MOTOROLA AND SAMSUNG CASES: TOWARDS A MORE 
LICENSEE-FRIENDLY APPROACH? 
In	 April	 2012,	 the	 Commission	 started	 a	 proceeding	 against	 Motorola,	
following	complaints	lodged	by	Microsoft	and	Apple	(the	“Motorola	case”).	In	the	
same	year	Motorola	had	sought	and	enforced	an	injunction	against	Apple	before	
the	Mannheim	regional	court	in	Germany,	based	on	an	SEP	reading	on	the	GPRS	
                                                
379 	DAVID	 TELYAS,	 THE	 INTERFACE	 BETWEEN	 COMPETITION	 LAW,	 PATENTS	 AND	 TECHNICAL	 STANDARDS	
(KLUWER	LAW	INTERNATIONAL,	2014),	p.	222.	
380	European	 Commission	 Press	 Release;	 “Antitrust:	 Commission	 sends	 Statement	 of	 Objections	 to	
Samsung	on	potential	misuse	of	mobile	phone	standard-essential	patents”,	21	Dec.	2012.	
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mobile	technology	standard	(an	ETSI	standard),	which	is	embodied	in	Microsoft’s	
and	Apple’s	main	devices	such	as	Xbox,	Windows,	I-Phone	and	I-Pad.		
The	 enforcement	 of	 the	 injunction	 was	 carried	 out	 notwithstanding	 that	
“…Apple	 had	 agreed	 to	 take	 a	 license	 and	 be	 bound	 by	 a	 determination	 of	 the	
FRAND	royalties	by	the	relevant	German	court”.381	Apple	argued	that	Motorola	had	
requested	 Apple	 to	 cross-license	 its	 entire	 non-SEP	 portfolio,	 in	 return	 for	
Motorola’s	 SEPs.	 Apple	 contented	 that	 Apple’s	 refusal	 to	 accept	 these	 licensing	
terms	triggered	Motorola’s	legal	action	against	Apple.	Facing	the	consequences	of	
the	lawsuits,	which	led	to	a	temporary	ban	on	Apple’s	online	sales	of	its	flagship	
products,	 Apple	 agreed	 to	 enter	 into	 a	 settlement	 agreement	 with	 Motorola,	
which	 imposed	 disadvantageous	 licensing	 terms	 for	 Apple,	 comprising	 a	 non-
challenge	clause,	which	granted	to	Motorola	the	right	to	terminate	the	license	if	
Apple	did	not	give	up	its	right	to	challenge	the	validity	of	Motorola’s	SEPs.	
In	 its	 decision,	 the	 Commission	 held	 that	 “it	 was	 abusive	 for	 Motorola	 to	
both	 seek	and	enforce	an	 injunction	against	Apple	 in	Germany	on	 the	basis	of	 an	
SEP,	 which	Motorola	 had	 committed	 to	 licensing	 on	 FRAND	 terms,	 where	 Apple	
had	 agreed	 to	 take	 a	 license	 and	 be	 bound	 by	 a	 determination	 of	 the	 FRAND	
royalties	 by	 the	 relevant	 German	 court”.382	The	Commission	 therefore	 concluded	
that	 Apple	 was	 willing	 to	 license.	 Moreover,	 it	 considered	 abusive	 Motorola’s	
practice	 of	 insisting,	 under	 the	 threat	 of	 enforcing	 the	 injunction,	 that	 Apple	
agree	 to	 disadvantageous	 licensing	 terms.	 As	 noted	 by	 the	 Commission	
“…[i]mplementers	of	standards	and	ultimately	consumers	should	not	have	to	pay	for	
invalid	or	non-infringed	patents.	Implementers	should	therefore	be	able	to	ascertain	
the	validity	of	patents	and	contest	alleged	infringements”.383	
Regardless	of	the	finding	of	abuse,	the	Commission	did	not	impose	a	fine	on	
Motorola,	 acknowledging	 that	 there	was	 a	 lack	 of	 case-law	 from	 the	 EU	 courts	
                                                
381	Commission’s	 press	 release	 in	 Case	 COMP/39.985,	 Motorola	 -	 Enforcement	 of	 GPRS	 standard	
essential	 patents,	 IP/14/489	 (Commission	 finds	 that	 Motorola	 Mobility	 infringed	 EU	 competition	
rules	by	misusing	standard	essential	patents),	29	Apr.	2014.	
382	Id.	
383	Id.	
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concerning	the	legality	of	SEP-based	injunctions	under	Article	102	TFEU,	and	that	
national	courts’	case-law	showed	diverging	conclusions	on	this	matter.384	
The	 parallel	 Samsung	 proceeding	 (the	 Samsung	 case),	 based	 on	 similar	
factual	 circumstances,	 was	 instead	 concluded	 with	 the	 acceptance	 by	 the	
Commission	of	specific	commitments	proposed	by	Samsung.	These	commitments	
were	 aimed	 at	 solving	 the	 competitive	 concerns	 raised	 during	 the	 investigation	
and	so	to	avoid	a	formal	assessment	of	the	violation	of	Article	102	TFEU.	
In	April	2011,	Samsung	commenced	to	seek	injunctive	relief	against	Apple	in	
various	 Member	 States,	 claiming	 infringement	 of	 its	 SEPs	 reading	 on	 the	 3G	
UMTS	 mobile	 technology	 standards,	 adopted	 by	 ETSI.	 Following	 Apple’s	
complain,	the	Commission	initiated	an	investigation	and	in	December	2013	issued	
its	 preliminary	 assessment,	 taking	 the	 view	 that	 given	 that	 Samsung	 had	
committed	to	license	on	FRAND	terms,	the	seeking	of	 injunctions	against	Apple	
on	Samsung’s	SEPs	may	be	construed	as	an	abusive	conduct.385	The	Commission	
further	remarked	that	recourse	to	injunctive	relief	might	distort	FRAND	licensing	
negotiations	and	 lead	 to	high	prices,	 reduced	product	choice,	and	the	stifling	of	
differentiating	 innovation	 in	 the	 markets	 for	 smartphones	 and	 tablets,	 to	 the	
ultimate	detriment	of	consumers.	
In	response	to	these	anticompetitive	concerns,	Samsung	committed	not	to	
seek	any	injunctions	in	the	European	Economic	Area	(the	“EEA”)	on	the	basis	of	
any	 of	 its	 SEPs	 for	 a	 period	 of	 five	 years	 against	 any	 company	 agreeing	 to	 a	
licensing	framework	that	consists	of:	(i)	a	mandatory	negotiation	period	of	up	to	
12	months;	and	(ii)	if	the	negotiation	fails,	a	third-party	determination	of	FRAND	
terms	by	a	court	if	either	party	chooses,	or	by	an	arbitrator	if	both	parties	agree.		
The	 commitments	 made	 clear	 that	 a	 prospective	 licensee	 should	 not	 be	
deemed	 “unwilling”,	 however,	 on	 the	 ground	 that	 the	 prospective	 licensee	
challenges	 validity,	 infringement,	 or	 essentiality	 of	 the	 SEP	 in	 question.	 The	
Commission	rendered	Samsung’s	commitments	legally	binding	under	Article	9	of	
                                                
384 	Case	 AT.39985	 Motorola	 -	 Enforcement	 of	 GPRS	 Standard	 Essential	 Patents,	 European	
Commission’s	Decision	(Apr.	29,	2014),	para.	561.	
385	European	 Commission	 Press	 Release;	 “Antitrust:	 Commission	 sends	 Statement	 of	 Objections	 to	
Samsung	on	potential	misuse	of	mobile	phone	standard-essential	patents”,	21	Dec.	2012.	
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Regulation	 1/2003.	 In	 this	 context,	 a	 would-be	 licensee	 can	 demonstrate	 its	
willingness	to	take	a	license	on	FRAND	terms	by	agreeing	that	a	court	or	mutually	
agreed	arbitrator	sets	the	terms	in	case	of	dispute.386	
This	 decision	 provides	 a	 “safe	 harbor”	 for	 prospective	 licensees	 who	 are	
willing	 to	 take	 a	 license	 on	 FRAND	 terms.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 Commission	
acknowledged	 that	 asserting	 SEPs,	 i.e.	 seeking	 an	 injunction	 or	 simply	
threatening	to	do	so,	might	run	counter	to	Article	102	TFEU	where:	(i)	the	patent	
holder	 has	 committed	 to	 a	 standardization	 body	 to	 grant	 licenses	 on	 FRAND	
terms,	 and	 (ii)	 the	 injunction	 is	 directed	 against	 a	 licensee	 genuinely	willing	 to	
negotiate	a	license	on	FRAND	terms.		
Besides	 this	much	needed	 clarification,	 the	 decision	does	 not	 provide	 any	
guidance	on	how	to	determine	if	a	prospective	licensee	is	“willing”	in	cases	falling	
outside	this	safe	harbor,	 i.e.	outside	the	context	of	FRAND-pledged	patents.	The	
Commission	 simply	 held	 that	 the	 assessment	 as	 to	 whether	 the	 defendant	 has	
been	willing	to	negotiate	a	license	in	good	faith	should	be	evaluated	on	a	case-by-
case	basis,	having	regard	to	the	specific	factual	circumstances.387	
As	noted,	the	standard	of	good	faith	adopted	by	the	Commission	suggests	a	
broader	 application	 of	 Article	 102	 TFEU	 to	 injunctions	 brought	 by	 SEP	 holders	
and	could	be	defined	as	being	 licensee-friendly.388	Indeed,	 the	assertion	of	SEPs,	
by	 threatening,	 seeking	or	 enforcing	 injunctions,	 occurring	 in	 light	of	 a	FRAND	
commitment,	is	generally	considered	abusive	as	a	main	rule,	as	long	as	the	would-
be	licensee	is	in	good	faith	or	willing	to	negotiate	a	license	on	FRAND	terms.	
2.1.2.2 THE ORANGE-BOOK-STANDARD CASE: A STRICTER STANCE 
Interestingly,	 the	 standard	 of	 good	 faith	 or	 willingness	 adopted	 by	 the	
Commission	 in	 the	 decision	 analyzed	 above	 differs	 significantly	 from	 that	
envisaged	by	the	German	Federal	Court	(Bundesgerichtshof)	in	the	“Orange-Book-
                                                
386	Cases	COMP/39.939	and	COMP/39.985,	MEMO/14/322	(Antitrust	decisions	on	standard	essential	
patents	 (SEPs)	 -	Motorola	Mobility	 and	 Samsung	Electronics	 -	Frequently	asked	questions),	29	Apr.	
2014.	
387 	DAVID	 TELYAS,	 THE	 INTERFACE	 BETWEEN	 COMPETITION	 LAW,	 PATENTS	 AND	 TECHNICAL	 STANDARDS	
(KLUWER	LAW	INTERNATIONAL,	2014).	
388	Id.		
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Standard	 case”	 of	 May	 6,	 2009,389	concerning	 CD-R	 and	 CD-RW	 patent	 pools	
(“Orange	Book”	was	the	informal	name	for	Philips	and	Sony’s	de	facto	recordable	
CD	standard).390	The	German	Court,	although	confirming	that	an	alleged	infringer	
may	plead	that	an	SEP	holder	is	abusing	its	dominant	position	if	the	SEP	holder	
refuses	to	license	on	FRAND	terms,	imposed	a	high	burden	on	alleged	infringers.	
To	counter	a	request	for	a	preliminary	injunction	with	a	competition	law	defense,	
the	alleged	 infringer	must	prove	 that	 the	patentee	was	given	 the	opportunity	 to	
obtain	a	license	on	FRAND	terms;	offering	evidence	that	the	alleged	infringer	was	
denied	a	license	on	FRAND	terms	to	which	he	was	entitled	is	not	sufficient.391	For	
this	 reason,	 the	Orange	 Book	 Standard	 has	 been	 perceived	 as	 being	 patentee-
friendly,392	especially	 compared	 to	 the	 approach	 of	 the	 Commission	 analyzed	
above.		
                                                
389 	Case	 KZR	 39/06,	 Philips	 Electronics	 N.V.	 v	 SK	 Kassetten,	 German	 Federal	 Supreme	 Court	
(Bundesgerichtshof),	6	May	2009.	For	an	English	version	of	the	judgment,	see	INTERNATIONAL	REVIEW	
OF	INTELLECTUAL	PROPERTY	AND	COMPETITION	LAW,	Vol.	41	(2010),	p.	369.	
390	However,	it	should	be	pointed	out	that	the	Orange-Book-Standard	case	was	not	precisely	on	point	
because	it	concerned	a	patent	essential	for	a	de	facto	standard	(i.e.,	a	standard	that	had	developed	in	
the	marketplace),	rather	than	a	patent	that	had	become	essential	through	a	standardization	process,	
and	the	Federal	Court’s	conclusion	was	not	based	on	the	patent	owner’s	(express	or	implied)	promise	
to	license	on	FRAND	terms.	
391	In	particular,	according	to	the	Orange	Book	Standard	defense,	a	presumptive	abuse	will	be	found	if	
the	firm	against	which	an	injunction	is	sought	is	a	“willing	 licensee”,	but	to	this	end	two	conditions	
must	be	satisfied:	(i)	the	potential	licensee	must	have	proposed	to	the	SEP	holder	“an	unconditional	
offer	 to	 conclude	 a	 license	 agreement	 which	 the	 patent	 proprietor	 cannot	 reject”.	 This	 condition	 is	
extremely	difficult	 for	a	 licensee	to	meet,	as	there	 is	a	wide	margin	for	the	SEP	holder	to	reject	the	
offer;	(ii)	the	defendant	(the	would-be	licensee)	must	have	“compl[ied]	with	the	obligations	on	which	
the	use	of	the	licensed	subject	matter	depends”,	which	implies	that	as	soon	as	he	makes	the	offer,	the	
alleged	 infringer	 must	 behave	 as	 if	 he	 is	 a	 licensee,	 i.e.	 “pay[ing]	 the	 royalties	 resulting	 from	 the	
contract	or	ensur[ing]	their	payment”	in	escrow	(Judgment	of	the	Bundesgerichtshof	of	6	May	2009	in		
Case	KZR	39/06	Orange	Book	Standard.	The	rationale	underpinning	this	is	that	a	FRAND	defense	will	
not	be	acceptable	unless	the	licensee	behaves	like	an	existing	FRAND	licensee.	Peter	Camesasca	et	al.,	
Injunctions	 for	 Standard-Essential	 Patents:	 Justice	 is	 not	 Blind,	 9	 JOURNAL	 OF	 COMPETITION	 LAW	 &	
ECONOMICS	2	(2013),	p.	295.		
It	follows	that	if	an	infringer	fails	to	satisfactorily	address	the	Orange	Book	criteria,	especially	
failing	 to	make	 an	 offer	 complying	 with	 the	 requirements	 established	 by	 the	 German	 court,	 the	
court	 deems	 that	 it	 cannot	 be	 the	 fault	 of	 a	 SEP	 holder,	 which	 has	 itself	 undertaken	 to	 grant	 a	
license	 on	 FRAND	 terms,	 and	 it	 will	 be	 proportionate	 to	 grant	 an	 injunction	 against	 such	 an	
infringer.	Conversely,	 in	case	these	requirements	are	met,	 the	FRAND	defense	would	succeed,	 the	
infringement	action	would	be	dismissed,	and	the	final	injunction	would	not	be	granted.	Ibid.,	296.	
The	proof	of	the	licensee’s	willingness	is	construed	in	an	even	more	narrow	way	as	it	cannot	
be	simply	extrapolated	from	explicit	statements.	To	the	contrary,	conclusive	evidence	of	exteriorized	
acts	 of	 fulfillment	 is	 required:	 i.e.	 a	 “serious”	 offer,	 and	 subsequent	 conduct	 in	 the	 form	 of	
anticipative	 payments.	 This	 departs	 from	 the	 Commission’s	 decision	 in	 Google/Motorola,	 where	
willingness	was	established	by	documentary	evidence,	in	particular	by	reviewing	internal	documents	
from	 Google.	 Google/Motorola,	 para	 150.	 Nicolas	 Petit,	 Injunctions	 for	 Frand-Pledged	 Standard	
Essential	Patents:	The	Quest	 for	an	Appropriate	Test	of	Abuse	Under	Article	 102	TFEU,	9	EUROPEAN	
COMPETITION	JOURNAL	3	(2013).		
392	Id.,	pp.	677-719.		
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The	legal	test	adopted	by	the	German	Federal	Supreme	Court	is	excessively	
narrow	and	it	appears	to	conflict	with	the	flexible	“good	faith”	norm	embraced	by	
the	Commission.	It	has	been	observed	that	by	“requiring	the	would-be	 licensee	 to	
fulfill	such	strict	conditions	arguably	fails	to	achieve	a	proper	balancing	of	interests	
in	 case	 a	 FRAND	 commitment	 has	 been	 issued	 by	 the	 patentee”.393	In	 fact,	 it	 is	
evident	in	the	context	of	the	assertion	of	FRAND-pledged	SEPs	that	the	risk	that	
competition	law	would	curb	the	scope	of	IPRs,	gradually	eroding	the	incentives	to	
innovate,	 is	 limited.	 In	 particular,	 the	 patentee,	 by	 voluntarily	 committing	 to	
license	the	patents	on	FRAND	terms	to	all	third	parties	pursuant	to	the	IPR	policy	
of	 an	SSO,	 “…	 expects	 to	 obtain	 remuneration	 for	 its	 SEPs	 by	means	 of	 licensing	
revenue	rather	than	using	these	patents	to	seek	to	exclude	others”,394	thus	showing	
willingness	to	trade	exclusivity	for	remuneration.395		
2.1.2.3 THE HUAWEI CASE: A MUCH SOUGHT-AFTER CLARIFICATION? 
This	background	of	 seemingly	 inconsistent	precedents	 at	national	 and	EU	
level	 raises	 the	 need	 for	 the	 CJEU	 and	 the	 European	 Commission	 to	 take	 the	
initiative	 to	 foster	 a	 more	 uniform	 approach,	 shaping	 a	 conceptual	 framework	
within	which	injunctions	are	not	granted	in	violation	of	Article	102	TFEU.		
A	 preliminary	 ruling	 delivered	 on	 July	 16,	 2015	 by	 the	 Court	 of	 Justice	
(“ECJ”)	in	 response	 to	 the	 reference	 made	 by	 the	 Landgericht	 Düsseldorf	 (the	
Düsseldorf	 Regional	 Court)	 goes	 in	 this	 direction. 396 	Interestingly,	 the	 case	
involved	two	major	Chinese	ICT	companies:	Huawei397	and	ZTE.398		
                                                
393 	DAVID	 TELYAS,	 THE	 INTERFACE	 BETWEEN	 COMPETITION	 LAW,	 PATENTS	 AND	 TECHNICAL	 STANDARDS	
(KLUWER	LAW	INTERNATIONAL,	2014),	p	218.	
394	Commission	Decision	C(2014)	2891	final	in	Case	COMP/39.939,	Samsung	 -	Enforcement	of	UMTS	
standard	essential	patents,	29	Apr.	2014,	para	62.	
395 	DAVID	 TELYAS,	 THE	 INTERFACE	 BETWEEN	 COMPETITION	 LAW,	 PATENTS	 AND	 TECHNICAL	 STANDARDS	
(KLUWER	LAW	INTERNATIONAL,	2014),	p	202.	
396 	CGEU,	 Case	 C-170/13,	 Huawei	 Technologies	 Co.	 Ltd	 v.	 ZTE	 Corp.,	 ZTE	 Deutschland	 GmbH,	
EU:C:2015:477.	
397	Huawei,	a	Chinese	telecommunications	company,	holds	a	European	patent	declared	as	essential	
to	the	Long	Term	Evolution	(the	“LTE”)	mobile	telecommunications	4G	standard	developed	by	the	
European	 Telecommunications	 Standards	 Institute	 (the	 “ETSI”),	 a	 standard	 setting	 organization.	
Huawei	 made	 a	 commitment	 to	 ETSI	 to	 grant	 licenses	 for	 SEPs	 for	 the	 LTE	 to	 third	 parties	 on	
FRAND	terms.		
398	ZTE,	also	a	Chinese	telecommunications	company,	markets	base	stations	with	LTE	software	that	
incorporates	technology	covered	by	Huawei’s	patent.	
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After	 ZTE	 and	 Huawei	 failed	 to	 conclude	 a	 licensing	 agreement,	 Huawei	
brought	 an	 action	 for	 infringement	 against	 ZTE	 before	 the	 Düsseldorf	 court	
seeking,	among	other	remedies,	an	injunction	prohibiting	the	continuation	of	the	
infringement.	ZTE	claimed	that,	given	its	willingness	to	license	Huawei’s	patents	
in	Germany	on	FRAND	terms,	Huawei’s	action	for	an	injunction	was	abusive.		
The	 request	 for	 a	 preliminary	 ruling	 stemmed	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
German	 court	 considered	 that,	 applying	 the	 Orange-Book-Standard	 to	 the	
Huawei-ZTE	case	would	 lead	it	 to	 issue	the	requested	 injunction,	while	applying	
the	 principles	 set	 out	 in	 the	 Samsung	 press	 release	 might	 lead	 it	 to	 dismiss	
Huawei’s	 action	 for	 an	 injunction	as	 an	 abuse.	The	outcome	depended	on	what	
was	 considered	 sufficient	 to	 show	 a	 willingness	 to	 license.	 The	 Düsseldorf	
Regional	 Court	 therefore	 stayed	 the	 proceedings	 and,	 on	 April	 5,	 2013,	 referred	
five	 questions	 to	 the	ECJ,	 asking	whether,	 and,	 if	 so,	 in	what	 circumstances,	 an	
action	for	infringement	brought	by	an	SEP	holder	that	has	given	a	commitment	to	
grant	licenses	on	FRAND	terms	constitutes	an	abuse	of	a	dominant	position.	On	
November	4,	2014,	Advocate	General	Wathelet	delivered	his	opinion	on	the	issues	
raised	by	the	court.399	On	July	16,	2015,	the	ECJ	delivered	its	judgment.400	
The	 judgment	 tries	 to	 balance	 the	 interests	 of:	 (i)	 SEP	 owners,	 and	 (ii)	
implementers	 and	 consumers.	 The	 ECJ	 noted	 that,	 to	 prevent	 an	 action	 for	 a	
prohibitory	 injunction	 from	 being	 regarded	 as	 abusive,	 an	 SEP	 holder	 must	
comply	with	conditions	 that	seek	 to	ensure	 “a	 fair	 balance	 between	 the	 interests	
concerned.”401	The	 judgment	 clarifies	 that	 SEP	 holders	 who	 have	 committed	 to	
grant	licenses	on	FRAND	terms	are	not	deprived	of	their	right	to	seek	and	enforce	
an	injunction	against	potential	infringers,	but	that	this	right	is	limited	in	various	
important	respects.	An	SEP	holder,	therefore,	is	entitled	to	commence	injunction	
proceedings,	but	only	after	it	has	complied	with	the	specific	requirements	set	out	
by	 the	 ECJ,	 and	 only	 provided	 that	 the	 SEP	 user	 has	 not	 complied	 with	 these	
specific	requirements:		
                                                
399 	CGEU,	 Case	 C-170/13,	 Huawei	 Technologies	 Co.	 Ltd	 v.	 ZTE	 Corp.,	 ZTE	 Deutschland	 GmbH,	
EU:C:2015:477,	Opinion	of	AG	Wathelet,	ECLI:EU:C:2014:2391.	
400	Ibid..	
401	Id.,	para	55.		
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  The	 SEP	 holder	 must	 notify	 the	 SEP	 user	 of	 the	 infringement,402	
designating	 the	 SEP	 and	 specifying	 the	 way	 in	 which	 it	 has	 been	
infringed.	 Given	 the	 large	 number	 of	 SEPs	 forming	 a	 standard,	 an	
SEP	 user	may	 not	 be	 aware	 that	 it	 is	 infringing	 a	 valid	 SEP.	Upon	
being	alerted	by	the	SEP	holder	of	the	alleged	infringement,	the	SEP	
user	must	 express	 its	willingness	 to	 conclude	 a	 license	 on	 FRAND	
terms.	403	
  Subsequently,	 the	SEP	holder	must	present	a	detailed	written	offer	
for	 a	 license	on	FRAND	 terms	 that	 includes	 the	 amount	of	 royalty	
and	 the	 way	 in	 which	 that	 royalty	 is	 to	 be	 calculated.404	The	 ECJ	
concluded	 that	 the	 SEP	 holder	 is	 better	 placed	 to	 make	 a	 non-
discriminatory	 offer	 than	 the	 SEP	 user,	 particularly	 given	 that	
licensing	agreements	with	third	parties	are	confidential.405		
  The	SEP	user	must	respond	promptly,	diligently,	and	in	good	faith,	
without	 engaging	 in	 delaying	 tactics.	 In	 particular,	 if	 the	 SEP	 user	
does	not	accept	the	offer,	it	must	submit,	promptly	and	in	writing,	a	
specific	FRAND	counter-offer.406		
  SEP	 users	 can	 challenge	 the	 validity	 and	 essentiality	 of	 an	 SEP	 in	
parallel	to	licensing	negotiations	and	after	conclusion	of	a	license.407	
The	ECJ’s	choice	of	language	seems	to	suggest	that	SEP	holders	can	
no	 longer	make	 their	 licenses	 conditional	on	users	 agreeing	not	 to	
bring	 such	 challenges,	 contrary	 to	 common	 practice	 under	 the	
                                                
402	Id.,	paras	60	and	61.	
403	Id.,	para	62.	
404	Id.,	para	63.	
405	However,	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	Union	did	not	explain	how	to	determine	whether	a	
SEP	 holder’s	 offer	 is	 FRAND,	 or	 address	 the	 implications	 of	 an	 offer	 failing	 to	 qualify	 as	 FRAND.	
Arguably,	 both	 issues	 will	 need	 to	 be	 assessed	 by	 the	 court	 in	 which	 the	 infringement	 action	 is	
brought.	If	the	SEP	holder’s	offer	does	not	qualify	as	FRAND,	the	court	should	reject	the	injunction.	
Another	issue	not	addressed	in	the	judgment	is	whether	the	willingness	of	a	SEP	holder	to	have	the	
FRAND	 terms	of	 the	 license	 set	by	 a	 court	or	 arbitration	 tribunal	 renders	 the	offer	per	 se	 FRAND,	
although	the	judgment	acknowledges	this	as	an	option,	and	courts	will	likely	agree	that	such	an	offer	
would	qualify	as	FRAND.	
406	Id.,	para	66.	If	the	parties	do	not	reach	an	agreement,	and	the	SEP	holder	seeks	an	injunction,	it	
would	seem	that	the	court	would	have	to	determine	whether	the	SEP	user’s	counter-offer	qualifies	as	
FRAND.	 If	 no	 agreement	 is	 reached,	 a	 SEP	user	 that	 is	 already	using	 the	 technology	must	 provide	
security	(e.g.,	by	providing	a	bank	guarantee	or	placing	amounts	necessary	on	deposit)	by	reference	
to	 the	 number	 of	 past	 acts	 of	 use,	 and	must	 be	 able	 to	 render	 accounts.	 Id.,	 para.	 67.	Where	 no	
agreement	is	reached,	the	amount	of	the	royalty	may,	by	common	agreement,	be	determined	by	an	
independent	third	party.	Id.,	para.	68.		
407	Id.,	para	69.	
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Orange-Book-Standard	 case	 law.	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	 judgment	 is	
consistent	 with	 the	 Commission’s	 decisions	 in	 Motorola 408 	and	
Samsung.409	
In	sum,	the	judgment	imposes	important	obligations	on	SEP	users,	notably,	
to	make	a	counter-offer	on	FRAND	terms	and	to	provide	appropriate	security	for	
the	prior	use	of	the	SEP.	The	judgment	places	SEP	holders	in	a	stronger	position	
than	they	appeared	to	be	in	under	the	Commission’s	decisions	in	Motorola410	and	
Samsung.411	In	 particular	 the	 judgment	 removes	 SEP	 users’	 unique	 “safe	 harbor”	
that	 allowed	 them	 to	 avoid	 an	 injunction	 by	 agreeing	 to	 have	 the	 terms	 of	 the	
license	 determined	 by	 a	 court	 or	 arbitration	 tribunal.	 Instead,	 third-party	
arbitration	will	only	be	available	by	common	agreement.	Moreover	 if	parties	 fail	
to	 reach	 agreement	 on	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 license,	 the	 SEP	 user	 must	 provide	
appropriate	 security	 and	 be	 able	 to	 render	 accounts,	 which	 represents	 an	
important	burden	on	the	SEP	user.	
Unfortunately,	 the	 judgment	 also	 leaves	many	 questions	 unanswered.	 For	
example,	the	ECJ	did	not	address	the	issue	of	dominance.	It	therefore	remains	an	
open	question	whether	an	SEP	holder	 is	(per	 se)	dominant	by	virtue	of	having	a	
patent	that	is	essential	to	a	standard.		
Moreover,	 the	 judgment	 provides	 no	 guidance	 on:	 (i)	 what	 amounts	 to	
“FRAND”	 terms;	 (ii)	 whether	 the	 license	 has	 to	 be	 country-wide,	 EEA-wide	 or	
worldwide;	(iii)	whether	a	portfolio	license	can	be	required	including	SEPs	on	the	
same	 standard	 or	 other	 standards	 or	 even	 non-SEPs;	 and	 (iv)	 whether	 a	 cross-
license	can	be	requested	and	if	so,	on	what	terms,	etc.	While	these	points	are	not	
addressed	 in	 the	 judgment,	 it	may	be	possible	 to	argue,	perhaps	as	a	 fallback	 in	
cases	where	an	offer	is	not	considered	FRAND,	that	willingness	to	have	the	terms	
of	 the	 license	 determined	 by	 an	 independent	 third	 party	 should,	 in	 itself,	 be	
considered	FRAND.		
                                                
408	Case	AT.	39985,	April	29,	2014,	Motorola	-	Enforcement	of	GPRS	Standard	Essential	Patents.	
409	Case	COMP/C-3/39.939,	September	27,	2013,	Samsung	Electronics	and	Others.	
410	Case	AT.	39985,	April	29,	2014,	Motorola	-	Enforcement	of	GPRS	Standard	Essential	Patents.	
411	Case	COMP/C-3/39.939,	27	Sept.	2013,	Samsung	Electronics	and	Others.	
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Nonetheless,	 the	 judgment	 seems	 to	 require	 courts	 considering	 the	
injunction	 applications	 to	 assess	 whether	 the	 offers	 made	 by	 the	 parties	 are	
objectively	FRAND.	If	the	parties	fail	to	agree	on	having	the	terms	of	the	license	
determined	by	a	third	party,	it	 is	not	entirely	clear	what	the	implications	will	be	
for	injunction	proceedings.412		
2.2 FAIR, REASONABLE AND NON-DISCRIMINATORY (“FRAND”) 
LICENSING: THE CHALLENGES OF UNREASONABLE ROYALTY PAYMENTS 
As	 a	 precondition	 to	 including	 any	 technology	 covered	 by	 IPRs	 in	 a	
standard,	SSOs	require	IPR	holders	that	are	essential	to	the	standard	to	guarantee	
mutual	fair	treatment	in	the	course	of	development	and	implementation	of	a	new	
standard.	 In	 order	 to	 help	 to	 ensure	 that	 standards	 do	 not	 allow	 the	 owners	 of	
essential	 patents	 to	 abuse	 their	market	 power	 to	 extort	 competitors	 or	 prevent	
them	from	entering	the	marketplace,	IPR	holders	commit	to	two	main	obligations:	
disclosure,	 which	 was	 analyzed	 earlier	 in	 the	 context	 of	 patent	 ambush,	 and	
licensing	rules.	Licensing	rules	guarantee	that	SSO	members	license	their	IPR	to	
each	other	on	equitable	terms,413	in	an	effort	to	thwart	patent	hold-up	scenarios,	
where	a	member	abuses	his	status	as	an	SEP	holder	by	requesting	excessive	fees	
from	potential	licensees	that	have	no	other	alternative	than	to	pay.414	
SSOs	 licensing	 requirements	 provide	 that	 SEP	 holders	 must	 license	 their	
patents	on	fair,	reasonable	and	non-discriminatory	terms.415	
                                                
412	Interestingly,	on	3	Nov.	 2015	 the	Düsseldorf	 court	 applied	 these	principles	 in	Sisvel	 v	Haier.	The	
Düsseldorf	 court	 left	 open	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 Sisvel’s	 worldwide	 offer	 for	 the	 portfolio	
concerned	 qualified	 as	 FRAND,	 because	 the	 user	 failed	 to	 provide	 security	 and	 therefore	 was	 not	
considered	a	willing	 licensee.	The	court	also	noted	that	 it	does	not	need	to	answer	 the	question	of	
whether	there	would	have	been	room	for	a	counter-offer	by	the	SEP	user	if	the	SEP	holder’s	offer	had	
actually	 been	 FRAND	 (the	 SEP	 holder	 having	 thus	 fulfilled	 its	 licensing	 duty).	 Finally,	 the	 court	
stated	that	the	security	provided	by	the	SEP	user	must	be	in	accordance	with	its	counter-offer.	This	
ruling	 suggests	 that	 the	 Düsseldorf	 court	 remains	 inclined	 to	 be	 SEP-holder	 friendly.	 Landgericht	
Düsseldorf,	Judgment	of	November	3,	2015,	Joined	Cases	4a	O	93/14	and	4a	O	144/14	Sisvel	v.	Haier.	
413	Richard	J.	Gilbert,	Deal	or	No	Deal?	Licensing	Negotiations	 In	Standard-Setting	Organizations,	77	
ANTITRUST	LAW	JOURNAL	(2011)	
414	Mark	A.	Lemley,	Carl	Shapiro,	Patent	Holdup	and	Royalty	Stacking,	85	TEXAS	LAW	REVIEW	(2007),	
p.1993.	
415	The	 FRAND	 requirement	 is	 also	 found	 in	 European	 Commission	 antitrust	 guidelines:	 “To	 avoid	
elimination	of	competition	in	the	relevant	market(s),	access	to	the	standard	must	be	possible	for	third	
parties	 on	 fair,	 reasonable	 and	 non-discriminatory	 terms.”	European	Commission	Guidelines	on	 the	
applicability	of	Article	81	of	the	EC	Treaty	to	horizontal	cooperation	agreements,	OJ	2001	C	3/2	(the	
“Horizontal	Guidelines”),	para	174.		
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The	FRAND	obligation	plays	a	central	role	 in	the	competition,	 innovation,	
IP	law	interface,	as	it	is	designed	to	attain	different	objectives.	First,	it	is	intended	
to	avoid	the	blocking	of	standards	by	outright	refusals	to	license	implementations	
and	 by	 patent	 holders	 seeking	 injunctions.	 Secondly,	 the	 FRAND	 obligation	 is	
designed	 to	 specifically	 prevent	 the	 use	 by	 the	 patent	 holder	 of	 excessive	
bargaining	power	to	extract	higher	than	reasonable	royalties	from	licensees.	Case-
law	and	anecdotal	evidence	strongly	suggest	that	royalties	must	not	be	left	to	be	
set	by	unfettered	price	mechanisms	and	that	FRAND	undertakings	are	necessary	
precisely	for	this	reason.	It	is	indeed	clear	that	in	the	context	of	standards	there	is	
a	tangible	risk	of	patent	holder	opportunism,	as	standards	have	a	deep	impact	on	
the	bargaining	situation	between	licensees	and	SEP	holders.	
Notwithstanding	 the	 relevance	 of	 FRAND	 undertakings,	 no	 antitrust	
authority	has,	to	date,	clarified	the	notion	of	FRAND	terms	in	a	standard	context.	
In	 particular	 the	 “fair	 and	 reasonable”	 components	 of	 FRAND	 terms	 has	 been	
interpreted	in	a	variety	of	ways,	often	diverging.416	
This	ambiguity	in	legal	terms	has	increased	litigation	to	determine	whether	
the	 FRAND	 standard	 has	 been	 met.	 It	 has	 increased	 the	 occurrence	 of	 legal	
disputes,	 between	 SEP	 holders	 and	 those	 seeking	 a	 license	 in	 order	 to	 be	
compliant	 with	 a	 standard,	 regarding	 what	 precisely	 constitutes	 fair	 and	
reasonable	license	terms.	As	noted	above,	such	disputes	ultimately	end	up	before	
competition	authorities	or	courts	insofar	as	licensees	or	would-be	licensees	assert	
that	the	license	terms	imposed	by	the	SEP	holder	run	counter	to	Article	102	TFEU.	
As	remarked,	there	is	also	an	increasingly	popular	practice	of	alleged	infringers	of	
SEPs	 adding	 on	 a	 competition	 law	 defense	 as	 a	 counterclaim	 in	 injunction	
proceedings,	 asserting	 that	 they	 had	 been	 willing	 to	 take	 a	 license	 on	 FRAND	
terms,	but	that	the	SEP	holder	insisted	on	non-FRAND	terms.	
The	 reluctance	 to	 more	 specifically	 define	 what	 constitute	 “fairness”	 and	
“reasonableness”	may	be	 seen	 as	 a	 deliberate	 policy	 choice	not	 to	 constrain	 the	
                                                
416	Richard	J.	Gilbert,	Deal	or	No	Deal?	Licensing	Negotiations	 In	Standard-Setting	Organizations,	77	
ANTITRUST	LAW	JOURNAL	855,	856	(2011),	p.	856.	
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freedom	of	 companies	 to	operate	 their	business	 and	 the	margin	of	maneuver	of	
the	Commission	to	deal	with	anticompetitive	behavior.417		
As	 the	 General	 Court	 has	 held,418		 in	 the	 assessment	 of	 whether	 license	
terms	 are	 fair	 and	 reasonable,	 all	 of	 the	 components	 forming	 the	 economic	
context	 at	 issue	 should	be	 taken	 into	 account,	 including	 the	 circumstances	 and	
position	 of	 the	 licensor	 and	 licensee.	 This	 case-by-case	 approach	 is	 indeed	
widespread	in	competition	law	and	it	stems	from	a	number	of	vague	legal	terms	
that	allow	for	a	more	flexible	application	of	remedies.419	
Nonetheless,	 legal	certainty	remains	an	 issue.	A	 legal	definition	of	FRAND	
may	arguably	be	useful	in	order	to	help	competition	authorities	to	assess	whether	
licensing	terms	are	FRAND,	or	not.		
SSOs’	policies	do	not	offer	much	guidance	on	the	notion	of	FRAND	as	their	
IPR	 rules	do	not	 spell	 out	what	 criteria	must	be	 satisfied	 for	 royalty	 rates	 to	be	
“fair”	 and	 “reasonable.”	Within	 standards	bodies’	 rules,	 IPR	policies,	 and	 related	
SSO	 documents	 there	 is	 no	 solid	 definition	 of	 what	 these	 terms	 concretely	
mean.420	They	usually	merely	state	 that	 licensing	 terms	must	be	negotiated	on	a	
bilateral	basis.	The	tendency	to	 leave	SSO	members	to	negotiate	the	contractual	
                                                
417	The	 European	 Commission	 has	 pointed	 out	 that	 “[it]	 is	 not	 feasible	 or	 appropriate	 to	 be	 more	
specific	as	to	what	constitutes	‘fairness’	or	‘reasonableness’	since	these	are	subjective	factors	determined	
by	 the	 circumstances	 surrounding	 the	 negotiation.	 If	 the	 right	 holder	 is	 to	 be	 satisfied	 that	 his	
investment	in	research	and	development	can	be	adequately	recovered,	he	would	expect	the	royalty	rate	
to	 relate	 in	 some	 way	 to	 the	 normal	 freely	 negotiated	 commercial	 rate,	 allowing	 for	 the	 greatly	
increased	 market	 for	 his	 technology	 which	 standardization	 will	 bring”.	 Communication	 from	 the	
European	Commission,	Intellectual	Property	Rights	and	Standardization,	COM(92)	445	Final,	27	Oct.	
1992,	point	4.3.3.	
418	The	General	Court	 in	Case	T-167/08,	Microsoft	Corp	 v.	 Commission,	27	 Jun.	2012,	para	95,	 stated	
that	“Microsoft	is,	on	the	other	hand,	right	to	maintain	that	several	rates	may	be	covered	by	the	notion	
of	‘reasonable	remuneration	rates’”.		
419	The	General	Court	 in	Case	T-167/08,	Microsoft	Corp	 v.	Commission,	27	 Jun.	2012,	para	84,	stated	
that	 “[…]	 the	 use	 of	 imprecise	 legal	 concepts	 in	 making	 rules,	 breach	 of	 which	 entails	 the	 civil,	
administrative	or	even	criminal	liability	of	the	person	who	contravenes	them,	does	not	mean	that	it	 is	
impossible	to	impose	the	remedial	measures	provided	for	by	law,	provided	that	the	individual	concerned	
is	in	a	position,	on	the	basis	of	the	wording	of	the	relevant	provision	and,	if	need	be,	with	the	help	of	the	
interpretation	of	it	given	by	the	courts,	to	know	which	acts	or	omissions	will	make	him	liable”	(also	see	
para	91).	
420	For	instance,	both	the	ETSI	IPR	policy	and	the	ANSI	Patent	Policy	abstain	from	unraveling	what	
they	mean	by	“fair	and	reasonable	terms”	or	by	“reasonable	terms	and	conditions,”	respectively.	Timo	
Ruikka,	 “FRAND”	Undertakings	 in	 standardization	 -	 A	 business	 perspective,	 Paper	 presented	 at	 the	
Fordham	IP	Conference,	New	York	City,	March	28,	2008.	
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licensing	terms,	without	any	interference,	might	also	be	explained	by	the	concern	
that	the	SSO	may	otherwise	be	accused	of	behaving	like	a	cartel.421	
This	 vagueness	 in	 terminology	 results	 makes	 it	 difficult	 to	 contest	 an	
offered	 royalty	 rate	 as	 not	 being	 compliant	with	 a	 FRAND	 commitment.422	This	
legal	uncertainty	raises	even	more	concerns	as	the	IPR	rules	of	standards	bodies	
generally	 do	 not	 deal	 with	 the	 coordination	 issues	 stemming	 from	 the	 co-
presence	 of	 a	 large	 number	 of	 patent	 holders,	 most	 of	 the	 time	 each	 licensing	
their	 essential	 patents	 independently	 and	without	 considering	 the	 totality	 of	 all	
essential	patents.	Given	this	context	and	having	confirmed	that	the	ex	post	effects	
of	 standardization	 deeply	 alter	 the	 equilibrium	 of	 licensing	 negotiations,	 the	
absence	 of	 clear	 rules	 in	 these	 respects	 paves	 the	 way	 for	 the	 opportunistic	
conduct	of	SEP	holders.423	
2.2.1 CRITERIA TO DEFINE “FAIRNESS” AND “REASONABLENESS” 
The	 uncertainty	 surrounding	 the	 concept	 of	 FRAND	 has	 forced	 courts	 to	
seek	 guidance	 from	market	 practices	 in	 foreign	 jurisdictions.	At	 the	 same	 time,	
                                                
421 	DAVID	 TELYAS,	 THE	 INTERFACE	 BETWEEN	 COMPETITION	 LAW,	 PATENTS	 AND	 TECHNICAL	 STANDARDS	
(KLUWER	LAW	INTERNATIONAL,	2014),	para	9.03[e][3].	
422	Timo	Ruikka,	“FRAND”	Undertakings	in	standardization	-	A	business	perspective,	Paper	presented	
at	the	Fordham	IP	Conference,	New	York	City,	March	28,	2008.	
423	Timo	Ruikka,	“FRAND”	Undertakings	in	standardization	-	A	business	perspective,	Paper	presented	
at	 the	 Fordham	 IP	 Conference,	 New	 York	 City,	 March	 28,	 2008.	 It	 should	 also	 be	 remarked	 that	
FRAND	 terms	 are	 negotiated	 between	 the	 licensor	 and	 the	 licensee	 and	 need	 to	 be	 construed	 as	
contractual	terms	mirroring	the	will	of	the	parties	and	binding	on	them.	Moreover,	patent	law	is	not	
of	 great	 help	 to	 courts	 in	 determining	 royalty	 rates	 as	 frequently	 they	 are	 not	 set	 in	 mandatory	
regulations.	 FRAND	 terms	 are	 grounded	 on	 the	 membership	 agreements	 that	 are	 undertaken	
voluntarily	 by	 the	 SSO	 members,	 as	 self-regulation.	 Hence,	 they	 could,	 at	 most,	 be	 qualified	 as	
contractual:	 this	 means	 that	 courts	 may	 only	 rely	 on	 general	 principles	 such	 as	 the	 principle	 of	
fairness	 in	 civil	 law,	 the	principle	of	 equity,	 and	 the	principle	of	 good	 faith	 in	 contract	 law.	See	for	
example,	中华人民共和国民法通则	General	Principles	of	the中华人民共和国合同法	Contract	Law	of	
the	 People’s	 Republic	 of	 China,	 Articles	 5	 to	 6.	 However,	 it	 remains	 necessary	 to	 distinguish	 the	
contractual	 implications	 of	 a	 FRAND	 understanding	 from	 those	 stemming	 from	Article	 102	 TFEU.	
Indeed,	although	SSOs’	licensing	policies	are	aimed	at	preventing	competition	issues	that	may	arise	
from	 the	 inclusion	of	 proprietary	 technology	 in	 a	 standard,	 contractual	 compliance	with	 a	 FRAND	
commitment	will	not	per	se	ensure	competition	law	compliance.	The	literature	has	pointed	out	that	
“even	if	SSO	policies	were	to	contain	elaborate	definitions	of	FRAND	such	definition,	as	agreed	between	
SSO	 members,	 would	 not	 necessarily	 be	 FRAND	 vis-à-vis	 non-members.	 In	 this	 respect	 it	 must	 be	
recalled	that	the	interests	of	SSO	members	cannot	be	presumed	always	to	be	aligned	with	those	of	the	
public,	 let	 alone	 in	 harmony	 with	 effective	 competition”.	 See	 Joseph	 Farrell	 et	 al.,	Standard	 Setting,	
Patents,	and	Hold-Up,	74	ANTITRUST	LAW	JOURNAL	3	(2007),	at	658.	In	other	words,	mere	compliance	
with	the	contractual	terms	of	the	FRAND	commitment	does	not	prevent	a	SEP	holder	from	refusing	
outright	to	license	or	to	set	royalty	rates	so	high	as	to	successfully	block	others	from	gaining	access	to	
the	 technology.	Damien	Geradin,	Miguel	Rato,	Can	 Standard-Setting	 Lead	 to	 Exploitative	 Abuse?	 A	
Dissonant	 View	 on	 Patent	 Hold-up,	 Royalty	 Stacking,	 and	 the	 Meaning	 of	 FRAND,	 3	 EUROPEAN	
COMPETITION	JOURNAL	101	(2007).	
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despite	 the	 local	nature	of	 the	 rights,	 and	 local	 jurisdiction,	 courts	need	 to	 face	
extra-territorial	 market	 considerations	 as	 well,	 as	 the	 market	 practices	 for	
standards	are	international.		
Notwithstanding	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 competition	 law	 definition	 of	 “fairness”	
and	“reasonableness”,	the	Commission	and	the	CJEU	have	identified	some	criteria	
in	order	to	investigate	whether	a	royalty	is	unfair	and	unreasonable	under	Article	
102	 TFEU.	 Furthermore,	 legal	 and	 economic	 doctrines	 have	 been	 elaborated	 in	
this	regard,	proposing	different	methods	on	how	to	calculate	FRAND	terms.	The	
topic	 is	 too	complex	to	be	comprehensively	analyzed	 in	this	chapter,	and	 it	 falls	
outside	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 present	 study.	 However,	 in	 the	 subsequent	 section	
reference	is	made	to	different	theories	in	this	respect.424	
The	European	Commission	Guidelines	on	the	applicability	of	Article	 101	of	
the	 TFEU	 to	 horizontal	 co-operation	 agreements	 2011	 (the	 “Horizontal	 Co-
operation	Guidelines”),	 recalling	the	CJEU	in	the	United	Brands	case,	offer	some	
guidance	on	the	legal	test	to	apply	to	ascertain	whether	a	dominant	undertaking	
                                                
424	The	European	Commission	could	intervene	to	tackle	non-FRAND	licensing	terms	on	the	
basis	of	excessive	pricing,	given	the	clear	 legal	basis	provided	 in	Article	 102(a)	TFEU,	according	to	
which	a	dominant	undertaking	that	imposes	“unfair	and	unreasonable	prices	or	other	unfair	trading	
conditions”	may	be	subject	to	liability.	In	this	vein,	the	conduct	of	imposing	excessive	royalties	due	
to	 the	market	 power	 granted	 by	 the	 ownership	 of	 SEPs	may	 amount	 to	 an	 abuse	 of	 a	 dominant	
position.	However,	 to	 date	 there	 is	 no	 European	Commission	 decision	 nor	CJEU	 case	 concerning	
intervention	 triggered	 by	 the	 finding	 that	 a	 royalty	 has	 been	 deemed	 excessive.	 This	 cautious	
approach	 in	 intervening	 directly	 against	 unfair	 pricing	 abuse	 is	 primarily	 due	 to	 the	 practical	
difficulty	 in	 identifying	 a	 benchmark	 against	 which	 the	 price	 can	 be	 compared	 and	 in	 deciding	
whether	the	gap	between	the	benchmark	and	the	alleged	excessive	price	is	sufficient	to	amount	to	a	
violation	of	Article	 102	TFEU.	This	 somewhat	 vague	 legal	 test	 is	made	 even	more	prone	 to	 errors	
given	that	competition	authorities	generally	lack	the	expertise	to	intervene	in	price	setting	matters.	
See	 Mario	 Mariniello,	 European	antitrust	 control	and	 standard	 setting,	 Bruegel	Working	 Paper	
2012/01,	at	 13.	The	reluctance	shown	towards	a	direct	 intervention	on	prices	might	 furthermore	be	
attributable	to	the	risk	of	reducing	the	incentive	to	enter	the	market,	as	“it	creates	uncertainty	as	to	
whether	 the	 investments	 in	 R&D	 can	 be	 recouped”.	 See	 DAVID	 TELYAS,	 THE	 INTERFACE	 BETWEEN	
COMPETITION	LAW,	PATENTS	AND	TECHNICAL	STANDARDS	(KLUWER	LAW	INTERNATIONAL,	2014),	p.	88.		
SEP	 holders	 should	 indeed	 be	 allowed	 to	 recoup	 the	 risky	 investments	 made	 to	 develop	 their	
patented	technology.	High	prices	would	then	represent	a	“necessary	reward”	for	the	innovative	effort	
made	by	the	most	efficient	firms	and	intervention	against	high	profits	might	undermine	innovation	
and,	ultimately,	be	detrimental	to	consumers’	interests.	This	has	been	recognized	by	the	European	
Commission	as	well:	“[…]	high	profits	may	often	be	the	results	of	superior	innovation	and	risk	taking,	
which	 should	not	 be	penalized	as	 this	would	work	as	a	disincentive	 to	 innovate	and	 invest”.	OECD,	
Policy	Roundtables	-	Excessive	Prices	2011,	DAF/COMP	820119	18,	2012	p.	311.	
Another	source	which	may	cause	competition	authorities	to	exercise	restraint	is	the	perception	that	
direct	 intervention	 on	 price	 constitutes	 conclusive	 evidence	 of	 a	 failure	 of	 competition	 policy,	
consequently,	“[I]t	seems	unsound	to	argue	that	competition	authorities	would	be	the	best	placed	to	
perform	 such	 a	 duty.	 That	 perhaps	 explains	 the	 reluctance	 to	 intervene	 shown	 by	 the	 European	
Commission	 in	 the	 past	 and	 the	 skepticism	 often	 flagged	 by	 high-ranked	 EC	 officials”.	 Mario	
Mariniello,	European	antitrust	control	and	standard	setting,	Bruegel	Working	Paper	2012/01,	p.	13.		
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has	 violated	 Article	 102(a)	 TFEU	 by	 using	 its	 market	 power	 to	 reap	 benefits	
otherwise	 not	 achievable	 if	 “normal	 and	 sufficiently	 effective	 competition”425	had	
been	 in	 place.	 According	 to	 the	 Commission	 “[t]he	 assessment	 of	 whether	 fees	
charged	for	access	to	IPR	in	the	standard-setting	context	are	unfair	or	unreasonable	
should	be	based	on	whether	the	fees	bear	a	reasonable	relationship	to	the	economic	
value	 of	 the	 IPR”.426 	The	 Horizontal	 Co-operation	 Guidelines	 present	 a	 non-
exclusive	list	of	methods	to	carry	out	this	assessment.	
That	 being	 said,	 the	 Horizontal	 Co-operation	 Guidelines	 specify	 that	 “In	
principle,	 cost-based	methods	 are	 not	well	 adapted	 to	 this	 context	 because	 of	 the	
difficulty	 in	 assessing	 the	 costs	 attributable	 to	 the	 development	 of	 a	 particular	
patent	 or	 groups	 of	 patents”. 427 	The	 difficulty	 in	 determining	 relevant	 costs	
assessing	 whether	 a	 royalty	 is	 excessive	 is	 all	 the	 more	 an	 issue	 in	 the	 patent	
context	where	 “allocating	 fixed	 R&D	 costs,	 including	 the	 costs	 of	 failed	 projects,	
with	any	precision	is	close	to	impossible”.428	The	ECJ	has	in	fact	acknowledged	that	
there	may	 be	 “…considerable	 and	 at	 times	 very	 great	 difficulties	 in	 working	 out	
production	 costs	 which	may	 sometimes	 include	 a	 discretionary	 apportionment	 of	
indirect	costs	and	general	expenditure…”.429	
Conversely,	the	Commission	asserts	that	the	reasonableness	and	fairness	of	
a	royalty	rate	imposed	ex	post	after	a	standard	has	been	adopted	may	be	decided	
by	 “compare[ing]	 the	 licensing	 fees	 charged	 by	 the	 company	 in	 question	 for	 the	
relevant	patents	 in	a	competitive	environment	before	the	 industry	has	been	 locked	
into	the	standard	(ex	ante)	with	those	charged	after	the	industry	has	been	locked	in	
(ex	post)”.	This	comparative	method	evidently	“assumes	that	the	comparison	can	
be	made	in	a	consistent	and	reliable	manner”.430	
                                                
425	Case	 27/76,	United	 Brands	 v.	 Commission,	 14	 Feb.	 1978,	 para	 250.	 See	 also	 Case	 26/75,	General	
Motors	v.	Commission,	13	Nov.	1975,	para	249.	
426	European	Commission	Guidelines	on	the	applicability	of	Article	101	of	the	TFEU	to	horizontal	co-
operation	 agreements,	 2011	 (the	 “Horizontal	 Co-operation	Guidelines”).	The	 European	 Commission	
makes	 a	 similar,	 albeit	 obiter,	 statement	 in	 its	 merger	 clearance	 decision	 in	 Case	
COMP/M.6381	Google/Motorola	(2012)	(paragraph	105).	
427	2011	Commission	Guidelines	(n	1)	289.	
428 	DAVID	 TELYAS,	 THE	 INTERFACE	 BETWEEN	 COMPETITION	 LAW,	 PATENTS	 AND	 TECHNICAL	 STANDARDS	
(KLUWER	LAW	INTERNATIONAL,	2014),	p.	121.	
429	Case	27/76,	United	Brands	v.	Commission,	14	Feb.	1978,	para	254.	
430	2011	Commission	Guidelines	(n	1)	289.	Communication	from	the	European	Commission,	Guidelines	
on	the	applicability	of	Article	101	of	the	Treaty	on	the	Functioning	of	the	European	Union	to	horizontal	
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The	 comparative	 ex	 post-ex	 ante	 method	 suggests	 that	 the	 “the	 overall	
benchmark	is	the	hypothetic	royalty	rate	which	would	have	been	offered	had	it	not	
been	 for	 the	 SEP	 holder’s	 dominant	 position”.431 	In	 other	 words,	 this	 method	
assumes	 that	 the	patent	 subject	 to	 scrutiny	was	 licensed	before	 the	 adoption	of	
the	 standard	 on	 the	 market	 to	 which	 the	 standard	 is	 related	 and	 with	 the	
objective	of	letting	the	licensee	implement	features	analogous	to	those	covered	by	
the	standard.432	
Consequently,	the	method	assumes	that	 if	 the	patent	at	 issue	was	licensed	
ex	 ante	 at	 a	 certain	 rate,	 the	 licensor	 must	 have	 evaluated	 its	 adequateness	 to	
allow	 for	 the	 costs	 linked	 to	 the	development	 of	 the	patented	 technology	 to	 be	
recovered	and	 for	 the	 risks	 to	be	offset.	Thus,	any	 increase	 in	 royalties	after	 the	
standard	 is	 adopted	 is	 presumed	 to	 be	 indicative	 of	 an	 anticompetitive	
opportunistic	 behavior	 aimed	 at	 extracting	 rents	 in	 excess	 of	 a	 technology’s	
intrinsic	 value,	without	 any	 objective	 justification.	 This	 consideration	 is	 aligned	
with	 the	 General	 Court’s	 reasoning	 that	 the	 reasonableness	 of	 a	 royalty	 rate	
reflects	 exclusively	 the	 intrinsic	 value	 deriving	 from	 the	 technology	 innovative	
character.	 Conversely,	 a	 patentee	 should	 not	 be	 allowed	 to	 charge	 royalty	 rates	
reflecting	 the	 strategic	 value	 deriving	 from	 network	 effects	 stemming	 from	 the	
fact	that	the	standard	has	been	adopted	and	the	market	has	become	locked-in,	as	
the	opportunistic	exploitation	of	this	strategic	value	cannot	escape	the	scrutiny	of	
Article	102	TFEU.433		
	
	
                                                                                                                                 
co-operation	agreements,	OJ	2011/C	11/1,	14	Jan.	2011,	para	289.This	method	comparing	ex	ante	royalty	
with	ex	post	royalty	rates	has	been	supported	by	some	scholars.	See	for	 instance	CARL	SHAPRIO,	HAL	
VARIAN,	INFORMATION	RULES:	A	STRATEGIC	GUIDE	TO	THE	NETWORK	ECONOMY	(HARVARD	BUSINESS	SCHOOL	
PRESS,	1999),	at	241:	“[r]easonable	should	mean	the	royalties	that	the	patent	holder	could	obtain	in	open,	
up-front	competition	with	other	technologies,	not	the	royalties	that	the	patent	holder	can	extract	once	
other	participants	are	effectively	locked	in	to	use	technology	covered	by	the	patent”.	
431 	DAVID	 TELYAS,	 THE	 INTERFACE	 BETWEEN	 COMPETITION	 LAW,	 PATENTS	 AND	 TECHNICAL	 STANDARDS	
(KLUWER	LAW	INTERNATIONAL,	2014),	p.	119.	
432 	DAVID	 TELYAS,	 THE	 INTERFACE	 BETWEEN	 COMPETITION	 LAW,	 PATENTS	 AND	 TECHNICAL	 STANDARDS	
(KLUWER	LAW	INTERNATIONAL,	2014),	pp.	128-129.	
433	Case	T-167/08,	Microsoft	Corp	v.	European	Commission,	27	Jun.	2012,	paras	143-144.	The	court	did	
not	 employ	 the	 term	 “network	 effects”,	 notwithstanding	 that	 it	 held	 that	Microsoft	 should	 not	 be	
permitted	to	charge	remuneration	rates	that	mirrored	the	strategic	value	deriving	from	“[…]	the	mere	
ability	to	interoperate	with	Microsoft’s	operating	systems”.	Ibid.,	para	142.	
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2.2.2 CRITERIA TO DEFINE “NON-DISCRIMINATORY” CONDUCT 
Having	analyzed	the	meaning	of	fairness	and	reasonableness,	it	is	important	
to	 turn	 to	 the	 “non-discriminatory”	 component	 of	 FRAND,	which	 imposes	 that	
licensing	 terms	 should	 be	 non-discriminatory, 434 	meaning	 that	 “all	 similarly	
situated	licensees	and	licensors	must	have	access	to	technology	on	the	same	terms	
and	conditions,	so	as	to	enable	them	to	compete	on	a	level	playing	field.	Deviation	
from	 the	 non-discrimination	 principle	 is	 allowed	 only	 if	 there	 is	 an	 objective	
justification	 and	 the	 difference	 in	 treatment	 is	 proportionate	 to	 the	 difference	 in	
circumstances.”435		
The	 licensor	 may	 indeed	 have	 an	 incentive	 to	 not	 only	 put	 in	 place	 an	
exploitative	abuse	through	excessive	pricing,	but	also	to	impose	a	discriminatory	
royalty	rate	that	would	place	the	licensee	at	a	competitive	disadvantage	vis-à-vis	
other	 trading	partners	enjoying	more	 favorable	 rates,	ultimately	excluding	 them	
from	the	market.436		
Interestingly,	 discriminatory	 licensing	 has	 so	 far	 received	 little	 attention	
compared	to	the	“fair”	and	“reasonable”	part	of	FRAND,	and	no	EU	case-law	has	
dealt	 with	 this	 element.	 Nor	 is	 there	 any	 guidance	 on	 this	 in	 the	 Horizontal	
Guidelines,437	or	in	the	Commission’s	Technology	Transfer	Guidelines,438	which	do	
not	address	the	matter	of	discriminatory	licensing.	Nonetheless,	there	is	no	doubt	
that	 discriminatory	 licensing	 may	 run	 counter	 to	 EU	 competition	 law	 and	 fall	
within	the	scope	of	Article	102(c)	TFEU.439	
                                                
434	See	also	Anne	Farrar-Layne,	Nondiscriminatory	pricing	 is	 standard	 setting	different,	6	JOURNAL	OF	
COMPETITION	 LAW	 &	 ECONOMICS	 4	 (2010),	 p.	 812;	 Chris	 Chaffer,	 Prohibiting	 discriminatory	 cross-
licensing,	21	INFORMATION	&	COMMUNICATIONS	TECHNOLOGY	LAW	2	(2012),	p.	91.	
435	Maurits	Dolmans,	Standards	for	standards,	26	FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	(2002).	
436 	For	 an	 in-depth	 analysis	 on	 the	 reasons	 why	 a	 SEP	 holder	 may	 be	 induced	 to	 engage	 in	
discriminatory	 licensing,	 see	 DAVID	TELYAS,	THE	 INTERFACE	BETWEEN	COMPETITION	LAW,	PATENTS	 AND	
TECHNICAL	STANDARDS	(KLUWER	LAW	INTERNATIONAL,	2014),	pp.	150-153.	
437	Communication	from	the	European	Commission,	Guidelines	on	the	applicability	of	Article	101	of	the	
Treaty	on	the	Functioning	of	the	European	Union	to	horizontal	co-operation	agreements,	OJ	2011/C	11/1,	
14	Jan.	2011,	paras	289-291.	
438	European	Commission	Guidelines	on	the	application	of	Article	101	of	the	Treaty	on	the	Functioning	
of	the	European	Union	to	technology	transfer	agreements,	OJ	2014/C	89/03,	28	Mar.	2014.	
439	See	 European	 Commission	 press	 release	 in	 Case	 COMP/37.792,	Microsoft,	 IP/01/1232	 (European	
Commission	 initiates	 additional	 proceedings	 against	 Microsoft),	 30	 Aug.	 2001.	 Interestingly,	 the	
European	 Commission	 dropped	 the	 allegations	 of	 discrimination	 in	 its	 final	 decision	 in	 Case	
COMP/37.792,	Microsoft,	24	Mar.	2004	so	the	General	Court	did	not	address	this	aspect	on	appeal	in	
Case	T-201/04,	Microsoft	Corp.	v.	Commission,	17	Sep.	2007.	
 119 
However,	 Article	 102(c)	 TFEU	 prohibits	 “applying	 dissimilar	 conditions	 to	
equivalent	 transactions	 with	 other	 trading	 parties,	 thereby	 placing	 them	 at	 a	
competitive	 disadvantage”.	 The	CJEU	 and	 the	Commission	have	 interpreted	 this	
provision	 as	 also	 prohibiting	 reverse	 discrimination,	 i.e.,	 applying	 equivalent	
conditions	 to	 transactions	 characterized	 by	 different	 factual	 circumstances.440	
Non-discrimination	 can	 thus	 be	 evaluated	 if	 the	 patent	 holder	 has	 already	
licensed	the	same	patent	or	a	patent	of	the	same	type	of	technology:	a	comparison	
of	 the	 value	 ascribed	 can	 straight	 away	 signal	 if	 there	 is	 discrimination.	 If	 the	
patent	 holder	 has	 not	 already	 so	 licensed,	 a	 criterion	 is	 to	 verify	 whether	 the	
prospective	 value	 is	 contrary	 to	 id	 quod	 plerumque	 accidit	 in	 the	 same	 industry	
and	to	make	a	comparison	of	those	values.441		
Consequentially,	 the	 application	 of	 Article	 102(c)	 TFEU	 presupposes	 a	
detailed	case-by-case	analysis	of	all	 factual	and	economic	circumstances	at	 issue	
that	may	justify	differential	treatment	of	licenses,	as	diverging	licensing	terms	do	
not	automatically	signal	an	abuse	of	market	power.442			
                                                
440 	See	 Case	 C-209/10,	 Post	 Danmark	 A/S	 v.	 Konkurrencerådet,	 27	 Mar.	 2012,	 para	 30	 and	
COMP/A.36.568/D3,	Scanlines	Sverige	v.	Port	of	Helsingborg,	23	Jul.	2004,	para	276.	
441	M.	 Siragusa,	 Le	 essential	 facilities	 nel	 diritto	 comunitario	 ed	 italiano	 della	 concorrenza,	 in	 E.	A.	
RAFFAELLI,	ANTITRUST	FRA	DIRITTO	NAZIONALE	E	DIRITTO	COMUNITARIO	(BRUXELLES-MILANO,	1998),	p.	196.	
442	This	has	been	accepted	by	the	CJEU.	See	for	example	Case	322/81,	Michelin	v.	Commission,	9	Nov.	
1983,	 para	 73,	 and	 Case	 T-228/97,	 Irish	 Sugar	 v.	 Commission,	 7	 Oct.	 1999,	 para	 114.	 Nonetheless,	
diverging	 licensing	 terms	 may	 indeed	 be	 justified	 where	 they	 mirror	 different	 circumstances	
underlying	 the	 transactions	 being	 compared	 and	 actually	 represent	 the	 effort	 to	 offset	 different	
economic	and	competitive	circumstances.	See	Case	13-63,	Italian	Republic	v.	Commission,	17	Jul.	1963,	
concerning	 discrimination	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 	 European	 Coal	 and	 Steel	 Community	 (“ECSC”)	
Treaty.	 As	 stated	 by	 the	 European	 Commission	 in	 its	 Guidance	 on	 the	 European	 Commission’s	
enforcement	priorities	 in	applying	Article	82	of	 the	EC	Treaty	 to	abusive	exclusionary	conduct	by	
dominant	undertakings,	a	dominant	undertaking	may	justify	its	conduct	“…	either	by	demonstrating	
that	 its	 conduct	 is	 objectively	 necessary	 or	 by	 demonstrating	 that	 its	 conduct	 produces	 substantial	
efficiencies	which	outweigh	any	anti-competitive	effects	on	consumers.”	See	Communication	from	the	
European	Commission,	Guidance	 on	 the	European	Commission’s	 enforcement	 priorities	 in	 applying	
Article	 82	 of	 the	 EC	 Treaty	 to	 abusive	 exclusionary	 conduct	 by	 dominant	 undertakings,	OJ	 2009/C	
45/02,	24	Feb.	2009,	point	28.	
It	 follows	 that	 Article	 102(c)	 TFEU	 does	 not	 entail	 a	 per	 se	 prohibition	 against	 licensing	
discrimination.	 Conversely,	 the	 licensor	 should	 ensure	 that	 the	 royalty	 charged	 mirrors	 any	
dissimilarity	 as	 to	 the	 terms	and	 conditions	 agreed	 in	order	 to	 avoid	 applying	 equal	 treatment	 to	
non-equivalent	transaction.	This	would	run	counter	to	Article	102(c)	TFEU,	which	as	noted	has	been	
construed	 as	 prohibiting	 reverse	 discrimination.	 It	 is	 evident	 that	 “…discrimination	 could	 also	 be	
caused	 if	 different	 situations	 were	 treated	 in	 the	 same	manner.”	 See	Case	 13-63,	 Italian	 Republic	 v.	
Commission	(1963)	ECR	165.	
In	 this	 vein,	 restricting	 patentees’	 freedom	 to	 differentiate	 between	 licensees	 might	 have	
unwarranted	 results.	 A	 parallel	 can	 be	 drawn	 with	 the	 European	 Commission’s	 cautious	 stance	
towards	 provisions	 that	 require	 SSO	 members	 to	 issue	 a	 blanket	 licensing	 commitment	 as	 a	
precondition	 for	 participation	 (“license-by-default”	 clauses).	 See	 the	 ETSI	 controversy,	 where	 the	
European	Commission	noted	that	a	license-by-default	scheme	would	likely	contravene	Article	101(1)	
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3. CHINA: REGULATING STANDARDS TO PROTECT THE MARKET 
3.1 STANDARDIZATION ADMINISTRATION OF CHINA (“SAC”)’S 
MEASURES ON NATIONAL STANDARDS 
The	 US	 has	 been	 reiterating	 its	 concern	 that	 China	 is	 pursuing	 a	
protectionist	 agenda	 in	 disguise	 of	 the	 goal	 of	 fostering	 indigenous	 innovation	
through	 State-supported	 development	 and	 implementation	 of	 home-grown	
standards	that	differ	from	international	ones.443		
As	 seen	 above,	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 China’s	 position	 in	 the	 global	 supply	
chain,	 one	 of	 the	 primary	 drivers	 of	 the	 country’s	 willingness	 to	 support	 its	
domestic	 technology	 standards	 is	 arguably	 explained	 by	 the	 ever-increasing	
production	costs,	which	are	constantly	driven	up	by	patents	and	related	royalties,	
held	 by	 advanced	 nations.444	The	more	 patents	 and	 related	 royalty	 fees	Chinese	
firms	need	to	pay,	 the	 less	profit	margin	the	country’s	manufacturing	sector	can	
make.	This	is	especially	acute	in	the	ICT	sector,	which	features	a	high	number	of	
                                                                                                                                 
TFEU	as	 it	does	not	provide	SSO	members	with	a	chance	 to	exclude	select	 technologies	 from	the	
FRAND	licensing	obligation.	See	European	Commission	Notice	in	Case	IV/35.006,	and	ETSI	interim	
IPR	policy,	95/C	76/05,	28	Mar.	1995,	point	8.	See	also	Eric	J.	Iversen,	Standardization	and	Intellectual	
Property	 Rights:	 ETSI’s	 controversial	 search	 for	 new	 IPR-procedures,	 SIIT’99	 Proceedings,	 IEEE	
Conference	 on	 Standardization	 and	 Innovation,	 Aachen,	 Germany,	 15-17	 Sept.	 1999,	 p.	 6;	 and	
Maurits	Dolmans,	Standards	for	standards,	26	FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	(2002),	pp.	180-
181.	It	has	been	observed	that	such	“a	compulsory	licensing	obligation	[…]	would	discriminate	against	
companies	 in	possession	of	 large	 IPRs	portfolios	and	be	 therefore	detrimental	 to	 innovation”.	DAVID	
TELYAS,	THE	INTERFACE	BETWEEN	COMPETITION	LAW,	PATENTS	AND	TECHNICAL	STANDARDS	(KLUWER	LAW	
INTERNATIONAL,	2014),	p.	94.	In	fact,	it	would	discourage	participation	by	patentees,	thus	leading	to	
inferior	 standards	 by	 curbing	 the	 number	 of	 substitute	 technologies	 available	 for	 inclusion.	 The	
European	 Commission	 acknowledges	 this	 risk	 in	 its	 1992	 communication	 on	 IPR	 and	 standards,	
noting	that	“although	it	could	be	argued	that	consumers	would	benefit	in	the	short	term	if	intellectual	
property	 rights	 were	 compulsively	 licensed	 to	 serve	 as	 the	 basis	 of	 standards,	 in	 the	 long	 term,	
investment	in	research	and	development	in	the	standardized	industrial	sectors	would	dry	up	within	the	
Community”.	See	Communication	from	the	European	Commission,	Intellectual	Property	Rights	and	
Standardization,	COM(92)	445	Final,	27	Oct.	1992,	point	5.1.15.	
Indeed,	 differences	 as	 to	 the	 terms	 and	 conditions	 agreed	 will	 often	 result	 in	 differential	
licensing	schemes.	But	this	will	not	amount	to	discrimination	within	the	meaning	of	Article	102(c)	
TFEU,	 in	 so	 far	 as	 there	 is	 an	objective	 and	proportionate	 justification,	 identified	 in	 a	 causal	 link	
between	 the	 diverging	 royalty	 rates	 charged	 and	 the	 monetary	 payment	 mode	 under	 the	 terms	
agreed	by	the	licensing	negotiations.	It	has	been	observed	that	“while	not	 strictly	 related	 to	 supply	
costs,	 the	 terms	 and	 conditions	 impact	 both	 the	 value	 of	 the	 patent	 licensed	 as	 well	 as	 the	 risks	 -	
hereby	the	potential	costs	 -	of	 the	parties	 to	 the	agreement.	Accordingly,	differences	as	 to	 the	 terms	
agreed	will	 therefore	most	often	 translate	 into	diverging	 royalty	payments	or	other	 fees”.	See	DAVID	
TELYAS,	THE	INTERFACE	BETWEEN	COMPETITION	LAW,	PATENTS	AND	TECHNICAL	STANDARDS	(KLUWER	LAW	
INTERNATIONAL,	2014),	p.	159.	
443 	United	 States	 Trade	 Representative	 (USTR),	 2014	 Report	 to	 Congress	 On	 China’s	 WTO	
Compliance	(December	2014)	(the	“2014	USTR	Report”)	73.	
444	See	Dan	Breznitz,	Michael	Murphree,	The	rise	of	China	in	technology	standards:	New	norms	in	old	
institutions,	prepared	for	the	US-China	Economic	and	Security	Review	Commission	16	(2013),	p.	2.	
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overlapping	 patents,	 often	 amounting	 to	 patent	 thickets,	 in	 order	 to	 reach	 the	
needed	 level	 of	 interoperability	 among	 heterogeneous	 devices.445 	Against	 this	
background,	 China	 seems	 to	 be	 aiming	 at	 squeezing	 down	 prices	 by	 increasing	
supply.	The	use	of	competing,	alternative,	domestic	technologies	can	indeed	serve	
the	purpose	of	forcing	concessions	in	royalties.	
This	situation	is	exacerbated	by	a	notable	amount	of	uncertainty	under	the	
Anti-Monopoly	 Law	 (“AML”) 446 	and	 its	 implementing	 regulations	 as	 to	 the	
treatment	 of	 IPRs	 and	 FRAND-related	 concerns.	 This	 uncertainty	 increases	 the	
risk	of	public	and	private	antitrust	actions	and	creates	uncertainty	regarding	the	
consistency	 of	 China’s	 standardization	 policy	 vis-à-vis	 its	 WTO	 commitments.	
The	encouragement	of	 indigenous	 innovation	affects	 the	way	Chinese	 standard-
setting	agencies	deal	with	patents	in	standards.	
The	 issue	has	 been	 the	 subject	 of	 three	draft	 regulations	 advanced	by	 the	
Standardization	 Administration	 of	 China	 (“SAC”)	 in	 2004,	 2009	 and	 2012	
respectively.	These	drafts	show	a	progressive	softening	of	China’s	stance	following	
foreign,	especially	US,	claims	that	the	Beijing	government	has	placed	emphasis	on	
developing	 national	 standards	 that	 rely	 either	 on	 technology	 belonging	 to	 the	
public	domain	or	technology	that	can	be	made	available	at	reduced	rates.447	
The	2004	draft	regulation448	provided	that	patented	technologies	could	not	
be	 incorporated	 in	 mandatory	 national	 standards,	 and	 could	 be	 included	 in	
voluntary	 national	 standards	 only	 where	 the	 technology	 concerned	 is	 deemed	
                                                
445	This	apprehension	is	particularly	severe	with	respect	to	ICT,	which,	by	its	nature,	not	only	needs	a	
high	 degree	 of	 interoperability,	 but	 also	 includes	 a	 heavy	 portfolio	 of	 patented	 technology,	
particularly	software.	See	Andrew	Updegrove,	ICT	Standard	Setting	Today:	A	System	Under	Stress,	6	
CONSORTIUM	 STANDARDS	 BULLETIN	 No.	 4	 (Apr.	 2007).	 The	 sheer	 number	 of	 patents	 increases	 the	
danger	 that	 patent	 thickets	 will	 merge,	 hypothetically	 obstructing	 innovation,	 principally	 where	
standards	are	involved.	Carl	Shapiro,	Navigating	 the	patent	 thicket:	Cross	 licenses,	patent	pools,	and	
standard	setting,	1	INNOVATION	POLICY	AND	THE	ECONOMY	(2001),	pp.	119-150.		
446Anti-monopoly	 Law	 of	 the	 People’s	 Republic	 of	 China,	 Adopted	 at	 the	 29th	 meeting	 of	 the	
Standing	 Committee	 of	 the	 10th	 National	 People’s	 Congress	 of	 the	 People’s	 Republic	 of	 China	 on	
August	30,	2007.	
447 	United	 States	 Trade	 Representative	 (USTR),	 2014	 Report	 to	 Congress	 On	 China’s	 WTO	
Compliance	(December	2014)	73,	at	69.	The	USTR	frames	such	reduced	rates	as	below	market,	though,	
of	 course,	 the	 point	 of	 FRAND	 licensing	 terms	 is	 to	 correct	 the	 market	 disruption	 caused	 by	
standardization.	
448	See国家标准涉及专利的规定（暂行）（征求意见稿）[Provisions	on	 Issues	Related	 to	Patents	 in	
National	Standards	(Interim)	(Draft	for	Public	Comment,	Mar.	19,	2004)].		
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“irreplaceable”.449	Moreover,	 when	 a	 national	 standard	 does	 involve	 a	 patented	
technology,	 the	holder	would	be	 required	 to	 irrevocably	 state,	 in	writing,	his	or	
her	agreement	to	license	either	on	a	royalty-free	or	FRAND	basis.450	Nonetheless,	
the	2004	draft	did	not	make	any	reference	addressing	the	issue	of	what	amounts	
to	 FRAND.	The	 2004	draft	was	never	 adopted	because	 of	 the	 lobbying	pressure	
exerted	against	it	by	the	US	government	and	companies.451	
The	 2009	 draft	 regulation 452 	allowed	 for	 the	 inclusion	 of	 patented	
technologies	 in	 national	 standards	 only	 if	 such	 technologies	 are	 “essential”	 for	
them.453	It	 provided	 that	 in	 case	 the	 national	 standard	must	 include	 a	 patented	
technology,	 the	 owner	 of	 the	 SEPs	must	 sign	 an	 irrevocable	written	declaration	
stating	its	willingness	to	license	its	technologies	on	a	royalty-free	or	FRAND	basis.	
According	 to	 this	draft	 the	 fee	 should	be	 “at	 a	 price	 significantly	 lower	 than	 the	
normal	royalties”.	This	wording	is	arguably	problematic	as	it	would	likely	work	as	
a	deterrent	for	IPR	owners	to	participate	in	standard-setting	activities	in	China	as	
it	would	limit	their	capacity	to	receive	a	fair	return	on	their	R&D	investment.454		
As	 for	mandatory	 standards,	 the	 2009	draft	 regulation	 reiterated	 the	 2004	
draft’s	 prohibition	 on	 the	 inclusion	 of	 patented	 technologies	 in	 mandatory	
national	standards,	stating	that	“in	principle,	compulsory	national	standards	shall	
not	 involve	 patents”	 (Article	 12).	 In	 case	 a	 national	 standard	 does	 involve	 a	
patented	technology,	the	2009	draft	compelled	the	patent	holder	either	to	grant	a	
royalty-free	license	or	to	negotiate	with	SAC	to	reach	a	jointly	acceptable	solution.	
It	provided	that	if	such	a	solution	is	not	reached,	SAC	shall	either	not	approve	the	
national	standard	at	issue	or	demand	a	compulsory	license	(Article	13).		
However,	 this	 compulsory	 licensing	 power	 of	 SAC	 posed	 some	 issues.	
Indeed,	 compulsory	 licensing	 is	 to	be	 allowed	only	under	 clear	procedural	 rules	
                                                
449	Id.	at	Art.	3.		
450	Id.	at	Art.	11.		
451	Greg	S.	Slater,	Compulsory	 Licensing	 Trends	 in	 the	 Technology	 Sector:	 China	 as	 a	 Case	 Study	 on	
Licensing	Patents,	in	ABA	SECTION	OF	INTELLECTUAL	PROPERTY	LAW:	COMPULSORY	LICENSING	AND	OTHER	IP	
CONTROLS	(2009),	p.	135.	
452 	See	 涉及专利的国家标准制修订管理规定（暂行）（征求意见稿） 	 [Provisions	 on	 the	
Administration	 of	 Formulating	 and	Revising	National	 Standards	 Involving	Patents	 (Interim)	 (Draft	
for	Public	Comment)]	(Nov.	2,	2009).		
453	Id.	at	Art.	3.		
454	George	 T.	Willingmyre,	Take	 Two	 -	 China’s	 Proposed	 Regulations	 for	 Patent-Involving	 National	
Standards,	INTELLECTUAL	PROPERTY	WATCH,	21	Dec.	2009.	
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and	undertaken	within	the	regulatory	framework	spelled	out	by	the	WTO’s	TRIPs	
Agreement.	Besides	a	lack	of	clarity,	as	noted	by	the	Intellectual	Property	Owners	
Association	 the	SAC	policy	on	compulsory	 licensing	 requirements	would	 risk	 to	
negatively	 impact	 China:	 “compulsory	 licensing,	 or	 forced	 negotiation	 in	 the	
shadow	 of	 the	 threat	 of	 compulsory	 licensing,	 for	 mandatory	 national	 standards	
would	also	 lead	to	reduced	 innovation.	Patents	benefit	Chinese	society	by	creating	
long-term	 incentives	 for	Chinese	 companies	 to	 invest	 in	 innovation.”455	The	policy	
would	further	jeopardize	the	possibility	to	efficiently	develop	standards	using	the	
most	 advanced	 technologies.	 Critics	 indeed	 argued	 that	 the	 draft	 regulation	
would	force	China	to	accept	inferior	technologies.	Ultimately,	the	stark	criticism	
received,	led	to	the	abandonment	of	the	2009	draft	regulation	as	well.	
Eventually,	 in	 2012	 SAC	 proposed	 a	 third	 draft	 regulation	 on	 patents	 in	
standards456	that	shifted	the	language	in	a	way	more	favorable	to	the	inclusion	of	
patented	technologies	in	national	standards,	allowing	more	flexibility	on	the	part	
SAC.	However,	it	remains	unclear	if	the	re-wording	is	a	mere	cosmetic	gesture	to	
placate	Western	 critics	 or	 it	 actually	 reflects	 a	 change	 in	 SAC’s	 approach	 to	 the	
issue	in	practice.		
Similarly	 to	 the	 previous	 two	 draft	 regulations,	 the	 2012	 draft	 requires	
patented	 technologies	 to	be	 “indispensable”	 for	 them	to	be	 included	 in	national	
standards.457	In	 case	 a	 national	 standard	must	 cover	 a	 patented	 technology,	 the	
patent	holder	must	give	an	 irrevocable	written	declaration	stating	either	that	he	
or	she	agrees	to	license	the	patent	on	a	royalty-free	or	FRAND	basis;	or	that	he	or	
she	does	not.458	Importantly,	this	draft	deleted	that	the	fee	must	be	“significantly	
lower	 than	 normal”	 wording,	 although	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 how	 SAC	would	 interpret	
FRAND.	
With	regards	to	mandatory	national	standards,	the	2012	draft	maintains	that,	
“in	 principle”,	 mandatory	 national	 standards	 shall	 not	 incorporate	 patented	
                                                
455	See	Intellectual	Property	Owners	Association’s	Comments	on	the	Standardization	Administration	
of	China’s	Draft	Provisions	on	 the	Administration	of	 Formulating	 and	Revising	National	 Standards	
Involving	Patents.		
456	See 国家标准涉及专利的管理规定（暂行）征求意见稿）[Provisions	 on	 the	 Administration	 of	
National	Standards	Involving	Patents	(Interim)	(Draft	for	Public	Comment)]	(Dec.	19,	2012).		
457	Id,	Art.	I.4.		
458	Id,	Art.	III.1.		
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technologies.459	In	 case	 a	mandatory	 national	 standard	 does	 include	 a	 patented	
technology,	 the	 patent	 holder	 is	 still	 required	 to	 negotiate	with	 SAC	 to	 reach	 a	
mutually	acceptable	 solution.460	Hence,	 the	draft	does	not	mention	 the	granting	
of	a	royalty-free	license	anymore,	although	nothing	would	prevent	a	patent	holder	
from	so	granting	if	he	or	she	sees	fit.	In	case	a	deal	with	SAC	is	not	reached,	while	
SAC	 is	 required	 not	 to	 approve	 the	 national	 standard	 in	 question,461	it	 cannot	
impose	a	compulsory	license	as	it	could	do	under	the	previous	2009	draft.462	
The	 softer	 stance	 adopted	 in	 the	 2012	 draft	 regulation	 may	 signal	 the	
awareness,	 on	 the	 part	 of	 China,	 of	 the	 potential	 negative	 unintended	
consequences	of	a	policy	 that	 is	exceptionally	hostile	 to	patent	holders	and	that	
fails	 to	 appropriately	 value	 IPRs	 in	 standards.463	Regardless	 of	 the	 underlying	
rationale	 that	 pushed	 SAC	 to	 soften	 its	 original	 stances	 on	 this	 issue,	 the	 2012	
draft	was	positively	welcomed	by	international	stakeholders	positively	and	it	was	
enacted	 as	 the	 Interim	 Regulatory	 Measures	 on	 National	 Standards	 Involving	
Patents	 (the	 “Measures	 on	 National	 Standards”),	 issued	 jointly	 by	 SAC	 and	 the	
State	 Intellectual	 Property	 Office	 (“SIPO”)	 and	 became	 effective	 on	 January	 1,	
2014.464		
However,	 a	 number	 of	 issues	 remain.	 First,	 the	 Measures	 on	 National	
Standards	seem	to	be	designed	to	benumb	patents,	as	mandatory	standards	will	
never	 include	 patented	 technology	 unless	 SAC	 reaches	 a	 mutually	 acceptable	
solution	with	the	patent	holder.	It	has	been	observed	that	whilst	such	provisions	
ensure	 that	 “proprietary	 technical	 standards	 will	 always,	 one	 way	 or	 another,	 be	
subject	 to	 competition”,	 they	 “tee	 China	 up	 for	 another	 WTO/TBT	 dispute	 if	 it	
decides	 to	 mandate	 a	 standard	 in	 a	 field	 where	 an	 international	 standard	 does	
incorporate	patent	rights”).465		
                                                
459	Id.,	Art.	IV.1.		
460	Id,	Art.	IV.2.		
461	Ibid.	
462	Ibid.	
463	D.	Daniel	Sokol,	Wentong	Zheng,	FRAND	in	China,	22	TEXAS	INTELLECTUAL	PROPERTY	LAW	JOURNAL	
(2013),	p.	23.	
464	SIPO,	国家标准涉及专利的管理规定(暂行),	see	SIPO’s	website.		
465	See	C.	McElwain,	The	World’s	Laboratory:	China’s	Patent	Boom,	IT	Standards	and	the	Implications	
for	the	Global	Knowledge	Economy,	14	SANTA	CLARA	JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL	Law	441	(2016),	p.	456.	
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Secondly,	 the	 term	 “reasonable”	 remains	 susceptible	 to	 diverging	
interpretations.	Indeed,	as	seen	above,	it	remains	to	be	seen	how	SAC,	which	has	
demonstrated	a	general	aversion	towards	SEPs,	will	interpret	this	term,	which	is	a	
common	requirement	of	standard-setting	organizations.466	
3.2 STATE ADMINISTRATION FOR INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE (“SAIC”)’S 
2012 DRAFT IP ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES 
Besides	 the	 above	 SAC	 regulations,	 the	 SAIC	 draft	 IP	 Enforcement	
Guidelines	released	in	August	2012	also	cover	some	detailed	provisions	on	IPRs	in	
standard-setting.	 Specifically,	 Article	 22	 provides	 that	 unilaterally	 setting	 the	
terms	and	conditions	of	patent	 licenses	during	 the	 standard-setting	process	 is	 a	
legitimate	way	of	exercising	patent	holders’	IPRs	and	generally	does	not	have	the	
effect	of	excluding	or	impeding	competition.467	
However,	the	same	provision	also	states	that	patent	holders	may	violate	the	
AML]	if	they:	(i)	know	or	should	have	known	that	their	patents	may	be	included	
in	a	standard;	(ii)	do	not	disclose	their	patent	information	as	required	by	the	rules	
of	 the	 standard	 setting	 agency;	 (iii)	 claim	 patent	 rights	 after	 they	 have	 been	
included	 in	a	 standard;	and	 (iv)	 such	claims	have	a	potential	adverse	 impact	on	
competition	and	innovation	in	the	relevant	market.468	
Article	 22	 also	 states	 that	 in	 case	 a	 patented	 technology	 is	 included	 in	 a	
mandatory	 national	 standard,	 an	 upper	 limit	 or	 “cap”	 should	 be	 established	 for	
the	 royalty	 fees,	which	should	not	be	 “significantly	higher”	 than	 the	 royalty	 fees	
prevailing	 prior	 to	 the	 inclusion	 of	 the	 patent	 in	 the	 standard.469	The	 cap	 thus	
represents	what	will	be	considered	an	acceptable	royalty	 fee	amount	 for	patents	
included	 in	 standards	 and	 it	 provides	 some	 insights	 into	 how	 China’s	
antimonopoly	regulators	might	approach	FRAND	licensing	in	standard-setting.470	
	
                                                
466	Ibid.	
467	See	关于知识产权领域反垄断执法的指南	 [Guide	on	Antimonopoly	Law	Enforcement	 in	 the	Field	
of	Intellectual	Property	Rights],	Art.	4	[the	“SAIC	Draft	IP	Enforcement	Guideline”],	Art.	22.	
468	Ibid.	
469	Ibid.	
470	D.	Daniel	Sokol,	Wentong	Zheng,	FRAND	in	China,	22	TEXAS	INTELLECTUAL	PROPERTY	LAW	JOURNAL	
(2013),	pp.	23-24.	
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3.3 SAIC’S 2015 DRAFT IPR REGULATION 
IPR	policies	 in	China	have	been	greatly	developed	 to	bring	 them	closer	 to	
international	 standards	 and	 to	 make	 them	 more	 appropriate	 for	 market	
participants’	 needs.471	In	 this	 vein,	 on	April	 7,	 2015,	 the	 State	Administration	 for	
Industry	and	Commerce	(“SAIC”)	published	the	Regulation	on	the	Prohibition	of	
Conduct	Eliminating	or	Restricting	Competition	by	Abusing	Intellectual	Property	
Rights	(Consultation	Draft)	(“draft	SAIC	IPR	Regulation”).472		
It	represents	an	important	step	in	the	competition	regulation	of	IPRs	as,	for	
the	 first	 time,	 the	Chinese	antitrust	authorities	set	out	a	 legal	 framework	 in	this	
regard,	 in	 an	 effort	 to	 bridge	 the	 gap	 between	 the	 previous	 patchwork	 of	 pre-
existing	 laws,	 which	 lacked	 consistency,	 and	 the	 international	 practices	 in	
antitrust	and	IPR	established	in	the	EU	and	the	US.	473		
Building	 upon	 previous	 developments,	 the	 draft	 SAIC	 IPR	 Regulation	
emphasizes	that	the	AML	and	IPR	laws	have	the	communal	purpose	of	fostering	
innovation	 and	 competition,	 advancing	 efficiency,	 and	 ultimately	 defending	 the	
interests	 of	 consumers	 and	 the	 public	 interest.	 It	 clarifies	 the	 grey	 areas	 left	 by	
Article	55	of	the	AML,	which	contains	the	very	generic	prohibition	on	any	(ab)use	
of	 IPRs	aimed	at	 eliminating	or	 restricting	competition	 through	anticompetitive	
agreements,	 abuse	 of	 dominance	 or	 other	 conduct	 incompatible	 with	 the	 AML	
and	IPR	laws.	
The	 draft	 regulation	 contains	 an	 obligation	 to	 disclose	 IPRs	 during	 the	
standardization	 process.	 Article	 13(2)	 prohibits	 two	 categories	 of	 abuse	 of	
dominance	without	justifiable	causes:	(1)	patent	assertions	after	failing	to	disclose	
patents	in	the	standard-setting	phase;	(2)	undertakings’	failure	to	comply	with	the	
FRAND	principle.		
                                                
471	EURObiz,	Journal	of	the	European	Union	Chamber	of	Commerce	in	China,	Sept/Oct.	2015.		
472	关于禁⽌止滥⽤用知识产权排除、限制竞争⾏行为的规定	 2015	年 4	月 7	日国家工商行政管理总局
令	第 74	号公布,	Regulation	on	the	Prohibition	of	Conduct	Eliminating	or	Restricting	Competition	by	
Abusing	Intellectual	Property	Rights	(Consultation	Draft).		
473	See	Adrian	Emch,	Liyang	Hou,	Antitrust	Regulation	 of	 IPRs:	China’s	 First	 Proposal,	COMPETITION	
POLICY	INTERNATIONAL	(2014).	
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One	of	the	most	discussed	provisions	is	Article	7,	as	it	appears	to	extend	the	
“essential	 facilities	 doctrine”	 to	 the	 IPR	 sector.	 It	 provides	 (Article	 7(2))	 that	 a	
dominant	firm	may	not	refuse	without	due	justification	to	license	its	IPRs	under	
reasonable	terms	if	 these	IPRs	constitute	an	essential	 facility	and	the	refusal	has	
anticompetitive	effects.	The	provision	also	identifies	the	aspects	to	be	considered	
to	assess	whether	a	request	for	access	to	an	essential	facility	may	be	precluded	by	
a	dominant	firm:	(i)	the	IPRs	cannot	be	reasonably	substituted	and	are	necessary	
for	other	undertakings	 to	 compete	 in	 the	 relevant	market;	 (ii)	 refusal	 to	 license	
will	 cause	a	negative	 impact	on	competition	or	 innovation,	harming	consumers’	
or	 the	public	 interests;	 and	 (iii)	 licensing	 the	 rights	will	not	cause	unreasonable	
harm	to	the	licensor.	
Hence,	 there	 are	 some	doubts	 as	 to	whether	 these	 provisions	 consider	 all	
patents	included	in	national	standards	an	essential	facility	in	the	context	of	AML.	
In	general,	the	provisions	also	recognize	that	firms	should	not	be	presumed	
to	have	a	dominant	position	only	because	they	own	IPRs.	They	thus	sacrifice	any	
sort	of	golden	rules	in	favor	of	a	more	tailored	“rule	of	reason”	approach.	
Additionally,	 also	 the	 revision	 of	 the	 PRC	 Patent	 Law	 in	 the	 current	
proposal	 contained	 in	 the	4th	amendment	 includes	 some	provisions	 concerning	
the	abuse	of	IPRs.	In	particular,	Article	82	that	requires	a	patent	holder	to	grant	
licenses	in	case	of	failure	to	disclose	SEPs	related	to	national	standards	during	the	
standard	 setting	 process.474	In	 other	words,	 the	 new	 proposal	 seems	 to	 create	 a	
compulsory	 licensing	 regime	 for	 the	 patents	 that	 are	 included	 in	 the	 national	
standards,	 where	 the	 rights’	 holders	 have	 failed	 to	 disclose	 SEPs	 during	 the	
standard	setting	process.		
However,	the	2015	draft	SAIC	IPR	Regulation,	although	specifically	tackling	
IPR-related	AML	issues,	limits	the	scope	of	applicability	as	they	are	construed	as	a	
mere	 departmental	 regulation,	 which	 is	 unable	 to	 address	 all	 IPR	 related	
monopolistic	conduct.		
                                                
474	中华人民共和国专利法修改草案（征求意见稿）条文对照	 (Comparison	 of	 text:	 Draft	 for	 public	
comment	on	the	4th	Amendment	of	the	Patent	Law).	
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It	is	worth	mentioning	that	on	February	4,	2016,	SAIC	published	for	public	
comment	its	draft	Guidelines	On	Anti-Trust	Enforcement	Against	IP	Abuse,	dated	
February	 2,	 2016.475	These	draft	 guidelines	 are	 in	 addition	 to	 the	2015	draft	 SAIC	
IPR	 Regulation.	 It	 is	 the	 Antimonopoly	 Commission	 of	 the	 State	 Council	 that	
decides	 whether	 or	 not	 to	 adopt	 the	 guidelines,	 while	 the	 2015	 draft	 SAIC	 IPR	
Regulation	was	drafted	adopted	on	the	basis	of	SAIC’s	own	 legislative	authority.	
Arguably,	 if	 there	will	be	dissimilarity	 in	wording	and	policy	between	 these	 two	
legal	tools,	there	will	unavoidably	be	concerns	about	how	this	dissimilarity	will	be	
enforced.	
3.4 THE COURTS’ APPROACH: CHALLENGING PATENT LICENSING 
PRACTICES BY (STRATEGICALLY) USING AML 
Chinese	courts	have	decided	a	few	cases	on	the	antitrust	concerns	raised	by	
FRAND	commitments	in	the	context	of	the	2008	AML.		
In	this	regard,	it	is	remarkable	that	the	AML,	which	just	like	other	antitrust	
laws	 in	many	 jurisdictions	 covers	 agreements,	 abuses	 of	 dominant	 position	 and	
mergers,	 specifically	 singles	 out	 IP.	 In	 other	 words,	 “the	 AML	 is	 unique	 among	
comparable	 laws	 in	specifically	addressing	 intellectual	property	rights,	 the	“abuse”	
(滥用)	of	which	can	constitute	a	violation”.476	In	particular,	Article	55477	states	that:	
“[t]his	 Law	 shall	 not	 apply	 to	 the	 conduct	 of	 undertakings	 of	 exercising	 their	
intellectual	property	rights	in	accordance	with	the	relevant	laws	and	regulations	on	
intellectual	 property	 rights;	 however,	 this	 Law	 shall	 apply	 to	 the	 conduct	 of	
undertakings	 of	 eliminating	 or	 restricting	 market	 competition	 by	 abusing	 their	
intellectual	property	rights.”478		
Article	 55,	 by	 assuring	 the	 right	 of	 IPR	 holders	 to	 exercise	 their	 rights,	
subordinates	 any	 suspected	 IP	 misuse	 to	 the	 remit	 of	 the	 AML,	 which	 thus	
                                                
475	See	关于滥用知识产权的反垄断执法指南（国家工商总局第七稿>公开征求意见的公告.	
476	See	C.	McElwain,	The	World’s	Laboratory:	China’s	Patent	Boom,	IT	Standards	and	the	Implications	
for	the	Global	Knowledge	Economy,	14	SANTA	CLARA	JOURNAL	OF	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	441	(2016),	p.	456.	
477	For	an	overview	of	the	types	of	anticompetitive	conduct	under	the	AML,	see	Chapter	10	on	China	
in	 D.	 DANIEL	 SOKOL,	 DANIEL	 A.	 CRANE	 AND	 ARIEL	 EZRACHI,	GLOBAL	 ANTITRUST	 COMPLIANCE	 HANDBOOK	
(OXFORD	UNIVERSITY	PRESS,	2014).	
478	AML,	Art.	55.		
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constitutes	 the	 fully	 legitimate	 statutory	 basis	 for	 public	 and	 private	 antitrust	
enforcement	related	to	anticompetitive	IP	use.479		
These	provisions	have	been	interpreted	by	the	Chinese	government	to	mean	
that	 charging	 market-based	 IP	 licensing	 fees	 to	 Chinese	 companies	 is	 “abuse”.	
Commentators	have	remarked	that	these	norms	have	thus	been	relied	on	in	order	
“to	take	legal	action	against	companies	whose	only	“crime”	is	to	be	innovative	and	
hold	 patents.	 Indeed,	 the	 Chinese	 law	 allows	 compulsory	 licensing	 of	 IP	 by	 a	
“dominant”	company	 that	 refuses	 to	 license	 its	 IP	 if	 access	 to	 it	 is	 “essential	 for	
others	 to	 effectively	 compete	 and	 innovate.”	 And	 with	 Chinese	 courts	 largely	
rubberstamping	the	government’s	dictates,	foreign	companies	have	little	choice	but	
to	comply.	All	too	often,	complying	means	changing	their	terms	of	business	so	that	
they	 sell	 to	 the	 Chinese	 for	 less	 and/or	 transfer	 even	more	 IP	 and	 technology	 to	
Chinese-owned	companies,	often	after	paying	substantial	fines.”480		
Overall,	what	 these	provisions	mean	 in	practical	 terms	 remains	uncertain.	
For	 instance,	 Sokol	 and	 Zheng	 underline	 that	 what	 would	 be	 considered	 an	
unfairly	high	price,	 	 is	highly	unclear	under	Chinese	 law	“given	 that	Chinese	 law	
does	 not	 offer	 clear	 guidance	 on	 what	 an	 acceptable	 fee	 should	 be”. 481	
Comparatively,	 charging	 high	 prices	 is	 rarely	 challenged	 in	 Europe. 482	
Nevertheless,	“in	the	Chinese	context,	such	a	provision	might	be	used	to	extract	or	
impose	 better	 terms	 for	 a	 FRAND	 licensee.	 These	 legal	 ambiguities	 create	
significant	uncertainty	for	FRAND	licensing	in	China”.483	
Lacking	specific	guidance	on	patent	royalties,	at	first,	Chinese	courts	called	
to	solve	disputes	involving	the	licensing	of	IPRs	applied	the	general	principles	set	
by	the	Supreme	People’s	Court’s	(the	“SPC”)	advisory	opinions	on	determination	
                                                
479	For	a	comprehensive	overview	of	the	AML,	see	H.	STEPHEN	HARRIS	ET	AL.,	ANTI-MONOPOLY	LAW	AND	
PRACTICE	IN	CHINA	(OXFORD	UNIVERSITY	PRESS,	2011).	
480	Robert	 D.	 Atkinson	 Stephen	 Ezell,	 False	 Promises:	 The	 Yawning	 Gap	 Between	 China’s	 WTO	
Commitments	and	Practices,	 Information	Technology	&	Innovation	Foundation,	September	17,	2015,	
citing	the	Hearing	on	the	Foreign	Investment	Climate	in	China	before	the	U.S.-China	Economic	and	
Security	 Review	 Commission	 (2015)	 (written	 testimony	 of	 Dr.	 Robert	 D.	 Atkinson,	 President,	
Information	Technology	and	Innovation	Foundation),	8,	http://www2.itif.org/2015-uscc-investment-
climate.pdf.	
481	D.	Daniel	Sokol,	Wentong	Zheng,	FRAND	in	China,	22	TEXAS	INTELLECTUAL	PROPERTY	LAW	JOURNAL	
(2013),	p.	14.	
482 	Ibid.	 See	 D.	 DANIEL	 SOKOL,	 DANIEL	 A.	 CRANE,	 ARIEL	 EZRACHI,	 GLOBAL	 ANTITRUST	 COMPLIANCE	
HANDBOOK	(OXFORD	UNIVERSITY	PRESS,	2014).	
483	Ibid.	
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of	 royalties	 rates.	 These	 opinions	 are	 replies	 given	 to	 inquiries	 from	 lower-level	
courts.484	In	 these	 opinions,	 the	 SPC	 has	 generally	 adopted	 an	 approach	 on	
FRAND	 that	 seems	 aligned	 with	 the	 one	 taken	 by	 the	 SAC	 in	 its	 2009	 draft	
regulation	on	patents	 in	standards.	 Indeed,	pursuant	to	the	SPC’s	reasoning,	 if	a	
patent	holder	has	 taken	part	 in	the	standard	development	process	at	a	national,	
sector,	or	local	level,	or	has	given	consent	to	incorporate	its	patents	in	a	national,	
sector,	or	local	standard,	then	he	or	she	will	be	considered	to	have	consented	to	
granting	to	others	the	use	of	his	or	her	patents	for	the	purposes	of	implementing	
the	standard.	This	use	will	not,	evidently,	amount	to	patent	infringement.	In	case	
the	patent	holder	requires	the	users	of	his	or	her	patent	to	pay	a	royalty	fee,	the	
amount	of	the	fee	should	be	“significantly	lower	than	the	normal	amount”.485		
Although	 this	 approach	 to	 royalty	 rates	 echoes	 the	 SAC’s	 2009	 draft	
regulation,	 it	 should	 be	 remarked	 that	 this	 draft	 was	 never	 enacted	 and	 the	
subsequent	 2012	 draft	 distanced	 itself	 from	 the	 SAC’s	 original	 hard	 stance	 on	
patents	 in	 standards	 and	deleted	 the	 “significantly	 lower	 than	 normal”	 language	
from	the	text.	In	my	view,	this	amendment	does	not	preclude	that,	in	theory,	both	
the	 SPC	 and	 the	 SAC	would	 still	 interpret	 FRAND	 to	mean	 “significantly	 lower	
than	 normal”.	 It	 is	 thus	 far	 from	 unambiguous	 whether	 the	 SPC	 and	 the	 SAC	
would	take	the	same	approach	or	would	reconsider	their	previous	understanding	
of	FRAND.		
However,	in	view	of	the	above,	a	consideration	could	be	provisionally	drawn,	
one	 that	non-Chinese	 companies	operating	 in	 the	Chinese	market,	 or	willing	 to	
enter	it,	should	be	aware	of,	especially	considering	China’s	increasingly	influential	
participation	 in	 the	 global	 standard-setting	 scenario	 and	 its	 incontrovertible	
relevance	to	the	international	economy.	The	Chinese	approach	to	FRAND	appears	
to	 be	 aggressive	 and	more	 favorable	 to	 patent	 implementers,	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	
                                                
484	See	 in	particular	 the	2008	advisory	opinion:	最高人民法院关于朝阳兴诺公司按照建设部颁发的行
业标准《复合载体夯扩桩设计规程》设计、施工而实施标准中专利的行为是否构成侵犯专利权问题的
函（[2008]民三他字第 4 号）[Supreme	 People’s	 Court’s	 Letter	 of	 Reply	 on	 Whether	 Chaoyang	
Xingnuo	 Co.	 Infringed	 a	 Patent	 Included	 in	 a	 Ministry	 of	 Construction	 Standard	 when	 it	
Implemented	the	Patent	as	Required	by	the	Standard]	(Jul.	8,	2008).	The	SPC’s	2008	advisory	opinion	
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发明专利权纠纷上诉案[Civil	Judgment	on	Appeal	of	Dispute	Between	Hengshui	Ziyahe	Construction	
Ltd.	 Co.	 and	 Zhang	 Jingting	 et	 al.	 Regarding	 Invention	 Patent	 Infringement],	Hebei	High	 People’s	
Court	(Mar.	21,	2011).	
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current	 global	 tendency.	 This	 interpretation	 of	 FRAND	 that	 cuts	 down	 royalty	
rates,	 reinforced	by	a	 strategic	use	of	 antitrust	 enforcement,	 as	will	be	analyzed	
below,	 coupled	 with	 the	 Government-led	 support	 to	 develop	 and	 implement	
competing	 home-grown	 standards,	 seems	 to	 be	 designed	 to	 shape	 a	 novel,	
alternative	 patent-licensing-standardization	 regime,	 aimed	 at	 reducing	 the	
leverage	of	patentees	and	royalty	rates.	
3.4.1 HUAWEI V. INTERDIGITAL: SQUEEZING FRAND ROYALTY RATES 
DOWNWARDS 
The	Huawei	 cases486	concern	 the	 interpretation	of	 FRAND	 royalty	 rates	 in	
China	 and	 as	 such	 these	 judgments	 have	 resulted	 in	 notable	 debate	 among	
academics	and	practitioners.		
On	 July	 26,	 2011,	 InterDigital	 Inc.	 (“InterDigital”),	 a	 US	 company,	 sued	
Huawei	Technologies	Co.,	Ltd.	(“Huawei”),	a	Chinese	company,	and	others	before	
the	 US	 International	 Trade	 Commission	 for	 infringing	 its	 SEPs	 on	 wireless	
technologies.	 As	 a	 response,	 on	December	 5,	 2011,	Huawei	 sued	 InterDigital	 for	
unlawful	 tying	 and	 excessive	 pricing	 in	 contravention	 of	 the	 AML	 and	 for	
violating	its	obligation	to	license	on	FRAND	terms.487	The	cases	were	decided	on	
February	4,	2013,	by	the	Shenzhen	Intermediate	Court	and	later,	in	October	2013,	
confirmed	in	their	entirety	by	the	Guangdong	High	Court	of	China.488		
Huawei	prevailed	 in	 its	 two	claims	as	on	appeal	 it	was	 confirmed	 that:	 (i)	
InterDigital	 had	 abused	 its	 dominant	 market	 position	 by	 dictating	 a	 tying	
arrangement	in	the	license	agreements,	requesting	grant	backs,	and	demanding	a	
discriminatory	and	unreasonably	high	royalty	rate	for	its	Chinese	SEPs	and	non-
SEPs.	As	for	the	definition	of	the	relevant	market,	the	court	held	that	each	of	the	
SEP	 licensing	 markets	 amounted	 to	 a	 relevant	 market;	 (ii)	 InterDigital	 had	
imposed	 excessively	 high	 royalty	 rates	 for	 its	 SEPs	 related	 to	 2G,	 3G,	 and	 4G	
wireless	 communications	 standards.	 Namely,	 the	 court	 held	 that	 InterDigital’s	
                                                
486	Shenzhen	Intermediate	People’s	Court,	Huawei	v.	 InterDigital,	Feb.	4,	2013,	[2011]	Shen	Zhong	Fa	
Zhi	Min	Chu	Zi	Nos.	857	and	858;	Guangdong	High	People’s	Court,	Huawei	 v	 InterDigital,	Oct.	 16,	
2013,	[2013]	Yue	Gao	Fa	Min	San	Zhong	Zi	Nos.	305	and	306.	
487	For	an	overview	of	the	case	background,	see	Michael	Han,	Kexin	Li,	Huawei	v.	InterDigital:	China	
at	 the	 Crossroads	 of	 Antitrust	 and	 Intellectual	 Property,	 Competition	 and	 Innovation,	 COMPETITION	
POLICY	INTERNATIONAL	(2013).		
488	These	decisions	were	published	only	in	April	2014.	
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royalty	 rates	were	markedly	higher	 in	comparison	 to	 the	agreement	 InterDigital	
entered	into	with	Apple	and	Samsung.		
The	 imposition	 of	 excessively	 high	 royalty	 rates	 was	 deemed	 part	 of	 a	
complex	coercive	conduct	 including	the	filing	before	the	US	International	Trade	
Commission	of	 the	 injunctive	 relief	 suits	 InterDigital	 sought	 against	Huawei.	 In	
this	regard,	the	Guangdong	High	Court	found	this	injunction	to	amount	to	one	of	
the	factors	demonstrating	InterDigital’s	abuse	in	forcing	excessive	pricing.489	
Other	elements	 that	worked	 together	 in	 the	 finding	of	patent	abuse,	were	
represented	by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	court	held	 that	Huawei	was	a	 “willing	 licensee”,	
although	 the	 judges	 did	 not	 elaborate	 on	 this	 legal	 standard,	 and	 that	
InterDigital’s	offer	to	Huawei	was	not	FRAND	since	it	was	non-negotiable.	
Overall,	 Guangdong	 High	 Court	 did	 not	 pronounce	 itself	 on	 whether	
seeking	 an	 SEP-based	 injunction	 is	 to	 be	 considered,	 per	 se,	 abusive	
conduct.	Using	the	legal	reasoning	of	the	Huawei	decision	as	a	point	of	departure,	
it	 seems	sensible	 to	concluded	that	 seeking	an	SEP-based	 injunction	 is	prone	 to	
be	 abusive	 where	 injunctive	 relief	 is	 sought	 by	 an	 SEP	 holder	 with	 market	
dominance,	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 forcedly	 prompting	 a	 willing	 licensee	 to	 accept	
excessively	high	royalty	rates.	
A	particular	contested	aspect	of	 the	decision	concerns	 the	parameter	used	
to	assess	the	“reasonableness”	of	the	licensing	terms	that	InterDigital	imposed	on	
Huawei.	 Indeed,	 the	court	determined	the	upper	 limit	of	 the	FRAND	royalty	 for	
InterDigital’s	 SEPs	 mainly	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 comparison	 with	 the	 royalties	
InterDigital	 charged	 other	 parties	 outside	 China.	 In	 particular,	 the	 court	
evaluated	publicly	available	information,	such	as	InterDigital’s	licensing	revenues,	
in	 order	 to	 calculate	 the	 royalty	 fees	 that	 InterDigital	 charged	 or	 proposed	 to	
charge	 Apple	 and	 Samsung.	 Interestingly,	 it	 appears	 that	 the	 court	 needed	 to	
                                                
489	The	court	argued	that:	“[…]	 InterDigital	 failed	 to	 fulfill	 its	 fair,	 reasonable	and	non-discriminatory	
licensing	 obligations	 and	 acted	 without	 regard	 to	 Huawei’s	 good	 faith	 and	 willingness	 during	
negotiations.	It	did	not	adjust	 its	offer	[to	a	reasonable	pricing];	 instead,	 it	 initiated	a	suit	 in	the	U.S.	
based	 on	 the	 essential	 patents.	 While	 InterDigital	 seemingly	 was	 exercising	 its	 legitimate	 litigation	
rights,	it	intended	to	coerce	Huawei,	through	means	of	litigation,	to	accept	excessive	pricing	and	to	pay	
consideration	 on	 top	 of	 the	 essential	 patents.	 This	 act	 lacks	 legitimacy	 and	 should	 be	 remedied.”.	
Guangdong	High	People’s	Court,	Huawei	v	InterDigital,	16	Oct.	2013.	
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reverse-engineer	 this	 data	 as	 InterDigital	 refused	 to	 disclose	 it	 by	 providing	
evidence,	 fearing	 that	 it	 would	 be	 made	 available	 to	 non-parties	 to	 the	 case.	
Indeed,	 InterDigital	 could	 not	 obtain	 assurance	 that	 its	 confidential	 business	
information	 would	 not	 be	 disclosed	 to	 its	 Chinese	 customers	 and	 competitors.	
This	 of	 course	 represents	 a	 worrisome	 procedural	 problem	 likely	 to	 cause	 a	
headache	for	non-Chinese	companies	 involved	 in	antitrust	 litigation	 in	China.490	
The	 court	 then	 compared	 the	 estimated	 royalty	 fees	 (between	 InterDigital	 and	
Samsung,	 and	 between	 InterDigital	 and	 Apple)	 to	 the	 fees	 InterDigital	 had	
requested	 from	 Huawei	 and	 concluded	 the	 fees	 requested	 from	 Huawei	 were	
significantly	higher.491	
Nonetheless,	 some	 commentators	 have	 remarked	 that	 the	 royalty	 rate	
estimate	lacks	sufficient	grounds,	as	the	two	alleged	comparable	licensees	(Apple	
and	Samsung)	may	not	have	been	very	comparable	in	practice	to	the	hypothetical	
license	between	InterDigital	and	Huawei.	In	particular,	the	Samsung	license	was	
entered	into	in	the	settlement	of	litigation,	and	the	Apple	license	“might	not	have	
been	 entered	 into	 based	 on	RAND	 considerations”.492	Along	 the	 same	 line,	 critics	
have	 pointed	 out	 that	 “patents	 covered	 by	 InterDigital’s	 licenses	 with	 Apple	 and	
Samsung	may	not	be	totally	identical	to	what	would	be	included	in	the	license	with	
Huawei”	 and	 they	may	actually	 cover	different	 specific	 standards	within	 the	2G,	
3G,	and	4G	standards.493	It	has	been	further	observed	that	a	number	of	elements	
cast	 doubt	 over	 the	 comparable	 character	 of	 the	 licensees.	 Notably,	 the	
dissimilarity	of	the	products	made	by	the	licensees;	the	uncertainty	over	whether	
the	Samsung	and	Apple	licenses	had	other	provisions,	for	instance	grant-backs	or	
cross-licenses;	and	the	fact	that	the	Apple	license	was	a	lump-sum	license,	which	
means	 that	 “when	 turning	 it	 into	 a	 per	 unit	 royalty	 one	 should	 use	 the	 projected	
sales	 units	 at	 the	 time	 of	 license	 negotiation	 as	 the	 denominator,	 instead	 of	 the	
actual	 sale	 units”.	494	Additionally,	 the	 court	 calculated	 that	 a	 FRAND	 royalty	
                                                
490	Other	 procedural	 concerns	were	 that	 non-Chinese	 lawyers	were	 not	 allowed	 to	 attend	hearings	
and	that	there	was	a	general	lack	of	access	to	information	and	transparency.	
491	D.	Daniel	Sokol,	Wentong	Zheng,	FRAND	in	China,	22	TEXAS	INTELLECTUAL	PROPERTY	LAW	JOURNAL	
(2013).	
492	Fei	Deng,	Su	Sun,	Determining	 the	 FRAND	Rate:	U.S.	 Perspectives	 on	Huawei	 v.	 InterDigital,	CPI	
ANTITRUST	CHRONICLE	(2014),	pp.	9-12.	
493	Ibid.	
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“should	 not	 exceed	 0.019%	 of	 the	 actual	 sales	 price	 of	 each	Huawei	 product”.495	
However,	 the	 decisions	 do	 not	 disclose	 how	 the	 specific	 FRAND	 rate	 was	
appraised,	nor	do	they	spell	out	the	underlying	rationale	that	supposedly	justified	
imposing	a	specific	FRAND	rate.		
Moreover,	 a	 number	 of	 procedural	 problems	 characterized	 the	Huawei	 v	
InterDigital	 case.	 For	 example,	 non-Chinese	 lawyers	were	not	 allowed	 to	 attend	
hearings,	 there	 was	 a	 lack	 of	 access	 to	 information,	 and	 InterDigital	 could	 not	
provide	evidence	containing	confidential	business	 information	 in	 the	absence	of	
the	 assurance	 that	 it	 would	 not	 be	 disclosed	 to	 its	 Chinese	 customers	 and	
competitors.496	
This	case	may	be	interpreted	as	the	signal	that	the	FRAND	policy	in	China	
is	being	led	by	industrial	policy	objectives.	In	the	Huawei/InterDigital	saga,	it	has	
been	argued	that	the	decisions	and	the	actual	setting	of	the	FRAND	rates	was	not	
due	to	legal	reasoning,	but	was	instead	decided,	or	at	least	greatly	influenced,	by	
the	Government’s	 industrial	 policy	 concerns	 of	 keeping	 the	 patent	 royalty	 rates	
low	 in	 order	 to	 “improve[e]	 Huawei’s	 position	 as	 a	 telecom	 equipment	
manufacturer	 with	 lower	 prices	 for	 a	 needed	 input”. 497 	According	 to	 this	
interpretation	 “[g]iven	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 government	 over	 judges	 in	 China,	 the	
decisions	raise	the	possibility	that	in	China,	ultimately	it	is	the	Chinese	government,	
not	the	judges,	that	determines	the	FRAND	rates”.498	Indeed,	it	is	arguable	that	the	
absence	of	transparency	fuels	the	concerns,	often	expressed	by	Western	firms	and	
advanced	 countries,	 that	 China	 relies	 on	 antitrust	 enforcement	 as	 a	 tool	 to	
advance	its	industrial	policy	agenda.	The	government-sponsored	industrial	policy	
of	Indigenous	Innovation	and	the	strategic	use	of	antitrust	have	deep	implications	
for	 antitrust	 FRAND	 policy.	 However,	 the	 practical	 consequences	 for	 Chinese	
competition	law	on	FRAND	determination	still	remain	uncertain.	
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The	Huawei/InterDigital	saga	shows	nonetheless	a	trend	within	the	Chinese	
context	 towards	an	austere	approach	to	FRAND	determination,	aimed	at	setting	
extreme	reductions	in	royalty	rates.	This	approach	represents	an	understandable	
response	 to	 the	concern	about	excessive	pricing	charged	by	advanced	countries’	
patent	holders.	By	pushing	FRAND	royalty	rates	downwards,	the	Chinese	judges,	
to	a	certain	extent	not	genuinely	 independent	 from	the	Government’s	 industrial	
policy,	reduce	patentees’	 leverage,	while	putting	patent	 implementers	 in	a	much	
better	 position.	 This	 novel,	 alternative	 licensing	 paradigm,	 also	 significantly	
contrasts	with	the	approach	in	most	other	jurisdictions.	
However,	this	strategy	carries	the	risk	of	backfiring.	While	the	stimulation	
of	 domestic	 innovation,	 also	 through	 the	 strategic	 use	 of	 antitrust	 policy	 as	
highlighted	 by	 the	 aggressive	 stance	 on	 FRAND,	 has	 arguably	 allowed	 the	
attainment	 of	 the	 critical	 goal	 of	 reducing	 royalties	within	 the	Chinese	 political	
economy,	there	are	unintended	consequences	to	take	into	account.	The	political	
influence	 of	 FRAND	 policy	 is	 indeed	 likely	 to	 lead	 to	 a	 systemic	 slow-down	 in	
innovation499	as	a	 reduction	 in	FRAND	would	disincentivize	 foreign	SEP	holders	
from	 entering	 the	 Chinese	 market.	 This	 would	 ultimately	 shield	 domestic	
competition	 from	 genuine	 global	 competition.	 Moreover,	 reduced	 economic	
incentives	for	SEP	holders	may	also	encourage	patent	implementers	to	engage	in	
reverse	hold-up	conduct,	stifling	even	more	investments.		
Given	this	non-optimal	overall	outcome,	in	terms	of	fostering	innovation,	it	
is	 likely	 that	 China’s	 policy	makers	will	 start	 to	 face	 internal	 opposition	 if	 they	
persevere	with	 an	 excessively	 aggressive	 policy	 on	 FRAND.	 This	 is	 all	 the	more	
important	 as	China	 transitions	 from	an	 implementer	 country	 focused	on	 lowest	
costs	 where	 firms	 are	 low	 margin,	 high	 value	 manufacturing	 businesses,	 to	 an	
innovator	 creating	 IP	 of	 its	 own	 with	 a	 growing	 interest	 in	 IP	 protection.	 As	
Chinese	innovative	firms	start	to	realize	that	they	can	extract	substantial	revenues	
from	the	protection	of	their	own	IPRs,	their	interest	in	IP	protection	is	expected	
to	increase,	as	already	shown	by	the	burgeoning	volume	of	patents	issued	by	the	
SIPO.	
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Moreover,	 as	 China	 transitions	 from	 being	 an	 implementer,	 centered	 on	
lowest	 cost,	 to	 an	 innovator,	 commanding	 a	 cost	 premium,	 efforts	 to	 impose	
unreasonable	restrictions	that	lack	a	genuine	antitrust	basis	will	impede	Chinese	
innovation	and	may	cause	China	to	fall	into	a	“middle	income	trap”.	Namely,	the	
economic	 slowdown	 that	 most	 fast-growing	 developing	 economies	 experience	
when	 they	 reach	 income	 thresholds	 comparable	 to	 that	 of	 China	 today.500	For	
these	 reasons,	 a	 FRAND	 policy	 focused	 on	 short-term	 industrial	 policy	 needs,	
appears	to	be,	at	the	very	least,	short-sighted.501	
3.4.2 NDRC V. QUALCOMM: PROTECTING CHINESE INFANT INDUSTRY 
Chinese	 competition	 authorities	 and	 courts	 have	 been	 ramping	 up	 the	
enforcement	 of	AML,	 also	 by	 regulating	 the	 pricing	 practices	 of	 patent	 holders.	
This	is	in	stark	contrast	to	the	trend	in	the	EU,	where	there	is	a	general	reluctance	
to	review	excessive	pricing.	
This	is	the	case	with	the	Qualcomm	case,	which	was	decided	on	February	10,	
2015,	 by	 the	 Chinese	 National	 Development	 and	 Reform	 Commission	 (the	
“NDRC”).502	The	NDRC	is	the	competition	authority	responsible	for	investigating	
anti-competitive	conduct	related	to	prices.	
The	decision,	which	followed	an	investigation	that	lasted	more	than	fifteen	
months,	 ruled	 that	 Qualcomm	 Incorporated	 (“Qualcomm”),	 the	 world’s	 largest	
maker	 of	 smartphone	 microchips,	 had	 engaged	 in	 anticompetitive	 conduct	
relating	 to	 its	 business	 model	 for	 SEP	 licensing	 for	 wireless	 communication	
technology	 and	 base-land	microchip	 sales.	 The	 NDRC	 decided	 that	 Qualcomm	
had	violated	Article	17(i)	(selling	products	at	unfairly	high	prices)	and	Article	17(v)	
                                                
500 	Pierre-Richard	 Agénor,	 Otaviano	 Canuto,	 Middle-Income	 Growth	 Traps	 (World	 Bank	 Policy	
Research	Working	 Paper	No.	 6210,	 2012)	 (for	 a	 general	 overview	 on	middle-income	 growth	 traps).	
Specifically	 on	 China,	 see	 David	 Bulman,	 Maya	 Eden,	 Ha	 Nguyen,	 Transitioning	 from	 low-income	
growth	to	high-income	growth:	 is	there	a	middle-income	trap?,		JOURNAL	OF	THE	ASIA	PACIFIC	ECONOMY	
(2016).	For	an	economic	analysis	of	the	middle-income	trap,	see	KEUN	LEE,	SCHUMPETERIAN	ANALYSIS	OF	
ECONOMIC	CATCH-UP:	KNOWLEDGE,	PATH-CREATION,	AND	THE	MIDDLE-INCOME	TRAP	(CAMBRIDGE	UNIVERSITY	
PRESS,	2013).	
501	D.	Daniel	Sokol,	Wentong	Zheng,	FRAND	 in	China,	22	TEXAS	INTELLECTUAL	PROPERTY	LAW	JOURNAL	
(2013),	p.	35-36.	
502 	NDRC	 Administrative	 Sanction	 Decision	 No.	 1	 [2015]	 (Mar.	 2,	 2015).	 The	 NDRC	 previously	
announced	 the	 conclusion	 of	 its	 15-month	 investigation	 (the	 “NDRC	 Announcement”):	 NDRC	
Ordered	Qualcomm	to	Rectify	its	Anti-Competitive	Behavior	and	Imposed	a	Fine	of	RMB	6	Billion	(10	
Feb.	2015).	
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(tying	 products	 or	 imposing	 unreasonable	 conditions	 of	 trade)	 of	 the	 AML,	
eliminated	 and	 restricted	 market	 competition,	 hindered	 and	 repressed	
technological	innovation	and	development,	and	harmed	consumer	interests.	
	In	particular,	the	NDRC	held	that:		
I. Qualcomm	 had	 charged	 excessive	 royalties	 when	 licensing	 its	
patents	to	Chinese	companies,	based	on	the	following	elements:	(a)	
it	had	refused	to	disclose	 its	patent	 list	and	had	 included	expired	
patents	 in	 its	patent	portfolio	 licensed	to	Chinese	 licensees;	(b)	 it	
had	requested	that	Chinese	licensees	grant	back	their	patents	free	
of	 charge,	 and	 had	 refused	 to	 deduct	 the	 value	 of	 such	 patents	
from	royalty	fees	or	to	pay	for	such	patents	in	other	ways;	and	(c)	
it	had	charged	 relatively	high	 royalty	 fees	and	unreasonably	used	
the	net	sale	price	of	the	whole	mobile	devices	that	incorporated	its	
technology	as	the	base	for	its	royalty	fees;	
II. Qualcomm	 had	 violated	 the	 AML	 as	 it	 had	 bundled	 wireless	
communications	 SEPs	 with	 non-SEPs,	 without	 justification.	 The	
NDRC	held	that	this	behavior	had	restricted	non-SEP	licensing	by	
Qualcomm’s	 competitors.	 Interestingly,	 the	 NDRC	 discarded	
Qualcomm’s	 defense	 that	 it	 can	 be	 hard	 to	 distinguish	 between	
SEPs	and	non-SEPs	and	 instead	 insisted,	without	providing	much	
explanation,	that	the	distinction	can	be	easily	made	as	a	matter	of	
normal	practice;		
III. Qualcomm’s	 conduct	 involving	 conditioning	 its	 supply	 of	 base-
band	 microchips	 on	 unreasonable	 licensing	 terms	 and	 on	 a	
covenant	 not	 to	 challenge	 the	 licensing	 agreements	 was	
anticompetitive.	
The	decision	required	Qualcomm	to	cease	certain	anticompetitive	conduct	
and	to	pay	a	record	fine	of	RMB	6.088	billion	(about	USD	975	million).503	It	also	
                                                
503	As	for	the	fine,	Article	47	of	the	AML	authorizes	the	antitrust	authority	to	confiscate	illegal	gains	
and	impose	a	fine	of	between	one	and	ten	percent	of	the	prior	year’s	turnover.	Article	49	of	the	AML	
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imposed	 a	 number	 of	 intrusive	 regulatory	 remedies	 agreed	 upon	 by	Qualcomm	
and	the	NDRC.		
Although	 this	 fine	 imposed	on	Qualcomm,	which	 is	 a	US	company,	 is	 the	
largest	fine	imposed	to	date	for	a	violation	of	the	AML,	it	has	been	noted	that	it	
amounts,	at	the	most,	to	an	“inconvenience	 (albeit	 a	 significant	one,	 in	monetary	
terms),	considering	that,	as	of	March	2014	it	held	reserves	of	$30	billion	in	cash	and	
marketable	 securities.”504	What	 is	 going	 to	be	 an	 even	greater	 source	of	 concern	
for	 Qualcomm,	 and,	 presumably,	 other	 SEP	 owners,	 given	 that	 these	measures	
will	 travel	 with	 Qualcomm’s	 SEPs	 if	 they	 are	 transferred,505	is	 the	 rectification	
remedy	imposed	by	the	NDRC.	Specifically,	Qualcomm	agreed	to	reduce	the	basis	
for	 royalties	 to	 65%	 of	 the	 net	 selling	 price	 of	 branded	 devices	 retailed	 for	 use	
within	mainland	China.	The	NDRC	decision	stressed,	however,	that	the	pertinent	
net	selling	price	is	the	“wholesale”	price.	Moreover,	Qualcomm	was	asked	to	not	
alter	the	royalty	percentage,	namely,	5%	for	SEPs	concerning	3G	devices,	and	3.5	%	
for	SEPs	concerning	4G	devices	that	do	not	implement	CDMA	or	WCDMA.	
It	 should	 be	 remarked	 that,	 notwithstanding	 fears	 related	 to	 the	 NDRC’s	
increased	 focus	 on	 investigating	patent	holders,	 the	NDRC’s	 decision	 comprises	
some	 features	 that	 are	 favorable	 to	 patent	 holders	 that	 have	 aggressively	
construed	FRAND.	Indeed,	Qualcomm	has	maintained	its	capability	to	determine	
royalties	based	on	the	wholesale	price	of	the	entire	device	(although	restricted	to	
                                                                                                                                 
stipulates	that	the	antitrust	authority	shall	take	into	consideration	factors	such	as	the	nature,	extent,	
and	duration	of	the	violation	when	setting	the	fine.	The	Qualcomm	fine	amounts	to	around	8%	of	
Qualcomm’s	2013	sales	in	China.	The	NDRC	originally	based	the	fine	at	10%,	given	the	severity	and	
duration	of	 the	 anticompetitive	 conduct.	 Later,	 the	NDRC	clarified	 that	 it	 diminished	 the	 fine	by	
two	 percentage	 points	 given	 Qualcomm’s	 cooperative	 attitude	 with	 the	 investigators.	 See	 NDRC	
explains	why	it	has	not	imposed	a	10%	fine,	Xinhua	Press	(10	Feb.	2015).	It	has	been	observed	that	
“[i]t	is	a	matter	of	some	concern,	nonetheless,	that	such	a	high	fine	could	be	imposed	for	practices	that	
were	controversial,	but	for	which	not	very	clear	precedent	existed”.	In	particular,	the	NDRC	decision	
concerning	the	fine	is	in	stark	contrast	with	the	Motorola	SEP	case	in	the	EU,	where	the	European	
Commission	did	not	 impose	a	 fine	on	Motorola,	 acknowledging	 the	 lack	of	 case-law	 from	the	EU	
courts	 concerning	 the	 legality	of	 SEP-based	 injunctions	under	Article	 102	TFEU,	and	 the	 fact	 that	
national	court	case-law	showed	diverging	conclusions	on	this	matter.	See	Case	AT.39985	-	Motorola	
-	Enforcement	of	GPRS	Standard	Essential	Patents,	European	Commission	Decision	(29	Apr.	2014),	
para	561.	
504	Jack	Ellis,	Qualcomm	antitrust	decision	could	be	the	Big	Bang	moment	for	China’s	domestic	patent	
market,	IAM,	12	Feb.	2015.	
505	Cunzhen	Huang,	Maurits	Dolmans,	 Stephan	 Barthelmess,	 Anita	Ng,	 and	 Tara	 Tavernia,	China’s	
NDRC	imposes	changes	in	licensing	practices	(Qualcomm),	E-COMPETITION	No.	72356,	2	Mar.	2015.	
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65	%	of	 that	price),	 rather	 than	only	on	the	price	of	 the	microchip,	 the	smallest	
saleable	component,	as	some	advocated.	
Given	the	 lack	of	 supporting	 information	 in	 the	NDRC’s	decision,	 it	 is	not	
clear	how	the	relevant	percentages	(the	5	%	rate	for	3G,	and	the	3.5	%	rate	for	LTE)	
were	calculated,506other	than	that	these	were	reported	to	be	rates	that	Qualcomm	
charged	 in	 the	 past.	 This	 appears	 to	 be	 the	 result	 of	 a	 negotiated	 compromise,	
which	affects	its	precedential	value.		
Most	 importantly,	 the	 NDRC’s	 decision	 could	 have	 a	major	 effect	 as	 SEP	
licensors	of	Chinese	patents	(i)	are	now	obliged	to	pay	reasonable	rates	for	cross-
licenses	of	Chinese	patents;	and	(ii)	cannot	 insist	on	a	cross-license	of	non-SEPs	
as	a	condition	 for	an	SEP	 license.	This	outcome	shows	 the	 flexibility	enjoyed	by	
the	NDRC	in	assessing	excessive	pricing.	It	also	echoes	the	struggle	in	defining	a	
reasonable	 price	 level	 for	 a	 specific	 product	 or	 service.	 Although,	 to	 a	 certain	
extent,	the	NDRC	decision	could	exacerbate	the	doubts	for	firms	as	to	whether	or	
not	they	comply	with	Article	17(1)	of	the	AML,	as	far	as	SEP	holders	are	concerned,	
it	 offers	 guidance	 on	how	 their	 pricing	 policies	 and	 conduct	 should	 fit	 into	 the	
Chinese	competition	regime.		
This	 landmark	 decision	 provides	much	 needed	 guidance	 on	 the	 approach	
that	the	NDRC	will	take	in	analyzing	matters	at	the	crossroads	of	competition	and	
IP	 law.	 Nonetheless,	 NDRC	 pronouncements	 are	 not	 binding	 on	 the	 State	
Administration	 for	 Industry	 and	 Commerce	 (“SAIC”)	 and	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Commerce	 (“MOFCOM”),	 therefore	 raising	 the	prospect	 that	 the	 three	 agencies	
may	 apply	 the	 AML	 to	 IP	 rights	 in	 dissimilar	 ways.	 The	 NDRC	 decision	 leaves	
open	many	 issues	about	the	NDRC’s	stance	on	the	scope	of	 its	own	jurisdiction,	
given	that	the	decision	is	drafted	in	broad	terms,	while	the	detailed	obligations	of	
                                                
506	Article	 11	 of	 the	Anti-Price	Monopoly	 Rules	 provides	 that,	when	 determining	whether	 excessive	
pricing	 exists,	 the	 following	 should	 be	 taken	 into	 consideration:	 (i)	 whether	 the	 sale	 price	 is	
significantly	 higher	 than	 the	 sale	 price	 of	 other	 competitors;	 (ii)	 if	 the	 cost	 is	 generally	 stable,	
whether	the	sale	price	is	increased	beyond	normal	scale;	(iii)	whether	the	sale	price	increase	level	is	
significantly	higher	than	the	cost	increase	level;	and	(iv)	other	factors.	
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the	company	are	set	out	in	a	voluntary	rectification	plan	that	was	acknowledged	
by	the	NDRC	to	meet	its	requirements.507		
After	 China,	 mobile	 microchip	 giant	 Qualcomm	 now	 faces	 European	
antitrust	 scrutiny.	 In	July	 2015,	 the	 European	 Commission	 opened	 two	 formal	
antitrust	 investigations	 to	 gauge	 concerns	 that	 Qualcomm	 may	 have	 abused	 a	
dominant	position	 in	 the	area	of	baseband	microchip	 sets	 through	 two	separate	
forms	of	conduct.508
	
On	December	8,	2015,	 the	Commission	sent	 two	Statements	
of	 Objections	 (“SOs”)	 to	 Qualcomm,	 concerning	 exclusivity	 payments	 and	
predatory	pricing,	respectively,	outlining	the	Commission’s	preliminary	view	that	
the	microchip	 set	 supplier	 had	 abused	 its	 dominant	 position	 in	 the	 worldwide	
markets	for	3G	(UMTS)	and	4G	(LTE)	baseband	microchip	sets,	in	violation	of	EU	
competition	rules,	in	particular	Article	102	of	the	TFEU.509	The	first	SO	stated	that	
since	 2011,	Qualcomm	had	paid	 significant	 amounts	 to	a	major	 smartphone	 and	
tablet	 manufacturer	on	 condition	 that	 it	 exclusively	 use	 Qualcomm	 baseband	
microchip	 sets	 in	 its	 smartphones	 and	 tablets,	 allegedly	 reducing	 the	
manufacturer’s	incentives	to	source	microchip	sets	from	Qualcomm’s	competitors	
and	 hampering	 competition	 and	 innovation	 in	 the	markets	 for	 UMTS	 and	 LTE	
baseband	microchip	 sets.510	The	 second	SO	outlined	 that	between	2009	and	2011	
Qualcomm	 engaged	 in	 predatory	 pricing	 by	 selling	 certain	 baseband	microchip	
sets	at	prices	below	costs,	with	the	aim	of	deterring	competition	in	the	market.	In	
the	Commission’s	view,	this	conduct	occurred	at	a	time	when	the	UK	microchip	
set	maker	Icera	constituted	a	mounting	threat	to	Qualcomm	in	the	primary	edge	
segment	 of	 the	market,	 offering	 advanced	 data	 rate	 performance.	 According	 to	
the	SO,	Qualcomm	reacted	to	that	threat	by	selling	certain	amounts	of	its	UMTS	
baseband	 microchip	 sets	 to	 two	 of	 its	 customers	 at	 prices	 that	 did	 not	 cover	
Qualcomm’s	costs,	with	the	aim	of	pushing	Icera	out	of	the	market.511	
                                                
507	For	instance,	the	precise	limitation	of	the	geographic	scope	of	the	remedies	to	smartphones	made	
in	China	for	use	in	China,	and	the	limitation	of	the	SEPs	affecting	only	Chinese	patents,	are	not	set	
out	in	the	Decision	itself.	H.	Stephen	Harris,	Jr.	An	Overview	of	the	NDRC	Decision	in	the	Qualcomm	
Investigation,	7	ANTITRUST	CHRONICLE	(2015).	
508	European	 Commission	 -	 Press	 release,	 Antitrust:	 Commission	 opens	 two	 formal	 investigations	
against	chipset	supplier	Qualcomm	(16	Jul.	2015).		
509	European	Commission	-	Press	release,	Antitrust:	Commission	sends	 two	Statements	of	Objections	
on	exclusivity	payments	and	predatory	pricing	to	Qualcomm	(8	Dec.	2015).	
510	Id.	
511	Id.	
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Concluding,	 it	 can	 be	 stated	 that	 overall	 China’s	 competition	 authorities	
have	 interpreted	 and	 applied	 the	 AML	 aggressively	 and	 expansively	 against	
foreign	 companies,	 especially	 requiring	 FRAND	 licensing	 of	 IPRs	 in	 conditional	
merger	 and	 acquisition	 approvals.	 In	particular,	 although	Article	 55	of	 the	AML	
excludes	 from	 its	 remit	 the	 use	 of	 IPR,	 it	 specifies	 that	 “however,	 this	 Law	 is	
applicable	 to	conduct	of	undertakings	 that	abuse	 their	 intellectual	property	 rights	
to	eliminate	or	restrict	competition.”512		
3.5 CHINESE COMPETITION POLICY AS A REGULATORY TOOL APPLIED TO 
NATIONAL INDUSTRY 
It	could	arguably	be	inferred	that	the	implications	of	Qualcomm	v.	NDRC	go	
beyond	this	specific	proceeding	and	are	likely	to	represent	a	concern	for	all	major	
companies	that	have	a	rich	patent	portfolio	and	aim	to	license	it	and	do	business	
in	China.	Indeed,	prices	could	be	imposed	on	them	that	may	be	much	lower	than	
the	ones	they	charge	in	other	countries.	More	and	more,	the	AML	is	employed	as	
a		tool	“to	tackle	perceived	 ‘monopolistic’	strangleholds	in	technology	development	
and	 transfer”.	 However,	 as	 it	 has	 been	 observed,	 “Due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 most	
valuable	 technologies	 are	 not	 controlled	 by	Chinese	 companies,	 it	 goes	with	 little	
doubt	that	the	AML	might	be	used	as	a	strategy	to	protect	Chinese	licensees”.		
This	is	even	more	so	in	the	mobile	manufacturing	sector,	which	has	become	
fundamental	 to	 the	 Chinese	 economy.	 Several	 international	 smartphone	
producers	have	 relocated	 their	 activity	 to	China,	whilst	 the	other	many	Chinese	
smartphone	 producers	 have	 expanded,	 for	 example,	 Huawei,	 ZTE,	 and	 Xiaomi,	
                                                
512	AML	Ch.	VII,	Art.	55.	See	also	Xiaoye	Wang,	The	New	Chinese	Anti-Monopoly	Law:	A	Survey	of	a	
Work	 in	Progress,	54	ANTITRUST	BULLETIN	(2009),	p.	580.	In	this	context,	SAIC’s	final	Regulation	on	
the	 Prohibition	 of	 Conduct	 Eliminating	 or	 Restricting	 Competition	 Through	 the	 Abuse	 of	
Intellectual	 Property	 Rights	 (IPR	 Regulation)	 issued	 on	 April	 7,	 2015	 should	 also	 be	 taken	 into	
account.	 In	 particular,	 Articles	 4	 to	 15	 address	 in	 depth	 the	 potential	 prohibited	 uses	 of	 IPRs,	
especially	pointing	at	“undertakings	with	dominant	market	positions.”	See	Draft	IP	Rules	Arts.	4-15.	
Article	 1	 notes	 that	 the	 rules	 have	 been	 drafted	 “in	 order	 to	 protect	 competition	 and	 encourage	
innovation,	 as	 well	 as	 to	 prohibit	 the	 use	 of	 [IPRs]	 by	 undertakings	 to	 eliminate	 or	 restrict	
competition.”	 See	Draft	 IP	 Rules	Art.	 1.	 Article	 2	 adds	 that	 “[t]he	 AML	 shares	 the	 same	 goal	 with	
intellectual	property	protection,	which	 is	 to	promote	 innovation	and	competition,	 improve	efficiency	
and	consumer	welfare	and	public	interest	of	the	society.”	See	Draft	IP	Rules	Art.	2.	The	IPR	Regulation	
efficiently	imposes	obligations	on	dominant	undertakings	to	license	their	IPR	on	“reasonable	terms”	
in	 cases	 where	 that	 IPR	 amounts	 to	 an	 essential	 facility	 for	 production	 or	 operation	 and	 except	
where	a	valid	reason	for	not	doing	so	is	provided.	Id..	
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whose	 further	 development	 is	 linked,	 prominently,	 to	 the	 lowered	 royalty	 fees	
charged	by	SEP	holders,	such	as	Qualcomm.513		
Although	this	consideration	is	not	sufficient	for	the	conclusion	to	be	drawn	
that	China	is	systematically	using	its	AML	to	foster	a	form	of	neo-protectionism,	
there	appear	 to	be	hints	 that	China’s	competition	policy,	or	at	 least	 the	NDRC’s	
practice,	primarily	emphasizes	boosting	national	industrial	policy	interests	rather	
than	achieving	a	 level	playing	 field.	The	development	of	domestic	 technology	 is	
central	to	China’s	development	strategy.	In	this	context,	as	IPRs	are	often	vested	
in	 technology,	 creating	 competition	 concerns,	 laws	 and	policies	 relating	 to	 IPRs	
(and	competition)	can	play	a	vital	role	in	implementing	the	strategy.514		
Specifically	 regarding	 the	Qualcomm	 v.	 NDRC	 case,	 the	 NDRC’s	 practice	
could	 offer	 a	 means	 to	 shield	 domestic	 smartphone	 producers.	 It	 has	 been	
observed	 that	 “while	 China	 is	 currently	 one	 of	 the	 world’s	 leading	 producers	 of	
electronic	 devices,	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 semiconductors	 it	 is	 still	 a	 major	 importer	
(USD	 232	 billion	 in	 2013).”	 It	 has	 been	 observed	 that	 “[h]itting	 Qualcomm	 and	
other	 international	 companies	may	 contribute	 to	 the	 development	 of	 the	 nation’s	
semiconductor	industry:	the	infant-industry	argument	meets	competition	policy”.515	
The	 strategic,	 protectionist	 use	 of	 AML	 is	 not	 something	 novel.	 Although	
China	 is	entering	 into	only	 its	ninth	year	of	competition	regulation,	as	 the	AML	
came	into	effect	in	August	2008,	“the	country’s	relatively	young	antitrust	regime	is	
moving	 towards	 a	more	 complete	 and	 enforced	 regulatory	 framework”,516	and	key	
patterns	of	competition	enforcement	are	appearing.	What	seems	to	emerge	is	that	
China	is	basing	its	current	AML	activity	on	the	objective	in		Article	1	of	the	AML	
of	 “promoting	 the	 healthy	 development	 of	 the	 socialist	 market	 economy”. 517	
Moreover,	 Article	 4	 provides	 that	 “the	 State	 formulates	 and	 implements	
competition	rules	compatible	with	the	socialist	economy,	strengthens	and	perfects	
macro	 regulation	 and	 control,	 and	 completes	 a	 unified,	 open,	 competitive	 and	
                                                
513	Liyang	 Hou,	 Qualcomm:	 How	 China	 has	 Invalidated	 Traditional	 Business	 Models	 on	 Standard	
Essential	Patents,	7	JOURNAL	OF	EUROPEAN	COMPETITION	LAW	&	PRACTICE	10	(2016),	p.	686.	
514	Ibid.	
515	Luís	Cabral,	Competition	policy	in	the	global	era,	New	Zealand	Economic	Papers,	May	2016.	
516	Wing	Gar	Cheng,	China’s	Watchdog	 intensifies	 efforts	 to	 enforce	 regulatory	 conditions,	 Financial	
Times	(26	Nov.	2013).	
517	AML,	Ch.	I,	Art.	1.	
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orderly	market	 system.”	From	the	outset,	China’s	AML	does	not	simply	 focus	on	
efficiency	 and	 consumer	 welfare,	 but	 it	 factors	 in	 the	 regulatory	 elements	
impacting	 on	 its	 industrial	 policy,	 political,	 economic,	 social,	 and	 employment	
concerns.518	In	 the	 same	 vein,	 the	 ruling	Communist	 Party	 has	 emphasized	 that	
the	public	 interest	 “is	 a	 critical	 part	 of	 the	 law,”519	and	 that	China’s	 competition	
regulation	 is	 construed	 as	 part	 of	 the	 State’s	 control	 over	 an	 orderly	 market	
system	designed	to	promote	the	healthy	development	of	China’s	socialist	market	
economy,	and	“the	universal	good	of	the	Chinese	people.”520	
Indeed,	although	the	shift	from	planned	economy	towards	a	market	system	
is	 clearly	 occurring,	 with	 China	 following	 precedent	 development	 patterns	 of	
advanced	 Western	 countries,	 it	 is	 evolving	 in	 its	 own	 fashion,	 “aggressively	
charting	 its	 own	 course”.521	China	 has	 been	 adopting	 elements	 taken	 from	 the	
Western	 tradition,	 as	 reflected,	 within	 the	 competition	 framework,	 by	 the	 fact	
that	the	central	provisions	of	the	AML	were	modeled	on	EU	competition	law,	and	
to	a	lesser	degree,	on	the	laws	of	the	United	States,	522	Germany,	Japan,	and	other	
countries.523	However,	it	is	also	shaping	its	own	development	course.		
Hence,	 having	 confirmed	 the	 particular	 nature	 of	 China’s	 competition	
regulation	and	 its	 close	 link	with	 the	country’s	development	agenda	as	a	whole,	
which	implies,	to	a	certain	extent,	a	sort	of	subordination	of	the	AML	to	national	
policy	 objectives,	 it	 should	 come	 as	 no	 surprise	 that	 China’s	 competition	
                                                
518	Thomas	J.	Horton,	Confucianism	and	Antitrust:	China’s	Emerging	Approach	to	Anti-Monopoly	Law,	
47	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	193,	204	(2013),	at	213.	See	Lawrence	S.	Liu,	All	About	Fair	Trade?	-	Competition	
Law	 in	 Taiwan	 and	 East	 Asian	 Economic	 Development,	 57	 ANTITRUST	 BULLETIN	 259,	 p.	 298	 (2012),	
asserting	 that	 China	 “resorts	 to	 serious	 industrial	 policy	 to	 foster	 national	 champions	 in	 strategic	
sectors”.		
519	XIAOYE	WANG,	THE	EVOLUTION	OF	CHINA’S	ANTI-MONOPOLY	LAW	(EDWARD	ELGAR,	2014),	p.	322.	
520	Ibid.	
521	See	MARTIN	JACQUES,	WHEN	CHINA	RULES	THE	WORLD,	582	(2d	ed.	2012):	“It	would	be	wrong	to	assume	
that	 [China]	 will	 behave	 like	 the	 West;	 that	 cannot	 be	 discounted,	 but	 history	 suggests	 something	
different”.	See	also	Thomas	Velk,	Olivia	Gong,	Ariel	S.N.	Zuckerbrot,	A	Trans-Pacific	Partnership,	60(1)	
ANTITRUST	BULLETIN	4,	5	(2015),	which	argues	that	“By	means	of	 a	unique,	 clearly	 evident	 capacity	 to	
mix,	 balance,	 and	 then	 apply	 its	 own	 special	 plays	 and	 stratagems,	 China	 will	 evolve	 into	 a	 highly	
efficient	 but	 quite	 different	 superpower	 from	 the	 United	 States”;	 and	 Thomas	 Jeffrey	 Horton,	
Confucianism	 and	 Antitrust:	 China’s	 Emerging	 Evolutionary	 Approach	 to	 Anti-Monopoly	 Law,	 THE	
INTERNATIONAL	LAWYER	47.2	(2013),	at	212:	 “China’s	 long	 and	 impressive	 history	 and	 culture,	 however,	
ensure	that	China	will	do	what	it	has	done	throughout	its	long	history	-	chart	its	own	course”.	
522	AML	came	into	effect	in	August	2008,	118	years	after	the	Sherman	Act	and	50	years	after	the	Treaty	
of	Rome	entered	into	force.		
523	H.	 STEPHEN	 HARRIS,	 JR.,	 PETER	 J.	WANG,	YIZHE	 ZHANG,	MARK	 A.	 COHEN,	SEBASTIAN	 J.	 EVRARD,	 ANTI-
MONOPOLY	LAW	AND	PRACTICE	IN	CHINA	(OXFORD	UNIVERSITY	PRESS,	2011).	
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enforcement	 constitutes	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 its	mission	 of	 “safeguarding	 market	
order	 and	 achieving	 social	 fairness	 and	 justice	 [in]	 establish[ing]	 an	 initial	 law	
regime	for	the	socialist	market	economy.”524	Such	interests	are	perceived	as	central	
in	“building	a	harmonious	socialist	society,”	and	in	encouraging	“the	prosperity	of	
the	 nation,	 and	 the	 vitality	 and	 happiness	 of	 the	 Chinese	 people.” 525 	This	
background,	 beset	 by	 heterogeneous	 non-competition	 concerns,	 gives	 wide	
leverage	 for	 critics	 to	 point	 out,	 just	 like	 the	 United	 States	 Federal	 Trade	
Commissioner	 Maureen	 K.	 Ohlhausen	 has	 done,	 the	 fear	 that	 there	 is	 a	
“continuing	impulse	to	factor	in	effects	on	Chinese	industry	and	employment	rather	
than	 focusing	 simply	 on	 efficiency	 and	 consumer	 welfare,	 as	 well	 as	 ongoing	
support	for	more	direct	government	intervention	in	the	market.”526		
China’s	competition	rules	are	highly	“culturally	embedded”.	527	In	China,	the	
question	 of	 whether	 competition	 enforcement	 is	 being	 used	 to	 attain	 a	 certain	
degree	 of	 protectionism	 in	 favor	 of	 domestic	 companies,	 “is	 perceived	 as	 one	
relating	 to	 the	 place	 of	 competition	 law	 within	 the	 more	 general	 framework	 of	
economic	 policy.”	 Scholar	 Liyang	 Hou	 has	 noted	 that	 “Although	 boasted	 as	 the	
economic	 constitution	 or	 the	 last	 watchdog	 of	 the	market	 economy,	 competition	
law,	when	boiled	down	to	its	hardcore,	remains	one	type	of	economic	policy.	As	an	
economic	policy,	 it	has	 to	 fit	 into	 the	national	development	 strategy”.528	This	trait	
necessarily	 accentuates	 the	 divergence	 with	 competition	 laws	 elaborated	 in	
Western	societies,	which	are	an	expression	of	different	competition	enforcement	
and	 regulatory	 focuses,	which	 “may	 arise	 from	 the	 unique	 and	 economic-specific	
national	 policies	 each	 country’s	 antitrust	 laws	 are	 designed	 to	 promote.” 529	
Consequentially,	 it	 is	no	surprise	that	the	competition	authorities	are	evaluating	
                                                
524	The	State	Council	 Info.	Office,	China,	China’s	Efforts	 and	Achievements	 in	Promoting	 the	Rule	of	
Law,	7	CHINESE	JOURNAL	OF	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	(2008),	pp.	514-517.	
525 	XIAOYE	 WANG,	 THE	 EVOLUTION	 OF	 CHINA’S	 ANTI-MONOPOLY	 LAW	 322-323	 (2014),	 quoting	 the	
Communist	Party	of	China	Central	Committee’s	October	11,	2006	Decisions	Regarding	Several	Major	
Issues	With	Building	a	Harmonious	Society.	
526	See	e.g.	Maureen	K.	Ohlhausen,	Commissioner,	Federal	Trade	Commission,	Second	Annual	GCR	
Live	Conference,	Antitrust	Enforcement	in	China	-	What’s	Next?	(Sept.	16,	2014),	p.	8.	
527	Lawrence	 S.	 Liu,	All	 About	 Fair	 Trade?	 -	 Competition	 Law	 in	 Taiwan	 and	 East	 Asian	 Economic	
Development,	57	ANTITRUST	BULLETIN	(2012),	p.	269.	
528	Liyang	 Hou,	 Qualcomm:	 How	 China	 has	 Invalidated	 Traditional	 Business	 Models	 on	 Standard	
Essential	Patents,	7	JOURNAL	OF	EUROPEAN	COMPETITION	LAW	&	PRACTICE	10	(2016),	p.	686.	
529	Susan	Beth	Farmer,	The	 Impact	 of	China’s	Antitrust	 Law	and	Other	Competition	Policies	 on	U.S.	
Companies,	23	LOY.	CONSUMER	L.	REV.	34	(2010),	p.	41.	
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“specific	 social	 and	 economic	 circumstances	 in	 China,	 rather	 than	 uncritically	
importing	the	legislative	models	used	in	the	U.S.	and	the	E.U.”530	
This	 trend	 in	 reality	 reflects	 China’s	 development	 model	 as	 a	 whole,	 not	
limited	to	the	competition	perspective,	as	it	has	been	observed	that	“[t]he	reason	
for	 China’s	 transformation	 […]	 has	 been	 the	 way	 it	 has	 succeeded	 in	 combining	
what	 it	has	 learnt	 from	the	West,	and	also	 its	East	Asian	neighbors,	with	 its	own	
history	 and	 culture,	 thereby	 tapping	 and	 releasing	 its	 own	 native	 sources	 of	
dynamism”.531	Under	 these	 conditions,	 it	 is	 arguably	 plausible	 that	this	 trend	 in	
development	 will	 endure	 and	 that	 China	 will	 continue	 “selectively	 adapting	
elements	 of	 Western	 learning	 and	 technology	 to	 [its]	 needs”532	and,	 at	 the	 same	
time,	develop	“in	very	much	its	own	way,	based	on	its	own	history	and	traditions,	
which	 will	 owe	 little	 or	 nothing	 to	 any	 Western	 inheritance”. 533 	Critics	 have	
highlighted	 a	 number	 of	 sectors	 where	 China’s	 AML	 enforcement	 is	 showing	 a	
propensity	to	rely	on	“non-competition	 factors”534	and	instead	focus	on	“help[ing]	
domestic	companies	to	catch	up	in	industries	in	which	they	are	lagging”.535		
China’s	propensity	to	enforce	AML	in	an	aggressive	manner	is	 increasingly	
coming	under	international	scrutiny	and	increasingly	being	subjected	to	criticism.		
The	U.S.	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 is	 one	 of	 the	most	 vocal	 in	 raising	 such	
concerns.	 In	 a	 comprehensive	 and	 far-reaching	 report	 issued	 on	 September	 9,	
                                                
530	Dr.	Yijun	Tian,	The	Impacts	of	the	Chinese	Anti-Monopoly	Law	on	IP	Commercialization	in	China	&	
General	 Strategies	 for	 Technology-Driven	 Companies	 and	 Future	 Regulators,	 4	 DUKE	 LAW	 &	
TECHNOLOGY	REVIEW	(2010).	
531	MARTIN	JACQUES,	WHEN	CHINA	RULES	THE	WORLD,	582	(2d	ed.	2012),	p.	562.	
532	JONATHAN	D.	SPENCE,	THE	SEARCH	FOR	MODERN	CHINA	(NORTON,	1990).		
533	MARTIN	JACQUES,	WHEN	CHINA	RULES	THE	WORLD,	582	(2d	ed.	2012),	p.	563.	
534	See	e.g.	Maureen	K.	Ohlhausen,	Commissioner,	Federal	Trade	Commission,	Second	Annual	GCR	
Live	Conference,	Antitrust	Enforcement	in	China	-	What’s	Next?	(Sept.	16,	2014),	pp.	3-4	(“a	growing	
chorus	is	claiming	that	the	Chinese	are	using	the	AML	to	promote	industrial	policy	[and]	the	AML	may	
be	 used	 to	 protect	 and	 promote	 domestic	 industry”);	 and	 U.S.	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce,	 Competing	
Interests	 in	 China’s	 Competition	 Law	 Enforcement,	 Sept.	 9,	 2014,	 at	 (ii)	 (“China’s	 remedies	 often	
appear	 designed	 to	 advance	 industrial	 policy	 and	 boost	 national	 champions,	AMEAs	 [anti-monopoly	
enforcement	 authorities]	 rely	 insufficiently	 on	 sound	 economic	 analysis,	 intellectual	 property	 rights	
have	been	curtailed	in	the	name	of	competition	law,	and	AML	enforcement	suffers	from	procedural	and	
due	process	shortcomings.	These	patterns	in	AML	enforcement	give	rise	to	growing	concern	about	the	
quality	and	fairness	of	enforcement,	and	they	raise	legitimate	questions	about	China’s	commitment	to	
the	global	antitrust	commons”).	
535	Thomas	 Velk,	 Olivia	 Gong,	 Ariel	 S.N.	 Zuckerbrot,	 A	 Trans-Pacific	 Partnership,	 60	 ANTITRUST	
BULLETIN	1	(2015).	See	also	China	Targeting	Foreign	Companies,	American	Chamber	Says,	Bloomberg	
News,	Sept.	2,	2014.	
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2014,	titled	“Competing	Interest	in	China’s	Competition	Law	Enforcement,”536	the	
U.S.	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 claims	 that	 AML	 is	 being	 employed	 by	 Beijing	 “to	
advance	policy	and	boost	national	champions.”537	The	U.S.	Chamber	of	Commerce	
specifically	focuses	on	China’s	approach	to	FRAND	licensing	of	IPRs	as	the	single	
area	 where	 Chinese	 competition	 enforcers	 have	 been	 the	 most	 hostile	 against	
foreign	 companies,	 implementing	 what	 it	 considers	 to	 be	 China’s	 “[s]ystemic,	
officially	 sanctioned	 curtailment	 of	 IP	 rights,”538	relying	 on	 a	 number	 of	 “[d]ue	
process	 deficiencies,	 [which]	 facilitate	 these	 problems.”539	The	 report	 underlines	
that	 “foreign	 companies	 suffer	 disproportionately	 from	 China’s	 patterns	 of	
enforcing	 the	 AML.	 In	 fact,	 all	 transactions	 blocked	 or	 conditionally	 approved	 to	
date	 have	 involved	 foreign	 companies,	 and	 the	 curtailment	 of	 IP	 rights	 appears	
designed	to	strengthen	the	bargaining	position	of	domestic	licenses.”540	Against	this	
background,	the	U.S.	Chamber	of	Commerce	concludes	that	AML	enforcement	is	
breaching	the	commitments	that	China	assumed	in	joining	the	WTO.541	
Thomas	 J.	 Horton	 has	 remarked	 how	 these	 concerns	 are	 far	 more	
widespread.542	For	 example,	 in	 September	 2014,	 the	U.S.	China	Business	Council	
(the	“USCBC”)	detected	that	“foreign	companies	have	well-founded	concerns	about	
how	 investigations	 are	 conducted	 and	 decided.”	 Indeed	 “Chinese	 competition	
practices	can	create	de	facto	discrimination	against	foreign	companies	by	not	giving	
proper	weight	to	market	considerations.”543	Along	the	same	line,	the	USCBC	filed	a	
report	with	the	United	States	Congress	in	November,	2014,544	observing	that	“[t]he	
bilateral	trade	 imbalance	 is	driven,	 in	 large	part,	by	China’s	mercantilist	and	state	
directed	policies,”545	and	alleging	that	“[i]n	2014,	China	 ramped	up	 its	use	of	Anti-
Monopoly	 Law	 (AML)	 against	 foreign	 firms	 in	 what	 appears	 to	 be	 unequal	
                                                
536 	United	 States	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce,	 Competing	 Interests	 in	 China’s	 Competition	 Law	
Enforcement:	China’s	Anti-Monopoly	Law	Application	and	the	Role	of	Industrial	Policy,	Sept.	9,	2014.	
537	Id.	 at	 (ii).	 The	 Chamber	 also	 holds	 that	 “[t]he	 beneficiaries	 of	 these	 policies	 are	 often	 Chinese	
national	 champions	 in	 industries	 that	 China	 considers	 strategic,	 such	 as	 commodities	 and	 high	
technology.”	
538	Id.	p.	77.	
539	Id.	p.	78.	
540	Id.	p.	2.	
541	Neil	Gough,	China’s	 Antitrust	 Campaign	 Seen	 as	 Possible	 Breach	 of	W.T.O.	 Rules,	N.Y.	Times	 (8	
Sept.	2014).	
542	Thomas	J.	Horton,	Antitrust	or	Industrial	Protectionism?:	Emerging	International	Issues	in	China’s	
Anti-Monopoly	Law	Enforcement	Efforts,	14	SANTA	CLARA	JOURNAL	OF	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	109	(2016).	
543	U.S.-China	Bus.	Council,	Competition	policy	and	enforcement	in	China	13	(2014).	
544	Ibid..	
545	Id.	p.	3.	
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enforcement	 in	 order	 to	 create	 favorable	 market	 conditions	 for	 Chinese	
competitors.”546	Similar	concerns	have	been	voiced	by	 the	American	Chamber	of	
Commerce	 in	 China	 and	 the	 EU	 in	 2014	 reports,	 “accusing	 China	 of	 unfair	
enforcement	of	the	AML.”547		
In	 conclusion,	 the	 review	 of	 China’s	 AML	 enforcement	 activities	 in	 the	
standardization	 sector,	 strongly	 supports	 the	 allegations	 that	 China	 is	 using	
competition	 enforcement	 as	 an	 opportunity	 “for	 protectionism	 and	 industrial	
policy	 to	sway	decisions.”548	The	licensing	sector	has	been	one	of	the	areas	where	
the	Chinese	aggressive	stance,	which	discriminates	against	foreign	companies,	has	
been	 considerable,	 	 causing	 grave	 concerns	 and	 paving	 the	 way	 for	 significant	
conflict.549	In	this	strategic	sector,	China	has	arguably	resorted	to	industrial	policy	
to	foster	national	champions.		
The	opportunistic	use	of	AML	to	support	national	companies’	access	to	IPRs	
held	 by	 foreign	 companies	 is	 also	 evident	 in	 MOFCOM’s	 use	 of	 IPR	 licensing	
requirements	in	the	conditional	approval	of	Merck’s	acquisition	of	AZ	Electronic	
Material.	 In	 that	 case	 MOFCOM	 held	 “that	 there	 were	 high	 barriers	 to	 entry,”	
comprising	Merck’s	holding	more	than	3,500	patents	in	the	liquid	crystals	display	
market.550	MOFCOM	voiced	 similar	 concerns	 about	 high	 barriers	 to	 entry	 in	 its	
decision	 unconditionally	 blocking	 the	 proposed	 P3	 Network	 Shipping	 Alliance	
merger	 between	 Maersk,	 Mediterranean	 Shipping,	 and	 CMA	 CGM.	 MOFCOM	
observed	 that	 the	 transaction	would	 “increase	 the	 already	 high	 barriers	 to	 entry,	
[and]	suppress	competitors’	room	for	development.”551	
In	 a	 stark	 departure	 from	 EU	 competition	 policy,	 Article	 31	 of	 the	 AML	
obliges	mergers	or	acquisitions	 involving	 foreign	companies	or	 investors,	 “which	
implicate	national	security”,	to	“go	through	national	security	reviews	according	to	
                                                
546	Id.	p.	60.	
547	Id.	
548	Id.	
549 	See,	 e.g.,	 Arthur	 Kroebe,	 Donald	 Clark,	 Is	 a	 Trade	 War	 with	 China	 Looming?	 A	 ChinaFile	
Conversation,	CHINAFILE	(12	Sept.	2014).	
550 	MOFCOM	 Conditionally	 Approves	 Merck’s	 Acquisition	 of	 AZ	 Electronic	 Materials,	 China	
Competition	Bulletin	3	(32nd	ed.	2014).		
551 	MOFCOM	 Prohibits	 the	 Formation	 of	 the	 P3	 Network	 Shipping	 Alliance	 Among	 Maersk,	
Mediterranean	Shipping,	and	CMA	CGM,	China	Competition	Bulletin	4	(32nd	ed.	2014).	
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relevant	 laws	 and	 regulations.”552	Article	 27	 of	 the	 AML	 furthermore	 requires	
China’s	 competition	 authorities	 to	 review	 “the	 effect	 of	 [a]	 concentration	 on	
national	 economic	 development,”	 and	 also	 “[o]ther	 factors	 affecting	 market	
competition	 as	 determined	 by	 the	 [Anti-Monopoly	 Enforcement	 Authorities].”553	
Assuming	 that	 China’s	 AML	 enforcement	 is	 protectionist,	 it	 is	 similar	 to	 other	
protectionist	approaches	taken	by	the	Chinese	market.		
It	has	been	observed,	for	example,	that	this	regulatory	trend	is	visible	in	the	
regulation	 of	 the	 internet. 554 	The	 Chinese	 government	 has	 constantly	 been	
hindering	and	restricting	Google-owned	web	platforms	such	as	Facebook,	Twitter	
and	 YouTube.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 Chinese	 indigenous	 counterparts,	 for	 instance	
Renren,	 Youku	 and	 Weixin	 have	 progressively	 surged	 to	 become	 market-
dominant	 players,	 as	 powerful	 as	 their	Western	 equivalents	 in	 Europe	 and	 the	
United	 States.555	The	 Chinese	 government	 has	 also	 been	 engaging	 in	 blocking	
virtual	 private	 networks	 (“VPNs”). 556 		 Western	 companies	 have	 expressed	
apprehension	over	certain	 industries	being	required	to	rely	solely	on	technology	
for	which	the	Chinese	government	has	the	means	to	circumvent	data	encryption	
native	 to	 the	 product	 or	 service	 that	 uses	 that	 technology,	 fearing	 that	 “new	
regulations…would	 force	 foreign	 technology	 and	 telecom	 companies	 to	 give	
government	 ‘back	doors’	to	their	hardware	and	software	and	require	them	to	store	
data	within	China”.557	It	follows	that	“as	domestic	Chinese	corporations	have	fewer	
gains	 to	 access	 foreign	 websites	 for	 collaboration,	 and	Western	 firms,	 concerned	
                                                
552	AML	Ch.	IV,	Art.	31.	
553	AML	 Ch.	 IV,	 Art.	 27.	 See	 also	 Maureen	 K.	 Ohlhausen,	 Illuminating	 the	 Story	 of	 China’s	 Anti-
Monopoly	Law,	ANTITRUST	SOURCE	(Oct.	2013),	p.	6:	discussing	how	AML	Article	27	expressly	allows	for	
consideration	of	broad	factors	that	are	inconsistent	“with	market	competition	analysis	[including]	the	
effect	 of	 the	 proposed	 deal	 on	 the	 development	 of	 the	 national	 economy,	 and	 any	 other	 factors	
determined	by	the	State	Council	Anti-Monopoly	Enforcement	Authority”.	
554	Jillian	Bray,	Firmly	Grasping	 the	Knife:	An	 Investigation	of	 the	Asymmetric	Application	of	Chinese	
Antitrust	 Law	 as	 a	 Protectionist	 Tool,	 24	CARDOZO	 JOURNAL	OF	 INTERNATIONAL	&	COMPARATIVE	 LAW	
(2015),	p.	372.	
555	Andrew	Jacobs,	China	Further	Tightens	Grip	on	the	Internet,	N.Y.	Times,	29	Jan.	2015.		
556	Bray	 notes	 that:	 “Over	 the	 past	 couple	 of	 months,	 China	 has	 increased	 its	 censorship	 efforts,	
blocking	 smart	 phones	 from	 being	 able	 to	 receive	 Grail,	 Outlook,	 or	 Apple	 Mail;	 Gmail	 on	 regular	
internet	browsers	has	become	“almost	impossible	to	use”	in	China,	and	several	VPN	companies,	such	as	
Astrill,	StrongVPN	and	Golden	Frog,	have	been	the	victims	of	official	“disrupted	services”	actions	from	
the	 government,	 which	 aim	 at	 establishing	 “cyber-sovereignty”	 in	 light	 of	 “soaring	 VPN	 use	 among	
ordinary	Chinese	citizens”.	Jillian	Bray,	Firmly	Grasping	the	Knife:	An	Investigation	of	the	Asymmetric	
Application	of	Chinese	Antitrust	Law	as	a	Protectionist	Tool,	24	CARDOZO	JOURNAL	OF	INTERNATIONAL	&	
COMPARATIVE	LAW	(2015),	p.	373,	quoting	Andrew	Jacobs,	China	Further	Tightens	Grip	on	the	Internet,	
N.Y.	Times,	29	Jan.	2015.		
557	Andrew	Jacobs,	China	Further	Tightens	Grip	on	the	Internet,	N.Y.	Times,	Jan.	29,	2015.		
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about	data	privacy,	have	new	disincentives	to	competing	in	the	Chinese	market,	this	
policy	 seems	 to	 provide	 a	 significant	 boon	 to	 domestic	 corporations”. 558	
Nonetheless,	 this	 regulatory	 approach	 could	 ultimately	 be	 detrimental	 to	 the	
Chinese	economy,	given	that	by	means	of	hindering	channels	of	communication,	
the	 government	 could	 in	 due	 course	 choke	 the	 pursuit	 of	 entrepreneurial	
innovation.559	
4. EU AND CHINESE APPROACHES TO COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT 
The	 next	 sections	will	 compare	 EU	 and	Chinese	 competition	 law	 through	
enforcement	 priorities	 and	 ultimate	 policy	 goals	 to	 disclose	 China’s	 relatively	
protectionist	 enforcement	 history.	 Although	 influenced	 by	 US	 and	 EU	
competition	 law,	 the	 Chinese	 AML	 has	 Chinese	 characteristics	 and	 therefore	
varies	 in	a	number	of	 substantive	and	procedural	 features.	Most	prominently,	 it	
requires	 industrial	policy	 concerns	 to	be	 considered	when	applying	 competition	
rules.	Indeed,	Article	4	specifies	that	competition	rules	must	be	“compatible	with”	
the	 socialist	 market	 economy,	 while	 Article	 7,	 concerning	 the	 special	 status	 of	
state-owned	 enterprises,	 stresses	 their	 relevance	 to	 “the	 national	 economy	 or	
national	security”.		
The	 EU	 has	 adopted	 its	 competition	 rules	 to	 “prevent	 competition	 from	
being	distorted	to	the	detriment	of	the	public	interest,	individual	undertakings	and	
consumers,	thereby	ensuring	the	well-being	of	the	EU”.560	The	competition	laws	of	
the	EU	and	the	US	are	“ostensibly	very	broad	in	scope”,	the	“ideas	of	‘competition’	
and	‘anticompetitive’	behavior	are	applied	as	filters,	thus	bringing	within	the	ambit	
of	antitrust	only	those	activities	detrimental	to	the	competitive	process.”561		
Conversely,	China’s	competition	policy	seems	“less	concerned	with	 the	goal	
of	 keeping	 a	 level	 playing	 field	 and	 more	 with	 fostering	 its	 own	 interests”.562	As	
                                                
558	Id.	
559	See	Liyang	Hou,	Qualcomm:	How	China	has	Invalidated	Traditional	Business	Models	on	Standard	
Essential	Patents,	7	JOURNAL	OF	EUROPEAN	COMPETITION	LAW	&	PRACTICE	10	(2016),	p.	686.	
560	Case	C-52/09	Kokkurrensverket	v	TeliaSonera	Sverige,	Judgment	of	17	Feb.	2011,	2011	4	CMLR	482,	
para	20.	See	also	Case	C-94/00	Roquette	Frères	2002	ECR	I-9011	2003	4	CMLR	46,	para	42.	
561	NIAMH	DUNNE,	COMPETITION	LAW	AND	ECONOMIC	REGULATION	(CAMBRIDGE	UNIVERSITY	PRESS	2015),	 p.	
26.	
562	Luís	Cabral,	Competition	 policy	 in	 the	 global	 era,	NEW	ZEALAND	ECONOMIC	PAPERS,	2016.	This	also	
emerges	plainly	from	the	National	People’s	Congress	members’	standpoint	during	the	AML	drafting	
in	2006:	“[i]f	we	allow	pillar	 companies	which	 the	 country	has	 fostered	 for	 years	 to	 be	 taken	over	 by	
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remarked	above,	objectives	of	the	AML	include	protecting	the	public	interest	and	
promoting	 the	 socialist	 market	 economy	 (see	 Articles	 1	 and	 4).	 Chinese	
competition	 policy	 expressly	 places	 emphasis	 on	 the	 primary	 concern	 of	
protecting	and	strengthening	China’s	national	and	economic	security.	A	number	
of	 AML	 provisions	 mirror	 the	 national	 security	 issue	 concern.	 Furthermore,	 as	
discussed	above,	China’s	AML	specifically	 identifies	 the	protection	of	“the	 public	
interest	 and	 the	 impact	 on	 the	 Chinese	 national	 economy”	 as	 key	 goals	 and	
objectives.563	However,	 the	difficulty	 in	curtailing	these	vague,	broad	concepts,564	
which	are	hardly	transposable	into	legal	terms	and	hardly	justifiable	according	to	
EU	competition	doctrine,	cannot	be	concealed.	
There	 are	 also	 structural	 differences	 between	 EU	 competition	 policy	 and	
Chinese	antitrust	enforcement.	Unlike	EU	competition	regulation	that	is	enforced	
by	 one	 single	 agency,	 the	Chinese	 competition	 architecture	 is	 based	 on	 the	 co-
existence	 of	 multiple	 authorities	 with	 potentially	 coinciding	 decisions.	 China’s	
AML	is	applied	by	three	dissimilar	regulators,	each	assigned	partially	overlapping	
competences.	 The	Ministry	 of	 Commerce	 (“MOFCOM”)	 is	 in	 charge	 of	 merger	
control.	However,	the	State	Administration	for	Industry	and	Commerce	(“SAIC”)	
and	the	National	Development	and	Reform	Commission	(the	“NDRC”)	both	have	
competence	 over	 monopoly	 agreements	 and	 abuses	 of	 a	 dominant	 market	
position.	 SAIC	 is	 responsible	 for	 non-price	 issues.	 The	NDRC	 is	 responsible	 for	
price-related	 issues,	 such	 as	 horizontal	 price-fixing	 between	 competitors,	 and	
vertical	 price-fixing,	 for	 example,	 resale	 price	 maintenance,	 between	
manufacturers	 and	 distributors.	 Additionally,	 Chinese	 courts	 are	 not	 bound	 by	
rulings	 of	 other	 courts,	 and	 even	 decisions	 of	 the	 nation’s	 highest	 courts	 have	
                                                                                                                                 
multinationals,	 the	 country	will	 face	 the	danger	 of	 losing	dominant	power	on	 industrial	 development	
and	technological	progress...	We	welcome	the	investment	of	large	foreign	companies	in	China	but	will	
prevent	them	from	taking	market	monopolistic	positions	which	are	not	good	for	 fair	competition	 in	a	
market	 economy.”	Competing	 Interests	 in	 China’s	 Competition	 Law	 Enforcement,	U.S.	 Chamber	 of	
Commerce,	International	Affairs	Division,	14	(2	Jul.	2014),	p.	22.	
563	Gregory	K.	Leonard,	Yizhe	Zhang,	Considering	the	Unique	Aspects	of	the	Merger	Review	Process	in	
China,	ANTITRUST	SOURCE	(2014).	See	also	AML,	Ch.	I,	Arts.	1	and	4.	
564	Xiaoye	 Wang,	 Adrian	 Emch,	 Five	 Years	 of	 Implementation	 of	 China’s	 Anti-Monopoly	 Law	 -	
Achievements	and	Challenges,	23	JOURNAL	OF	ANTITRUST	ENFORCEMENT	(2013).	
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uncertain	 authority.565	Accordingly,	 Chinese	 competition	 law	 and	 policy	 is	 far	
more	unpredictable	and	sometimes	uncertain,	than	the	written	law	may	suggest.	
5. CONCLUSIONS: DIVERGENCES IN THE APPLICATION OF COMPETITION 
LAW TO IPRS IMPACTING ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE  
The	 comparative	 analysis	 of	 the	 competition	 enforcement	 concerning	
standards	 and	 SEPs	 in	 the	 EU	 and	 China	 highlights	 that	 the	 present	 economic	
reality	 of	 globalization	 has	 not	 been	 reflected	 in	 a	 globally	 uniform	 legal	
framework	applicable	to	competition	and	IP	law	concerns.	Indeed,	“[d]espite	 the	
extensive	 harmonization	 of	 procedural	 and	 substantive	 patent	 norms	 through	
international	 agreements,	 patent	 rights	 are	 still	 local”.566	The	 territoriality	 of	 IP	
rights	 clashes	 with	 the	 purpose	 of	 SSOs	 setting	 standards	 for	 the	 use	 of	 SEPs.	
Standardization	aims	at	coordinating	the	fragmented	landscape	of	contacts,	rights,	
and	 industry	 customs,	 through	 a	 self-regulation	 instrument	 adopted	 voluntarily	
among	heterogeneous	market	participants.	The	global	nature	of	 the	commercial	
impacts	of	disputes	concerning	standards	and	SEPs	force	local	courts	“to	consider	
not	only	 local	 judicial	standards	and	doctrines,	but	also	those	used	elsewhere	that	
may	be	 relevant	 to	understand	complex	 facts	of	disputes”.567	It	follows	that	“[T]he	
courts	hearing	the	disputes	on	SEPs	need	to	balance	the	principle	of	territoriality	of	
law	and	the	underlying	rights,	with	the	need	to	respect	a	commercial	commitment	
affecting	global	businesses.”568	
This	 gives	 rise	 to	 an	 exchange	 of	 jurisprudential	 knowledge,	 doctrinal	
development	and	economic	analysis	across	jurisdictions,	which	can	be	interpreted	
as	a	push	towards	informal	norm	exchanges,	termed	as	“judicial	globalization”.569	
This	 exchange	 is	 desirable	 considering	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 impact	 that	 questions	
regarding	standardization	have	on	the	global	market.		
                                                
565	Stephen	Tung,	As	Chinese	Courts	Announce	Guiding	Cases,	 Stanford	Law	School	Helps	 to	Spread	
the	Word,	STANFORD	REPORT	(6	Feb.	2012).		
566	Nari	Lee,	Yang	Li,	European	Standards	 in	Chinese	Courts	-	A	Case	of	SEP	and	FRAND	Disputes	 in	
China,	 in	N.	LEE,	N	BRUUN,	M.	LI	 (EDS.),	GOVERNANCE	OF	 INTELLECTUAL	PROPERTY	RIGHTS	 IN	CHINA	AND	
EUROPE	(EDWARD	ELGAR	PUBLISHING,	2016),	p.	1.	
567	Ibid.,	p.	2.	
568	Ibid.,	p.	16.	
569	Edward	 Lee,	 The	 New	 Canon:	 Using	 or	 Misusing	 Foreign	 Law	 to	 Decide	 Domestic	 Intellectual	
Property	 Claims,	 46	 HARVARD	 INTERNATIONAL	 LAW	 JOURNAL	 1	 (2005);	 and	 Pamela	 Samuelson,	
Intellectual	property	arbitrage:	How	foreign	rules	can	affect	domestic	protections,	71	THE	UNIVERSITY	OF	
CHICAGO	LAW	REVIEW	1	(2004),	pp.	223-239.		
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However,	 upon	 closer	 scrutiny,	 there	 appear	 to	 remain	 major	 differences	
when	it	comes	to	the	application	of	legal	doctrine	to	the	actual	circumstances	of	
cases.	 Indeed,	 if	we	consider	the	 landmark	case	Huawei	 v.	 IDC,	notwithstanding	
the	fact	that	for	the	first	time	the	Shenzhen	Intermediate	Court570	and	Guangdong	
High	Court571	made	a	commendable	effort	to	determine	what	constitutes	FRAND	
terms	 in	 China,	 resolve	 the	 case	 and	 calculate	 the	 FRAND	 royalty	 rate,	 the	
reasoning	 of	 courts	 is	 to	 a	 certain	 extent	 debatable	 and	 leaves	much	 room	 for	
interpretative	speculation.	
To	make	this	scenario	more	unstable,	China	seems	to	enforce	and	make	an	
effort	to	apply	locally	the	many	legal	concepts	related	to	standardization.	In	doing	
so,	 China	 nonetheless	 reinterprets	 them	 to	 strategically	 serve,	 and	 arguably	
defensively,	 to	 some	 extent,	 the	 goals	 of	 the	 country’s	 industrial	 and	 economic	
agenda,	first	and	foremost	the	promotion	of	its	indigenous	industry.	
In	this	context,	the	issue	of	the	treatment	of	IP	rights	in	standards	and	their	
related	 competition	 concerns	 reflects	 the	 fragmentation	 of	 patent	 rights.	
Currently,	 “national	 competition	 laws	 embody	 a	 host	 of	 different	 assumptions	
about	 the	 role	 of	 economics;	 the	 proper	 scope	 and	 nature	 of	 competition	 law	
prohibitions,	 rules,	 and	 remedies;	 procedural	 issues;	 and	 the	 influence	 non-
competition	 policy	 concerns	 should	 have	 on	 competition	 law	 enforcement	
decisions”.572	This	 has	 resulted	 in	 inconsistent	 outcomes	 and	 the	 sub-optimal	
enforcement	of	competition	policy.	
Markets	 are	 increasingly	 global	 in	 nature	 and	 the	 boundaries	 of	 national	
trade	 are	 more	 and	 more	 blurred,	 making	 standardization	 and	 ultimately	
harmonized	objectives	a	crucial	facilitator	for	international	trade.573	It	is	thus	clear	
that	 the	 analysis	 of	 standards	 and	 competition	 cannot	 take	 place	 without	 an	
appreciation	 of	 the	 regulatory	 perspective	 of	 international	 trade.	As	 long	 as	 the	
                                                
570	Huawei	v	InterDigital	Communications	(IDC),	Shenzhen	Intermediate	People’s	Court,	Decision	of	
Feb.	2013,	No.	2011	深中法知民初字第	858	号.	
571	Huawei	v	InterDigital	Communications,	Guangdong	Higher	People’s	Court	No.	2013	粤高法民三	终
字第	306	号.	
572	Alden	 F.	 Abbott,	 Shanker	 Singham,	Competition	 Policy	and	 international	trade	distortions,	 in	 C.	
HERRMANN	ET	AL.	(EDS.),	EUROPEAN	YEARBOOK	OF	INTERNATIONAL	ECONOMIC	LAW	(EYIEL),	VOL.	4	(2013),	
p.	25.	
573	World	 Trade	 Organization,	 World	 Trade	 Report	 2005;	 K.	 BLIND,	 THE	 ECONOMICS	 OF	 STANDARDS:	
THEORY,	EVIDENCE,	POLICY	(EDWARD	ELGAR,	2004),	p.	219.	
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issue	of	patents	incorporated	into	standards	and	their	use	as	trade	barriers	“is	not	
resolved	 at	 a	 normative	 level,	 developing	 countries	 will	 be	 forced	 to	 create	 more	
competing	and	complementary	standards”.574	Consequently,	“competing	standards	
may	 raise	 considerable	 non-tariff	 barriers	 to	 international	 trade	 and	 to	 free/open	
markets”.575		
Indeed,	anticompetitive	practices	have	an	impact	on	market	access,	and	the	
protectionist	stance	of	China	has	itself	been	perceived	as	a	trade	barrier.	
The	anticompetitive	measures	that	are	relevant	to	this	analysis	include:	
I. anticompetitive	private	conduct,	such	as	business	methods,	that	are	
backed	 by	 government	 actions	 that	 which	 empower	 them	 giving	
an	 advantage	 over	 foreign	 competitors	 or	 companies	 not	 falling	
within	 a	 certain	 group	 of	 favored	 companies	 or	 sectors	 to	 be	
supported;	
II. government	 protectionist	 measures	 that	 create	 trade	 barriers	 by	
fostering	 national	 industrial	 and	 economic	 policy,	 and/or	 private	
indigenous	 industries,	 and	 discriminate	 against	 foreign	
competitors.	
These	anticompetitive	measures	are	likely	to	impact	on	international	trade	
the	more	they	concern	issues,	such	as	SEPs	and	standardization	that	are	globally	
used	 and	 can	 at	 the	 same	 time	 be	 perceived	 as	 market	 enablers	 or	 barriers	 to	
trade.	In	this	vein	measures	concerning	IPRs	in	standards	have	noticeable	effects	
on	 trade	 also	 outside	 the	 jurisdiction	 where	 the	 anticompetitive	 measure	 is	
imposed.	
The	 adoption	 of	 an	 international	 trade	 perspective	 is	 arguably	 the	 more	
adequate	as	this	phenomenon	cannot	be	challenged	by	the	domestic	enforcement	
of	 national	 competition	 rules,	 due	 to	 the	 dual	 and	 mutually	 reinforcing	
                                                
574	Yogesh	Pai,	Private	Proprietary	Standards	and	Public	Law:	Invoking	WTO’s	Competition	Dimension	
to	 Avoid	 Global	 Market	 Distortion,	 (November	 16,	 2012).	 See	 also	 P.	 Gao,	 Counter-networks	 in	
Standardization:	a	perspective	from	developing	countries,	17	INFO	SYSTEMS	JOURNAL	(2007),	pp.	391-420.	
575	Id.	See	also	John	S.	Wilson,	Standards,	Trade	and	Development,	in	LAURA	DENARDIS	(EDS.),	OPENING	
STANDARDS:	THE	GLOBAL	POLITICS	OF	INTEROPERABILITY	(MIT	PRESS,	2011),	p.	119.		
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complementary	relationship	between	anticompetitive	practices	and	global	 trade,	
both	aimed,	ultimately,	at	promoting	welfare.	Commentators	have	remarked	that	
modifications	to	trade	regulation	aimed	at	reducing	or	removing	national	barriers	
to	 trade	 and	 investment,	 such	 as	 high	 tariffs,	 quotas,	 and	 investor	 nationality	
restrictions,	 “promote	 welfare-enhancing	 contractual	 relations	 that	 expand	 trade	
and,	more	generally,	raise	aggregate	welfare	in	the	liberalizing	nations.	The	benefits	
of	 trade	 liberalization	 are	 magnified	 by	 competition	 law	 rules	 that	 lower	 the	
incidence	 of	 consumer	 welfare-reducing	 restrictions 576 	on	 the	 competitive	
process”.577	
Hence,	 there	 is	 arguably	 a	 preeminent	 role	 for	 international	 competition	
law	policy	in	an	increasingly	globalized	economy	through	voluntary	efforts	aimed	
at	 entering	 into	 an	 understanding	 across	 jurisdictions	 and	 thus	 progressively	
globally	 moving	 together	 towards	 best	 or	 better	 practices.578	This	 calls	 for	 the	
identification	 of	 international	 efforts	 to	 streamline	 and	 enforce	 competition	
policies.	 These	 efforts	 include,	 as	 discussed	 below,	 the	 WTO	 framework.	 The	
concerns	 related	 to	 IPRs	 in	 standards	 should	 be	 analyzed	 from	 the	 regulatory	
perspective	of	both	competition	and	international	trade	as	the	issues	concerning	
one	aspect	cannot	be	resolved	irrespective	of	the	other.	
	
                                                
576	The	 term	 “consumer	 welfare”	 is	 used	 here	 to	 describe	 the	 sum	 of	 consumers’	 and	 producers’	
surplus.	 See	 ROBERT	 H.	 BORK,	 THE	 ANTITRUST	 PARADOX	 (FREE	 PRESS	 1993),	 pp.	 90-106.	 Consumer	
welfare-reducing	 restrictions	 could	 be	 either	 private	 (e.g.,	 price	 fixing,	 division	 of	markets	 among	
competitors,	 and	 other	 anticompetitive	 contracts)	 or	 public	 (e.g.,	 onerous	 licensing	 requirements,	
other	restrictions	on	entry	 into	businesses	or	professions,	and	prohibitions	on	truthful	advertising).	
On	 the	detrimental	nature	of	government	 restraints	on	competition,	 see	William	E.	Kovacic,	 James	
C.	Cooper,	 US	 Convergence	 with	 International	 Competition	 Norms:	 Antitrust	 Law	 and	 Public	
Restraints	on	Competition,	90	BOSTON	UNIVERSITY	LAW	REVIEW	(2010)	,	p.	1555.	
577	Alden	 F.	 Abbott,	 Shanker	 Singham,	Competition	 Policy	and	 international	trade	distortions,	 in	 C.	
HERRMANN	ET	AL.	(EDS.),	EUROPEAN	YEARBOOK	OF	INTERNATIONAL	ECONOMIC	LAW	(EYIEL),	VOL.	4	(2013),	
pp.	23-24.	
578	Id.,	p.	25.	
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1. INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND COMPETITION: MUTUALLY AFFECTING EACH 
OTHER 
The	previous	chapter	illustrated	how	differential	legal	and	policy	treatment	
of	patented	technology	through	the	application	of	national	competition	laws	has	
given	rise	to	inter-jurisdictional	regulatory	frictions.	These	differences	ultimately	
fail	 to	 prevent	 IPR	 holders	 from	 exercising	 their	 market	 power	 by	 means	 of	
exploiting	incorporated	standards	as	trade	barriers.	This	causes	a	harmful	lack	of	
consistency	within	the	international	trading	regime.		
To	 adopt	 a	 perspective	 limited	 to	 competition	 law,	 namely,	 a	 perspective	
that	solely	addresses	the	anticompetitive	danger	produced	by	standardization	 in	
relation	 to	 lack	 of	 compliance	 with	 the	 antitrust	 rules,	 would	 fall	 short	 of	
appreciating	the	implications	of	standardization	in	the	international	trade	arena.		
An	 approach	 exclusively	 concentrated	 on	 competition	 is	 necessarily	
jurisdiction-specific.	Focusing	on	a	purely	national	perspective	is	not	sufficient	as	
more	 far-reaching	 international	 engagement	 is	 necessary.	 This	 is	 all	 the	 more	
evident	given	the	costs	of	the	current	sources	of	disharmony	among	countries	and	
the	 opportunities	 that	 exist	 for	 collaboration	 among	 competition	 authorities	 as	
well	as	 trade	and	competition	authorities,	 including	the	WTO,	which	can	play	a	
constructive	 role	 in	 developing	 a	 common	 understanding	 of	 the	 issues	
surrounding	 the	 intersection	 between	 trade	 and	 competition	 policy	 for	 both	
developed	and	developing	economies.	A	greater	role	for	the	WTO	is	nonetheless	
conditional	 on	 the	 support	 and	 pursuit	 of	 additional	 steps	 to	 deepen	 the	 work	
already	under	way	 at	 the	 intersection	between	 trade	 and	 competition	policy,	 to	
make	the	WTO	a	more	competition	policy	friendly	environment.	
Indeed,	excluding	a	competition	policy	perspective	from	the	WTO	regime,	
ultimately	 rejecting	 the	 mutual	 relationship	 between	 competition	 and	
international	trade,	cannot	represent	a	winning	strategy	for	advanced,	developing	
and	 emerging	 economies,	 regardless	 of	 divergences	 in	 institutional	 and	 legal	
traditions.	Indeed,	the	literature	has	remarked	how	international	trade	policy	and	
competition	 policy,	 suitably	 enforced,	 are	 “mutually	 reinforcing	 methods	 for	
promoting	welfare”.	This	means	that	“[c]hanges	to	trade	laws	and	regulations	that	
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reduce	or	eliminate	national	barriers	to	trade	and	investment	(such	as	high	tariffs,	
quotas,	 and	 investor	 nationality	 restrictions)	 promote	 welfare-enhancing	
contractual	relations	that	expand	trade	and,	more	generally,	raise	aggregate	welfare	
in	the	liberalizing	nations”.579		
Conversely,	 the	 implications	 of	 standardization	 in	 the	 international	 trade	
arena	should	be	scrutinized	in	light	of	the	inherent	intertwined	tension	between	
patent	 rights	embodied	 in	 technical	 standards,	 innovation	and	 the	 international	
trade	regime.		
Indeed,	 competition	 law	 is	 only	 one	 side	 of	 the	 problem.	 The	 following	
points	must	be	taken	into	account:		
I. the	difference	in	views	and	uncertainty	that	has	characterized	the	
tensions	 between	 patents	 and	 standards	 from	 a	 competition	
standpoint	 (see	 Chapter	 IV)	 has	 allowed	 developed	 countries	 to	
use	standards	as	trade	barriers;		
II. dissimilarities	 in	 laws	 and	 public	 policies	 concerning	
standardization	 that	 have	 posed	 significant	 obstacles	 to	 cross-
border	 trade,580	have	 led	 latecomers	in	 the	 international	economy	
to	call	for	more	penetrating	government	intervention.	In	particular,	
supporting	 the	 development	 and	 adoption	 of	 competing	
homegrown	 complementary	 standards	 as	 a	 source	 of	 economic	
catch-up,581	which,	in	return,	has	arguably	given	rise	to	a	novel	type	
of	substantial,	protectionist,	non-tariff	barrier	to	trade.582		
                                                
579 	Alden	 F.	 Abbott,	 Shanker	 Singham,	 Competition	 policy	 and	 international	 trade	 distortions,	
EUROPEAN	YEARBOOK	OF	INTERNATIONAL	ECONOMIC	LAW	(2013).	
580	Yogesh	 Pai,	 Standards-Essential	 Patents:	 A	 Prolegomena,	 19	 JOURNAL	 OF	 INTELLECTUAL	 PROPERTY	
RIGHTS	 (2014),	 p.	 59;	Baisheng	An,	 Intellectual	 Property	 Rights	 in	 Information	 and	 Communications	
Technology	Standardization:	High	Profile	Disputes	and	Potential	for	Collaboration	between	the	United	
States	 and	 China,	 45	 TEXAS	 INTERNATIONAL	 LAW	 JOURNAL	 (2009),	 p.	 175;	 Christopher	 S.	 Gibson,	
Globalization	and	Technology	Standards	Games:	Balancing	Concerns	of	Protectionism	and	Intellectual	
Property	in	International	Standards,	22	BERKLEY	TECHNOLOGY	LAW	JOURNAL	(2007),	p.	1403.	
581 	Richard	 P.	 Suttmeier,	 Xiangkui	 Yao	 and	 Alex	 Zixiang	 Tan,	 Standards	 of	 Power:	 Technology,	
Institutions,	 and	 Politics	 in	 the	Development	 of	 China’s	 National	 Standards	 Strategy,	 THE	NATIONAL	
BUREAU	OF	ASIAN	RESEARCH	(2006),	p.	11.	
582	See	generally	Branislav	Hazucha,	Technical	 Barriers	 to	Trade	 in	 Information	 and	Communication	
Technologies,	in	TRACEY	EPPS	AND	MICHAEL	J.	TREBILCOCK	(EDS.),	RESEARCH	HANDBOOK	ON	THE	WTO	AND	
TECHNICAL	 BARRIER	 TO	 TRADE	 (CHELTENHAM:	 EDWARD	 ELGAR	 PUBLISHING	 2014),	 pp.	 539-540;	 Robert	
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It	 follows	 that	 international	 trade	 is	 arguably	 hindered	 by	 governmental	
measures	that	distort	domestic	markets	and	ultimately	have	substantial	effects	on	
trade	outside	the	jurisdiction	that	imposes	the	restrictions.	Indeed,	a	wide-range	
of	 acts	 of	 governments	 can	 hamper	 international	 trade.	 Notably,	 formal	
governmental	 actions,	 which	 may	 “immunize	 some	 firm	 conduct”,	 as	 well	 as	
“tak[ing]	measures	that	are	excessively	trade-restricting	and	anticompetitive”.		
Governments	 may	 also	 act	 indirectly,	 by	 backing	 private	 initiatives	 that	
lessen	competition,	while	applying	competition	enforcement	aggressively	against	
foreign	companies	that	seek	to	do	business	in	the	country,	imposing	restraints.	In	
other	 words,	 governments	 might	 also	 use	 the	 indirect	 strategy	 of	 supporting	
private	 arrangements	 that	 have	 hostile	 effects	 on	 international	 trade	 and	 on	
access	 to	 markets.	 In	 this	 way,	 “practices	 that	 may	 be	 anticompetitive	 or	
exclusionary	may	not	fall	neatly	into	a	category	of	either	purely	private	restraints	or	
governmental	practices”.583		
It	 is	 thus	necessary	 to	be	 skeptical	 of	 arguments	 that	 exclusively	 focus	on	
purely	 private	 business	 practices	 or	 solely	 on	 governmental	 restrictive	 policies,	
because	restraints	of	a	mixed	private	and	public	nature	can	also	have	significant	
trade-distorting	consequences.		
Confronted	with	 such	problems,	 trade	 and	 competition	policies	 are	better	
understood	 as	 two	 mutually	 supportive	 methods	 of	 addressing	 such	 issues.	
However,	 neither	 trade	 nor	 competition	 policy	 tools	 offer	 comprehensive	
solutions	 to	 the	problems	 that	originate	 from	 this	mixture	of	governmental	 and	
private	restraints.		
These	challenges	cannot	be	successfully	addressed	by	national	competition	
authorities	of	the	home	countries	of	the	affected	foreign	companies.	Indeed,	it	is	
practically	 impossible	 to	 rely	 upon	 national	 competition	 rules	 as	 an	
extraterritorial	 tool,	 given	 issues	 of	 jurisdictional	 reach	 and	 divergences,	 as	
                                                                                                                                 
Howse,	A	New	Device	 for	Creating	 International	 Legal	Normativity:	 The	WTO	Technical	 Barriers	 to	
Trade	Agreement	 and	 “International	 Standards”,	 in	CHRISTIAN	JOERGES	AND	ERNST-ULRICH	PETERSMANN	
(EDS.),	 CONSTITUTIONALISM,	 MULTILEVEL	 TRADE	 GOVERNANCE	 AND	 SOCIAL	 REGULATION	 (Oxford:	 Hart	
Publishing	2006),	pp.	392-393.	
583	International	 Competition	 Policy	 Advisory	 Committee	to	 the	 Attorney	 General	 and	 Assistant	
Attorney	General	for	Antitrust,	Final	repost	Annex	2-c	(2000),	Executive	Summary,	chapter	5.	
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illustrated,	 in	 the	 competition	 laws	 and	 enforcement	 of	 countries,	 which	 have	
diverging	industrial	policy	objectives.		
The	missing	 link	 in	 legal	analysis	 that	 the	present	 study	strives	 to	address	
concerns	the	issue	that	protectionism	of	latecomers	and	the	skewing	of	regulatory	
systems	 in	 favor	 of	 national	 champions	 or,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 standards,	 national	
technology,	 is	 arguably	 caused,	 at	 least	 in	 part,	 by	 advanced	 countries’	
opportunist	use	of	IP	tools,	which	is,	in	return,	allowed,	or	at	least	not	adequately	
addressed,	by	 inconsistent	competition	enforcement	and	uncertainty	concerning	
fundamental	 notions	 on	 IP	 and	 competition	 tensions,	 such	 as	 the	 definition	 of	
clear	and	widely-accepted	licensing	requirements.	
This	missing	 link	calls	 for	a	normative	solution	 to	 the	competition-related	
uncertainties	 and	 inconsistencies.	 It	 also	 calls	 for	 deeper	 insight	 into	 exploring	
whether	the	WTO	might	represent	the	most	useful	forum	in	which	to	assess	these	
restraints,	given	its	extraterritorial	reach,	and	the	fact	that	protectionist	strategies	
might	 trigger	 its	 provisions.	 Against	 this	 background,	 the	 following	 remaining	
issues	should	be	assessed:		
I. how	competition	interacts	with	the	WTO	regime;	and		
II. whether	 the	 integration	of	 competition	policy	within	 the	WTO	 is	
advisable	 to	 address	 the	 trade-restrictive	 measures	 implemented	
by	latecomers,	caused,	at	least	partially,	by	the	differences	in	views	
and	 uncertainty	 that	 characterizes	 the	 tensions	 between	 patents	
and	 standards	 as	well	 as	 the	 strategic	 use	 of	 IP	 to	 extract	 higher	
royalties	on	the	part	of	advanced	countries.			
These	issues	will	be	addressed	below.		
2. THE MISSING COMPETITION POLICY PERSPECTIVE WITHIN THE 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGIME 
The	 first	 issue	 to	 be	 addressed	 relates	 to	 the	 need	 to	 integrate	 a	 global	
competition	 policy	 perspective	 into	 international	 economic	 law	 in	 order	 to	
intervene	 and	 restrain	 the	 exclusionary	 consequences	 created	 by	 the	
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opportunistic	use	of	standardization	across	several	jurisdictions,	coupled	with	the	
unpredictable,	 occasionally	 lax,	 level	 of	 antitrust	 scrutiny.	 Accordingly,	 the	
establishment	 of	 a	 comprehensive	 competition	 policy	 framework	 matching	 the	
tenets	of	international	trade	and	IP	law	should	be	explored.		
This	 analysis,	 which	 is	 even	 more	 needed	 today,	 cannot	 be	 deferred	
anymore	as	the	 integration	of	developing	countries	 into	the	global	economy	has	
exacerbated	 potential	 conflicts.	 As	 markets	 are	 increasingly	 global	 and	
intertwined,	 standardization	 is	 becoming	 an	 important	 enabler	 in	 international	
trade.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 developing	 countries	 are	 increasingly	 facing	 trade	
barriers	 in	 the	 form	 of	 patents	 embodied	 into	 standards,	 which	 have	 been	
opportunistically	used	by	developed	countries	as	entry-deterrents	to	ICT	markets.		
2.1. THE FAILURE OF COMPETITION POLICY NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN THE 
WTO 
The	 WTO	 is	 a	 multilateral	 organization	 having	 a	 unique	 place	 among	
international	 organizations	 and	 rulemaking	 bodies	 by	 reason	 of	 its	
comprehensiveness,	 comprising	 164	 members	 from	 developed	 and	 developing	
economies,	and	its	significance	as	a	forum	for	negotiating	binding	rules	governing	
the	economic	behavior	of	nations.	The	WTO’s	core	focus	has	been	on	the	trade-
distorting	conduct	of	governments.	As	 such,	with	 the	exception	of	 antidumping	
and	countervailing	duty	 laws,	 it	has	not	concentrated	its	actions	on	the	conduct	
of	 firms.	However,	 “while	 several	WTO	 agreements	 have	 elements	 that	 implicate	
competition	policy,	and	while	many	WTO	principles	are	supportive	of	competition	
policy	 objectives”,	 for	 example,	 transparency,	 nondiscrimination,	 and	 national	
treatment,	 the	“treatment	 of	 competition	 policy	 as	 such	 in	WTO	agreements	 has	
been	only	fragmentary”.584	
Indeed,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 take	 into	 account	 a	 preliminary	 consideration.	
Namely,	 that	 national	 competition	 regimes	 have	 not	 been	 accompanied	 by	 a	
legally	binding	international	regime	on	competition	policy.		
                                                
584 	International	 Competition	 Policy	 Advisory	 Committee	to	 the	 Attorney	 General	 and	 Assistant	
Attorney	General	for	Antitrust,	Final	repost	Annex	2-c	(2000),	Executive	Summary,	chapter	5.	
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Yet,	there	is	an	important	global	competition	issue	that	needs	to	be	better	
considered	by	the	appropriate	policymakers.	The	relevance	of	competition	policy	
to	 international	 trade	 has	 become	 recognized	 by	 more	 and	 more	 nations.	
Competition	 is	 now	 understood	 as	 “a	 tool	 for	 spurring	 innovation,	 economic	
growth,	 and	 the	 economic	well-being	 of	 countries	 around	 the	world”.585	This	 is	all	
the	 more	 clear	 in	 light	 of	 the	 economic	 liberalization	 and	 the	 technological	
advancements	 that	 are	 themselves	 an	 “engine	 for	 liberalization”.	 In	 turn,	 both	
“economic	 liberalization	 and	 technological	 development	 -	 are	 in	 turn	 driving	
economic	 integration”.586	Understood	this	way,	competition	policy	can	contribute	
to	 “facilitate	 economic	 liberalization”	and	 “produce	more	goods	and	services	 from	
scarce	 resources	 and	 provide	 a	 set	 of	 rules	 and	 disciplines	 that	 are	 not	 based	 on	
privilege	 and	 that	 are	 conducive	 to	 and	 responsive	 to	 efficient	 marketplace	
behavior”.587		
Numerous	 international	 competition	 policy	 issues	 are	 matters	 of	
significance	 for	 international	 trade.	 Indeed,	 as	 formal	 governmental	 barriers	 to	
international	 trade	 and	 investment	 are	 reduced,	 attention	 is	 turning	 more	 to	
anticompetitive	 practices	 occurring	 within	 nations	 that	 affect	 trade	 flows	 from	
other	 nations.	 As	 a	 result,	 in	 the	 last	 decade,	 “perceived	 restrictions	 emanating	
from	 exclusionary	 or	 anticompetitive	 practices	 have	 generated	 economic	 and	
political	tensions	between	nations	and	firms”.588	
Efforts	to	define	an	overarching	legal	framework	for	competition	date	back	
to	the	first	historic	attempt	to	legally	regulate	trade	relations	between	states	on	a	
multilateral	 basis. 589 	Namely,	 the	 Havana	 Charter,	 signed	 in	 1948,	 which	
established	 the	 unsuccessful	 International	 Trade	Organization	 (the	 “ITO”).	 The	
intention	 was	 to	 create	 an	 institution	 like	 the	 ones	 established	 through	 the	
Bretton	 Woods	 Agreement,	 namely,	 the	 World	 Bank	 and	 the	 International	
Monetary	Fund.		
                                                
585	Id.,	chapter	1.	
586	Ibid.	
587	Ibid.	
588	Id.,	chapter	5.	
589	P.	PICONE,	A.	LIGUSTRO,	DIRITTO	DELL’ORGANIZZAZIONE	MONDIALE	DEL	COMMERCIO	(CEDAM,	2002).		
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The	 Havana	 Charter	 specifically	 addressed	 restrictive	 business	 practices,	
and	 its	Chapter	V,	 including	Articles	 46	 to	 54,	was	 aimed	 at	 preventing,	 on	 the	
part	 of	 private	 or	 public	 commercial	 companies,	 business	 practices	 hindering	
international	trade	that	restrain	competition,	 limit	access	to	markets,	or	nurture	
monopolistic	control,	each	time	such	practices	having	detrimental	effects	on	the	
development	of	production	or	trade	and	hampering	the	achievement	of	any	of	the	
other	 goals	 of	 the	 ITO.	However,	 the	 provisions	 on	 competition	 in	 the	Havana	
Charter	 never	 entered	 into	 force	 as	 other	 provisions,	 notably	 the	 ones	 granting	
robust	powers	of	enforcement	to	the	ITO,	caused	apprehension	in	the	US,	whose	
Senate	rejected	the	Charter.590	As	a	result,	the	making	of	the	ITO	was	stopped	and	
no	international	rules	on	competition	policy	were	adopted.	The	only	provisions	of	
the	Havana	Charter	that	came	into	effect	were	the	ones	concerning	trade,	namely,	
the	General	Agreement	on	Tariffs	and	Trade	(“GATT”),	concluded	in	1947,	which	
was	applied	as	an	interim	discipline	until	the	instituting	of	the	WTO,	on	January	1,	
1995,	which	replaced	GATT	as	an	international	organization.591		
The	WTO	is	meant	to	“provide	the	common	institutional	 framework	 for	the	
conduct	 of	 trade	 relations	 among	 its	 Members	 in	 matters	 related	 to	 the	
agreements”.592	In	particular,	 it	 is	meant	 to	attain	higher	 standards	of	 living,	 full	
employment,	growth	of	income	and	demand,	expansion	of	trade	and	production	
of	 goods	 and	 services,	 whilst	 trying	 to	 find	 a	 balance	 between	 commercial	 and	
environmental	 values,	 as	 stated	 in	 the	 preamble	 of	 both	 GATT	 and	 the	 WTO	
settlement	 agreement.	 In	 order	 to	 achieve	 these	 objectives,	 the	 WTO	 has	 to	
guarantee	that	“trade	flows	as	smoothly,	predictably	and	freely	as	possible”.	It	does	
so	 through	 the	 formation	 of	 a	 platform	 for	 negotiation	 of	 trade,	 the	
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 163 
accomplishment	of	full	equality	between	states	and	the	dropping	of	trade	barriers.	
Accordingly,	 the	WTO	 promotes	 the	 “Most	 Favored	 Nation”	 and	 the	 “National	
Treatment”	 principles	 and	 its	 chief	 objective	 is	 to	 “constrain	 governments	 from	
imposing	 or	 continuing	 a	 variety	 of	 measures	 by	 restraint	 or	 distortion	 of	
international	trade”.593		
Regarding	 competition	 policy,	 the	WTO	 provided	 a	 new	 stimulus	 to	 the	
debate	on	the	inclusion	of	provisions	dealing	with	anticompetitive	practices	in	the	
international	 trade	 law	 framework.	 In	 particular,	 in	 light	 of	 the	 gradually	
globalizing	economy	and	the	increasing	dismantling	of	government	restraints	on	
trade,	 such	 as	 tariffs	 and	 non-tariff	 barriers	 to	 trade.	 Not	 least	 concerns	 that	
private	restraints	on	trade	were	merely	replacing	the	previous	public	restraints	on	
trade,	 particularly	 in	 those	 economies	 where	 extensive	 privatization	 and	
deregulation	increased	the	room	for	private	monopolies	and	market	dominance.		
Against	 this	background,	at	 the	WTO	Ministerial	Conference	 in	Singapore	
in	 1996,	 the	Working	Group	on	the	Interaction	Between	Trade	and	Competition	
Policy	(the	“Working	Group	on	Competition	Policy”)	was	created	“to	study	issues	
raised	by	Members	relating	to	the	interaction	between	trade	and	competition	policy,	
including	anti-competitive	practices,	 in	order	to	 identify	any	areas	that	may	merit	
further	 consideration	 in	 the	 WTO	 framework”. 594	The	 Ministerial	 Conference,	
however,	 decided	 that	 “future	 negotiations,	 if	 any,	 regarding	 multilateral	
disciplines	in	these	areas,	will	take	place	only	after	an	explicit	consensus	decision	is	
taken	among	WTO	Members	regarding	such	negotiations”.595		
The	EU	was	the	chief	advocate	in	the	WTO	for	the	inclusion	of	competition	
policy	 within	 the	 WTO	 regime.596	It	 proposed	 a	 multilateral	 framework	 to	 the	
Working	Group	on	Competition	Policy,	grounded	on	core	principles,	cooperation	
                                                
593	J.	H.	 JACKSON,	W.	 J.	DAVEY,	A.	O.	SYKES,	LEGAL	PROBLEMS	OF	 INTERNATIONAL	ECONOMIC	RELATIONS	
(5TH	EDITION,	THOMSON	WEST,	2008),	p.	215.		
594	World	Trade	Org.,	Singapore	Ministerial	Declaration	of	Dec.	13,	1996,	WT/MIN(96)/DEC,	36	I.L.M.	
218,	para	20	(1997).	
595	Id.	
596	Julien	Moiroux,	 The	 Internationalization	 of	 Competition	 Policy:	 The	 EU	 and	 the	 WTO	 Between	
Boldness	and	Rally,	2	GLOBAL	ANTITRUST	REV.	38	(2009).	
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and	support	 for	developing	countries.597	In	particular,	 the	EU	argued	that	“WTO	
negotiations	on	competition	should	[focus]	on	 three	key	 issues:	 core	principles	on	
domestic	competition	 law	and	policy;	cooperation	modalities,	 including	both	case-
specific	cooperation	and	more	general	exchanges	of	experiences;	and	support	for	the	
reinforcement	 of	 competition	 institutions	 in	 developing	 countries,	 including	
through	 a	 more	 coherent	 and	 enhanced	 approach	 to	 technical	 assistance	 for	
capacity	building.”598	
Developing	 countries	 have	 energetically	 opposed	 the	 inclusion	 of	 a	
competition	 framework	 in	 the	 WTO.	 This	 opposition	 has	 mainly	 been	 due	 to	
developing	 countries’	 fear	 of	 potential	 restrictions	 on	 their	 policy	 margin	 of	
maneuver.	 In	particular,	 in	relation	to	being	able	to	adopt	suitable	strategies	 for	
their	 development. 599 	Also,	 it	 has	 been	 due	 to	 the	 reluctance	 of	 developing	
countries	to	adopt	a	proposed	regime	that	would	give	rise	to	burdensome	costs	of	
implementation	and	enforcement,	which	would	be	a	further	drain	on	their	small	
economies.600	
At	 the	 WTO	 Ministerial	 Conference	 in	 Doha,	 in	 2001,	 the	 “case	 for	 a	
multilateral	 framework	 to	 enhance	 the	 contribution	 of	 competition	 policy	 to	
international	 trade	 and	 development,	 and	 the	 need	 for	 enhanced	 technical	
assistance	 and	 capacity-building	 in	 this	 area”, 601 	was	 included	 in	 the	 Work	
Program	of	 the	WTO	Doha	Development	Round	of	negotiations.	Ministers	 then	
envisaged	 that	 negotiations	would	 take	 place	 at	 the	next	ministerial	 conference	
“on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 decision	 to	 be	 taken,	 by	 explicit	 consensus,	 at	 that	 Session	 on	
                                                
597	Working	Group	on	the	Interaction	Between	Trade	and	Competition	Policy,	Communication	from	
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601	World	Trade	Org.,	Ministerial	Declaration	of	Nov.	14,	2001,	WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1,	41	I.L.M.	746,	23	
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modalities	 of	 negotiations.” 602 	Nonetheless,	 at	 the	 Ministerial	 Conference	 in	
Cancun	in	2003,	a	consensus	on	those	modalities	was	not	achieved.603	
During	the	Doha	Conference	the	Ministers	also	provided	that	the	Working	
Group	 on	 Competition	 Policy	 should	 focus	 “on	 clarification	 of:	 core	 principles,	
including	transparency,	nondiscrimination	and	procedural	 fairness,	and	provisions	
on	 hard	 core	 cartels;	 modalities	 for	 voluntary	 cooperation;	 and	 support	 for	
progressive	 reinforcement	 of	 competition	 institutions	 in	 developing	 countries	
through	capacity	building”.604	
Despite	 movements	 during	 negotiations,	 some	members	 fiercely	 opposed	
the	inclusion	of	competition	policy	in	the	Doha	Round	agenda.605	
Although	 it	 is	 not	 the	 aim	 of	 the	 present	 research	 	 to	 rehearse	 the	main	
arguments	put	forward	by	WTO	members	for	and	against	integrating	competition	
and	 trade	 regimes,	 it	 should	 be	 observed	 that	 the	 US	 opposed	 the	multilateral	
competition	policy	framework	within	the	WTO	for	several	reasons.606	Principally,	
it	 was	 skeptical	 that	 international	 competition	 rules	would	 give	 rise	 to	 benefits	
that	the	US	could	not	achieve	on	its	own.	It	was	also	concerned	that	competition	
could	 be	 used	 as	 a	 bargaining	 chip	 in	 negotiations	 between	 WTO	 members,	
eventually	watering	down	good	competition	 rules	and	practices	and	creating	an	
onerous	bureaucratic	architecture.	
The	US	asserted	that	“the	WTO	as	a	forum	for	review	of	private	restraints	is	
not	appropriate.	Given	the	possible	risks,	and	the	lack	of	international	consensus	on	
the	 content	or	appropriateness	of	 rules	or	dispute	 settlement	 in	 this	area,	 […]	the	
WTO	 should	 not	 develop	 new	 competition	 rules	 under	 its	 umbrella.	 Various	
concerns	 animate	 the	 […]	 skepticism	 toward	 competition	 rules	 at	 the	 WTO,	
including	the	possible	distortion	of	competition	standards	through	the	quid	pro	quo	
nature	 of	WTO	 negotiations;	 the	 potential	 intrusion	 of	WTO	 dispute	 settlement	
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605 	Martin	 Khor,	 Analysis	 of	 the	 Doha	 Negotiations	 and	 the	 Functioning	 of	 the	 World	 Trade	
Organization,	South	Ctr.,	Research	Paper	No.	30,	May	2010,	p.16.	
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panels	 into	 domestic	 regulatory	 practices;	 and	 the	 inappropriateness	 of	 obliging	
countries	 to	 adopt	 competition	 laws.	While	 recognizing	 that	 in	 some	 instances	 it	
may	not	be	a	fully	satisfactory	result,	the	Advisory	Committee	believes	that	national	
authorities	are	best	suited	to	address	anticompetitive	practices	of	private	firms	that	
are	occurring	on	their	territory”.	Moreover,	“[o]ver	the	longer	term,	the	WTO	may	
be	 called	 upon	 to	 resolve	 disputes	 between	nations	 that	 hinge	 on	whether	 private	
practices	 that	 foreclose	 access	 to	 markets	 are	 ultimately	 attributable	 to	
governmental	practices.	The	ability	of	the	WTO	to	resolve	such	disputes	is	not	fully	
tested	 under	 the	 WTO’s	 existing	 rules	 or	 jurisprudence	 and	 is	 an	 area	 that	 […]	
needs	particular	study	and	consideration	by	trade	and	competition	policymakers	in	
the	 years	 ahead.”	The	US	has	however	acknowledged	 that	 “[a]s	 the	world	moves	
into	the	next	century,	and	as	new	countries	join	the	WTO,	the	problems	of	market	
access	 will	 surely	 deepen,	 and	 the	 line	 between	 public	 and	 private	 restraints	 will	
become	increasingly	opaque.	Hence,	it	is	a	particularly	important	area	of	attention	
by	trade	and	competition	policymakers”.607	
Developing	countries,	 instead,	opposed	a	competition	 regime	 in	 the	WTO	
as	 they	 feared	 that	 it	 “might	 be	 another	 Trojan	 horse”,	 as	 many	 of	 them	 had	
perceived	 TRIPS	 to	 be,	 608 	in	 due	 course	 restraining	 their	 ability	 to	 use	
competition	 as	 a	 strategic	 tool	 to	 achieve	 their	 development	 goals,	 including	
industrial	policy	and	promotion	of	domestic	champions.		
The	discussions	on	integrating	a	competition	policy	within	the	WTO	regime	
were	abandoned	mainly	due	to	the	opposition	of	developing	countries,	fuelled	by	
concerns	 that	 a	multilateral	 framework	on	competition	 could	have	a	number	of	
negative	 effects	 on	 their	 fragile	 economies	 rather	 than	 foster	 development	
scenarios.		
These	concerns	mainly	stem	from	the	perceived	limitations	that	a	potential	
competition	policy	 agreement	within	 the	WTO	could	 impose	on	 their	 ability	 to	
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adopt	 suitable	 measures	 to	 stimulate	 economic	 development.609	As	 developing	
economies	strongly	rely	on	governments	to	support	public	enterprises	by	means	
of	subsidies	and	other	regulatory	tools	to	shield	domestic	companies	from	strong	
competition,	 developing	 countries	 feared	 that	 under	 the	 aegis	 of	 the	 WTO,	 a	
multilateral	framework	for	competition	would	have	meant	giving	up	a	number	of	
policy	 instruments.	 For	 example,	 “monopolies	 granted	 by	 the	 state,	 preventing	
resellers	 from	 setting	 prices	 independently,	 requiring	 that	 unrelated	 products	 be	
sold	as	a	package	(product	sale	bundling),	promoting	cartel	behavior	by	a	few	state-
supported	 firms,	 putting	 high	 barriers	 to	 entry	 such	 as	 technical,	 financial	 or	
nationality	 requirements,	 geographical	 market	 restrictions,	 arbitrary	 blacklisting,	
price	fixing,	tied	purchasing	arrangements,	product	and	price	dumping”.610	
As	 it	has	been	noted,	 “in	 the	 early	 stages	 of	 industrialization,	 governments	
may	wish	 to	 promote	 ‘national	 champions’,	 that	 is,	 large	 industrial	 groups	which	
are	 likely	 to	 compete	with	 foreign	 firms	both	 in	domestic	and	possibly	 in	 regional	
markets.	 Hence,	 governments	 may	 want	 to	 encourage,	 at	 least	 initially	 or	
temporarily,	some	market	concentration.	A	competition	policy	primarily	concerned	
only	with	the	obsessive	quest	for	maximum	competition	is	likely	to	prevent	mergers	
leading	 to	 market	 concentration	 whereas	 industrial	 policy	 objectives	 might	
encourage	the	same	mergers”.611	
However,	 the	 economic	 perspective	 was	 only	 one	 side	 of	 the	 issue.	
Developing	 countries	 also	 perceived,	 arguably	 reasonably,	 competition	 to	 be	
intrinsically	 incompatible	 with	 their	 institutional	 status	 quo.	 In	 particular,	 the	
enforcement	of	 the	competition	 frameworks	proposed	by	 the	Western	countries	
to	 be	 integrated	 in	 the	WTO	presupposed	 “the	 existence	 of	 a	 strong	 state,	 with	
adequate	 institutional,	 human	 and	 financial	 capacity	 to	 conduct	 investigations,	
monitor	markets	and	sanction	prohibited	practices.”612	On	the	contrary,	developing	
countries	generally	did	not	have	the	institutional	architecture	 in	place	necessary	
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to	implement	such	policies.	To	subject	them	to	advanced	countries’	competition	
regimes	 would	 have	 amounted	 to	 an	 “unnecessary	 administrative	 and	 fiscal	
burden.”613		
Developing	countries	therefore	opposed	the	approach	to	competition	policy	
that	underpinned	 the	proposals	brought	before	 the	WTO.	Developing	 countries	
instead	advocated	a	competition	framework	bespoke	to	their	development	needs,	
preserving	ample	policy	 space	 to	put	 in	place	policy	 instruments	affecting	 trade	
and	competition.	China	was	no	exception.	It	has	constantly	used	competition	law	
enforcement	strategically	to	attain	industrial	policy	objectives.	In	particular,	it	has	
varied	 its	 enforcement	 of	 competition	 principles	 depending	 on	 the	 stages	 of	
economic	development	and	productive	capacity.	It	has	therefore	tactically	varied	
the	level	of	intra-firm	rivalry	depending	on	its	view	of	the	susceptibility	or	power	
of	firms	in	the	context	of	a	strategy	to	promote	national	champions.614	
Eventually,	 in	 August	 2004,	 the	 WTO	 General	 Council	 decided	 that	
competition	policy	 “[would]	 not	 form	 part	 of	 the	Work	 Program	 set	 out	 in	 that	
Declaration	 and	 therefore	 no	 work	 towards	 negotiations	 […]	 [would]	 take	 place	
within	 the	WTO	 during	 the	 Doha	 Round”.615	As	 a	 result,	 the	Working	Group	 on	
Competition	Policy	also	stopped	its	activity.	
This	research	is	not	intended	to	be	a	comprehensive	analysis	of	the	pros	and	
cons	 of	 advocating	 for	 the	 inclusion	 of	 a	 specific	 competition	 policy	within	 the	
WTO	 regime	 and	 the	 means	 by	 which	 to	 include	 it.	 However,	 a	 general	
understanding	 of	 the	 underlying	 conflicts	 that	 would	 affect	 the	 relationship	
between	competition	policy	and	international	trade	distortions	within	the	context	
of	standards	is	necessary.		
	
	
                                                
613	VICENTE	 PAOLO	 B.	 YU	 III,	 SOUTH	 CTR.,	 DEVELOPMENT	 CHALLENGES	 OF	 COMPETITION	 POLICY	 IN	 THE	
ECONOMIC	PARTNERSHIP	AGREEMENTS	2	(2007).	
614	Paul	 Kuruk,	Negotiating	 Competition	 Policy	 in	 Multilateral	 Trade	 Agreements:	 European	 Union	
Overtures	 to	 West	 Africa	 and	 the	 WTO,	 UNIVERSITY	 OF	 PENNSYLVANIA	 JOURNAL	 OF	 INTERNATIONAL	
ECONOMIC	LAW	36	(2014),	p.	651.	
615	Doha	Work	 Programme:	Decision	Adopted	 by	 the	General	 Council	 on	 Aug.	 1,	 2004,	WT/L/579,	
para	1(g).	
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2.2. CHINA’S ACCESSION TO THE WTO 
An	 analysis	 of	 the	 role	 of	 the	 WTO	 in	 addressing	 issues	 related	 to	 the	
strategic	use	of	standardization	cannot	be	carried	out	without	an	appreciation	of	
China’s	role	within	the	WTO	regime.		
Indeed,	China’s	accession	to	the	WTO	in	2001	represented	a	milestone	not	
only	 for	 China	 but	 for	 the	 entire	 global	 economy.	 It	 was	 attained	 after	 nearly	
fifteen	 years	 of	 extensive	 negotiations,	 having	 many	 legal,	 political	 and	 social	
implications	 for	 all	 parties,	 at	 the	 end	 of	 which	 China	 was	 eventually	 able	 to	
persuade	WTO	members	that	without	China,	the	WTO	would	not	be	a	worldwide	
trade	organization.616	
China’s	 accession	 to	 the	 WTO	 was	 preceded	 by	 bilateral	 negotiations	
between	China	and	WTO	members	on	China’s	market	access	commitments	and	
concessions, 617 	which	 were	 eventually	 incorporated	 into	 China’s	 Goods	 and	
Services	 Schedules,	 applying	 to	 all	 WTO	 members. 618 	The	 final	 Protocol	 of	
accession	 echoes	 the	 terms	 and	 conditions	 of	 the	 various	 Chinese	 bilateral	
agreements619	with	the	US,620	the	EU621	and	Canada.622	
                                                
616	PAOLO	D.	 FARAH,	 FIVE	YEARS	OF	CHINA	WTO	MEMBERSHIP:	 EU	AND	US	PERSPECTIVES	ABOUT	CHINA’S	
COMPLIANCE	WITH	TRANSPARENCY	COMMITMENTS	AND	THE	TRANSITIONAL	REVIEW	MECHANISM	LEGAL	ISSUES	
OF	ECONOMIC	INTEGRATION	(KLUWER	LAW	INTERNATIONAL,	VOL.	33,	NO.	3,	2006),	p.	264.	
617 	USTR,	 U.S.-China	 Trade	 Relations:	 Entering	 a	 New	 Phase	 of	 Greater	 Accountability	 and	
Enforcement,	Top-to-Bottom	Review	(“Top-to-Bottom	Review”)	(Feb.	2006),	p.	11.	
618	Id.	
619 	Fabio	 Spadi,	 L’evoluzione	 del	 protocollo	 di	 accessione	 della	 Repubblica	 Popolare	 Cinese	
all’Organizzazione	mondiale	del	commercio	(DIRITTO	DEL	COMMERCIO	INTERNAZIONALE,	2000),	p	205-207.	
620	Chinese-US	negotiations	lastly	came	to	an	end	in	Nov.	1999	with	a	bilateral	agreement	for	China’s	
accession.	 In	 2000,	 China	 was	 acknowledged	 by	 the	 US	 Congress	 with	 a	 permanent	 normal	 trade	
status.	For	an	overview	of	the	US-China	policy	for	the	accession	of	China	to	the	WTO,	see	generally	
Alan	Alexandroff,	Concluding	China’s	Accession	to	the	WTO:	the	U.S.	Congress	and	Permanent	Most	
Favored	 Nation	 Status	 for	 China	 3	UCLA	 JOURNAL	OF	 INTERNATIONAL	 LAW	&	FOREIGN	AFFAIRS	 (1998–
1999).	
621	The	bilateral	EU-China	agreement	on	WTO	was	signed	in	Beijing	on	May	19,	2000.	For	a	scrutiny	
of	the	outcomes	attained	by	the	EU	in	addition	to	the	Sino-US	accord,	see	the	Sino-EU	Agreement	on	
China’s	 Accession	 to	 the	 WTO:	 Results	 of	 the	 Bilateral	 Negotiations.	 For	 further	 analysis,	 see	
Eberhard	 Sandschneider,	 China’s	 Diplomatic	 Relations	 with	 the	 States	 of	 Europe,	 THE	 CHINA	
QUARTERLY	(2002),	pp.	33–44;	Markus	Taube,	Economic	Relations	between	 the	PRC	and	 the	States	of	
Europe,	THE	CHINA	QUARTERLY	(2002),	pp.	79–105;	Olivier	Prost,	Song	Li	Wei,	China’s	Accession	to	the	
WTO:	How	will	this	Benefit	European	Undertakings?,	24	FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	(2001),	
pp.	554–559.	
622	China	and	Canada	signed	in	Toronto	in	Nov.	1999	their	bilateral	agreement	on	China’s	accession	
into	WTO.	
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The	WTO	Working	Group	Party	also	started	multilateral	negotiations	with	
China	 in	 order	 to	 define	 the	 rules	 that	 would	 govern	 trade	 with	 China,	 thus	
delineating	China’s	Protocol	of	Accession	and	its	Report	of	the	Working	Party,623	
which	includes	several	central	commitments	by	China	regarding	standards,	in	an	
effort	to	address	the	questions	expressed	by	other	Working	Party	members.		
Concerns	involved	the	opportunity	for	public	consultation	and	comment	on	
proposed	 Chinese	 standards,	 technical	 regulations	 and	 conformity	 assessment	
procedures.	Moreover,	some	WTO	members	asked	for	further	details	concerning	
China’s	 strategy	 for	 using	 international	 standards	 as	 a	 ground	 for	 new	 Chinese	
standards,	 and	 for	 reviewing	 present	 standards	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	 a	 deeper	
harmonization	 with	 international	 standards.	 On	 this	 point,	 the	 Chinese	
government	stressed	that	China	was	an	active	member	of	ISO,	IEC	and	the	ITU,	
contributing	 to	 the	 development	 of	 international	 standards.	 Additionally,	 some	
feared	 that	 Chinese	 requirements	 for	 technical	 regulations	 did	 not	 sufficiently	
address	 vital	 obligations,	 such	 as	 transparency,	 non-discrimination,	 national	
treatment,	 and	 avoidance	 of	 unnecessary	 barriers	 to	 trade.	 To	 meet	 these	
concerns,	 the	 Chinese	 government	 assumed	 the	 obligation	 that,	 in	 order	 to	
eradicate	needless	barriers	 to	 trade,	 it	would	not	uphold	multiple	or	duplicative	
conformity	assessment	procedures,	nor	would	it	impose	requirements	exclusively	
on	imported	products.		
Eventually,	 WTO	 members	 formally	 approved	 China’s	 accession	 to	 the	
WTO	and	China	became	the	WTO’s	143rd	member	on	December	11,	2001.624		
                                                
623	WTO,	Protocol	of	accession	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	to	the	WTO	(hereinafter	Protocol),	
Document	WT/L/432.	In	Nov.	2001,	during	the	fourth	WTO	ministerial	conference	in	Doha,	the	text	
of	the	agreement	for	China’s	entry	into	the	WTO	was	approved	by	consensus,	so	China	has	been	an	
official	member	of	 the	WTO	since	December	 11,	 2001.	For	a	 further	description	of	 the	GATT/WTO	
negotiations,	 see	Franco	Algieri,	EU	Economic	 Relations	with	China:	 An	 Institutionalist	 Perspective,	
THE	CHINA	QUARTERLY	(2002),	pp.	73–77.	
624	The	 China’s	 WTO	 accession	 documents	 are:	 the	 Protocol	 of	 China’s	 accession	 to	 the	 WTO	
(WT/L/432),	 the	 Working	 Party	 Report	 (WT/ACC/CHN/49)	 and	 the	 Annexes	 containing	 market	
access	commitments	(WT/ACC/CHN/49/Add.2).	On	China’s	accession,	see	James	Feinerman,	China’s	
Quest	to	Enter	the	GATT/WTO,	90	AMERICAN	SOCIETY	OF	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	PROCEDURE	(1996),	p.	402:	
“PRC	diplomats	have	been	lobbying	the	GATT	intensively	since	the	early	1980s	to	gain	admission”.	See	
also	MARIA	WEBER,	IL	MIRACOLO	CINESE:	PERCHE	BISOGNA	PRENDERE	LA	CINA	SUL	SERIO	(IL	MULINO,	2003),	p.	
83–84	;	Leila	Choukroune,	Chine	et	OMC:	l’état	de	droit	par	l’ouverture	au	commerce	international?,	6	
REVUE	DE	DROIT	DES	AFFAIRES	INTERNATIONALES	(2002),	p.	655.	
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During	 the	 accession	 negotiations,	 some	 parties	 had	 originally	 envisaged	
including	 	 specific	 language	 detailing	 China’s	 responsibilities	 to	 use	 relevant	
international	standards	as	a	basis	for	China’s	technical	regulations,	standards	and	
conformity	 assessment	 procedures,	 in	 compliance	 with	 Article	 2	 of	 the	 TBT	
Agreement.625	However,	 an	 agreement	 was	 not	 found	 and	 the	 final	 Protocol	 of	
Accession	is	silent	on	specific	responsibilities	to	use	international	standards,	and	
instead	provides	only	 that	China	will	comply	with	the	TBT	Agreement,	bringing	
all	 technical	 regulations,	 standards,	 and	 conformity	 assessment	 procedures	 into	
conformity	 with	 it.626.	 Furthermore,	 the	 Protocol	 of	 Accession	 is	 silent	 as	 to	
whether	 China	 is	 entitled	 to	 recourse	 as	 a	 developing	 country,627	and	 it	 is	 thus	
entitled	 to	 “special	 and	 differential	 treatment”	 under	 Article	 12	 of	 the	 TBT	
Agreement.628	
In	the	light	of	China’s	aggressive	push	towards	national	ICT	standardization	
(see	 below,	 in	 particular,	 the	 WAPI	 case	 and	 its	 openly	 stated	 apprehensions	
about	IP	rights	as	an	obstacle	to	 following	 international	standards,	 the	concerns	
raised	 by	 China	 during	 the	 accession	 negotiations	 were	 revealing,	 signaling	
perhaps	that	the	anticipated	issues	would	soon	arise	to	create	tensions.	
2.3. THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IMPLICATIONS OF STANDARDIZATION 
The	 international	 trade	 implications	 of	 standardization	 cannot	 be	
overstated.	 The	 2005	 World	 Trade	 Report	 explains	 how	 this	 standard-setting	
dynamic	 can	 play	 out	 in	 competition	 between	 countries	 “[T]o	 the	 extent	 that	
promoters	 of	 competing	 standards	 come	 from	 different	 countries	 and	 the	 winner	
can	 claim	 rents	 from	 the	 adoption	 of	 their	 standard,	 strategic	 trade	 policy	
considerations	 come	 into	 play”.	 The	 protectionist	 concern	 is	 tangible,	 as	 “[a]	
government	 can	 try	 to	 tip	 the	 balance	 in	 favor	 of	 its	 national	 champion	 by	
mandating	the	use	of	the	firm’s	standard	at	home.	This	would	be	in	the	hope	that	an	
                                                
625	See	Ichiro	Araki,	China	and	the	Agreement	on	Technical	Barriers	to	Trade,	RIETI	DISCUSSION	PAPER	
SERIES	02-E-008,	p.	8	(July	2002)	(quoting	paragraph	15	of	the	draft	Protocol).	
626	Id.	at	paras	13.2	and	13.4(a).	
627	Id.	
628	Id.	,	p.	10.	
 172 
installed	base	of	users	would	create	a	strong	enough	bandwagon	effect	to	convince	
foreign	suppliers	to	switch	to	the	national	firm’s	standard	in	other	markets”.629		
Government	 involvement	 in	 standardization,	 whether	 through	 regulation,	
preferential	treatment	to	domestic	firms,	measures	that	make	it	more	difficult	for	
foreign	firms,	and	even	strategic	use	of	antitrust,	must	be	examined	with	caution	
and	with	due	regard	to	trade	considerations,	as	it	may	infringe	WTO	rules.	As	the	
2005	World	Trade	Report	puts	it,	the	WTO	“deals	with	 the	 rules	of	 international	
trade	and	inevitably	has	to	deal	with	the	role	of	standards	in	international	trade.”630	
Moreover,	 “[i]n	 a	 global	 system,	 coherence	 between	 multilateral	 trade	 rules	 and	
standard-setting	 policies	 is	 necessary	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 conflicts	 among	 trading	
partners”.631	
Standards	play	an	undisputed	crucial	role,	also	recognized	within	the	WTO,	
as	trade	facilitators.	Indeed,	“a	stable	and	mutually	supportive	relationship	between	
standards	 regimes	 and	 international	 trade	 rules	 is	 central	 to	 the	 effective	
functioning	of	 the	 trading	system.”632	However,	standards	must	be	construed	in	a	
way	that	prevents	their	use	by	governments	as	a	protectionist	weapon,	“avoid[ing]	
the	 misappropriation	 or	 capture	 of	 public	 policy	 in	 these	 areas	 to	 construct	
unwarranted	obstacles	to	competition	and	trade”.633	
3. CHINA’S STANCE ON STANDARDIZATION: THE USE OF STANDARDS AS A 
PROTECTIONIST REGULATORY TOOL TO COUNTERVAIL STRATEGIC 
PATENTING  
In	China,	the	Indigenous	Innovation	policy	has	raised	concerns	that	directly	
implicate	 international	 trade	 obligations	 under	 the	WTO’s	 legal	 framework	 and	
hint	at	the	possible	protectionist	goal	of	China’s	standardization	policy.	In	other	
words,	concerns	have	been	raised,	especially	on	the	part	of	the	US,	that	China	is	
“actively	pursuing	the	development	of	unique	requirements,	despite	the	existence	of	
                                                
629	See	 World	 Trade	 Organisation,	 World	 Trade	 Report	 2005	 –	 Exploring	 links	 between	 trade,	
standards	and	the	WTO	(2005),	p.	41.	
630	Id.,	at	xxv.	
631	Id.,	at	xxxvi.	
632	These	 are	 the	words	 used	 by	WTO’s	 former	Director-General,	 Supachai	 Panitchpakdi,	 stressing	
that	standards	are	key	for	abetting	efficient	markets	where	technical	interoperability	is	indispensable,	
such	as	networked	environments.	Supachai	Panitchpakdi,	Foreword	to	World	Trade	Report	2005,	at	iii.	
633	Ibid.	
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well-established	 international	 standards,	 as	 a	 means	 for	 protecting	 domestic	
companies	from	competing	foreign	standards	and	technologies”.634		
This	 policy	 is	 likely	 susceptible	 to	 function	 as	 a	 barrier	 to	 entry	 into	 the	
Chinese	 market,	 since	 foreign	 companies	 will	 have	 to	 comply	 with	 domestic	
standards,	thus	enacting	costly	switching	and	compliance	policies.	As	highlighted	
in	 the	 2006	 Report	 to	 Congress	 on	 China’s	 WTO	 Compliance,	 “China	 has	
continued	to	resort	 to	 industrial	policies	 that	 limit	market	access	 for	non-Chinese	
origin	goods	and	foreign	service	providers	[…]	In	some	cases,	the	objective	of	these	
policies	 seems	 to	 be	 to	 promote	 the	 development	 of	 Chinese	 industries	 that	 are	
higher	 up	 the	 economic	 value	 chain	 than	 the	 industries	 that	 make	 up	 China’s	
current	labor-intensive	base”.635	
Of	 course,	 standardization	 cannot	 be	 considered	 good	 per	 se	 in	 all	
circumstances	 as	 the	 development	 of	 domestic	 competing	 and	 mandatory	
standards	can	raise	substantial	non-trade	barriers	to	international	trade	and	open	
markets. 636 	Under	 certain	 circumstances,	 China’s	 emphasis	 on	 home-grown	
standards,	diverging	from	existing	international	ones,	is	arguably	defensively	used	
to	 raise	 standards’	 compliance	 costs	 for	 non-Chinese	 market	 participants	 and	
significantly	restrain	their	market	access.		
From	 a	 global	 perspective,	 China’s	 adoption	 of	 competing	 national	
standards	has	implications	on	its	WTO	commitments;	commitments	which	push	
towards	 the	 removal	 of	 trade	 and	 investment	 barriers,	 the	 fostering	 of	 greater	
integration	 into	 the	 world	 economy	 and	 fair	 competition.637	Although,	 explicit	
barriers	 to	 international	 trade	 such	 as	 quotas	 on	 imports	 and	 high	 tariffs	 have	
been	gradually	 reduced	or	 even	 removed	by	 the	GATT,	 established	 in	 1947,	 and	
the	WTO,	 established	 in	 1995,638	current	 trade	 liberalization	 has	moved	 on	 into	
                                                
634 	UNITED	 STATES	 TRADE	 REPRESENTATIVE	 (USTR),	 2014	 REPORT	 TO	 CONGRESS	 ON	 CHINA’S	 WTO	
COMPLIANCE	(2014).	In	the	same	terms,	USTR,	2006	REPORT	TO	CONGRESS	ON	CHINA’S	WTO	COMPLIANCE	
(2006),	and	USTR,	2003	REPORT	TO	CONGRESS	ON	CHINA’S	WTO	COMPLIANCE	(2003).		
635	USTR,	2006	REPORT	TO	CONGRESS	ON	CHINA’S	WTO	COMPLIANCE	47	(2006),	p.	7.	
636	John	S.	Wilson,	Standards,	Trade	and	Development,	in	OPENING	STANDARDS:	THE	GLOBAL	POLITICS	OF	
INTEROPERABILITY	(ED.	LAURA	DE	NARDIS,	MIT	PRESS,	2011),	p.	119.	
637	See	 ALICE	AMSDEN,	 ESCAPE	 FROM	EMPIRE:	 THE	DEVELOPING	WORLD’S	 JOURNEY	 THROUGH	HEAVEN	 AND	
HELL	(CAMBRIDGE,	MA:	MIT	PRESS,	2007).	
638	Tariffs	 are	 the	 preferred	 trade	 barrier	 under	 GATT	 rules	 while	 quotas	 and	 other	 NTBs	 are	
disfavoured.	Article	11	GATT	establishes	as	follows:	“No	prohibitions	or	restrictions	other	than	duties,	
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the	less	obvious	area	of	implicit	non-trade	barriers	(“NTBs”),	which	have	become	
increasingly	significant.639	
Specifically,	issues	related	to	standards	and	trade	were	addressed	under	the	
GATT	by	the	voluntary	GATT	Standards	Code.640	Following	the	Uruguay	Round	of	
negotiations,	 which	 resulted	 in	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 WTO,	 the	 technical	
standards	regime	converted	from	voluntary	rules	to	mandatory	obligations	under	
the	Agreement	on	Technical	Barriers	to	Trade	(the	“TBT	Agreement”)641.	China,	as	
a	 WTO	 member,	 is	 subject	 to	 this	 TBT	 Agreement,	 which	 acknowledges	 the	
growing	 impact	 of	 standards	 on	 trade	 in	 goods	 and	 under	 international	 law,	 in	
particular,	with	its	core	principles	prohibiting	discriminatory	trade	practices	and	
unnecessary	barriers	to	trade.	
It	is	important	to	note	that	the	TBT	Agreement	also	requires	member	states	
to	 use	 “international	 standards”	 if	 they	 “exist	 or	 their	 completion	 is	 imminent”	
(Article	2(4)	of	the	TBT	Agreement).		
Against	 this	 background,	many	 critics	 have	 claimed	 that	China’s	 focus	 on	
domestic	 standards	 represents	 a	 form	 of	 protectionism	 contravening	WTO	 and	
TBT	principles.	China	maintains	that	the	international	standardization	regime	is	
the	real	barrier	to	trade.		
The	 Chinese	 delegation	 to	 the	 WTO	 has	 constantly	 asserted	 that	 the	
mandatory	imposition	of	proprietary	technology	standards	impedes	international	
trade.	It	contends	that	patents	in	international	standards	should	be	subordinated	
to	 some	 sort	 of	 FRAND	 licensing	 if	 observance	 to	 those	 standards	 is	 to	 be	
obligatory	 under	 the	 TBT	 Agreement.642	It	 has	 been	 pointed	 out	 that	 this	 is	 an	
ostensibly	 straightforward	 position	 that	 the	 U.S.	 maintains	 it	 cannot	 even	
                                                                                                                                 
taxes	 or	 other	 charges,	 whether	 made	 effective	 through	 quotas,	 import	 or	 export	 licences	 or	 other	
measures,	shall	be	instituted	or	maintained	by	any	contracting	party	on	the	importation	of	any	product	
of	the	territory	of	any	other	contracting	party	or	on	the	exportation	or	sale	 for	export	of	any	product	
destined	for	the	territory	of	any	other	contracting	party”.		
639 	ALAN	 O.	 SYKES,	 PRODUCT	 STANDARDS	 FOR	 INTERNATIONALLY	 INTEGRATED	 GOODS	 MARKETS	 (THE	
BROOKINGS	INSTITUTION	1995).	
640	Agreement	on	Technical	Barriers	to	Trade	(with	Annexes),	12	Apr.	1979,	1186	U.N.T.S.	276.	
641	Agreement	 on	Technical	 Barriers	 to	 Trade,	 15	Apr.	 1994,	Marrakesh	Agreement	 Establishing	 the	
World	Trade	Organization,	Annex	IA,	Legal	Instruments-Results	of	the	Uruguay	Round.	
642	Christopher	S.	Gibson,	Globalization	and	 the	Technology	Standards	Game:	Balancing	Concerns	of	
Protectionism	 and	 Intellectual	 Property	 in	 International	 Standards,	 22	BERKELEY	TECH.	L.J.	 1403,	 1464	
(2007),	pp.	1429-1435.	
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grasp.643	In	 other	 words,	 China	 maintains	 that	 the	 international	 standards	 that	
include	proprietary	IPRs,	which	are	mainly	designed	and	ultimately	controlled	by	
developed	 advanced	 countries,	 are	 harmful	 to	 fair	 competition	 and	 have	 a	
detrimental	impact	on	international	trade.		
In	this	vein,	China	called	for	the	WTO	TBT	Committee	to	reflect	upon	the	
relationship	between	IPRs	and	international	standards	in	the	TBT	Agreement.	In	
its	 submission,	 China	 stated:	 “If	 Members	 are	 not	 clear	 of	 IPRs	 in	 the	 relevant	
international	standard,	whether	all	the	IPRs	have	been	disclosed,	under	what	terms	
the	 IPRs	 are	 to	 be	 licensed	 by	 the	 IPR	 holders,	 all	 WTO	 Members	 will	 face	
difficulties	when	adopting	international	standards…From	the	governmental	level,	as	
well	 as	 the	 company	 level,	 there	 exists	 the	 kind	 of	 unwillingness	 of	 adopting	
international	 standards	 as	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 national	 standards	 and	 technical	
regulations	if	there	is	no	common	rule	to	regulate	IPRs	in	standardization.	Such	a	
situation	will	bring	a	negative	impact	on	implementation	of	a	TBT	Agreement”.644	
The	perception	of	unfairness	 concerning	 standards	derives	 from	 the	very	
dynamics	 that	 characterize	 patent	 licensing.	 Research	 has	 suggested	 that	
patenting	 is	 not	 concentrated	 among	 firms	 of	 any	 one	 country.	 Rather,	 it	 is	
distributed	at	 least	 among	 firms	based	 in	 the	major	developed	economies	 (the	
U.S.	 (Qualcomm,	 InterDigital	 and	 Motorola),	 Korea	 (LG	 and	 Samsung),	 and	
Europe	 (Nokia	 and	 Ericsson)).	 In	 this	 context,	 China’s	 Huawei	 represents	 an	
exception,	as	it	has	been	extremely	active	in	the	area	of	Internet	standardization	
and	related	patent	holdings.645		
Nonetheless,	less-developed	countries	are	still	lagging	behind.	Firms	based	
in	 advanced	 countries	 that	 participate	 in	 SSOs	 attain	 patents	 covering	 the	
standard	 globally,	 implementing	 the	 standards	 in	 products	 that	 are	 sold	
                                                
643 	After	 thoroughly	 reviewing	 the	 concerns	 raised	 by	 the	 Chinese	 delegation,	 the	 U.S.’s	
representative	“could	not	see	any	such	relationship”	between	SEP	hold	ups	and	the	TBT	Agreement’s	
focus	on	removing	technical	barriers	to	trade.	Id.,	p.	1431.	
644	Communication	 from	the	People’s	Republic	of	China,	 Intellectual	Property	Right	 (IPR)	 Issues	 in	
Standardization,	G/TBT/W/251/Add.1,	November	9,	2006.	
645	As	 for	 Japanese	 firms	 such	 as	 Sony,	 Toshiba,	 Sharp	 and	 Panasonic,	 although	 they	 have	 played	
major	 roles	 in	 many	 areas	 of	 ICT	 standardization,	 Contreras	 notes	 that	 they	 are	 comparatively	
underrepresented	 in	 telecommunications	 and	 networking	 SSOs,	 due	 primarily	 to	 early	 policies	
adopted	 by	 the	 Japanese	 government.	 Jorge	 L.	 Contreras,	Divergent	 Patterns	 of	 Engagement	 in	
Internet	 Standardization:	Japan,	Korea	and	China,	38	TELECOMUNICATIONS	POLICY	(2014).		
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worldwide.	 As	 remarked	 by	 Contreras,	 when	 firms	 in	 less-advanced	 countries	
eventually	 become	mindful	 of	 “the	 potential	 for	 sales	 of	 such	 products	 in	 their	
own	 countries	 (possibly	 with	 locally-attractive	 features,	 lower	 costs	 or	
domestically-sourced	 components),the	 basic	 product	 	 technologies	 have	 already	
been	patented	by	foreign	[…]	firms”.646	
Non-patent	holding		firms	from	less-developed	countries	are	then	forced	to	
seek	licenses	from	foreign	patent-holding	firms	in	order	to	produce	standardized	
products	in	their	domestic	markets.	Here	comes	the	real	issue:	as	remarked	by	the	
literature,	 the	 royalties	 requested	 by	 foreign	 patent-holding	 firms,	 although	
disputably	 reasonable	on	an	 international	 stage,	may	be	 regarded	as	 inequitable	
by	 local	 firms	 and	 governments.	 This	 is	 especially	 true	 where	 foreign	 patent-
holding	 firms	 enter	 the	market	 and	 compete	with	 the	 local	 non-patent	 holding	
firms.647	
Facing	 this	 alleged	 unfairness,	 often	 non-patent	 holding	 developing	
countries	may	decide:		
I. to	 adopt	 protective	 regulations,	 and	 embark	 on	 enforcement	
efforts	 aimed	 at	 sheltering	 their	 local	 industries.	 These	 actions,	
where	 amounting	 to	 explicitly	 protectionist	 regulation,	 could	
infringe	 a	number	of	 international	 treaty	obligations,	 such	as	 the	
WTO	Agreements;	
II. to	 strategically	 use	 existing	 regulation,	 competition	 	 law	
investigations		and	enforcement	actions	against	large	Western	SEP	
holders.	 For	 example,	 the	 recent	 Qualcomm/NDRC	 case.	 In	
February	 2015,	 China’s	 National	 Development	 and	 Reform	
Commission	 (the	 “NDRC”)	 fined	 Qualcomm	 approximately	 USD	
975	 million	 for	 a	 range	 of	 alleged	 violations	 of	 China’s	
Antimonopoly	Law	in	connection	with	its	licensing	of	SEPs.		
                                                
646	Jorge	 L.	 Contreras,	 Patents,	 Standards	 and	 Borders:	 Addressing	 National	 Disparities	 among	
Holders	 of	 Standard-Essential	 Patents,	 East-West	 Center	Workshop	 on	 Mega-Regionalism	 -	 New	
Challenges	for	Trade	and	Innovation,	2016.	
647	Id.	
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Some	 notable	 examples	 of	 efforts	 to	 use	 standards	 as	 a	 protectionist	 tool	
deserve	brief	 scrutiny.	They	 illustrate	not	only	 the	dual	nature	of	 standards,	but	
also	the	role	of	patenting	practices	perceived	as	unfair,	generating	a	protectionist	
response	by	emerging	economies.		
3.1. THE WAPI CASE 
The	 wireless	 LAN	 authentication	 (the	 “WAPI”)	 saga	 is	 an	 example	 of	 the	
Chinese	 government’s	 attempt	 to	 assist	 its	 ICT	 firms	 in	 moving	 up	 the	 global	
value	chain	by	decreasing	the	encumbrance	of	royalties.		
The	 Standardization	 Administration	 of	 China	 (the	 “SAC”)	 and	 the	
Administration	for	Quality	Supervision,	Inspection,	and	Quarantine	(the	“AQSIQ”)	
adopted	a	new	encryption	standard	for	wireless	devices	sold	in	China,	which	was	
termed	WAPI.648	The	 standard	 was	 issued	 in	 March	 2003	 and	 the	 Government	
imposed	that	by	the	end	of	2003	all	wireless	devices	entering	the	Chinese	market	
had	to	conform	to	this	standard.		
Officially,	the	adoption	of	the	WAPI	standard	was	justified	by	alleging	that	
the	security	specification	 for	 the	 IEEE-802.11	wireless	standard	(“Wi-Fi”)	was	not	
sufficiently	 secure.649	Despite	 this	 official	 reason	 supporting	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	
new	wireless	security	protocol,	doubts	were	cast	that	this	imposition	was	actually	
prompted	 by	 IPR	 concerns,650	as	 the	 application	 of	 the	 WAPI	 standard	 was	
conditional	on	access	to	specific	encryption	technologies	that	were	largely	owned	
by	Chinese	firms,	some	of	them	being	potential	competitors	with	Western	firms.		
In	order	to	comply	with	the	WAPI	standard,	this	scheme	would	have	forced	
foreign	 microchip	 makers	 to	 acquire	 licenses	 and	 consequentially	 pay	 a	 per-
microchip	 royalty	 from	 their	 Chinese	 counterparts.651	This	 furthermore	 meant	
that	foreign	companies	would	have	been	required	to	cooperate	with	their	Chinese	
                                                
648	Administration	for	Quality	Supervision,	Inspection,	and	Quarantine	(AQSIQ)	and	Standardization	
Administration	 of	 China	 (SAC)’s	 Notification	 regarding	 Implementation	 of	 National	 Mandatory	
Standard	for	WLAN	(promulgated	by	AQSIQ	and	SAC)	(November	26,	2003).	
649	For	 a	detailed	overview	of	 the	WAPI	case,	 see	Brian	DeLacey,	Kerry	Herman,	David	Kiron,	 Josh	
Lerner,	Wai-Shun	Lo,	Government	Intervention	in	Standardization:	The	Case	of	WAPI	(2006).	
650	Christopher	 S.	 Gibson,	 Globalization	 and	 Technology	 Standards	 Game:	 Balancing	 Concerns	 of	
Protectionism	 and	 Intellectual	 Property	 in	 International	 Standards,	 22	 BERKELEY	 TECHNOLOGY	 LAW	
JOURNAL	(2007),	p.	1435.	
651	Id.,	pp.	1436-1437.	
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competitors	 in	 the	R&D	sector,	 thus	 sharing	 their	proprietary	 technologies	with	
potential	competitors.	The	exclusionary	effect	on	 foreign	companies	would	have	
been	even	more	magnified	by	the	fact	that	the	WAPI	standard	was	designed	to	be	
incompatible	 with	 the	Wi-Fi	 standard.	 Accordingly,	 foreign	 micro-chip	 makers	
would	 have	 had	 to	 develop	 new	 products	 suitable	 for	 the	 Chinese	 standards,	
which,	 of	 course,	 would	 increase	 the	 manufacturing	 costs	 for	 non-Chinese	
companies.	652		
Once	 the	WAPI	 standard	was	 adopted,	China	 lobbied	 for	 adoption	 of	 the	
WAPI	 standard	 as	 an	 international	 standard	 by	 the	 ISO,	 but	 the	 standard	 was	
ultimately	 rejected	 in	 favor	 of	 the	 IEEE	 802.11i	 security	 protocol.653	However,	
China	 stuck	 to	 WAPI,	 appealing	 ISO’s	 decision	 and	 endorsing	 the	 WAPI	
technology	 through	 alternative	 channels.	 Indeed,	 in	 2009,	 all	 three	 of	 China’s	
mobile	 carriers	 incorporated	WAPI-capability	 as	 a	 requirement	 for	 handsets	 on	
their	 networks,	 raising	 the	 suspicion	 of	 the	 Government’s	 influence.654	Lastly,	
China	even	resubmitted	the	standard	for	international	consideration	in	2009.655	
Ultimately,	 in	 light	 of	 WAPI’s	 distinctively	 indigenous	 character	 and	 the	
government’s	 resolute	 support	 for	 it	 notwithstanding	 international	 political	 and	
commercial	 resistance,656	the	 regulatory	 imposition	 of	 this	 domestic	 standard	 is	
generally	 perceived	 as	 an	 attempt	 to	 support	 local	 enterprises	 to	 gain	 a	
competitive	 advantage	 to	 the	 detriment	 of	Western	microchip	makers,	 both	 in	
the	Chinese	market	and	internationally.	For	these	reasons	WAPI	is	considered	the	
“poster	 child	 for	China’s	use	of	 standards	 in	 the	 service	of	 techno-nationalism”.657	
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WAPI	 and	 South	 Korea’s	 WIPI,	 32(9–10)	 TELECOMMUNICATIONS	 POLICY	 662	 (2008),	 p.	 666;	 UNITED	
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Standardization:	The	Case	of	WAPI	(2006).	
654	Ibid.	See	also	Owen	Fletcher,	Years	on,	China	Pushes	WAPI	in	Mobile	Phones,	CIO	(8	May	2009).	
655	Watch	Out:	WAPI	is	back	on	the	Wi-Fi	agenda,	EE	TIMES	(19	Jun.	2009).	
656	Owen	Fletcher,	Years	on,	China	Pushes	WAPI	in	Mobile	Phones,	CIO	(8	May	2009)	
657	Christopher	 McElwain,	The	 World's	 Laboratory:	 China's	 Patent	 Boom,	 IT	 Standards	 and	 the	
Implications	 for	 the	 Global	 Knowledge	 Economy,	 14	SANTA	CLARA	JOURNAL	OF	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	441	
(2016),	p.	451.	See	also	Zia	K.	Cromer,	China’s	WAPI	policy:	security	measure	or	trade	protectionism?,	4	
DUKE	 L.	 &	 TECH.	 REV.	 1	 (2005);	 Richard	 P.	 Suttmeier,	 A	 New	 Technonationalism?	 China	 and	 the	
Development	of	Technical	Standards,	48	COMMUNICATIONS	OF	THE	ACM	35	(2005),	
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However,	 some	commentators	have	remarked	that	 the	WAPI	saga	 is	 “something	
of	an	outlier	…a	fixation	that	China	developed	while	its	new	standardization	regime	
was	in	its	infancy	and	one	that	is	arguably	rooted	as	much	in	the	security	paranoia	
of	 particular	 state	 actors	 as	 in	 a	 broad	national	 economic	policy	designed	 to	 give	
domestic	companies	a	leg	up”.658	
After	WAPI,	China’s	alleged	techno-nationalism	in	the	ICT	standardization	
sector	has	become	“more	nuanced”.	McElwain	and	Fernandez,	 for	example,	have	
noticed	 how	 Chinese	 home-grown	 standards	 “often	 incorporate	 significant	
amounts	 of	 foreign	 technology,	 making	 their	 effectiveness	 questionable	 as	 pure	
tools	of	techno-nationalism”.	Moreover,	“in	nearly	every	case,	government	efforts	to	
promote	 the	 standard	have	been	 far	 from	unequivocal	and	have	 failed	 to	 result	 in	
the	 commercial	 success	 that	 Indigenous	 Innovation	 proponents	 supposedly	
crave”.659	
3.2. THE TD-SCDMA CASE 
For	 instance,	 among	 all	 standards	 set	 by	 China,	 the	 3G	 mobile	 Time	
Division-Synchronous	Code	Division	Multiple	Access	 (“TD-SCDMA”)	 technology	
standard	has	drawn	most	attention.		
The	TD-SCDMA	is	the	only	Chinese	standard	approved	by	an	international	
organization	 (i.e.	 the	 ITU).	 Moreover,	 the	 Chinese	 government	 has	 constantly	
given	preferential	treatment	to	its	development	over	competing	standards	like	W-
CDMA	 and	 CDMA2000,	 which	 were	 created	 and	 embraced	 by	 European	 and	
American	 multinational	 corporations,	 respectively.660	The	 Chinese	 government	
has	allocated	tremendous	resources	and	efforts	 to	 the	TD-SCDMA,	which	raised	
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660 	M.	 Hess,	 N.M.	 Cowe,	 Making	 connections:	 global	 production	 networks,	 standards,	 and	
embeddedness	 in	 the	mobile-telecommunications	 industry,	38	ENVIRONMENT	AND	PLANNING	A	7	(2006),	
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the	 debate	 over	 its	 motivations.661 	For	 example,	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Information	
Industry,	 the	 NDRC	 and	 the	MOST	 jointly	 subsidized	 TD-SCDMA	 R&D	 in	 the	
amount	of	RMB	700	million	from	2002	to	2003662	and	RMB	1	billion	from	2004	to	
2006. 663 	Moreover,	 state	 directed	 national	 banks,	 such	 as	 the	 Industry	 and	
Commerce	 Bank	 (the	 “ICBC”),	 the	 Construction	 Bank	 of	 China	 and	 the	Huasia	
Bank,	 offered	 loans	 for	 approximately	 RMB	 1.5	 billion.	 Additionally,	 the	 China	
Development	 Bank	 offered	RMB	 38	 billion	 during	 2005	 to	 2007	 for	 TD-SCDMA	
network	building	and	testing.664	
Yet,	 the	 TD-SCDMA	 standard	 was	 not	 a	 great	 success	 in	 the	 market	 as	
market	 forces	 managed	 to	 offset	 Government-sponsored	 favoritism	 and	 so	 the	
Government	did	not	manage	 to	 “have	 “foreign”	 telephony	 standards	 […]	actually	
excluded	from	China”.	Support	from	the	Chinese	Government	was	not	sufficient	to	
prevent	the	TD-SCDMA	network	from	lacking	industry-player	backing	and	from	
losing	market	share	to	competing	W-CDMA	and	CDMA2000	standards.		
3.3. THE EVD CASE  
A	 further	 illuminating	 example	 of	 domestic	 standards	 incorporating	
noteworthy	 amounts	 of	 foreign	 technology	 and	 that	 did	 not	 enjoy	 much	
commercial	 success,	 even	 within	 China,	 is	 the	 Enhanced	 Versatile	 Disk	 (the	
“EVD”).		
Its	 adoption	 was	 directly	 encouraged	 by	 the	 Chinese	 government	 in	 an	
effort	 to	develop	an	alternative	 to	 the	DVD.	 In	particular,	 it	was	developed	as	a	
response	to	China’s	loss	of	dominance	in	the	production	of	digital	optical	storage	
media	 (for	 example,	 CD	 players,	 DVD	 players,	 computer	 disk	 drives,	 and	 high-
definition	disk	drives).665	Indeed,	the	manufacturing	sector’s	profits	were	 limited	
due	 to	 burdensome	 royalties	 that	 loomed	 over	 China’s	 downstream	
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a	Flagship?	DRUID	(DANISH	RESEARCH	UNIT	FOR	INDUSTRIAL	DYNAMICS)	WORKING	PAPER	NO.	07-01(2006).	
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Technology	Standards,	2013	CARDOZO	LAW	REVIEW	DE	NOVO	196	(2013),	p.	204.	
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manufacturers,	 who	 did	 not	 have	 much	 leverage	 to	 renegotiate	 the	 licensing	
terms.666	To	 assuage	 this	 adverse	 trend,	 the	 Chinese	 Ministry	 of	 Information	
Industry	 and	 the	 Chinese	 State	 Trade	 and	 Economic	 Commission	 started	 to	
develop	 an	 indigenous	 standard	 by	 bringing	 together	 government-funded	
research	 institutes	 and	 DVD	 manufacturers	 to	 develop	 the	 EVD,	 a	 competing	
format	to	the	DVD.667		
Despite	this	auspicious	effort,	the	government	support	did	not	prevent	the	
EVD	from	being	a	commercial	fiasco,	which	was	accelerated	by	the	appearance	of	
next-generation	 optical	 storage	 technologies,	 such	 as	 the	 high-definition	 digital	
video	disk	(HD-DVD)	and	Blu-Ray.668		
3.4. CONCLUSIONS: NOT JUST PROTECTIONISM 
The	 analysis	 of	 the	 efforts	 made	 by	 the	 Chinese	 government	 to	 use	
standards	 as	 a	 protectionist	 tool	 show	 that	 Indigenous	 innovation	 is	 not	 the	
ultimate	aim	of	China’s	strategy,	which	appears	to	be	more	complex,	articulated	
and	 nuanced.	 Although	 the	 chief	 objective	 of	 Chinese	 policy	 towards	 fostering	
home-grown	 standards	 remains	 to	 immunize	 domestic	 industries	 from	 foreign	
competition,	 it	 is	 a	 many-sided	 effort	 towards	 modifying	 international	 norms	
towards	a	paradigm	closer	 to	China’s	economic	 interests	and,	arguably,	more	 in	
harmony	with	Chinese	approaches	towards	proprietary	technology.669	
This	conclusion	seems	 to	be	confirmed	by	 the	EDV	case	 illustrated	above.	
Despite	being	a	commercial	debacle,	this	regulatory	intervention	partly	succeeded	
in	 lowering	 the	 burden	 of	 royalty	 payments	 for	 Chinese	 manufacturers,670	thus	
serving	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 Chinese	 ICT	 industry.	 Most	 importantly,	 the	 EVD	
standard	 allowed	 Chinese	 firms	 to	 guarantee	 leverage	 in	 the	 DVD	 royalty	
negotiations	 by	 augmenting	 their	 fallback	 position	 or	 “threat	 point”,	 using	 the	
                                                
666	Ibid.	
667	Greg	 Linden,	China	 Standard	 Time:	 A	 Study	 in	 Strategic	 Industrial	 Policy,	 6	 BUSINESS	&	POLICY	 1	
(2004),	p.	15.	
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 182 
EVD	standard	and	its	availability	as	a	negotiating	weapon	for	about	30	%	less	of	
the	 licensing	 fees	 for	 the	DVD	 standard.	Chinese	 companies	 could,	 in	 case	 of	 a	
dispute,	have	restricted	the	sale	of	non-EVD	players	in	China.	Empirical	evidence	
has	 shown	 that	 the	 development	 of	 the	 EVD	 triggered	 an	 increase	 in	 royalty	
concessions	from	major	IP-rich	Western	companies	who	held	patents	vital	to	the	
DVD	standard.671		
In	 conclusion,	 although	 perhaps	 the	 Chinese	 drive	 for	 alternative	 ICT	
standards	can	sometimes	be	explained	as	a	way	to	rely	on	competing	technologies	
to	force	royalty	concessions	down,	672	protectionism	is	not	the	only	driver.	Rather,	
sheltering	 specific	domestic	 industries	 represents	an	aspect	of	 a	greater	 strategy	
aimed	at	boosting	Chinese	firms’	status	within	the	world’s	supply	chain	and	trade	
arena.	 The	 Chinese	 standardization	 policy	 aims	 to	 alleviate	 the	 alleged	
commercial	encumbrance	produced	when	manufacturers	are	forced	to	lease	IPRs	
solely	for	purposes	of	international	compatibility.673	
4. ADDRESSING PROTECTIONISM WITHIN THE WTO: THE GLOBAL 
DIMENSION OF COMPETITION POLICY AND IP RIGHTS IN STANDARDIZATION 
An	analysis	of	the	trade	implications	of	standardization	at	the	international	
level	 should	 assess	whether	 there	 is	 a	 comprehensive	multilateral	 framework	 to	
address	 the	 use	 of	 regulatory	 processes	 that	 threaten	 global	 trade.	 Indeed	
competition	and	efficiency	have	been	the	foundation	stone	of	a	globalized	trading	
regime	 within	 the	 WTO’s	 legal	 framework,	 attained	 by	 means	 of	 the	 non-
discrimination	principle.674	Notwithstanding	the	absence	of	a	competition	regime	
at	the	multinational	level,	the	issue	of	patenting	in	standards	and	the	use	of	non-
tariff	barriers	as	a	means	to	curtail	international	trade	are	at	the	core	of	the	TBT	
and	TRIP	agreements.	
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The	 TBT	 Agreement,	 as	 seen	 above,	 fosters	 the	 adoption	 of	 available	
international	 standards	 and	 encourages	 harmonization	 to	 counter	 obstacles	 to	
global	 trade.	The	TRIPS	agreement	 is	based	on	 the	 “exclusive	 rights”	granted	 to	
patent	 holders	 and	 the	 patent	 owners’	 right	 to	 charge	 a	market	 price	 for	 their	
inventions.	Nonetheless,	both	 the	TBT	and	 the	TRIPS	agreements	do	not	 tackle	
how	competition	policy	should	play	out.	Moreover,	a	comparative	investigation	of	
antitrust	enforcement	in	different	jurisdictions,	namely	the	EU	and	China,	shows	
a	 great	 margin	 of	 divergence	 on	 the	 issue	 of	 patents	 in	 standards.	 Moreover,	
competition	law	is	prone	to	be	misused	by	governments	as	a	means	to	implement	
industrial	 policies	 by	 favoring	 regulatory	 intervention	 or	 inertia.675	By	 the	 same	
token,	 technical	 standards	 can	 promote	 or	 stifle	 domestic	 trade	 and	 industrial	
policy	 aims.676	Therefore,	 a	 mere	 competition	 perspective,	 prone	 to	 dynamic	
efficiency	 and	 deferential	 to	 strong	 IP	 protection,	 allowing	 patent	 holders	 to	
extract	free	market	royalties	in	a	standards	context,	would	ultimately	support	the	
industrial	policy	objectives	of,	exclusively,	IP	producing	countries.677	
4.1.1.  NON-TARIFF BARRIERS TO TRADE (“NTBS”) AND THE TBT 
AGREEMENT 
From	 a	 preliminary	 analysis	 it	 emerges	 that	 the	WTO	 has	 only	 a	 limited	
ability	 to	 combat	 the	mentioned	 protectionist	 trend	within	 the	 use	 of	 strategic	
domestic	standardization.	However,	the	WTO	combines	a	package	of	multilateral	
agreements	 addressing	 a	 number	 of	 measures,	 such	 as	 NTBs,	 that	 could	
potentially	 have	 a	 protectionist	 purpose	 over	 domestic	 interests,	 thus	 impeding	
competition	from	imports.678		
Gradually,	along	with	the	reduction	of	tariffs	over	the	more	than	forty	years	
of	 the	 GATT	 regime,	 NTBs	 have	 become	 more	 important,	 amounting	 to	 “the	
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crucial	 terrain	 of	 trade	 policy	 today.” 679 	NTBs	 can	 be	 described	 as	 non-tax	
measures	adopted	in	international	trade	relations	in	order	to	narrow	the	amount	
of	imports.	They	include	quotas,	which	specify	the	quantity	of	a	specific	item	that	
a	 country	 allows	 to	 be	 imported	 during	 a	 given	 time	 period,	 import	 licenses,	
subsidies	to	domestic	production	and	technical	regulations.680	
Specifically	addressing	these	NTBs,	 the	Tokyo	Round	 in	 the	 1970s	resulted	
in	 nine	 limited	 membership	 agreements	 on	 non-tariff	 measures,	 including	
realistically	 tangible	 obligations.681	Among	 these	 agreements,	 the	 Agreement	 on	
Technical	Barriers	to	Trade	(“TBT	Agreement”),	signed	in	April	1979	was	signed	by	
more	 governments	 than	 any	 other	 of	 the	 specific	 agreements	 (with	 47	
governments	 eventually	 signing	 it). 682 	Eventually,	 the	 Uruguay	 Round	
negotiations	 updated	 the	 TBT	 Agreement	 and	 fully	 integrated	 it	 under	 the	
WTO/GATT	 legal	 system,683	with	 its	 provisions	 binding	 all	WTO	members	 and	
any	 disputes	 arising	 under	 it	 administered	 by	 the	 WTO’s	 dispute	 settlement	
rules.684		
The	 TBT	 Agreement	 was	 adopted	 precisely	 to	 deal	 with	 barriers	 to	
international	 trade	 based	 on	 technical	 regulations,	 voluntary	 standards,	 and	
conformity	 assessment	 regulations.	 The	 main	 purposes	 of	 the	 TBT	 Agreement,	
laid	 down	 in	 its	 Preamble,	 include:	 (i)	 boosting	 international	 standards	 and	
conformity	assessment	systems,	in	recognition	of	“the	important	contribution	that	
international	 standards	 and	 conformity	 assessment	 systems	 can	 make	 […]	 by	
improving	 efficiency	 of	 production	 and	 facilitating	 the	 conduct	 of	 international	
trade;”	 and	 (ii)	 “ensur[ing]	 that	 technical	 regulations	 and	 standards,	 […]	 and	
                                                
679	Id.,	p.	21.	Professor	Jackson	continues	on	this	point:	“Many	domestic	producer	interests	would	begin	
turning	to	a	variety	of	non-tariff	barriers	(more	than	a	thousand)	as	a	way	to	minimize	the	competition	
from	imports,	since	tariffs	would	no	longer	provide	that	type	of	protection.”		
680	J.	 H	 JACKSON,	 W.	 J	 DAVEY,	 A.	 O.	 SYKES,	 LEGAL	 PROBLEMS	 OF	 INTERNATIONAL	 ECONOMIC	 RELATIONS	
(5TH	EDITION,	THOMSON	WEST,	2008),	p.	215.		
681	Id.,	p.	21.	
682	WTO	Secretariat,	Guide	to	the	Uruguay	Round	Agreements	(1999),	p.	71.	
683	JOHN	H.	JACKSON,	THE	WORLD	TRADE	ORGANIZATION,	CONSTITUTION	AND	JURISPRUDENCE	(	ROUTLEDGE,	
1998),	p.	22.	
684	WTO	Secretariat,	Guide	to	the	Uruguay	Round	Agreements	(1999),	p.	71.	
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procedures	for	assessment	of	conformity	with	technical	regulations	and	standards,	
do	not	create	unnecessary	obstacles	to	international	trade”.685		
The	Preamble	sets	out	that	WTO	members	should	nevertheless	be	entitled	
to	 take	 measures	 to	 protect	 national	 security	 and	 the	 environment,	 to	 ensure	
quality	of	exports	and	prevent	deceptive	practices,	and	to	protect	human,	animal,	
or	 plant	 life	 or	 health,	 so	 long	 as	 these	measures	 “are	 not	 applied	 in	 a	 manner	
which	would	constitute	a	means	of	arbitrary	or	unjustifiable	discrimination	between	
countries	 where	 the	 same	 conditions	 prevail	 or	 a	 disguised	 restriction	 on	
international	 trade”. 686 	The	 Preamble	 recognizes	 the	 “contribution	 which	
international	 standardization	 can	 make	 to	 the	 transfer	 of	 technology	 from	
developed	to	developing	countries”,	while	acknowledging	that	“developing	countries	
may	 encounter	 special	 difficulties	 in	 the	 formulation	 and	 application	 of	 technical	
regulations	 and	 standards	 and	 procedures	 for	 assessment	 of	 conformity	 with	
technical	regulations	and	standards”.687	
Moreover,	the	TBT	Agreement	extends	the	obligations	of	countries	to	non-
governmental	 actors	 to	 guarantee	 compliance	 and	abstain	 from	actions	 that	 are	
irreconcilable	with	the	provisions	of	the	TBT	Agreement.688		
Notably,	the	recitals	of	the	TBT	Agreement689	point	in	favor	of	international	
solutions	 over	 national	 ones	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 fragmented	 markets	 due	 to	
standards.690	In	this	vein,	the	Appellate	body	has	underlined	that	recital	3	of	the	
TBT	Agreement	emphasizes	the	significant	part	played	by	international	standards	
and	 conformity	 assessment	 systems	 in	 encouraging	 and	 enabling	 international	
trade.691		
                                                
685	Agreement	on	Technical	Barriers	 to	Trade,	Apr.	 15,	 1994,	Marrakesh	Agreement	Establishing	 the	
World	 Trade	 Organization,	 Annex	 1A,	 Legal	 Instruments	 –	 Results	 of	 the	 Uruguay	 Round,	 at	
Preamble,	§§	1	&	3.		
686	Id.	
687	Id.	
688	Articles	3,	4,	7	and	8	of	the	TBT	Agreement.	
689	The	 recitals	 of	 the	 TBT	 Agreement	 are	 equivalent	 to	 Preamble.	 Appellate	 Body-	 US-	 Shrimps,	
WТ/DS58/AВ/R	(§§129-131).	
690	See,	Recital	4	of	the	TBT	Agreement.	
691	EC-Sardines	WТ/DS231/AB/R.	
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The	TBT	Agreement,	although	not	prohibiting	altogether	the	development	
of	national	 standards,	 provides	 “systematic	 layers	 of	 obligations	 and	 rights”692	in	
order	 to	 establish	 and	 ensure	 that	 standards	 are	 implemented	 without	 putting	
into	place	an	NTB	to	international	free	trade.	
A	 number	 of	 obligations	 in	 the	 TBT	 Agreement	 become	 relevant	 in	 an	
endeavor	 to	 address	 the	 main	 concerns	 related	 to	 the	 interplay	 between	
standardization,	 competition	 and	 international	 trade.	 Accordingly,	 these	 WTO	
principles	 concerning	 standard-setting	 constitute	 a	 starting	 point	 to	 establish	
what	good	governance	principles	should	be	relied	on	under	competition	rules.693		
Annex	 III	 of	 the	 TBT	 Agreement	 is	 the	 Code	 of	 Good	 Practice	 for	 the	
Preparation,	Adoption	and	Application	of	Standards	(the	“Code	of	Good	Practice”).	
In	 accepting	 the	 TBT	Agreement,	WTO	Members	 agree	 to	 guarantee	 that	 their	
central	government	standardizing	bodies	agree	to	comply	with	this	Code	of	Good	
Practice	and	to	 take	reasonable	measures	 to	ensure	 that	 local	government,	non-
governmental	and	regional	standardizing	bodies	do	the	same.	The	Code	of	Good	
Practice	sets	the	substantive	principles	with	respect	to	the	preparation,	adoption,	
and	 application	 of	 standards	 by	 standardizing	 bodies.	 It	 represents	 a	 point	 of	
departure	to	protect	competition	indirectly,	by	regulating	and	upholding	the	good	
governance	and	the	integrity	of	procedural	rules	of	the	standard-setting	process.	
As	such,	 it	provides	guidance	for	the	standard-setting	process	and,	 in	particular,	
addresses	 process	 qualities	 that	 are	 important	 for	 the	 development	 of	
international	standards.	In	order	“to	improve	the	quality	of	international	standards	
and	 to	 ensure	 the	 effective	 application	of	 the	Agreement,	 […]	there	was	 a	need	 to	
develop	principles	concerning	transparency,	openness,	 impartiality	and	consensus,	
                                                
692	Yogesh	Pai,	The	International	Dimension	of	Proprietary	Technical	Standards:	Through	the	Lens	of	
Trade,	Competition	Law	and	Developing	Countries,	SOCIAL	SCIENCE	RESEARCH	NETWORK	(2012),	p.	45.	
693	Bjorn	Lundqvist,	Competition	Law	as	the	Limit	to	Standard-Setting,	in	JOSEF	DREXL	AND	FABIANA	DI	
PORTO	(ED),	COMPETITION	LAW	AS	REGULATION	(EDWARD	ELGAR,	2015).	See	Articles	2	and	5	and	Annex	III	
to	 the	 WTO/TBT	 Agreement	 and	 connected	 decisions.	 It	 is	 noteworthy	 that	 TBT	 Agreement	 is	
reviewed	annually	and	triennially	and	the	reviews	become	central	 interpretations	of	 the	document.	
Under	the	TBT,	decisions	and	recommendations	have	been	 issued	that	define	criteria	outlining	the	
principles	 of	 an	 international	 standards-developing	 organization.	 These	 decisions/principles	
stemmed	from	the	Second	Triennial	Review	(May	23,	2002)	and	stipulate	that	the	WTO-TBT	criteria	
for	 an	 “international	 standards	 developing	 organization”	 are:	 transparency,	 openness,	 impartiality,	
effectiveness,	relevance,	consensus,	use	of	performance-based	standards,	coherence,	due	process	and	
technical	assistance.	See	WTO,	Decisions	and	Recommendations	adopted	by	the	WTO	Committee	on	
Technical	Barriers	to	Trade	since	January	1,	1995,	G/TBT/1/Rev.10,	46,	48.		
 187 
relevance	 and	 effectiveness,	 coherence	 and	 developing	 countries’	 interests	 that	
would	 clarify	 and	 strengthen	 the	 concept	 of	 international	 standards	 under	 the	
Agreement	and	contribute	to	the	advancement	of	its	objectives”.694	
	The	 Code	 of	 Good	 Practice	 sets	 out	 substantive	 criteria,	 identifying	 the	
principles	of	an	international	standard-developing	organization.	The	rules	set	out	
in	the	Code	of	Good	Practice,	given	that	“standards	 come	 in	 such	a	multitude	 of	
different	 forms”,	“must	take	 into	consideration	the	aim	and	ambit	of	 the	proposed	
standards	 and	 the	 market	 being	 regulated”.695	Nonetheless,	 the	 code	 does	 not	
address	the	issue	of	IP	incorporated	into	standards.696		
It	 is	 important	 to	 consider	whether	 the	TBT	Agreement	has	 the	 ability	 to	
address	 the	 international	 dimension	 of	 competition	 policy	 and	 IP	 rights	 in	
standardization.		
As	 seen,	 given	 that	 SEPs	 amount	 to	 the	 specifications	 and	 technological	
requirements	 of	 products,	 standards	 could	 maintain	 a	 de	 facto	 discrimination	
against	foreign	products.	This	is	especially	the	case	where	the	IPR	holder	violates	
FRAND	 obligations	 or	 where	 the	 terms	 and	 conditions	 of	 licensing	 are	 not	
reasonable	 for	 stakeholders	 in	 third	 countries	 or	 implement	 anti-competitive	
policies.	Whilst	 the	TBT	Agreement	undeniably	 incorporates	a	series	of	 relevant	
principles	 and	 provisions	 in	 this	 regard,	 the	 application	 of	 these	 principles	 and	
provisions	to	standardization	is	not	explicit.	The	adequacy	of	the	TBT	framework	
                                                
694	Committee	 on	 Technical	 Barriers	 to	 Trade,	 Second	 Triennial	 Review	 of	 the	 Operation	 and	
Implementation	of	the	Agreement	on	Technical	Barriers	to	Trade,	20,	G/TBT/9	(Nov.	13,	2000).	
695	BJORN	LUNDQVIST,	COMPETITION	LAW	AS	THE	LIMIT	TO	STANDARD-SETTING,	IN	JOSEF	DREXL,	FABIANA	DI	
PORTO	(ED),	COMPETITION	LAW	AS	REGULATION	(EDWARD	ELGAR,	2015),	p.	35.	
696	See	Christopher	S.	Gibson,	Globalization	and	the	technology	standards	game:	Balancing	concerns	of	
protectionism	 and	 intellectual	 property	 in	 international	 standards,	 22	 BERKELEY	 TECHNOLOGY	 LAW	
JOURNAL	4	 (2007),	pp.	 1403-1484.	 The	 author	 has	 elaborately	 dealt	 on	 the	 limitation	 of	 the	 code	 of	
good	 practices	 and	 has	 suggested	 amending	 the	 code	 to	 take	 into	 account	 concerns	 regarding	
intellectual	property	in	technical	standards.	According	to	the	author:	“The	new	policy	would	thus	send	
a	strong	signal	to	standard-setting	organizations	that	do	not	already	have	such	rules	in	place	to	address	
IP	rights.	At	the	same	time,	it	would	also	send	a	message	to	countries	like	China,	reinforcing	their	need	
to	participate	more	fully	in	global	standard	setting	activities,	rather	than	object	regarding	the	burden	of	
IP	rights	 in	existing	 international	standards.	By	providing	China	with	 incentive	to	become	 involved	 in	
the	standards-setting	process	so	that	it	could	state	potential	objections	(concerning	IP	rights	or	other	
matters)	 during	 the	 development	 cycle,	 the	 new	 policy	 would	 change	 the	 calculus	 that	 led	 China	 to	
develop	 and	 mandate	 the	 WAPI	 standard	 unilaterally,	 in	 a	 manner	 that	 potentially	 violated	 TBT	
Agreement	obligations.”	Id.,	p.	1483.	
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to	 address	 issues	 deriving	 from	 IPRs	 in	 standardization	 should	 therefore	 be	
assessed.	
Against	this	background,	the	WTO	provisions	could	be	triggered	in	at	least	
three	circumstances:697		
I. Discrimination	against	like	products	from	other	countries	by	
means	of	standards.		
The	 principle	 of	 non-discrimination	 in	 the	 adoption	 and	 application	 of	
technical	 regulations	 and	 standards	 is	 a	 key	 provision.	 Article	 2(1)	 of	 the	 TBT	
Agreement	 extends	 the	 rules	 on	 national	 treatment	 and	 MFN	 treatment	 in	
relation	to	technical	regulations	to	the	like	products	imported	from	the	territory	
of	any	other	WTO	member,	stating	that	“Members	shall	ensure	that	 in	respect	of	
technical	regulations,	products	imported	from	the	territory	of	any	Member	shall	be	
accorded	treatment	no	less	favorable	than	that	accorded	to	like	products	of	national	
origin	and	to	like	products	originating	in	any	other	country”	(Article	2(1)	of	the	TBT	
Agreement).		
The	Code	of	Good	Practice	also	extends	the	same	standards	to	be	applied	by	
standardizing	 bodies	 in	 regard	 to	 standards:	 “In	 respect	 of	 standards,	 the	
standardizing	body	shall	accord	 treatment	 to	products	originating	 in	 the	 territory	
of	 any	 other	 Member	 of	 the	 WTO	 no	 less	 favorable	 than	 that	 accorded	 to	 like	
products	of	national	origin	and	to	like	products	originating	in	any	other	country.”	
Moreover,	 Article	 2.2	 of	 the	 TBT	Agreement	 requires	members	 to	 “ensure	
that	 technical	 regulations	 are	 not	 prepared,	 adopted	 or	 applied	with	 a	 view	 to	 or	
with	the	effect	of	creating	unnecessary	obstacles	to	international	trade”.	The	trade	
restrictive	effect	of	technical	regulations	shall	be	assessed	against	the	principles	of	
necessity	 and	 proportionality.	 Consequently,	 technical	 regulations	 “shall	 not	 be	
more	 trade-restrictive	 than	 necessary	 to	 fulfill	 a	 legitimate	 objective”.	 The	 TBT	
Agreement	 applies	 the	 requirement	 of	 “least	 trade	 restrictiveness”	 for	 the	
adoption	of	technical	regulations	and	standards	regardless	of	the	violation	of	the	
                                                
697	Yogesh	Pai,	The	International	Dimension	of	Proprietary	Technical	Standards:	Through	the	Lens	of	
Trade,	Competition	Law	and	Developing	Countries,	SOCIAL	SCIENCE	RESEARCH	NETWORK	(2012),	p.	51	
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national	 or	MFN	 treatment.	 It	 also	 provides	 a	 non-exhaustive	 list	 of	 legitimate	
objectives	 including	 “national	 security	 requirements;	 the	 prevention	 of	 deceptive	
practices;	protection	of	human	health	or	safety	animal	or	plant	life	or	health,	or	the	
environment”.		
By	 the	 same	 token,	 the	 Code	 of	 Good	 Practice	 mandates	 that	 the	
“standardizing	 body	 shall	 ensure	 that	 standards	 are	 not	 prepared,	 adopted	 or	
applied	 with	 a	 view	 to,	 or	 with	 the	 effect	 of,	 creating	 unnecessary	 obstacles	 to	
international	trade”.	
In	 case	 of	 discrimination	 against	 like	 products	 from	 other	 countries	 by	
means	 of	 standards,	 the	 recalled	 TBT	 Agreement’s	 principles	 of	 non-
discrimination,	 necessity	 and	 proportionality,	 and	 the	 Code	 of	 conduct	 on	 the	
adoption	 and	 application	 of	 standards	 could	 come	 into	 play,	 by	 virtue	 of	 the	
exception	 under	 Article	 XX(d)	 of	 the	 GATT	 that	 allows	 nations	 to	 enforce	 IP	
rights.698	However,	 the	WTO	case	 law	does	not	clarify	where	measures	violating	
the	TBT	Agreement	could	be	justified	under	Article	XX	of	the	GATT.		
II. SSOs	 protectionist	 practices	 backed	 by	 governmental	
policies.	.		
Articles	3	and	4	of	the	TBT	Agreement	set	out	the	responsibility	of	states	for	
technical	regulations	and	standards	adopted	by	non-state	actors.		
Specifically,	countries	are	entirely	accountable	for	the	compliance	with	the	
provisions	 relating	 to	 the	 preparation,	 adoption	 and	 application	 of	 technical	
regulations.	 They	 should	 also	 take	 “reasonable	 measures	 as	 may	 be	 available	 to	
them	 to	 ensure	 that	 local	 government	and	nongovernmental	 standardizing	bodies	
within	 their	 territories”	 comply	 with	 these	 provisions.	 Regarding	 standards,	
countries	 are	 required	 to	 ensure	 that	 central	 government	 standardizing	 bodies	
accept	and	comply	with	the	Code	of	Good	Practice	for	the	Preparation,	Adoption	
and	Application	 of	 Standards	 in	Annex	 3	 to	 the	Agreement.	Moreover,	 the	TBT	
Agreement	 includes	 best	 endeavor	 obligations	 on	 countries	 and	 to	 ensure	 that	
                                                
698	WTO,	European	 Communities	 -	Measures	 Affecting	 Asbestos	 And	 Asbestos-Containing	 Products,	
Report	of	the	Appellate	Body,	WT/DS135/AВ/R,	March	12,	2001,	para	83.	
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local	 government	 and	 nongovernmental	 standardizing	 bodies,	 and	 regional	
standardizing	bodies	of	which	they	or	one	or	more	bodies	within	their	territories	
are	 members,	 accept	 and	 comply	 with	 the	 Code	 of	 Good	 Practice.	 Lastly,	
countries	should	not	take	measures	that		have	the	effect,	directly	or	indirectly,	of	
requiring	 or	 encouraging	 such	 standardizing	 bodies	 to	 act	 in	 a	 manner	
inconsistent	with	the	Code	of	Good	Practice.699	
The	WTO	 jurisprudence	 does	 not	 offer	 any	 interpretative	 support	 on	 the	
scope	 of	 Article	 4	 of	 the	 TBT	 Agreement	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 responsibility	 of	
governments	in	relation	to	SSO’s	practices	and	policies.	The	TBT	Committee	has	
set	 out	 the	 principles	 of	 transparency,	 openness,	 impartiality	 and	 consensus,	
effectiveness	 and	 relevance,	 and	 coherence,	 partially	 addressing	 the	 concerns	 of	
developing	 countries.700	However,	 it	 appears	 that	 the	 responsibility	 of	 countries	
with	respect	 to	SSOs	 is	not	sufficient	 to	allow	third	countries	 to	challenge	trade	
restrictive	implications	of	standards	affected	by	IP	rights.701	
III. WTO	 provisions	 could	 be	 triggered	 where	 preference	 to	
international	standards	is	not	given.		
Article	 2(4)	 of	 the	 TBT	 Agreement	 specifically	 provides	 that	 “[w]here	
technical	 regulations	 are	 required	 and	 relevant	 international	 standards	 exist	 or	
their	 completion	 is	 imminent,	 Members	 shall	 use	 them,	 or	 the	 relevant	 parts	 of	
them,	 as	 a	 basis	 for	 their	 technical	 regulations	 except	 when	 such	 international	
standards	or	relevant	parts	would	be	an	ineffective	or	 inappropriate	means	for	the	
fulfillment	of	the	legitimate	objectives	pursued	[…]”.	
Indeed,	in	the	EC-Sardines	case	 ,	the	Appellate	Body	expansively	construed	
Article	 2.4	 of	 the	 TBT	 Agreement	 on	 harmonization	 and	 preference	 to	
international	 standards.	The	 international	 standards	 seem	to	be	better	 suited	 to	
overcoming	the	interests	of	solely	domestic	IPR		holders	and	are	to	be	understood	
                                                
699	According	 to	 Article	 4	 of	 the	 TBT	 Agreement	 “the	 obligations	 of	 Members	 with	 respect	 to	
compliance	 of	 standardizing	 bodies	 with	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	 Code	 of	 Good	 Practice	 shall	 apply	
irrespective	of	whether	or	not	a	standardizing	body	has	accepted	the	Code	of	Good	Practice”.	
700	European	Communities	-	Trade	Description	of	sardines,	Report	of	the	Panel,	WT/DS231/R,	May	29,	
2002,	para	7.91.	
701	Yogesh	Pai,	The	 International	Dimension	of	Proprietary	Technical	Standards:	Through	 the	Lens	of	
Trade,	Competition	Law	and	Developing	Countries,	SOCIAL	SCIENCE	RESEARCH	NETWORK	(2012),	p.	52.	
 191 
as	 “a	 basis	 for”	 technical	 regulations	 “when	 used	 as	 the	 principal	 constituent	 or	
fundamental	 principle	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 enacting	 the	 technical	 regulation.”702	
Specifically,	 the	 TBT	 Agreement	 requires	 countries	 to	 employ	 international	
standards,	 provided	 they	 exist	 or	 their	 completion	 is	 about	 to	 happen,	 as	 a	
foundation	for	national	technical	regulations.		
Exceptions	 are	 foreseen	 when	 such	 international	 standards	 would	 be	 an	
ineffective	 or	 inappropriate	 means	 for	 the	 success	 of	 the	 legitimate	 purposes	
pursued	 under	 national	 technical	 regulations.	 The	 same	 exception	 applies	 to	
standards	adopted	by	standardizing	bodies	where	international	standards	exist	or	
their	completion	is	 forthcoming.	The	exception	is	based	on	 	an	insufficient	 level	
of	protection	(Annex	3	(F)	of	the	TBT	Agreement).703		
More	 significantly,	 an	 international	 standard	 under	 the	 connotation	 of	
Article	 2:4	 has	 to	 be	 adopted	 by	 an	 international	 standardizing	 body	 (and	 not	
necessarily	any	organization)	whose	membership	is	open	to	all	pertinent	bodies	of	
at	least	all	WTO	member	countries.	
4.1.1. THE TERMS OF “INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS” WITHIN THE WTO 
REGIME AND DIVERGING REGULATORY APPROACHES TO STANDARDIZATION  
A	recurrent	issue	for	trade	policy	makers	which	has	resulted	in	great	tension	
between	China	and	other	WTO	members,	especially	the	US,	concerns	the	term	of	
“relevant	 international	 standards”	 within	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 TBT	 Agreement.	
Indeed,	 although,	 as	 seen,	 Article	 2.4	 of	 the	 TBT	 Agreement	 requires	 WTO	
members	to	use	“relevant	 international	standards	as	a	basis	 for”	settling	national	
standards, 704 	it	 does	 not	 define	 the	 term	 of	 “international	 standards”,	 the	
definition	of	which	has	been	far	from	unequivocal	and	has	failed	to	result	in	legal	
certainty.		
                                                
702	WTO,	 European	 Communities	 -	 Trade	 Description	 of	 Sardines,	 WT/15S231/AB/R,	 Sept.	 2002,	
Report	of	the	Appellate	Body,	paras	240-245.	
703	Article	 2.6	 of	 the	 TBT	 Agreement	 also	 imposes	 a	 best	 endeavor	 clause	 that	 “[…]ith	 a	 view	 to	
harmonizing	technical	regulations	on	as	wide	a	basis	as	possible,	Members	shall	play	a	full	part,	within	
the	 limits	 of	 their	 resources,	 in	 the	 preparation	 by	 appropriate	 international	 standardizing	 bodies	 of	
international	standards	for	products	for	which	they	either	have	adopted,	or	expect	to	adopt,	technical	
regulations.”	
704	The	TBT	Agreement,	Article	2.4	(technical	regulations),	Article	4.1	and	Annex	3	§	F	(standards).	
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The	tension	springs	from	two	main	schools	of	thought.	One,	which		China	
embraces,	assumes	that	only	formal	inter-governmental	institutions	like	the	ISO,	
the	 ITU	and	 the	 IEC	can	 set	 international	 standards	 triggering	TBT	obligations.	
The	other,	which	is	in	line	with	the	view	taken	by	the	US	Government,	holds	that	
the	 term	 of	 “international	 standards”	 falling	 under	 the	 TBT	 Agreement	 also	
encompasses	 standards	 that	 are	 rubber-stamped	by	 industry-led	consortia	or	by	
NGOs,	such	as	the	Institute	of	Electrical	and	Electronic	Engineers	(	the	“IEEE”).705	
Indeed,	 absent	 a	 definition	 of	 “international	 standards”,	 it	 is	 far	 from	
unequivocal	 which	 standard-setting	 organizations	 can	 legitimately	 set	 technical	
standards	covered	by	the	scope	of	Article	2.4	of	the	TBT	Agreement.706		
The	identification	of	SSOs	whose	outcomes	can	be	accepted	as	international	
standards	 triggering	TBT	obligation	 is	 crucial	 as	 the	Appellate	Body	 in	 the	 	US-
Tuna	II	(Mexico)	case	clarified		the	“characteristics	of	the	entity	setting	a	standard”	
that	qualify	a	standard	as	an	“international	standard”.707	It	follows	that	a	standard	
can	 amount	 to	 an	 “international	 standard”	 within	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 TBT	
Agreement	 only	 if	 it	 is	 adopted	 by	 an	 entity	 that	 itself	 qualifies	 as	 an	
“international	 standardizing	 body”. 708 	Accordingly,	 the	 qualification	 as	 an	
“international	 standard”	 is	 strictly	 dependent	 on	 the	 features	 of	 the	
standardization	entity	that	adopt	the	alleged	international	standards	itself.		
	
                                                
705	Dan	Breznitz,	Michael	Murphree,	The	Rise	of	China	 in	Technology	Standards:	New	Norms	 in	Old	
Institutions,	pp.	12-13.	
706	Robert	Howse,	A	 New	 Device	 for	 Creating	 International	 Legal	 Normativity:	 The	WTO	 Technical	
Barriers	 to	 Trade	 Agreement	 and	 “International	 Standards”,	 in	 CHRISTIAN	 JOERGES,	 ERNST-ULRICH	
PETERSMANN	 (EDS.),	 CONSTITUTIONALISM,	 MULTILEVEL	 TRADE	 GOVERNANCE	 AND	 SOCIAL	 REGULATION	
(OXFORD:	HART	PUBLISHING,	2006),	 pp.	 392-393.	 As	 highlighted	 by	Han-Wei	 Liu,	 the	 issue	 has	 been	
raised	on	various	occasions	since	the	late	1990s:	e.g.,	Committee	on	Technical	Barriers	to	Trade,	U.S	
Paper	on	the	First	Triennial	Review,	G/TBT/W/40	(Apr.	25,	1997);	Committee	on	Technical	Barriers	to	
Trade,	 Issues	 Concerning	 International	 Standards	 and	 International	 Standardization	 Bodies:	
Submission	from	Japan,	G/TBT/W/113	(Jun.	15,	1999);	and	Committee	on	Technical	Barriers	to	Trade,	
On	the	Conditions	for	the	Acceptance	and	Use	of	International	Standards	in	the	Context	of	the	WTO	
Technical	Barriers	to	Trade	Agreement:	Note	from	the	European	Community,	G/TBT/W/87/Rev.1	(Sept.	
30,	 1999).	 See	 Han-Wei	 Liu,	 International	 Standards	 in	 Flux:	 A	 Balkanized	 ICT	 Standard-Setting	
Paradigm	and	Its	Implications	for	the	WTO,	17	JOURNAL	OF	INTERNATIONAL	ECONOMIC	LAW	3	(2014),	p.	20.	
707	Ibid.	
708	Appellate	Body	Report,	United	States-Measures	Concerning	the	Importation,	Marketing	and	Sale	of	
Tuna	and	Tuna	Products,	WT/DS381/R,	adopted	Jun.	13,	2012	(hereinafter	Appellate	Body	Report,	US-
Tuna	II	(Mexico)),	para	356.		
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4.1.2. THE RISE OF REGIONAL STANDARD-SETTING ORGANIZATIONS AND 
INDUSTRY-LED CONSORTIA 
The	terminology	issue	is	further	confused	by	the	increasing	multiple	actors	
in	 the	 ICT	 standard-setting	 panorama,	 which	 exacerbates	 the	 difficulty	 in	
identifying	a	definition	for	the	term	“international	standardization	body”.	Notably,	
the	 debate	 on	 the	 term	 of	 “international	 standards”	 recently	 increased	 again	
following	 the	 vagueness	 created	 by	 the	 shift	 from	 a	 static	 ICT	 standard-setting	
landscape	 dominated	 by	 three	 formal	 institutions,	 	 the	 ITU,	 the	 ISO	 and	 the	
IEC,709	to	 a	 fragmented	 one,	 marked	 by	 the	 rise	 of	 regional	 standard-setting	
organizations	and	 industry-led	consortia,	 this	shift	altered	the	 former	monopoly	
symbolized	by	the	ITU-ISO-IEC	group.710	This	paradigm	transformation	in	the	ICT	
standards’	world	was	driven	by	a	number	of	elements.	
I. First	 the	 privatization	 of	 the	 telecoms	 sectors	 in	 the	 1980s	 and	
1990s711	forced	 incumbents	 to	 compete	 with	 several	 new	 private	
carriers,	triggering	intensive	transnational	competition	and	greater	
R&D	 investments. 712 	The	 transnational	 scope	 of	 the	 expanding	
telecoms	 industry	 thus	 generated	 substantial	 incentives	 towards	
standards’	 development	 to	 enable	 interconnection	 and	
interoperability	across	networks,713	making	the	concept	of	national	
standards	archaic.714	
                                                
709	Kai	 Jakobs,	 ICT	 Standardisation:	 Coordinating	 the	 Diversity	 in	 Innovation	 in	 NGN	 -	 Future	
Network	and	Services:	First	ITU-T	Kaleidoscope	Academic	Conference	(IEEE	2008),	p.	119.	
710	Tineke	 M.	 Egyedi,	 Institutional	 Dilemma	 in	 ICT	 Standardization:	 Coordinating	 the	 Diffusion	 of	
Technology,	 in	 KAI	 JAKOBS	 (EDS.),	 INFORMATION	 TECHNOLOGY	 STANDARDS	 AND	 STANDARDIZATION:	 A	
GLOBAL	PERSPECTIVE	(HERSHEY,	PENNSYLVANIA:	IGI	GLOBAL	BOOK,	2000),	p.	52.		
711	Wei	 Li,	 Lixin	Colin	Xu,	The	 Impact	 of	 Privatization	 and	 Competition	 in	 the	 Telecommunications	
Sector	 Around	 the	World,	 47	 JOURNAL	OF	LAW	AND	ECONOMICS	 395	 (2004),	 p.	 396,	 remarking	on	 the	
growing	percentage	of	privately-owned	telecoms	operators	worldwide.			
712 	Philipp	 Genschel,	 How	 Fragmentation	 Can	 Improve	 Co-ordination:	 Setting	 Standards	 in	
International	Telecommunications,	18	ORGANIZATION	STUDIES	603	(1997),	p.	605.		
713	Krishna	 Jayakar,	 Globalization	 and	 Legitimacy	 of	 International	 Telecommunications	 Standard-
Setting	Organizations,	5	INDIANA	JOURNAL	OF	GLOBAL	LEGAL	STUDIES	711	(1998),	p.	723.		
714	Andrew	Updegrove,	ICT	Standard	Setting	Today:	A	System	Under	Stress,	6	CONSORTIUM	STANDARDS	
BULLETIN	 4	 (Apr.	 2007),	 noting	 that	 due	 to	 the	 global	 nature	 of	 trade,	 travel,	 production	 and	
utilization,	“[i]n	ICT	in	particular,	the	concept	of	a	national	standard	has	become	archaic”).	
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II. Secondly,	 the	 constant	 flow	 of	 innovation	 in	 the	 computer	 and	
semi-conductor	 sectors	 also	 deeply	 affected	 standardization.715	
Notably,	the	end	of	IBM’s	de	 facto	standards	dominance	-	which	
had	until	the	1970s	enjoyed	an	uncontested	monopoly,	absent	any	
other	 commercially	 available	 non-proprietary	 network	 system	 -	
caused	 by	 the	 emergence	 of	 new	 firms.716	Also	 the	 shift	 from	
analog	 to	 	 digital.,717	These	 factors	 led	 to	 the	 incorporation	 of	
different	services	and	applications	into	telecoms	networks.	In	this	
context,	many	standardization	initiatives	were	launched,	in	order	
to	ensure	what	new	market	participants	could	advantage	of	new	
business	opportunities	 in	the	global	supply	chain,	and	to	ensure	
interoperability	between	heterogeneous	ICT	devices.718	
III. A	 third	aspect	 that	 contributed	 to	 revolutionizing	 the	 standard-
setting	landscape	was	the	emergence	of	regional	standardization	
bodies.	 At	 the	 EU	 level,	 for	 instance,	 the	 rise	 of	 regional	 SSOs	
took	 place	 in	 response	 to	 pressure	 exerted	 on	 the	 ITU-ISO-IES	
system,	 which	 proved	 unable	 to	 promote	 deeper	 cooperation	
with	industry	stakeholders.719		
As	 remarked	 in	 a	 chapter	 of	 the	 present	 study,	 the	 European	
Commission	greatly	contributed	to	the	rise	of	regional	standard-
setting	 organizations,	 introducing	 in	 1985	 a	 novel	 regulatory	
model,	 labeled	 the	 “New	 Approach”.	 This	 New	 Approach	 was	
primarily	 aimed	 at	 further	 harmonization,	 overcoming	 the	
detrimental	consequences	on	trade	caused	by	diverging	national	
standards	developed	by	 various	Member	States.	Pursuant	 to	 the	
                                                
715	TIMOTHY	 SCHOECHLE,	 STANDARDIZATION	 AND	DIGITAL	 ENCLOSURE:	 THE	 PRIVATIZATION	 OF	 STANDARDS,	
KNOWLEDGE,	 AND	 POLICY	 IN	 THE	 AGE	 OF	 GLOBAL	 INFORMATION	 TECHNOLOGY	 (NEW	 YORK:	 INFORMATION	
SCIENCE	REFERENCE,	2009),	p.	33.		
716	JANET	ABBATE,	INVENTING	THE	INTERNET	(CAMBRIDGE,	MA:	MIT	PRESS,	1999),	p.148.	
717 	JAYRAJ	 UGARKAR,	 THE	 ESSENTIALS	 OF	 TELECOMMUNICATIONS	 MANAGEMENT:	 A	 SIMPLE	 GUIDE	 TO	
UNDERSTANDING	A	COMPLEX	INDUSTRY	(BLOOMINGTON,	INDIANA:	AUTHORHOUSE,	2008),	p.170.		
718	On	how	technological	format	changes	impacted	standardization	and	telecoms	policy	at	large,	see	
STUART	MINOR	 BENJAMIN	 ET	 AL.,	 TELECOMMUNICATIONS	 LAW	 AND	 POLICY,	 3RD	 ED.	 (CAROLINA	 ACADEMIC	
PRESS,	2012),	pp.	35-36.		
719	Tineke	M.	Egyedi,	INSTITUTIONAL	DILEMMA	IN	ICT	STANDARDIZATION:	COORDINATING	THE	DIFFUSION	OF	
TECHNOLOGY,	 IN	 KAI	 JAKOBS	 (EDS.),	 INFORMATION	 TECHNOLOGY	 STANDARDS	 AND	 STANDARDIZATION:	 A	
GLOBAL	PERSPECTIVE	(HERSHEY,	PENNSYLVANIA:	IGI	GLOBAL	BOOK,	2000),	pp.	52-53.		
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New	 Approach	 framework,	 once	 national	 legislation	 requires	 a	
technical	standard	in	order	to	be	implemented	has	been	drafted,	
a	parallel	European	standard-setting	initiative	is	triggered	by	one	
of	the	delegated	three	European	standardization	bodies,	namely,	
the	 CEN,	 the	 CENELEC,	 and	 the	 ETSI.	 An	 observer	 of	 the	
European	 Commission	 participates,	 in	 this	 standard-developing	
process.	 The	 resulting	 standard	 provides	 a	 “safe	 harbor”	 for	
regulated	 entities	 in	 that,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 compliance	with	
European	 standards	 is	 merely	 voluntary,	 proof	 of	 conformity	
results	in	a	presumption	of	compliance	with	the	equivalent	law.720		
IV. Finally,	 another	 factor	 that	 has	 changed	 the	 standardization	
panorama	 is	 the	 appearance	 of	 industry-led	 consortia	 as	
standard-setting	 entities.	 They	 are	 generally	 described	 as	 loose	
alliances	 of	 firms,	 organizations,	 and	 individuals,	 which	 are	
funded	 by	 membership	 fees	 or	 for	 technical	 and	 commercial	
reasons, 721 	and	 have	 a	 	 different	 legal	 forms. 722 	Consortia	
standardize	 by	 operating	 outside	 the	 formal	 governmental	
standardization	 network,	 which	 has	 caused	 some	 scholars	 to	
describe	them	as	“grey”	SSOs.723	
The	emergence	of	 industry-led	 consortia	has	been	predominant	 in	 the	US	
system,	 where	 the	 progressive	 deregulation	 and	 liberalization	 of	 national	
telecoms	and	product	markets,	stimulated,	among	other	factors,	by	the	country’s	
WTO	 accession,	 facilitated	 private-sector	 involvement	 in	 developing	 standards.	
This	consequently	promoted	the	establishment	of	standard-developing	consortia	
                                                
720	Council	Resolution	(EC)	No	85/C	136/01	of	May	7,	1985,	O.J.	(C	136),	3	(“[n]ational	authorities	are	
obliged	 to	 recognize	 that	 products	 manufactured	 in	 conformity	 with	 harmonized	 standards	 (or,	
provisionally,	 with	 national	 standards)	 are	 presumed	 to	 conform	 to	 the	 “essential	 requirements”	
established	 by	 the	Directive.	 This	 signifies	 that	 the	 producer	 has	 the	 choice	 of	 not	manufacturing	 in	
conformity	with	 the	 standards	 but	 that	 in	 this	 event	he	has	 an	obligation	 to	 prove	 that	his	 products	
conform	to	the	essential	requirements	of	the	Directive.”).	
721 	Richard	 Hawkins,	 The	 Rise	 of	 Consortia	 in	 the	 Information	 and	 Communication	 Technology	
Industries:	Emerging	Implications	for	Policy,	23	TELECOMMUNICATIONS	POLICY	159	(1999),	p.	161.		
722	For	an	analysis	of	the	several	legal	formalities	characterizing	different	consortia,	see	Brad	Biddle	et	
al.,	 The	 Expanding	 Role	 and	 Importance	 of	 Standards	 in	 the	 Information	 and	 Communications	
Technology	Industry,	52	JURIMETRICS	177	(2012),	pp.	185-91.	
723	Daniel	Benoliel,	Technological	Standards,	Inc.:	Rethinking	Cyberspace	Regulatory	Epistemology,	92	
CALIFORNIA	LAW	REVIEW	1069	(2004),	p.	1110.		
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by	 ICT	 product	 developers,	 outside	 the	 traditional	 international	 standards	
framework	centered	on	the	ITU-ISO-IEC	triad.		
This	 paradigm	 revolution	 was	 prompted	 and	 supported	 by	 legislative	
measures.	 In	 particular,	 in	 1984,	 the	 US	 legislator	 enacted	 the	 National	
Cooperative	Research	Act,	which	decreased	 regulatory	 hurdles	 to	 the	 growth	 of	
consortia.724	Along	the	same	lines,	in	1993	the	National	Cooperative	Research	and	
Production	 Act	 was	 adopted,725	which	 encouraged	 R&D	 investment	 by	 ensuring	
that	 the	 outcome	 of	 a	 development	 or	 production	 venture	 or	 of	 joint	 research	
should	 be	 assessed	 according	 to	 the	 “rule	 of	 reason”	 criterion.	 The	 National	
Cooperative	 Research	 and	 Production	 Act	 also	 provides	 limited	 shield	 from	
antitrust	 liability	 to	 standard-developing	 consortia	 that	 comply	 with	 the	
notification	procedures	set	out	a	in	the	act.726	
China’s	approach	echoes	the	EU’s	centralized	one,	which	advocates	for	the	
designation	 of	 specific	 SSOs,	 namely	 the	 ITU,	 the	 ISO	 and	 the	 IEC,	 as	
“international	 standardization	 bodies”	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 the	 TBT	 Agreement.	
With	regards	 to	 the	 ICT	sector,	 the	EU	 in	 its	proposal	 to	 the	which	Negotiating	
Group	 on	 Market	 Access	 expressed	 the	 view	 that	 alternative	 standardization	
documents	to	those	adopted	by	the	ITU-ISO-IEC	should	not	be	construed	as	parts	
of	the	WTO	and	TBT	regime.727	At	the	most,	they	could	be	allowed	after	approval	
by	the	ITU-ISO-IEC,	provided	that	they	satisfy	certain	requirements	concerning,	
inter	alia,	the	scope	of	products,	timing,	licensing	and	disclosure.728		
However,	 it	 does	 not	 seem	 plausible	 that	 the	 EU	 could	 possibly	 prevent	
access	 to	 local	 markets,	 for	 	 products	 based	 on	 standards	 set	 by	 industry-led	
consortia	or	other	non-profit	entities	acting	as	SSOs.	Indeed,	it	has	been	observed	
that	 “under	 conditions	 of	 trade	 liberalization,	 products	 can	 be	 sold	 directly	 to	
                                                
724	National	Cooperative	Research	Act	of	1984,	Pub.	L.	No.	98-462,	98	Stat.	1815.	
725	National	Cooperative	Research	 and	Production	Act	 of	 1993,	Pub.	 L.	No.	 103-42,	 107	 Stat.	 117.	 See	
also,	The	Standards	Development	Organization	Advancement	Act	 of	 2004,	Pub.	 L.	No.	 108-237,	 118	
Stat.	661	(further	extending	the	provisions	of	the	NCRPA	to	standards	development	organizations).	
726	U.S.	Department	of	Justice-	Antitrust	Division	Manual	11–29	(2008).	
727 	WTO	 Negotiating	 Group	 on	 Market	 Access,	 Communication	 from	 the	 European	 Union:	
Negotiating	 Text:	 Understanding	 on	 the	 Interpretation	 of	 the	 Agreement	 on	 Technical	 Barriers	 to	
Trade	as	Applied	to	Trade	in	Electronics,	at	3,	TN/MA/W/129,	Dec.	7,	2009.		
728	For	an	in-depth	analysis,	Han-Wei	Liu,	International	Standards	in	Flux:	A	Balkanized	ICT	Standard-
Setting	 Paradigm	 and	 Its	 Implications	 for	 the	WTO,	 17	 JOURNAL	OF	INTERNATIONAL	ECONOMIC	LAW	 3	
(2014),	p.	21.	
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European	 producers	 and	 consumers	 that	 incorporate	 consortia-based	 standards,	
resulting	in	ad	hoc	recognition	of	de	facto	standards	before	de	jure	standards	can	be	
complete”.	 It	 follows	 that	 “[U]nder	 conditions	 of	 trade	 liberalization”,	 to	 block	
access	 to	 products	 incorporating	 consortia	 standards,	 “would	 be	 difficult	 as	 a	
practical	matter	and	politically	controversial	for	EU	regulators”.729	
From	 a	 global	 geopolitical	 and	 economic	 perspective,	 the	 EU’s	 preference	
for	 a	 standardization	 regime	dominated	by	 the	 traditional	 international	 SSOs	 is	
not	surprising	given	the	US’s	significant	lead	in	the	ICT	sector,	which	is	home	to	
most	 ICT	 industry-led	 consortia. 730 	The	 EU	 attempts	 to	 counter	 the	 US’s	
dominance	 in	 standardization	 by	 maintaining	 institutional	 links	 with	 the	 ITU-
ISO-IEC	 triad	 through	 its	 regional	 SSOs.	 Indeed,	 the	European	 standard-setting	
organizations	have	entered	into	a	formal	commitment	to	cooperate	with	ISO	and	
IEC,731	as	part	of	a	framework	of	coordination	of	standard-setting	that	orchestrates	
the	 work	 of	 national,	 European	 and	 international	 standard-developing	
organizations.732	In	 this	 regard,	 the	 words	 used	 in	 Council	 Resolution	 2000/C	
141/01	 are	 extremely	indicative	 and	 enlightening,	 emphasizing	 “the	 role	 of	
European	 standardization	 as	 a	 means	 to	 meet	 specific	 needs	 of	 the	 European	
market,	to	serve	the	public	interest,	in	particular	in	support	of	European	policies,	to	
provide	 standards	 in	 new	 domains,	 to	 implement	 international	 standards	 in	 a	
coherent	way	and,	while	respecting	the	independence	of	national	standards	bodies,	
to	 facilitate	mutual	 understanding	 between	Member	 States’	 standards	 bodies	 and	
the	 preparation	 of	 coherent	 positions	 in	 international	 standardization”.	 This	
                                                
729	Winn,	pp.	207,	208.	The	WTO	recognizes	certain	general	exceptions	 to	 the	obligation	 to	permit	
trade	with	other	members	in	Article	XX	of	the	WTO	Agreement,	which,	inter	alia,	provides:	“Subject	
to	the	requirement	that	such	measures	are	not	applied	in	a	manner	which	would	constitute	a	means	of	
arbitrary	 or	 unjustifiable	 discrimination	 between	 countries	 where	 the	 same	 conditions	 prevail,	 or	 a	
disguised	restriction	on	international	trade,	nothing	in	this	Agreement	shall	be	construed	to	prevent	the	
adoption	 or	 enforcement	 by	 any	 contracting	 party	 of	measures:	 .	 .	 .	 (b)	 necessary	 to	 protect	 human,	
animal	or	plant	life	or	health;	.	.	.	(d)	necessary	to	secure	compliance	with	laws	or	regulations	which	are	
not	 inconsistent	 with	 the	 provisions	 of	 this	 Agreement	 .	 .	 .	 [or]	 (g)	 relating	 to	 the	 conservation	 of	
exhaustible	natural	 resources	 if	 such	measures	are	made	effective	 in	 conjunction	with	 restrictions	on	
domestic	production	or	consumption	[...]”.	General	Agreement	on	Tariffs	and	Trade,	Art.	XX,	Oct.	30,	
1947,	61	Stat.	A-11,	55	U.N.T.S.	194.	
730	Han-Wei	Liu,	International	Standards	in	Flux:	A	Balkanized	ICT	Standard-Setting	Paradigm	and	Its	
Implications	for	the	WTO,	17	JOURNAL	OF	INTERNATIONAL	ECONOMIC	LAW	3	(2014),	p.	22.	
731	International	Organization	for	Standardization	(ISO)	&	European	Committee	for	Standardization	
(CEN),		Agreement	on	technical	co-operation		between	ISO	and	CEN	(called	the	Vienna	Agreement);	
see	Han-Wei	Liu,	International	Standards	in	Flux:	A	Balkanized	ICT	Standard-Setting	Paradigm	and	Its	
Implications	for	the	WTO,	17	JOURNAL	OF	INTERNATIONAL	ECONOMIC	LAW	3	(2014),	pp.	22-23.	
732	See	also	Council	Resolution	2000/C	141/01,	2000	O.J.	(C	141)	1,	3-4,	para	10.		
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collaboration	 arguably	 allows	 the	 EU	 to	 influence	 the	 world’s	 standardization	
process,	 with	 non-EU	 industry-led	 consortia’s	 standards	 in	 a	 secondary	 role.	
Indeed,	the	US	has	harshly	criticized	the	collaboration	between	traditional	SSOs	
and	EU	 regional	 SSOs,	 as	 it	 has	 perceived	 these	 collaboration	mechanisms	 as	 a	
way	 in	 which	 the	 EU	 countries	 sponsor	 their	 own	 standards,	 making	 them	
globally	accepted	international	standards	.	733		
Concluding,	the	diverging	regulatory	approaches	towards	standardization	of		
China,	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 US	 reflect	 the	 different	 institutional	 endowments	 and	
political	and	economic	cultures	of	these	three	trading	powers.734		
Indeed,	China’s	standardization	 is,	 still,	a	matter	of	State	(and,	as	we	have	
noted,	 sometimes	 even	 competition	 law	 enforcement	 is	 a	 matter	 of	 industrial	
policy).	
The	EU’s	approach	to	standardization	seems	to	be	aligned	to	its	regulatory	
stance.	 It	 reflects	 what	 has	 been	 described	 as	 a	 “coordinated	market	 economy”	
regulatory	 philosophy, 735 	as	 it	 favors	 a	 hierarchical	 framework	 marked	 by	
government	oversight.736	
The	US’s	approach	to	standardization	is,	in	contrast,	a	more	“individualistic,	
market	 oriented”	 one,	 as	 illustrated	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 US’s	 standard-setting	
organizations	operate	“largely	outside	any	form	of	government	oversight	and	focus	
intensively	on	market	conditions”	.737	The	preference	for	informal	standardization	
predominantly	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 the	 private	 sector	 reflects	 a	 regulatory	 approach	
falling	 within	 a	 “liberal	 market	 economy”. 738 	This	 regulatory	 policy	 for	 the	
                                                
733	See	TIM	BÜTHE	AND	WALTER	MATTLI,	THE	NEW	GLOBAL	RULERS:	THE	PRIVATIZATION	OF	REGULATION	IN	
THE	WORLD	ECONOMY	(PRINCETON:	PRINCETON	UNIVERSITY	PRESS,	2011),	p.158.		
734	Kenneth	W.	Abbot,	US-EU	Dispute	over	Technical	Barriers	to	Trade	and	the	“Hushkit”	Dispute,	in	
ERNST-ULRICH	PETERSMANN	AND	MARK	A.	POLLACK	 (EDS.),	TRANSATLANTIC	ECONOMIC	DISPUTES:	 THE	EU,	
THE	US,	AND	THE	WTO	(OXFORD:	OXFORD	UNIVERSITY	PRESS,	2003),	pp.	257;	Jane	K.	Winn,	Governance	of	
Global	 Mobile	 Money	 Networks:	 the	 Role	 of	 Technical	 Standards,	 8	WASHINGTON	 JOURNAL	OF	 LAW,	
TECHNOLOGY	AND	ART	197	(2013),	pp.	203-04.	
735	Jane	K.	Winn,	Globalization	 and	 Standards:	 The	 Logic	 of	 Two-Level	 Games,	 JOURNAL	OF	LAW	AND	
POLICY	FOR	THE	INFORMATION	SOCIETY	(2009),	p.	200.	
736	Id.,	p.	201.	
737	Id.,	p.	190.	
738	Jane	K.	Winn,	Globalization	 and	 Standards:	 The	 Logic	 of	 Two-Level	 Games,	 JOURNAL	OF	LAW	AND	
POLICY	FOR	THE	INFORMATION	SOCIETY	(2009),	pp.	189-190.	
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management	 of	 technical	 standards	 puts	 a	 greater	 emphasis	 on	 the	 market	
incentives,	rather	than	on	central	coordination	of	economic	activity.739		
These	diverging	stances	exacerbate	the	differences	between	the	US,	and	the	
EU	and	arguably	China’s	approach	to	standards’	development,	while	at	the	same	
time	explain	 the	preferences	of	different	 countries	 for	different	 standard-setting	
paradigms.	It	has	been	correctly	observed	that	reconciling	these	differences	would	
hardly	be	attainable,	as	it	would	entail	institutional	changes	that	are	not	likely	to	
take	 place.	 Indeed	 “these	 domestic	 and	 regional	 institutional	 standard-setting	
systems	[…]	can	be	self-reinforcing	and	are	likely	to	remain	in	place	over	time	due	to	
path	 dependence”.740	This	 can,	 as	 scholar	 Büthe	 and	 Mattli	 emphasize,	 create	
“powerful	 organizational	 and	 social	 interests	 that	 vehemently	 oppose	 any	 radical	
overhaul	of	the	domestic	institutional	systems	bound	to	undermine	their	power”.741	
In	 this	 vein,	 it	 has	 been	 observed	 that	 “one	might	 expect	 the	 persistence	 of	 this	
divergence	between	…	major	trading	powers	for	an	extended	period	of	time.”	Hence,	
“One	may	wonder,	then,	what	the	WTO	adjudicators’	preference	might	be.	When	a	
dispute	touches	on	new	arenas	that	fall	within	the	purview	of	those	consortia,	how	
would	WTO	adjudicators	seat	these	new	players	under	the	TBT	regime?”.742		
The	 answer	 is	 far	 from	 certain	 and	 presumes	 an	 examination	 of	 relevant	
case	law	applied	to	ICT	standardization.		
4.1.3. WTO JURISPRUDENCE ON TECHNICAL STANDARDS 
Having	 ascertained	 the	 difficulties	 in	 defining	 what	 amounts	 to	 an	
“international	 standard”	 and	 what	 constitutes	 an	 “international	 standardization	
body”	within	 the	TBT	Agreement,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 seek	guidance	 in	 the	WTO	
case	law.		
                                                
739	Id.,	p.	200.	
740	Han-Wei	Liu,	International	Standards	in	Flux:	A	Balkanized	ICT	Standard-Setting	Paradigm	and	Its	
Implications	for	the	WTO,	17	JOURNAL	OF	INTERNATIONAL	ECONOMIC	LAW	3	(2014),	p.	24.	
741	TIM	BÜTHE	AND	WALTER	MATTLI,	THE	NEW	GLOBAL	RULERS:	THE	PRIVATIZATION	OF	REGULATION	IN	THE	
WORLD	ECONOMY	(PRINCETON:	PRINCETON	UNIVERSITY	PRESS,	2011),	p.	219.		
742	Han-Wei	Liu,	International	Standards	in	Flux:	A	Balkanized	ICT	Standard-Setting	Paradigm	and	Its	
Implications	for	the	WTO,	17	JOURNAL	OF	INTERNATIONAL	ECONOMIC	LAW	3	(2014),	p.	24.	
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For	 this	 purpose,	 some	 passages	 of	 the	 reasoning	 of	 the	WTO	 Appellate	
Body	 (“AB”)	 in	 the	US-Tuna	 II	 (Mexico)	 case743	can	 help	 overcome	 some	 of	 the	
ambiguities	 detected	 in	 the	 determination	 of	 certain	 requirements	 for	
“international	standards”	pursuant	to	the	TBT	Agreement.		
Indeed,	the	AB	attempted	to	shed	some	light	on	the	definition,	drawing	on	
the	 differences	 in	 terminology	 used	 in	 different	 legal	 documents.	 The	 AB	
remarked	that,	in	the	absence	of	a	specific	definition,	there	is	a	discrepancy	as	to	
what	 sort	 of	 legal	 entity	 is	 suitable	 to	 approve	 an	 international	 standard	 in	 the	
1991ISO/IEC	 Guide	 2:	 (the	 “ISO/IEC	 Guide	 2”),	 to	 which	 	 Annex	 1	 to	 the	 TBT	
Agreement	makes	reference,	and	Annexes	1.2	and	1.4	of	the	TBT	Agreement.	The	
ISO/IEC	Guide	2	defines	an	“international	standard”	as	a	“standard	that	is	adopted	
by	 an	 international	 standardizing/standards	 organization	 and	 made	 available	 to	
the	 public”.744	It	 thus	 uses	 the	 term	 “organizations”	 in	 relation	 to	 international	
standards.	Conversely,	Annexes	 1.2	and	1.4	of	 the	TBT	Agreement,	use	the	terms	
“body”	and	“international	 body	 or	 system”,	 respectively.745	In	 this	 respect,	 the	AB	
further	 elucidated	 that	 the	 term	 “body”	 is	 to	 be	 construed	 as	 a	 “legal	 or	
administrative	entity	that	has	specific	tasks	and	composition”.	Differently,	the	term	
of	“organization”	is	to	be	interpreted	as	a	“body	that	is	based	on	the	membership	of	
other	 bodies	 or	 individuals	 and	 has	 an	 established	 constitution	 and	 its	 own	
administration”.746		
Using	 this	 terminological	 analysis	 as	a	point	of	departure,	 the	AB	 inferred	
that,	 within	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 TBT	 Agreement,	 “international	 standardizing	
bodies”,	 “may,	 but	 not	 necessarily,	 be	 organizations”. 747 	Hence,	 it	 has	 been	
observed	by	 the	 literature	 that	 this	 interpretation	“would	 appear	 to	 allow	 a	wide	
range	of	consortia	to	pass	the	formality	test,	regardless	of	which	model	these	SSOs	
choose”.748	From	these	considerations,	 it	would	thus	appear	possible	 that	 the	AB	
                                                
743	Appellate	Body	Report,	United	States-Measures	Concerning	the	Importation,	Marketing	and	Sale	of	
Tuna	and	Tuna	Products,	WT/DS381/R,	adopted	June	13,	2012.	
744	The	TBT	Agreement,	Annex	1.		
745	Appellate	Body	Report,	US-Tuna	II	(Mexico),	para	356.	
746	Id.,	para	355.	
747	Id.,	para	356.	
748	Han-Wei	Liu,	International	Standards	in	Flux:	A	Balkanized	ICT	Standard-Setting	Paradigm	and	Its	
Implications	for	the	WTO,	17	JOURNAL	OF	INTERNATIONAL	ECONOMIC	LAW	3	(2014),	p.	33.	
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would	be	inclined	to	accept	as	falling	within	the	scope	of	the	TBT	Agreement	also	
standards	developed	by	consortia	and	non-profit	organizations.		
Having	 clarified	 the	 terminology	 issues,	 in	 US-Tuna	 II	 (Mexico)	 the	 AB	
specified	that	from	a	substantive	perspective,	the	qualification	of	an	international	
standardizing	body	in	the	TBT-sense	is	dependent	on	its	membership	being	open	
to	the	“relevant	bodies	of	at	least	all	Members”749	It	defines	the	adjective	“open”	as	
“accessible	 or	 available	 without	 hindrance”,	 “not	 confined	 or	 limited	 to	 a	 few”,	
“generally	 accessible	 or	 available”,750	and	 ultimately,	 “non-discriminatory”	 to	 the	
relevant	 bodies	 of	 some	 WTO	 members	 as	 compared	 to	 other	 members.	 751	
Concluding,	 the	 AB	 held	 that	 for	 a	 body	 to	 constitute	 an	 “international	
standardization	 body”,	 it	 must	 be	 engaged	 in	 “recognized	 activities	 in	
standardization”.752	The	 AB	 interpreted	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 term	 “recognize”	 as	
“acknowledge	the	existence,	legality,	or	validity	of,	especially	by	formal	approval	or	
sanction;	 accord	 notice	 or	 attention	 to;	 treat	 as	 worthy	 of	 consideration”.753	It	
asserted	 that	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 term	 “recognize”	 spans	 from	 “a	 factual	 end	
(acknowledgement	 of	 the	 existence	 of	 something)	 to	 a	 normative	 end	
(acknowledgement	of	the	validity	or	legality	of	something)”.754	
In	 light	of	 these	observations,	 it	appears	that	 formal	as	well	as	substantive	
issues	 might	 impede	 the	 AB	 applying	 the	 TBT	 Agreement	 also	 to	 standards	
developed	by	consortia	and	non-profit	organizations.	
4.2. THE TRIPS AGREEMENT  
The	TRIPs	Agreement		one	of	the	multilateral	treaties	adopted	at	the	end	of	
the	Uruguay	Round	in	1994represents	an	effort	to	overcome	the	dissimilarities	in	
the	manner	 in	which	member	states	protect	 IPRs,	 in	order	 to	bring	 them	under	
common	 international	 rules.	 It	 sets	 the	minimum	requirements	 that	 the	 laws	of	
the	member	states	must	satisfy	in	order	to	protect	IP,	including	copyright.	patents,	
trademarks,	geographical	indications,	and	industrial	design.		
                                                
749	Appellate	Body	Report,	US-Tuna	II	(Mexico),	para	358.	
750	Id.,	para	364.	
751	Id.,	para	375.	
752	Id.,	para	376.	
753	Id.,	para	361.	
754	Ibid.	See	also	Id.,	paras	362	and	376.	
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The	 TRIPs	 Agreement	 sets	 out	 the	 “minimum	 standards”	 that	 WTO	
member	 states	 should	 guarantee	 in	 order	 to	 protect	 IPRs. 755 	Accordingly,	
measures	addressing	the	issues	raised	by	IPRs	in	standards	can	be	adopted	as	long	
as	they	are	compatible	with	the	TRIPS	Agreement.756		
The	 nondiscrimination	 principle	 plays	 a	 central	 role	 in	 the	 TRIPs	
Agreement.	Article	3	of	the	TRIPs	Agreement	establishes	the	“National	Treatment”	
principle,	according	to	which	locals	and	foreigners	should	be	treated	equally.	It	is	
a	 principle	 that	 is	 not	 only	 found	 in	 the	 other	 WTO	 multilateral	 agreements	
(GATT	 and	 GATS)	 but	 even	 in	 those	WIPO	 international	 agreements	 adopted	
before	 the	WTO	was	 created	 and	 recalled	 in	 Article	 2	 of	 the	 TRIPs	 Agreement	
(the	“Berne	Convention”	and	the	“Paris	Convention”).757	
Article	 8	 of	 the	 TRIPs	 Agreement	 provides	 	 that	 members	 may	 adopt	
measures	 necessary	 to	 protect	 public	 health	 and	 nutrition	 and	 to	 promote	 the	
public	 interest	 in	 sectors	 of	 vital	 importance	 to	 their	 socio-economic	 and	
technological	development.	The	article	further	identifies	the	need	for	appropriate	
measures	 to	 prevent	 abuse	 of	 IPRs	 by	 rights’	 holders	 as	well	 as	 anticompetitive	
conduct	 and	 practices	 impeding	 international	 trade.	 In	 any	 case,	 the	 measures	
adopted	by	the	members	under	Article	8	should	be	consistent	with	the	provisions	
of	the	TRIPS	Agreement.	
The	 key	 principles	 under	 the	 TRIPS	 Agreement	 relevant	 to	 the	 concerns	
raised	by	IPRs	in	standardization	concern:	(i)	the	adoption	of	exceptions	to	rights	
conferred	by	IPRs	(Article	30);	(ii)	the	use	of	compulsory	licensing	(Article	31),	(iii)	
the	prevention	of	anticompetitive	conduct	 in	contractual	 licensing	and	abuse	of	
IPRs	 (under	 Article	 8,	 along	 with	 Article	 40);	 (iv)	 provisions	 concerning	 the	
enforcement	of	IPRs	(Article	41);	and	(v)	injunctions	(Article	44).	These	principles	
are	examined	below.	
                                                
755	On	 the	 TRIPs	 Agreement,	 see	 DANIEL	 J.	 GERVAIS,	 THE	 TRIPS	 AGREEMENT:	 DRAFTING	 HISTORY	 AND	
ANALYSIS	 (SWEET	 &	 MAXWELL,	 2003);	 Giuseppe	 Di	 Vita,	 The	 TRIPs	 agreement	 and	 technological	
innovation,	35	JOURNAL	OF	POLICY	MODELING	6	(2013),	pp.	964-977.	
756	Specifically,	on	China’s	participation	in	the	WTO	Agreement,	see	Paolo	Davide	Farah,	Elena	Cima,	
China’s	Participation	in	the	World	Trade	Organization:	Trade	in	Goods,	Services,	Intellectual	Property	
Rights	and	Transparency	 Issues,	 in	LOPEZ-TARRUELLA	MARTINEZ,	AURELIO	(ED)	EL	COMERCIO	CON	CHINA.	
OPORTUNIDADES	EMPRESARIALES,	INCERTIDUMBRES	JURÍDICAS	(TIRANT	LE	BLANCH,	2010),	p.	101.	
757	Ibid.	
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I. Article	 30	 of	 the	 TRIPS	 Agreement	 (“Exceptions	 to	 Rights	
Conferred”).	Article	30	establishes	the	requirements	that	should	be	
cumulatively	 satisfied	 in	 order	 to	 adopt	 exceptions	 to	 rights	
conferred	 by	 a	 patent.	 Indeed,	 “[m]embers	 may	 provide	 […]	
exceptions	 to	 the	exclusive	 rights	conferred	by	a	patent”,	“provided	
that	 such	 exceptions”:	 (a)	 are	 “limited”;	 (b)	 do	 “not	 unreasonably	
conflict	with	 a	 normal	 exploitation	 of	 the	 patent”:	and	(c)	do	“not	
unreasonably	prejudice	the	legitimate	interests	of	the	patent	owner,	
taking	 account	 of	 the	 legitimate	 interests	 of	 third	 parties”	 (Article	
30	 of	 the	 TRIPs	 Agreement).	 Yet,	 it	 is	 contentious	 whether	 a	
remuneration	 of	 rights	 (i)	 mechanism	 can	 be	 reconciled	 with	
Article	 30,	 given	 that	 Article	 31	 provides	 for	 use	 without	
authorization	 on	 a	 case-by-case	 basis	 (“authorization	 of	 such	 use	
shall	be	considered	on	its	individual	merits”.	Article	31(a)).	It	follows	
that	 “any	 derogation	 of	 Article	 30	 to	 imply	 as	 providing	 for	 a	
remuneration	 of	 rights	 scheme	 deflates	 the	 compulsory	 license	
scheme	 enshrined	 in	Article	 31”.	As	 far	as	patents	 in	standards	are	
concerned,	the	most	relevant	benefit	of	an	Article	30	exception	is	
that	 the	 “solution	 is	 ex	 ante	 and	 will	 not	 be	 subject	 to	 the	
requirement	 of	 prior	 negotiations	 or	 would	 not	 require	 the	 use	 of	
such	mechanism	on	a	case	by	case	basis.	While	a	blanket	exclusion	
from	patent	 infringement	of	 standardized	 technologies	 is	 bound	 to	
deviate	from	the	incentives	that	the	patent	system	aims	to	foster,	a	
system	of	remuneration	based	 license	can	be	articulated	within	the	
Article	30	framework”.758	
II. Use	of	compulsory	 licensing.	Article	31	of	the	TRIPs	Agreement	
(“Other	Use	Without	 Authorization	 of	 the	 Right	Holder”)	 allows	
countries	 to	 use	 compulsory	 licensing.	 Such	 use	 “may	 only	 be	
permitted	if,	prior	to	such	use,	the	proposed	user	has	made	efforts	to	
obtain	 authorization	 from	 the	 right	 holder	 on	 reasonable	
commercial	 terms	 and	 conditions	 and	 that	 such	 efforts	 have	 not	
                                                
758	Yogesh	Pai,	The	 International	Dimension	of	Proprietary	Technical	Standards:	Through	the	Lens	of	
Trade,	Competition	Law	and	Developing	Countries,	SOCIAL	SCIENCE	RESEARCH	NETWORK	(2012),	p.	43.	
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been	successful	within	a	reasonable	period	of	time”	(Article	31(b)	of	
the	 TRIPs	 Agreement).	 It	 follows	 that	where	 the	 use	 of	 essential	
patents	 in	 standards	 is	 not	 made	 available	 on	 reasonable	
commercial	 terms	 and	 conditions	 within	 a	 reasonable	 period	 of	
time,	 countries	 can	 take	 measures	 to	 offset	 the	 impact	 of	 such	
practice.759	It	should	be	remarked	that	compulsory	 licensing	plays	
an	 important	 role	 in	 enforcing	 competition	 regulations	 in	 the	 IP	
and	 standardization	 realm	 as,	 unlike	 the	 limited	 exceptions	
pursuant	to	Article	30	of	the	TRIPs	Agreement,	which	act	as	an	ex	
post	 solution,	compulsory	 licensing	provides	a	 solution	only	after	
the	 findings	 of	 anticompetitive	 conduct,	 or	 failure	 to	 achieve	
licensing	“on	reasonable	commercial	terms	and	conditions”	“within	
a	reasonable	period	of	time”.		
Moreover,	Article	31(h)	requires	that	“the	right	holder	shall	be	paid	
adequate	 remuneration	 in	 the	 circumstances	 of	 each	 case,	 taking	
into	 account	 the	 economic	 value	 of	 the	 authorization.”	 It	 is	 thus	
central	 to	 assess	 whether	 the	 terms	 “fair	 and	 reasonable”	 as	
understood	 under	 FRAND	 terms	 depart	 from	 the	 “adequate	
remuneration”	requirement.	
Furthermore,	 except	 as	 a	 remedy	 to	 antitrust	 violations,	products	
produced	 under	 a	 compulsory	 license	 shall	 “be	 authorized	
predominantly	for	the	supply	of	the	domestic	market	of	the	Member	
authorizing	such	use”,	thus	creating	an	additional	deterrent	to	use	
compulsory	licensing	as	a	mechanism	to	operationalize	FRAND.760	
III. Anticompetitive	 conduct	 in	 contractual	 licensing	 and	 abuse	
of	 IPRs.	 Article	 8(1)	 of	 the	 TRIPs	 Agreement	 provides	 that	
“[a]ppropriate	measures,	provided	that	 they	are	consistent	with	 the	
provisions	of	this	Agreement,	may	be	needed	to	prevent	the	abuse	of	
intellectual	property	rights	by	right	holders	or	the	resort	to	practices	
which	 unreasonably	 restrain	 trade	 or	 adversely	 affect	 the	
                                                
759	Ibid.	
760	Ibid.	
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international	transfer	of	technology”.	By	the	same	token,	Article	40	
of	the	TRIPs	Agreement	indicates	that	“[m]embers	agree	that	some	
licensing	practices	 or	 conditions	 pertaining	 to	 intellectual	 property	
rights	which	restrain	competition	may	have	adverse	effects	on	trade	
and	may	impede	the	transfer	and	dissemination	of	technology”.	
For	instance,	countries	can	make	use	of	compulsory	licensing	as	a	
tool	 to	 address	 licensing	 practice,	 as	 well	 as	 of	 penalties	 and	
regulatory	actions	 to	challenge	anticompetitive	 licensing	conduct.	
Nevertheless,	neither	Article	8	nor	Article	40	makes	clear	whether	
there	 is	 room	 for	 a	 general	 relationship	 between	 IP	 and	
competition	 policy.	 Indeed,	 “[e]ven	 while	 countries	 can	 take	
measures	under	Articles	8	and	40,	 they	are	 in	 the	nature	of	comity	
principles	and	do	not	place	any	WTO	member	under	a	mandate	 to	
remedy	 a	 particular	 antitrust	 violation”.	Where	 IPRs	 that	 protect	
essential	 technologies	 and	 information	 are	 embodied	 into	
standards,	 the	 greater	 risk	 concerns	 potential	 IPR	 infringement	
claims	 against	 producers	 of	 goods	 and	 service	 providers.	 The	
current	 upsurge	 in	 litigation	 concerning	 patent	 infringement	 by	
standards’	 implementers,	 when	 FRAND	 commitments	 were	
provided	 highlights	 why	 limiting	 of	 remedies	 for	 infringement	 is	
crucial.	 Against	 this	 background,	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	 TRIPs	
Agreement	on	enforcement	of	 IPRs	can	be	applied	 in	appropriate	
cases	 involving	 IPRs	 in	 standardization	 as	 the	 TRIPs	 Agreement	
provides	for	the	minimal	standards	for	adoption	of	procedures	for	
the	 enforcement	 of	 IPRs.	 The	 standards	 on	 enforcement	
procedures	 are	 supported	 by	 relevant	 standards	 for	 fair	 and	
equitable	procedures	and	safeguard	against	abuse.		
IV. Enforcement	 of	 IPRs.	Article	41	of	the	TRIPS	Agreement	obliges	
members	to	“ensure	 that	 enforcement	procedures	 […]	are	available	
under	 their	 law	 so	 as	 to	 permit	 effective	 action	 against	 any	 act	 of	
infringement	 of	 intellectual	 property	 rights	 […],	 including	
expeditious	 remedies	 to	 prevent	 infringements	 and	 remedies	 which	
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constitute	 a	 deterrent	 to	 further	 infringements”.	 Moreover,	 these	
procedures	 “shall	 be	 applied	 in	 such	 a	 manner	 as	 to	 avoid	 the	
creation	of	barriers	to	legitimate	trade	and	to	provide	for	safeguards	
against	 their	 abuse”	(Article	41(1),	and	“shall	 be	 fair	 and	 equitable”	
and	not	“unnecessarily	complicated	or	costly,	or	entail	unreasonable	
time-limits	or	unwarranted	delays	”	(Article	41(2)).	
Decisions	 “shall	 be	 made	 available	 at	 least	 to	 the	 parties	 to	 the	
proceeding	without	undue	delay”	(Article	41(3)).		
The	 implementation	of	 the	general	principles	of	 enforcement	can	
operate	 as	 a	 safety	 net	 against	 abuse	 of	 the	 enforcement	
procedures.	Therefore,	 the	relevant	question	 is	whether	or	not	an	
injunction	 should	 follow	 against	 standards	 practitioners	 after	
FRAND	 commitments	 by	 the	 patent	 holders.	 Since	 the	 terms	
barriers	 to	 “legitimate	 trade”	 and	 “safeguards	 against	 [procedural]	
abuse”	have	not	been	considered	by	any	dispute	settlement	panel,	
the	 prospect	 of	 a	 FRAND	 exception	 to	 patent	 infringements	 is	
contentious.761	It	 should	 nonetheless	 be	 remarked	 that	 provisions	
of	the	TRIPs	Agreement	on	IPR	enforcement	should	be	interpreted	
in	 light	 of	 the	 GATT	 provisions.	 Indeed,	 the	WTO	 jurisprudence	
has	remarked	that	the	fact	that	legislation	is	applied	as	a	means	of	
IPR	enforcement	at	 the	border	does	not	provide	a	carve-out	 from	
the	 applicability	 of	 Article	 III	 (4)	 of	 the	 GATT,762	the	 purpose	 of	
which	 is	 to	 avoid	 protectionism	 in	 the	 application	 of	 internal	
measures.763	
                                                
761	Id.,	p.	44.		
762	GATT	(1989),	Panel	report	on	United	States	 -	Section	337	of	 the	Tariff	Act	of	 1930,	L/6439,	BISD	
36S/345,	 385-386,	 para	 5.10.	 Article	 III(4)	 of	 the	 GATT	 reads:	 “The	 products	 of	 the	 territory	 of	 any	
contracting	party	imported	into	the	territory	of	any	other	contracting	party	shall	be	accorded	treatment	
no	 less	 favourable	 than	 that	 accorded	 to	 like	 products	 of	 national	 origin	 in	 respect	 of	 all	 laws,	
regulations	 and	 requirements	 affecting	 their	internal	 sale,	 offering	 for	 sale,	 purchase,	 transportation,	
distribution	or	use	[…]”.	
763	Appellate	Body	Report,	Japan	-Alcoholic	Beverages	II,	p.	16:	“The	broad	and	fundamental	purpose	of	
Article	 III	 is	 to	avoid	protectionism	 in	 the	application	of	 internal	 tax	and	 regulatory	measures.	More	
specifically,	the	purpose	of	Article	III	‘is	to	ensure	that	internal	measures	“not	be	applied	to	imported	or	
domestic	 products	 so	 as	 to	 afford	 protection	 to	 domestic	 production”’.	Toward	 this	 end,	 Article	 III	
obliges	Members	 of	 the	WTO	 to	 provide	 equality	 of	 competitive	 conditions	 for	 imported	 products	 in	
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Consequentially,	 in	 the	United	 States-	 Section	 337	 case,	 a	 GATT	
Panel	 established	 that	 measures	 for	 IPR	 enforcement	 cannot	 be	
justified	under	the	general	exception	clause	in	Article	XX(d)	of	the	
GATT,	 when	 they	 accord	 to	 imported	 goods,	 challenged	 as	
infringing	patent	rules,	less	favorable	treatment	than	the	treatment	
accorded	 to	 similar	 challenges	 to	 products	 of	 origin.764	It	 follows	
that,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 assess	 the	 circumstances	 under	 which	
technical	 standards	 incorporating	 IPRs	 amount	 to	 barriers	 to	
“legitimate	 trade”	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 border	 measures	 or	 other	
procedures	 for	 IPR	 enforcement.	 However,	 it	 has	 been	 remarked	
that	 the	 answer	 depends	 on	 the	 term,	 under	 both	 the	TRIPs	 and	
the	 TBT	Agreement	 of	 “barriers	 to	 legitimate	 trade”.	As	 correctly	
pointed	out	by	Yogesh	Pai,	 the	 term	 “legitimate	 trade”	 “should	 be	
understood	 in	 terms	 of	 trade	 that	 conforms	 to	 rules	 and	 normal	
expectations	 of	 trade.	 The	 legitimacy	 of	 trade	 in	 goods	 that	
conforms	 to	 technical	 regulations	 and	 standards	 but	 infringes	 IP	
rights	obviously	can	be	challenged.	However,	the	concept	should	also	
be	 discussed	 in	 light	 of	 the	 adoption	 of	 technical	 regulations	 and	
standards	incorporating	IP	rights.”765		
V. Injunctions.	 According	 to	 Article	 44	 of	 the	 TRIPS	 Agreement,	
“[t]he	judicial	authorities	shall	have	the	authority	to	order	a	party	to	
desist	 from	an	 infringement”	(Article	44(1)).	The	TRIPs	Agreement	
emphasizes	on	the	application	of	injunctions	“inter	alia	 to	prevent	
the	 entry	 into	 the	 channels	 of	 commerce	 in	 their	 jurisdiction	 of	
                                                                                                                                 
relation	to	domestic	products.	‘[T]he	intention	of	the	drafters	of	the	Agreement	was	clearly	to	treat	the	
imported	products	 in	the	same	way	as	the	like	domestic	products	once	they	had	been	cleared	through	
customs.	Otherwise	indirect	protection	could	be	given.”	
764	GATT	(1989),	Panel	report	on	the	United	States-Section	337	of	the	Tariff	Act	of	1930,	L/6439,	BISD	
36S/345,	 385-386,	 para	 6.3.	Article	XX(d)	 of	 the	GATT	 reads:	 “Subject	 to	 the	 requirement	 that	 such	
measures	 are	 not	 applied	 in	 a	manner	 which	 would	 constitute	 a	means	 of	 arbitrary	 or	 unjustifiable	
discrimination	 between	 countries	 where	 the	 same	 conditions	 prevail,	 or	 a	 disguised	 restriction	 on	
international	 trade,	 nothing	 in	 this	 Agreement	 shall	 be	 construed	 to	 prevent	 the	 adoption	 or	
enforcement	 by	 any	 contracting	 party	 of	 measures:	 […]necessary	 to	 secure	 compliance	 with	 laws	 or	
regulations	which	are	not	inconsistent	with	the	provisions	of	this	Agreement,	including	those	relating	to	
customs	 enforcement,	 the	 enforcement	 of	 monopolies	 operated	 under	 paragraph	 4	 of	 Article	 II	 and	
Article	 XVII,	 the	 protection	 of	 patents,	 trademarks	 and	 copyrights,	 and	 the	 prevention	 of	 deceptive	
practices”.	
765	Yogesh	Pai,	The	 International	Dimension	of	Proprietary	Technical	Standards:	Through	the	Lens	of	
Trade,	Competition	Law	and	Developing	Countries,	SOCIAL	SCIENCE	RESEARCH	NETWORK	(2012),	p.	50.		
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imported	 goods	 that	 involve	 the	 infringement	 of	 an	 intellectual	
property	right,	immediately	after	customs	clearance	of	such	goods”.	
Article	 44	 also	 provides	 the	 flexibility	 for	 countries	 not	 to	 allow	
injunction	orders:	 against	good	 faith	dealers;	use	by	governments	
or	by	third	parties	authorized	by	a	government;	and,	in	other	cases,	
where	 ordering	 an	 injunction	 would	 be	 inconsistent	 with	 the	
domestic	 laws	 (Article	 44(2)).	 Moreover,	 the	 application	 of	 this	
provision	 is	 to	 be	 read	 together	 with	 the	 general	 obligations	
concerning	fairness	and	equitability	of	the	enforcement	procedures.	
In	 view	 of	 that,	 countries	 should	make	 available	 injunctions	 and	
other	 procedural	 remedies	 in	 a	 way	 that	 safeguards	 the	 fairness	
and	equitability	of	the	availability	of	such	procedural	remedies.766	
4.1.3. THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND IP RIGHTS IN STANDARDIZATION 
The	TRIPs	Agreement	 specifically	 touches	 upon	 the	 issues	 raised	 by	 IP	 in	
standards	 as	 it	 raises	 questions	 concerning	 rules	 for	 achieving	 public	 policy	
objectives	and	their	interlinks	with	IPR	enforcement.		
From	 a	 domestic	 perspective,	 litigation	 on	 IPRs	 in	 standards	 can	 trigger	
remedies	 descending	 from	 competition	 and	 patent	 laws,	 depending	 on	 the	
national	 laws	of	each	country.	These	remedies,	however,	barely	tackle	the	 issues	
raised	by	the	use,	certainty	and	efficiency	of	standards.	Against	this	background,	
SSOs,	 as	 well	 as	 governments	 have	 strived	 to	 design,	 adopt	 and	 implement	
standardization	policies	capable	of	addressing	these	issues,	focusing	on	IP	misuse,	
anticompetitive	conduct,	as	well	as	the	definition	of	FRAND	terms.		
In	 this	 context,	 the	 appreciation	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 IPRs,	 which	
mainly	have	a	domestic	scope	as	they	are	granted	nationally,	and	standards	which,	
in	contrast,	directly	affect	global	trade,	lags	behind.		
Hence,	the	TRIPs	Agreement	could	be	the	right	tool	and	step	to	tackle	the	
relationship	between	IPRs	in	standards	and	international	trade	at	the	global	level.	
                                                
766	Id.,		p.	44.	
 209 
However,	 it	presents	several	shortcomings,	which	stem	directly	 from	an	analysis	
of	the	main	articles	of	the	TRIPs	Agreement	already	scrutinized	above.		
For	instance,	Article	8	of	the	TRIPs	Agreement	endorses	the	need	to	adopt	
“appropriate	measures	 […]	 to	 prevent	 the	 abuse	 of	 intellectual	 property	 rights	 by	
right	 holders	 or	 the	 resort	 to	 practices	 which	 unreasonably	 restrain	 trade	 or	
adversely	 affect	 the	 international	 transfer	 of	 technology”.	 However,	 the	
inducement	 to	countries	 to	actually	adopt	measures	 to	prevent	 the	 	detrimental	
effect	on	international	trade	and	transfer	of	technology	remains	debatable.		
Considering	 this	 gap,	 Article	 40	 of	 the	 TRIPs	 Agreement,	 calls	 for	 a	
cooperation	principle	concerning	competition	norms	within	the	WTO	regime	in	
addressing	 the	 relationship	 of	 competition	 norms	 with	 IPRs.	 Article	 40	 of	 the	
TRIPs	 Agreement	 states	 that	 “[e]ach	 Member	 shall	 enter,	 upon	 request,	 into	
consultations	with	any	other	Member	which	has	cause	to	believe	that	an	intellectual	
property	right	owner	[…]	is	undertaking	[anticompetitive]	practices	in	[contractual	
licensing]”.	 The	 country	 addressed	 “shall	 accord	 full	 and	 sympathetic	
consideration	to,	and	shall	afford	adequate	opportunity	for,	consultations	with	the	
requesting	Member,	and	 shall	 cooperate	 through	supply	of	publicly	available	non-
confidential	 information	 of	 relevance	 […]	 subject	 to	 domestic	 law	 and	 to	 the	
conclusion	of	mutually	satisfactory	agreements”.		
Article	40	thus	calls	for	cooperation	to	enforce	competition	rules.	However,	
this	 is	 restricted	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 cooperation	 is,	 in	 practice,	 dependent	 on	
subsequent	 arrangements,	 the	 coming	 into	 existence	 of	 which	 is	 not	 at	 all	
established.	Moreover,	cooperation	on	competition	rules	in	this	context	is	further	
endangered	by	the	differences	in	the	notions	of	substantive	IPRs	and	competition	
law	 enforcement.	 The	 uncertainty	 surrounding	 the	 notions	 of	 FRAND	 terms	 in	
determining	the	amount	of	royalties	(which	are,	ultimately,	left	to	be	determined	
by	concerned	parties,	carrying	the	risk	of	having	licensing	terms	set	by	advanced	
nations	at	a	 supposedly	 reasonable	 level	only	 to	be	perceived	as	burdensome	or	
unreasonable	 in	 less	 developed	markets).	As	well	 as	 inconsistent	 IPR	disclosure	
policies,	with	a		certain	standardization	conduct	in	one	jurisdiction	being	held	as	
anticompetitive,	while	not	being	so	held		in	another	jurisdiction.	As	noted,	in	the	
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best	scenario	of	cooperation	in	IP	and	standardization,	“a	certain	conduct	 in	one	
jurisdiction	 considered	 anticompetitive	 from	 the	 angle	 of	 exporters	 may	 not	 be	
supported	 by	 market	 realities	 in	 importing	 countries.”	 IPRs	 incorporated	 into	
standards	 are	 not	 necessarily	 understood	 in	 the	 same	 manner	 globally.	
Consequentially,	the	cooperation	approach	in	Article	40	of	the	TRIPs	Agreement,	
concerning	 competition	 norms	 within	 the	 WTO	 regime,	 in	 addressing	 the	
relationship	of	competition	norms	with	IPRs	falls	short	of	overcoming	the	issues	
stemming	 from	diverging	 treatments	 in	different	 jurisdictions.	The	non-binding	
cooperation	approach,	is	ultimately	based	on	comity	principles.	The	development	
of	 positive	 comity	 can	 be	 used	 to	 tackle	 anticompetitive	 restraints	 in	 foreign	
markets,	 such	 as	 foreclosure.	 Comity	 is	 also	 an	 instrument	 to	 encourage	 other	
nations	 to	 enforce	 their	 competition	 laws	 concerning	 anticompetitive	 conduct	
that	 takes	 place	 on	 their	 territory	 and	 has	 detrimental	 consequences	 abroad.	
However,	 comity	 is	 not	 sufficient	 and	 reveals	 the	 inadequateness	 of	 the	
competition	policy	perspective	and	remedies	within	the	TRIPs	Agreement	context.		
In	addressing	whether	the	TRIPs	Agreement	tackles	the	international	trade	
perspective	of	 IPRs	 in	 standardization,	 another	 aspect	 should	be	 considered.	As	
seen,	the	TRIPs	Agreement	requires	the	application	of	IP	enforcement	procedures	
which	 “shall	 be	 applied	 in	 such	 a	manner	 as	 to	 avoid	 the	 creation	 of	 barriers	 to	
legitimate	 trade	 and	 to	 provide	 for	 safeguards	 against	 their	 abuse”	 (Article	 41(1).	
Moreover,	 Section	 4	 of	 the	 TRIPs	 Agreement	 (entitled	 “Special	 Requirements	
Related	 to	 Border	 Measures	 under	 TRIPs”)	 requires	 that	 when	 IPRs	 are	
incorporated	into	standards,	the	right	holder	can	invoke	border	measures	against	
the	manufacturing	and	exporting	of	goods	concerned	that	uses	the	IPRs	without	
authorization.	
5. CHALLENGES AHEAD 
5.1. OPENING THE WTO’S DOOR TO COMPETITION? A PRINCIPLE-BASED 
APPROACH TO TRADE BARRIERS THROUGH REGULATORY PROTECTION 
In	 conclusion,	 from	 the	 analysis	 carried	 out,	 it	 has	 emerged	 that	 the	TBT	
Agreement	 and	 the	 TRIPs	 Agreement	 legal	 frameworks	 have	 numerous	
shortcomings	 in	 their	 capacity	 to	 address	 the	 frictions	 concerning	 IPRs	 in	
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standardization	as	they	 implicate	competition-restrictive	practices	and	measures	
likely	 to	 constitute	 trade	 barriers	 at	 the	 international	 level.	 The	 main	 gap	
concerns	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 comprehensive	 multilateral	 regime	 integrating	
competition	policy	principles		on	the	whole.	While	the	specifics	of	the	interaction	
between	trade	and	competition	law	are	still	being	developed,	there	seems	to	be	a	
reluctance	 to	 recognize	 the	commonality	of	 the	objectives	of	competition	policy	
and	international	trade	regulation	(see	before).	In	particularly,	it	appears	that	the	
WTO	 still	 struggles	 to	 integrate	 competition	 policy	 considerations	 within	 its	
regime,	 holding	 that	 “[t]rade	 law	 generally	 […]	 focuses	 on	 the	 promotion	 of	
economic	 opportunities	 for	 importers	 through	 the	 elimination	 of	 discriminatory	
governmental	 measures	 which	 impair	 fair	 international	 trade.	 Thus,	 trade	 law	
addresses	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 potentiality	 to	 compete”.	 Conversely	 “[a]ntitrust	 law	
generally	focuses	on	firms’	practices	or	structural	modifications	which	may	prevent	
or	restrain	or	eliminate	competition”.767	In	a	way,	competition	law	is	the	other	side	
of	 the	 coin	 of	 liberal	 trade	 law,	 as	 it	 opens	markets	 by	 prohibiting	 private	 and	
other	commercial	restraints.	Differently,	 trade	 law	opens	markets	by	prohibiting	
public	restraints.	
As	seen,	the	integration	of	a	competition	policy	within	the	WTO	regime	has	
been	 extremely	 debated	 and	 fiercely	 opposed	 by	 developing	 countries,	 whose	
concerns	 about	 having	 their	 policy	margin	 of	 maneuver	 limited	 have	 prevailed	
over	the	interests	of	developing	a	more	consistent	international	level	playing	field	
that	competition	concerns.	Members	have	therefore	failed	to	come	to	a	decision	
on	 whether	 the	 WTO	 should	 start	 looking	 at	 some	 new	 issues	 such	 as	
competition.768		
                                                
767	Panel	Report,	Korea-	Alcoholic	Beverages,	para	10.81.		
768	WTO	DG	Azevedo,	at	the	closing	ceremony	of	the	Nairobi	Ministerial	Conference	in	2015	pointed	
out	the	“persistent	and	fundamental	divisions	on	[the]negotiating	agenda”	and	called	for	“finding	ways	
to	advance	the	negotiations”.	He	said	WTO	members	“have	to	 face	up	to	this	problem	 […][m]embers	
must	decide-	the	world	must	decide-	about	the	future	of	the	Doha	Round.”	He	declared:	“[t]his	impasse	
is	already	harming	the	prospects	of	all	those	who	rely	on	trade	today	-	and	it	will	disadvantage	all	those	
who	would	benefit	from	a	reformed,	modernized	global	trading	system	in	future.”		
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I	believe	that	it	is	time	to	embark	on	a	new	path	of	negotiations	within	the	
WTO	 on	 issues,	 such	 as	 competition	 policy,	 which	 is	 of	 great	 relevance	 to	 the	
current	status	of	international	trade.769		
Among	 the	 various	 issues,	 competition	 policy	 is	 arguably	 a	 subject	 that	
should	 be	 the	 first	 to	 be	 discussed	 in	 the	 WTO.	 This	 is	 because	 competition,	
together	 with	 investment,	 has	 become	 fundamental	 in	 shaping	 global	 supply	
chains,	 as	 well	 as	 in	 promoting	 innovation	 and	 technological	 advancements.	
Nonetheless,	 competition	 policy	 at	 the	 international	 level	 is	 still	 governed	 in	 a	
fragmented	manner,	through	rules	diverging	in	every	single	country,	which	gives	
rise	 to	 inter-jurisdictional	 conflicts.	WTO	members	will	 face	 a	 great	 loss	 if	 they	
remain	idle	on	this	subject.	Indeed,	this	situation	indeed	is	 likely	to	create	great	
hardship	 and	 economic	 burdens	 for	 operators	 in	 designing	 and	 implementing	
their	world	operation	strategy.	It	does	not	serve	country’s	protectionist	industrial	
policies,	 which	 are	 implemented	 through,	 among	 other	 things,	 domestic	
technological	 standards,	 in	 the	 long	 run,	 as	 they	might	 find	 themselves	 isolated	
from	 the	 global	 trade	 arena,	 which	will	 be	 even	more	 detrimental	 to	 economic	
development.		
Establishing	a	comprehensive	and	elaborated	competition	policy	within	the	
WTO	 regime	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 difficult	 goal	 to	 achieve	 today.	 In	 light	 of	 the	
difficulties	 encountered	 so	 far	 and	 analyzed	 above,	 the	 focus	 should	 therefore	
shift	to	establish		a	WTO	conceptual	framework,	adequately	translated	into	policy	
recommendations	 and	 concrete	 actions,	 that	 acknowledges	 the	 need	 for	 a	
competition	 perspective	 within	 the	 international	 trade	 regime.	 This	 could	 be	
achieved	 by	 emphasizing	 a	 principle-based	 approach,	 rather	 than	 a	 rule-based	
approach	 within	 the	 global	 trade	 system.770	It	 would	 entail	 interpreting	 WTO	
provisions	 in	 a	 way	 that	 guarantees	 the	 core	 values	 of	 competition	 policy.	
Nonetheless,	 internalizing	 the	 core	 values	 of	 competition	policy	 and	 law	within	
the	international	trade	law	regime	would	still	require	a	normative	solution	to	the	
questions	 concerning	 divergences	 in	 IP	 and	 competition	 notions	 in	 the	
                                                
769	Xiankun	Lu,	The	WTO	must	open	its	door	to	new	issues	now	(2016).	
770	M.	 Hilf,	 Power,	 rules	 and	 principles	 -	 which	 orientation	 for	 WTO/GATT	 law?,	 4	 JOURNAL	 OF	
INTERNATIONAL	ECONOMIC	LAW	1	(2001),	pp.	111-130.	
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standardization	 context,	 which	 currently	 stem	 from	 inconsistent	 competition	
rules	and	enforcement	(see	Chapter	4).	
This	 conceptual	 re-framing	 of	 the	 competition	 policy	 space	 within	
international	trade	law	is	particularly	needed	in	light	of	the	inherent	intertwined	
tension	between	IPRs	 into	 technical	 standards,	 innovation	and	the	 international	
trade	 regime.	 Also,	 given	 the	 mentioned	 commonality	 of	 purposes	 between	
international	 trade	 policy	 and	 competition	 policy	 as	 conjointly	 strengthening	
devices	for	stimulating	welfare.	Changes	to	trade	laws	and	regulations	that	reduce	
or	eliminate	national	barriers	to	trade	and	investment	promote	welfare-enhancing	
contractual	 relations	 that	 expand	 trade	 and,	more	 generally,	 increase	 aggregate	
welfare	 in	 the	 liberalizing	 nations.771	This	 illustrates	 the	 importance	 of	 serious	
reflection	 during	 future	WTO	 negotiations.	While	 an	 imminent	 negotiation	 on	
the	 inclusion	of	 competition	policy	within	 the	WTO	regime	 seems	unrealistic772	
serious	 discussion	 on	 this	 issue	 should	 be	 launched	 to	 start	 reflecting	 upon	 a	
more	principle-based	approach	to	it.		
This	 approach	 stems	 from	 the	 circumstance	 that	 while	 it	 was	 discussed	
above	 that	 there	 is	 no	 such	 thing	 as	 an	 universally	 accepted	 competition	 law,	
there	 has	 been	 substantial	 agreement	 on	 core	 principles,	 namely	 the	 key	
principles	of	transparency	and	non-discrimination	(between	domestic	and	foreign	
companies).	 These	 principles	 have	 been	 gaining	 widespread	 recognition	 within	
competition	 law	 analysis	 at	 an	 international	 level	 as	 tools	 likely	 to	 depoliticize	
competition	 law	 and	 policy,	 ensuring	 the	 independence	 of	 competition	
authorities	 and	 removing	 any	 possibility	 of	 including	 industrial	 policy	
considerations	in	the	competition	framework.	773		
A	 noticeable	 example	 of	 the	 principles	 of	 transparency	 and	 non-
discrimination	 can	 be	 seen	within	 the	 “Recommended	 Practices	 on	 Competition	
Assessment”774	and	 the	 “Guiding	 Principles	 for	 Merger	 Control	 and	 Review”775	as	
                                                
771 	Alden	 F.	 Abbott,	 Shanker	 Singham,	 Competition	 policy	 and	 international	 trade	 distortions,	
EUROPEAN	YEARBOOK	OF	INTERNATIONAL	ECONOMIC	LAW	(2013).	
772	Xiankun	Lu,	The	WTO	must	open	its	door	to	new	issues	now	(2016).	
773	Jonathan	Galloway,	The	Pursuit	of	National	Champions:	The	 Intersection	of	Competition	Law	and	
Industrial	Policy,	EUROPEAN	COMPETITION	LAW	REVIEW	(2007),	p.	12.	
774	For	the	text	of	the	Recommended	Practices	on	Competition	Assessment,	see	the	ICN’s	website.	
775	For	the	text	of	the	Guiding	Principles	for	Merger	Control	and	Review,	see	the	ICN’s	website.	
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agreed	 within	 the	 International	 Competition	 Network	 (the	 “ICN”).	 The	 ICN	
principles	are	non-binding	best	practice	recommendations,	which,	amongst	other	
things,	provide	 for	 transparency.	 In	particular,	 that	“[t]he	 process	 for	 conducting	
competition	 assessments	 should	 be	 transparent” 776 	and	 “in	 order	 to	 foster	
consistency,	 predictability,	 and	 fairness,	 the	 merger	 review	 process	 should	 be	
transparent	with	 respect	 to	 the	 policies,	 practices,	 and	procedures	 involved	 in	 the	
review,	the	identity	of	the	decisionmaker(s),	the	substantive	standard	of	review,	and	
the	bases	of	any	adverse	enforcement	decisions	on	the	merits”.777	They	also	provide	
for	 non-discrimination	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 nationality.	 In	 particular,	 that	 “[i]n	 the	
merger	 review	 process,	 jurisdictions	 should	 not	 discriminate	 in	 the	 application	 of	
competition	laws	and	regulations	on	the	basis	of	nationality.”778	
A	 principle-based	 approach	 could	 ultimately	 encourage	 the	 so-called	
depoliticization	 of	 competition	 law,	meaning	 that	 states	 would	 be	 “increasingly	
unable	 or	 unwilling	 to	 pursue	 industrial	 policy	 goals,	 such	 as	 the	
promotion/protection	 of	 national	 champions,	 through	 competition…”.	This	would	
decrease	 competition	 analysis	 being	 used	 to	 disguise	 industrial	 policy	
considerations,	as	 these	considerations	would	be	 increasingly	excluded	 from	the	
competition	law	framework	and	become	highly	visible.	The	question	would	then	
change	from	whether	or	not	industrial	policy	is	a	factor	in	a	competition	analysis,	
to	how	to	be	determined	which	of	the	two	interests	should	prevail	in	the	event	of	
conflict.779		
However,	 notwithstanding	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 comprehensive	 competition	
policy	within	 the	WTO	 regime,	 existing	 international	 trade	 norms	 do	 influence	
the	competition	policy	that	WTO	members	can	implement	in	a	number	of	sectors.	
As	 Noonan	 has	 pointed	 out,	 these	 include	 rules	 that	 require	 members	 to	 take	
action	 against	 private	 anticompetitive	 conduct	 as	 well	 as	 rules	 that	 allow	
                                                
776	ICN,	Recommended	Practices	on	Competition	Assessment	(III).	
777	ICN,	Guiding	Principles	for	Merger	Control	and	Review	(2).	
778	Id.,	(3).	
779	Jonathan	Galloway,	The	Pursuit	of	National	Champions:	The	 Intersection	of	Competition	Law	and	
Industrial	 Policy,	 EUROPEAN	COMPETITION	LAW	REVIEW	 (2007),	 p.	 14.	 The	 author	 asserts	 that	 “[i]t	 is	
surely	arguable	that	the	trend	of	depoliticising	competition	law,	and	merger	control	 in	particular,	has	
been	 a	 factor	 in	 the	 increasing	 visibility	 of	 protectionism,	 or	 “economic	 patriotism”.	The	 industrial	
policy	 considerations	 have	 been	 pushed	 out	 from	 the	 shadows	 of	 opaque	 public	 interest	 tests	 in	
competition	analysis	into	highly	visible	conflict	with	independent,	transparent	and	non-discriminatory	
competition	regimes.”	Id.,	p.	15.	
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members	to	take	action	under	competition	law	even	though	the	action	may	result	
in	 lessening	 the	 benefits	 that	 other	 members	 might	 expect	 from	 WTO	
commitments.780	
5.2. SOFT HARMONIZATION AND CONVERGENCE OF SYSTEMS: 
STRENGTHENING COMPETITION ADVOCACY 
Irrespective	of	this	evidence,	national	competition	laws	have	been	separate	
from	the	WTO-led	trade	law	regime.	As	seen,	a	crucial	point	is	to	assess	the	role	
of	 competition	 policy	 within	 the	 international	 marketplace.	 In	 this	 regard,	
competition	 law	 is	 to	 some	 extent	 unique	 to	 each	 individual	 jurisdiction,	while	
markets	 are	not	 (and	 should	not	be)	 restricted	by	national	boundaries.	The	key	
question	 arising	 here	 concerns	 whether	 national	 competition	 laws	 and	 their	
enforcement	 is	 sufficiently	adequate	 to	address	 the	market	 issues	of	 the	current	
economy,	 given	 that	 the	 scope	 of	markets	 is	 broader	 than	 national	 boundaries.	
Moreover,	it	may	be	useful	to	consider	whether	relying	upon	national	competition	
laws	is	conducive	to	the	development	of	an	international	trade	regime	that	assists	
the	 working	 of	 global	 markets.	 Facing	 these	 challenges,	 the	 international	
community	 has	 made	 the	 most	 headway	 in	 increasing	 cooperation	 and	
networking	among	the	competition	agencies	of	the	world.781		
Opponents	to	the	integration	of	competition	policy	within	the	international	
trade	 regime	 have	 observed	 that	 “national	 competition	 laws	 embody	 a	 host	 of	
different	assumptions	about	the	role	of	economics;	the	proper	scope	and	nature	of	
                                                
780	CHRIS	NOONAN,	THE	EMERGING	PRINCIPLES	OF	 INTERNATIONAL	COMPETITION	LAW	(OXFORD	UNIVERSITY	
PRESS,	 2008),	 p.	 405.Indeed,	 the	 WTO	 jurisprudence	 has	 had	 the	 chance	 to	 deal	 with	 concerns	
related	 to	 competition	 policy.	 See	 Mexico-	 Measures	 Affecting	 Telecommunications	 Services	
(WT/DS204/R,	2004),	in	which	the	WTO	dispute	panel	decided	the	WTO’s	first	competition	case.	It	
resolved	the	matter	in	favor	of	the	claim	that	Mexico	had	anticompetitively	facilitated	exploitative	
prices	and	a	cartel	that	raised	the	price	of	terminating	cross-border	telephone	calls	 in	Mexico	and	
thereby	harmed	trade	and	competition.	On	this	case,	see	Eleanor	M.	Fox,	The	WTO’s	First	Antitrust	
Case-Mexican	Telecom:	A	Sleeping	Victory	 for	Trade	and	Competition,	9	 JOURNAL	OF	INTERNATIONAL	
ECONOMIC	LAW	271	 (2006);	Marco	Bronckers	and	Pierre	Larouche,	Telecommunications	 Services,	 in	
PATRICK	MACRORY,	ARTHUR	APPLETON	AND	MICHAEL	PLUMMER	(EDS.),	THE	WORLD	TRADE	ORGANIZATION:	
LEGAL,	 ECONOMIC	 AND	 POLITICAL	 ANALYSIS	 (DORDRECHT:	 SPRINGER,	 2005),	 pp.	 999-1013;	 Damien	 J.	
Neven	 and	 Petros	 C.	 Mavroidis,	 El	 mess	 in	 TELMEX:	 a	 comment	 on	 Mexico-measures	 affecting	
telecommunications	 services,	 5	WORLD	TRADE	REVIEW	 271	 (2006),	 pp.	 290-292;	Amedeo	Arena,	The	
emergence	 of	 a	 WTO	 antitrust	 jurisprudence	 through	 cross-fertilization	 from	 other	 international	
antitrust	 institutions:	 the	 case	 for	 procedural	 fairness	 as	 a	necessary	precondition,	 in	PAUL	NIHOUL,	
TADEUSZ	SKOCZN	(EDS.),	PROCEDURAL	FAIRNESS	IN	COMPETITION	PROCEEDINGS	(EDWARD	ELGAR,	2015).	
781 	International	 Competition	 Policy	 Advisory	 Committee	to	 the	 Attorney	 General	 and	 Assistant	
Attorney	General	for	Antitrust,	Final	report	Annex	2-c	(2000),	Executive	Summary,	Chapter	5.	
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competition	 law	 prohibitions,	 rules,	 and	 remedies;	 procedural	 issues;	 and	 the	
influence	 non-competition	 policy	 concerns	 should	 have	 on	 competition	 law	
enforcement	 decisions”.	This	entails	 that	reaching	a	consensus	on	these	 issues	 in	
order	 to	 implement	 and	 enforce	 a	 uniform	 competition	policy	within	 the	WTO	
would	not	be	attainable	as	it	would	fail	to	take	into	account	these	divergences	in	
private	behavior	of	market	operators	that	operate	according	to	different	rules	and	
regulatory	 philosophies.	 Facing	 these	 challenges,	 observers	 have	 put	 forward	 a	
more	 flexible	 approach	 to	 foster	 a	 global	 competition	policy,	 not	 relying	on	 the	
WTO	 regime,	 but	 rather	 promoting	 voluntary	 regulatory	 efforts	 at	 building	 an	
understanding	across	jurisdictions	and	thereby	gradually	converging	towards	best	
or	 “better”	 practices. 782 	Diverging	 national	 policies	 in	 this	 sphere	 require	
regulators	 to	 harmonize	 their	 activities	 through	 informal	 consultations	 in	
informal	 venues 783 	in	 order	 to	 allocate	 regulatory	 competences	 between	
governments,	such	as,	in	the	area	of	antitrust	regulation.	
In	this	vein,	the	role	of	the	International	Competition	Network	(the	“ICN”)	
in	 advancing	 this	 purpose	 is	 proposed.	 In	 other	words,	 facing	 the	 difficulties	 in	
addressing	 anticompetitive	 trade	 distortive	 measures	 through	 competition	
enforcement	or	 through	the	WTO	regime,	employing	 the	advocacy	and	soft	 law	
toolkit	 of	 competition	 authorities	 should	 be	 investigated.	 The	 ICN	 was	
established	 in	 2001	 as	 an	 international	 network	 for	 the	 promotion	 of	 soft	 law	
convergence	 among	 competition	 policy	 regimes	 through	 the	 exchange	 of	
information	 among	 competition	 agencies	 and	 experts.	 Specifically,	 the	 ICN	
“provides	 competition	 authorities	 with	 a	 specialized	 yet	 informal	 venue	 for	
maintaining	 regular	contacts	and	addressing	practical	 competition	concerns.	This	
allows	 for	 a	 dynamic	 dialogue	 that	 serves	 to	 build	 consensus	 and	 convergence	
towards	 sound	 competition	 policy	 principles	 across	 the	 global	 antitrust	
community”.784	
                                                
782 	Alden	 F.	 Abbott,	 Shanker	 Singham,	 Competition	 policy	 and	 international	 trade	 distortions,	
EUROPEAN	YEARBOOK	OF	INTERNATIONAL	ECONOMIC	LAW	(2013).	
783	Michal	S.	Gal,	Regional	Competition	Law	Agreements:	An	Important	Step	for	Antitrust	Enforcement,	
60	 U.	 Toronto	 L.	 J.	 239	 (2010);	 Eleanor	 M.	 Fox,	 International	 Antitrust	 and	 the	 Doha	 Dome,	 43	
VIRGINIA	JOURNAL	OF	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	911	 (2003);	 and	Andrew	T.	Guzman,	 International	 Antitrust	
and	 the	WTO:	The	Lesson	 from	Intellectual	Property,	43	VIRGINIA	JOURNAL	OF	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	933	
(2003).	
784	See	ICN’s	website.	
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However,	it	should	be	remarked	that	China	is	the	most	notable	jurisdiction	
with	 a	 competition	 law	 and	 no	 representation	 in	 the	 ICN	 is	 China,.	 Although	
China	 participates	 in	 the	 work	 of	 the	 OECD	 Competition	 Committee	 as	 an	
observer	 and	 is	 a	 member	 of	 UNCTAD,	 the	 Chinese	 competition	 agencies	 (i.e.	
MOFCOM,	NDRC,	and	SAIC)	have	not	discussed	their	intentions	concerning	ICN	
membership.	 Arguably,	 China’s	 participation	 in	 the	 ICN	 is	 an	 important	
determinant	of	the	organization’s	future	success.785		
Within	 the	 ICN,	 an	 Advocacy	 Working	 Group	 has	 been	 established.	 Its	
purpose	 is	 to	 undertake	 projects,	 develop	 practical	 tools	 and	 guidance,	 and	
facilitate	 experience-sharing	 among	 ICN	member	 agencies,	 in	 order	 to	 improve	
the	effectiveness	of	ICN	members	in	advocating	the	use	of	competition	principles	
and	 to	 promote	 the	 development	 of	 a	 competition	 culture	 within	 society.	
Generally,	 “competition	 advocacy”	 refers	 to	 these	 activity	 conducted	 by	 the	
competition	 agency	 related	 to	 the	 promotion	 of	 a	 competitive	 environment	 for	
economic	 activities	 by	means	 of	 non-enforcement	mechanisms,	mainly	 through	
its	 relationships	 with	 other	 government	 bodies	 and	 by	 increasing	 public	
awareness	of	the	benefits	of	competition.786		
The	literature	has	increasingly	underlined	the	role	of	competition	advocacy	
in	curbing	government-sponsored	restraints	to	competition.	This	being	the	case,	a	
soft-convergence	 in	 competition	 practices	 would	 ultimately	 be	mirrored	 in	 less	
restraints	 to	 trade	 imposed	 by	 latecomers	 in	 light	 of	 the	 strategic	 use	 of	
competition	 embraced	 by	 advanced	 countries	 and	 companies	 based	 in	 those	
countries.	 In	 this	 vein,	 the	 ICN	 has	 elaborated	 “Recommended	 Practices	 on	
Competition	 Assessment”	 that	 are	 intended	 to	 provide	 guidance	 to	 competition	
agencies	 on	 the	 competition	 assessment	 process.	 Although	 this	 guidance	 is	
addressed	to	competition	agencies,	it	is	recognized	that	other	government	bodies	
can	carry	out	valuable	competition	assessment	work,	pursuing	two	main	goals:	
                                                
785	Hugh	Hollman,	William	E.	Kovacic,	The	International	Competition	Network:	Its	Past,	Current,	and	
Future	Role,	20	MINNESOTA	JOURNAL	OF	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	(2011),	p.	275.		
786	Definition	of	advocacy	from	the	2002	ICN	advocacy	report,	“Advocacy	and	Competition	Policy”,	p.	
1.	
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I. to	 increase	 harmonization	 of	 competition	 theories	 and	
enforcement	at	the	global	level;	and	could	be	achieved	through	an	
international	network	of	competition	authorities;	
II. to	 promote	 the	 development	 of	 soft	 law	 practices	 and	 best	
practices	 addressing	 the	 anticompetitive	 conduct	 by	 both	 private	
companies	and	government.	As	it	has	been	observed,	international	
networks	 of	 competition	 authorities,	 could	 develop	 a	 stronger	
advocacy	 platform	 to	 push	 decision-makers	 not	 to	 back	 or	
implement	 regulation	 that	 is	 likely	 to	 restrict	 competition	 and	
support	 anticompetitive	 measures	 which	 aimed	 at	 favoring	 a	
certain	industry.787	
There	 is	 no	 single	 approach	 that	 responds	 to	 all	 aspects	 of	 competition	
policy	 and	 international	 trade	 problems	 in	 the	 global	 standardization	 context.	
The	 approaches	 toward	 developing	 broader	 multilateral	 engagement	 on	
competition	 policy	 matters	 should	 encompass	 several	 actions	 and	 forums	 and	
should	be	designed	to	take	advantage	of	the	opportunities	to	more	global	markets	
and	expand	meaningful	cooperation	on	practical	enforcement	problems.	The	aims	
for	this	improved	international	engagement	should	comprise	establishing	a	more	
largely	worldwide	 standpoint	 on	 competition	 policy,	with	 the	 goals	 of	 reducing	
jurisdiction-specific	 actions	 by	 firms	 and	 governments,	 encouraging	 soft	
harmonization	 of	 competition	 policy	 regimes	 and	 convergence	 of	 systems,	 and	
developing	a	greater	degree	of	consensus	on	what	amounts	to	“best	practices”	in	
competition	policy	and	competition	enforcement.	
In	 this	 vein,	 an	advocacy	 effort	 could	give	 rise	 to	 instruments	 to	 establish	
explicit	 legal	 requirements	 that	 prohibit	 or	 severely	 limit	 the	 ability	 of	
government	institutions	to	curtail	business	rivalry.	788	
                                                
787	James	 C.	 Cooper,	William	 E.	 Kovacic,	U.S.	 Convergence	 with	 International	 Competition	 Norms:	
Antitrust	 Law	 and	 Public	 Restraints	 on	 Competition,	 90	BOSTON	UNIVERSITY	LAW	REVIEW	4	(2010),	 p.	
1582.	
788	See	William	 E.	 Kovacic,	Lessons	 of	 Competition	 Policy	 Reform	 in	 Transition	 Economies	 for	 U.S.	
Antitrust	Policy,	74	ST.	JOHN’S	L.	REV.	361,	363	(2000),	pp.	400-404.	
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The	competition	provisions	of	the	TFEU	and	the	case	 law	of	the	European	
courts	 could	 offer	 a	 valid	 standard	 as	 they	 severely	 restrict	 the	 power	 of	 EU	
Member	 States	 to	 enact	 anticompetitive	 legislation	 or	 regulations. 789 	Indeed,	
these	 provisions,	 along	 with	 the	 prohibition	 on	 State	 aid,	 allow	 the	 EU	
competition	policy	 regime	 to	heavily	 emphasize	 achieving	 economic	 integration	
and	forestall	Member	State	actions	that	would	frustrate	the	attainment	of	it.	The	
laws	of	some	jurisdictions	make	clear	that	State-owned	enterprises	are	subject	to	
the	 same	 competition	 policy	 obligations	 as	 private	 firms.	 Some	 competition	
systems	 enable	 the	 competition	 authority	 to	 veto	 government	 acts	 that	 curtail	
competition	 unless	 the	 restrictive	 measure	 has	 been	 approved	 by	 the	 national	
legislature.790		
However,	 having	 faith	 in	 soft-law	 convergence	 does	 not	 entail	 completely	
rejecting	a	role	for	the	WTO	regime.	Although,	at	present,	no	international	set	of	
rules	 directly	 addresses	 competition	 policy,	 a	more	 robust	 discipline	 should	 be	
developed	at	 the	 international	 level,	or,	 at	 least,	multilateral	 initiatives	could	be	
explored	through	existing	 international	organizations	such	as	 the	WTO.	Indeed,	
as	 far	 as	 public	 sector	 restraints	 on	 trade	 are	 concerned,	 the	 WTO	 regime	 is	
relevant	 as	 it	 addresses	 several	 regulatory	 constraints	 that	 lessen	 welfare	 by	
impairing	 competition	 and	 ultimately	 negatively	 affecting	 trade.	 Suffice	 to	
mention	 the	 rules	 dealing	 with	 anticompetitive	 private	 sector	 restraints	 (GATT	
Article	 IX),	 and	 specific	 anticompetitive	 restraints	 on	 a	 sectoral	 basis	 (Basic	
Telecom	 Agreement	 and	 Reference	 Paper	 on	 Competition	 Safeguards).	 These	
initiatives,	as	 remarked	by	commentators,	 “extend	 beyond	GATT	 1947,	 provisions	
that	are	drawn	from	the	competition	lexicon”.791		
Yet,	 these	 initiatives	 fall	 short	of	 covering	all	 the	 facets	of	 anticompetitive	
conduct	 that	 both	 private	 and	 public	 actors	 can	 impose	 on	 trade,	 specifically	
measures	 that	 raise	 de	 facto	 trade	 barriers	 by	 backing	 domestic	 interests	 over	
foreign	 rivals.	 These	 measures	 purportedly	 to	 promote	 certain	 favored	 firms,	
                                                
789	Regarding	State	aid,	see	Arts.	107-109	of	the	TFEU,	and	legislation	enacted	under	it.		
790	James	 C.	 Cooper,	William	 E.	 Kovacic,	U.S.	 Convergence	 with	 International	 Competition	 Norms:	
Antitrust	 Law	 and	 Public	 Restraints	 on	 Competition,	 90	BOSTON	UNIVERSITY	LAW	REVIEW	4	(2010),	 p.	
1584.	
791 	Alden	 F.	 Abbott,	 Shanker	 Singham,	 Competition	 policy	 and	 international	 trade	 distortions,	
EUROPEAN	YEARBOOK	OF	INTERNATIONAL	ECONOMIC	LAW	(2013),	pp.	23-37.	
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rather	than	to	discriminate	against	foreign	firms.	They	often	involve	government	
initiatives	 aimed	 at	 supporting	 private	 vested	 interests	 and	 counter	 artificial	
competitive	 advantages	 over	 their	 competitors,	 especially	 foreign	 ones.	 These	
measures	 are	 particularly	 tricky	 to	 assess.	 Some	 scholars	 have	 attempted	 to	
develop	 method	 to	 estimate	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 anticompetitive	 measures	 on	
domestic	and	global	markets	by	“quantify[ing]	the	differences	between	the	market	
premium	with	the	market	distorted	by	the	regulation,	and	the	equilibrium	where	the	
regulatory	distortion	was	present”.792	
The	 difficulties	 in	 assessing	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 WTO	 rules	 vis-à-vis	
anticompetitive	 measures	 makes	 a	 stronger	 argument	 for	 a	 global	 competition	
policy	based,	among	other	things,	on	competition	advocacy	and	soft-law	tools.	As	
such,	national	antitrust	 regulators	 insist	on	coordinating	 their	activities	 through	
informal	 bilateral	 or	multilateral	 coordination,	 rather	 than	 through	 a	WTO-like	
international	institution.		
However,	the	value	of	competition	advocacy	and	networks	is	also	uncertain,	
as:	
I. it	 should	 be	 measured	 by	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 advocacy	 efforts	
impact	 and	 alter	 regulatory	 outcomes	 and	 by	 the	 value	 to	
consumers	of	those	improved	outcomes.	Nonetheless,	for	practical	
purposes,	“both	elements	are	difficult	to	measure	with	any	degree	of	
certainty”;793		
II. the	 ICN	 consists	 of	 national	 competition	 agencies,	 and	 not	
national	governments.	This	hinders	its	constituents’	ability	to	bind	
their	 jurisdictions	 internationally	 and	 some	 may	 lack	 substantial	
domestic	 political	 influence,	 or	 even	 be	 a	 mere	 extension	 of	 the	
                                                
792 	Id.,	 pp.	 32-33,	 arguing	 that	 while	 historically	 analysis	 of	 trade	 barriers	 through	 regulatory	
protection	has	focused	on	the	impact	of	these	barriers	on	trade	flows,	a	better	methodology	could	be	
embraced,	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 impact	 on	 consumer	 welfare.	 The	 authors	 argue	 that	 a	
methodology	simply	based	on	the	impact	on	trade	flows,	while	it	measures	the	impact	of	the	barriers	
to	external	 trade,	does	not	properly	measure	 the	actual	 impact	of	 the	anticompetitive	measures	on	
the	domestic	economy	of	the	country	where	they	are	in	place.		
793	James	 C.	 Cooper,	William	 E.	 Kovacic,	U.S.	 Convergence	 with	 International	 Competition	 Norms:	
Antitrust	 Law	 and	 Public	 Restraints	 on	 Competition,	 90	BOSTON	UNIVERSITY	LAW	REVIEW	4	(2010),	 p.	
1582.	
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national	government	and	its	policies	as	is	the	case	in	China,	where	
competition	 agencies	 are	 far	 from	 independent	 from	 Beijing’s	
political	rulers;	and794	
III. as	 far	 as	 developing	 countries	 and	 latecomers	 economies	 are	
concerned,	 the	 impact	 of	 competition	 advocacy	 is	 further	
ambiguous,	 as	 in	 their	 competition	 coordination	 advanced	
countries	 generally	 tend	 “to	 keep	 out	 the	 developing	 countries”.795	
As	observed	by	Fox,	antitrust	regulators’	coalitions	focus	mainly	on	
their	 domestic	 markets	 without	 managing	 to	 fill	 the	 gap	 that	
exposes	developing	countries	 to	anticompetitive	practices.	As	Fox	
observes,	 “[m]any	 of	 these	 nations	 either	 do	 not	 have	 an	 antitrust	
law,	or	they	have	an	antitrust	law	that	is	not	given	serious	regard	by	
their	polity,	or	they	simply	do	not	have	the	resources	to	enforce	the	
law.	 Particularly,	 they	 do	 not	 have	 the	 resources	 and	 credible	
deterrence	 power	 to	 control	 the	 anticompetitive	 acts	 of	
multinational	corporations.	In	other	words,	they	are	easy	targets.”796		
	 	
                                                
794	Nevertheless,	 this	 could	 also	 be	 seen	 as	 an	 element	 of	 strength	 as	 the	 soft	 and	 non-binding	
normative	value	of	 ICN	recommendations	may	allow	agencies	to	sign	up	to	recommendations	even	
though	they	do	not	mirror	 the	current	national	government	policies.	 In	the	 long	run,	however,	 the	
agencies	may	be	able	to	win	home	state	support	for	such	recommendations,	to	the	extent	that	they	
become	more	generally	acknowledged	and	are	perceived	as	 replicating	 international	best	practices.	
Alden	F.	Abbott,	Shanker	Singham,	Competition	policy	and	international	trade	distortions,	EUROPEAN	
YEARBOOK	OF	INTERNATIONAL	ECONOMIC	LAW	(2013),	p.	34.		
795	Eleanor	M.	Fox,	International	Antitrust	and	the	Doha	Dome,	43	VIRGINIA	JOURNAL	OF	INTERNATIONAL	
LAW	911	(2003).	
796	Id.,	p.	922:	 “Global	mergers	may	have	 harmful	 effects	 in	 nations	 that	 constitute	 separate	markets	
and	 lack	 the	 power	 to	 protect	 themselves.	 This	 is	 particularly	 true	 for	 developing	 countries,	 whose	
voices	 are	not	heard	and	who	must	 live	with	whatever	 the	 industrialized	 countries	 decide	 is	 good	 for	
them.	 In	 Mannesmann/Italimpianti,	 Italian	 and	 German	 makers	 of	 specialized	 pipes	 for	 oil	 drilling	
operations	suitable	only	for	developing	countries	merged	to	form	a	monopoly.	China	was	the	principal	
buyer	 of	 this	 stage	 of	 technology.	 Unusually,	 Italy	 conditioned	 merger	 clearance	 on	 the	 firms’	
acceptance	of	licensing	obligations	that	could	ease	China’s	monopoly	problem	(if	potential	producers	in	
Europe	should	seek	a	 license).	More	 typically,	Germany	declined	 to	enforce	 the	German	 law,	allowing	
the	merger	because	the	German	market-	like	the	Italian	market-	was	not	hurt.	While	Italy’s	conditions	
on	this	proposed	merger	benefited	China	in	this	case,	another	China	cannot	count	on	any	protection	at	
all.	 It	 may	 become	 more,	 rather	 than	 less,	 common	 that	 multinational	 mergers	 impact	 developing	
nations	with	no	voice.”	
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1. TOWARD A NEW INDUSTRIAL REGULATION: GLOBAL TRENDS IN SHAKY 
TIMES 
The	 situation	 for	 technology	 standards	 paints	 a	 challenging	 picture.	
Technical	standardization,	especially	in	the	ICT	sector,	is	key	to	international	trade,	
competition	and	economic	development.	In	today’s	innovation-driven	society,	ICT	
standards	 have	 attracted	 increasing	 attention	 due	 to	 the	 rise	 in	 litigation	 in	 this	
field,	which	spurred	the	so-called	“patent	wars”,	mainly	focused	on	injunctions	or	
FRAND	 fees	 suits.	 This	 has	 unsurprisingly	 spurred	 the	 need	 to	 develop	 a	 wide-
ranging	 practical	 and	 theoretical	 legal	 framework	 capable	 of	 handling	 the	whole	
bundle	of	dilemmas	connected	to	competition,	 IP	and	trade.	The	task	 is	 far	 from	
easy,	 and	 the	 present	 study	 claims	 no	 ingenuity	 in	 providing	 a	 comprehensive	
answer	 to	 all	 these	 conundra,	 especially	 given	 the	plethora	 of	 public	 and	private	
interest	objectives	which	are	triggered	by	standardization.		
Moving	 from	 these	 observations,	 the	 study	 approached	 two	main	 areas	 of	
research.	
First,	my	 study	 investigated	 proprietary	 technologies	 in	 innovation-driven	
markets,	combined	with	the	 lack	of	coherent	competition	policy	and	scrutiny	of	
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IPRs	incorporated	in	standards.	The	research	sought	to	argue	that	the	uncertainty	
prompted	by	divergent	legal	and	policy	approaches	in	different	jurisdictions	has,	
to	 some	 extent,	 empowered	 advanced	 countries	 to	 rely	 upon	 standards	 as	 a	
strategic	 regulatory	 tool	 to	 thwart	 competition,	 impeding	 the	 distribution	 of	
innovation	gains	in	the	long	run.	
Second,	 my	 study	 outlined	 the	 mutually	 influential	 relationship	 between	
competition	 law	and	 trade	 law	within	 the	 standardization	 realm.	My	hypothesis	
assumed	this	aspect	to	be	strictly	connected	with	the	first	one:	to	the	extent	that	
differences	 in	 laws	 and	 public	 policies	 regarding	 standardization	 create	
substantial	 interferences	 for	 international	 trade,	 this	has	 triggered	 latecomers	in	
the	 international	economy	–	such	as	 the	Chinese	 indigenous	 innovation	strategy	
demonstrates	 –	 to	 develop	 a	 more	 piercing	 government	 intervention	 strategy		
through	the	adoption,	 inter	 alia,	of	competing	homegrown	alternative	standards	
as	a	source	of	economic	catch-up,797	which,	in	return,	could	amount	to	a	new	type	
of	protectionist,	non-tariff	barriers	to	trade.		
That	 said,	 the	 study	 adopted	 a	 comparative	 approach	 in	 examining	 the	
differences	 in	 the	 EU	 and	 Chinese	 standardization	 regimes.	 The	 Chinese	
standardization	 system	 was	 particularly	 illuminating	 as	 it	 is	 illustrative	 of	 how	
States	try	(and	sometimes	manage)	to	shape	industrial	policy	via	competition	and	
trade	 regulation.	The	Chinese	 standardization	 regime	–	managed	by	 the	 central	
government	 through	 overarching	 nationwide	 standardization	 –	 emerged	 as	 one	
mirroring	the	political	philosophy	underpinning	the	planned	economy.	Along	the	
same	 line,	 the	 role	of	 standardization	 in	China	 shows	how	standards	are,	 at	 the	
same	time,	reflecting	and	shaping	the	country’s	role	 in	the	global	setting,	seeing	
after	thirty	years	steady	growth	in	GDP,	trade	and	investments	and,	zooming	on	
the	 present	 study’s	 focus,	 shifting	 from	 a	 mere	 standards	 implementer	 to	 a	
standards	developer	and	innovator,	despite	the	inevitable	economic	slowdown.		
                                                
797	Richard	 P.	 Suttmeier,	 Xiangkui	 Yao,	 and	 Alex	 Zixiang	 Tan,	 Standards	 of	 Power:	 Technology,	
Institutions,	 and	 Politics	 in	 the	Development	 of	 China’s	 National	 Standards	 Strategy,	 THE	NATIONAL	
BUREAU	OF	ASIAN	RESEARCH	(2006),	p.	11.	
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The	focus	on	China	was	indeed	instrumental	in	order	to	scrutinize	the	main	
features	of	the	competition	law	aspects	implicating	technical	standards	and	IP	in	
the	ICT	sector.			
A	series	of	tensions	emerged:	
First,	 a	 constant,	 fundamental	 friction	 between	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 R&D	
investors,	who	chase	economic	yields,	and	users	of	technology,	who	pursue	access	
on	reasonable	and	affordable	terms,	was	detected.	Competition-wise,	issues	arise	
when	technical	standards	hamper	effective	competition	through	conduct	such	as	
lock-in	 and	 hold-up,	 whose	 occurrence	 is	 likely	 to	 happen	 when	 the	
implementation	of	a	standard	requires	the	inclusion	of	a	proprietary	technology.	
Here,	SEPs	constitute	the	core	competition	issue,	as	they	empower	their	holders	
to	 prevent	 their	 competitors	 from	 employing	 certain	 technology	 or	 requesting	
excessive	 royalties.	 However,	 a	 challenge	 is	 presented	 in	 the	 difficulties	 in	
assessing	and	 identifying	which	patents	are	 “essential”	 for	a	 standard,	as	 today’s	
market	features	firms	holding	massive	patent	portfolios	as	well	as	a	wide	range	of	
overlapping	patent	thickets	incorporated	into	high-tech	devices.			
A	second	tension	concerns	the	rationale	of	IP	and	standards.	Indeed,	while	
the	 patent	 regime	 allows	 for	 differentiation	 among	 products,	 services	 and	 the	
whole	business,	conversely,	standardization	has	always	been	 instrumental	 in	the	
reduction	of	uncertainty,	functioning	as	a	selection	mechanism	that	contours	the	
diversity	of	technologies	and	allowing	the	ICT	industry	to	minimalize	transaction	
costs	related	to	compatibility	and	interoperability	in	network-based	technologies.		
The	 tension	between	 IP	 and	 standards	 can	 also	 be	 envisaged	 as	 a	 tension	
between	 public	 good	 (standards)	 and	 private	 good	 (patents).	 Indeed,	 while	
technical	 standardization	 is	 conducive	 to	 converting	 ideas	 into	 a	 public	 good	
available	to	all,	parent	protection	converts	them	into	a	private	good,	pursuing	the	
objective	of	securing	private	property	and	their	exclusionary	effect.	
My	analysis	sought	to	frame	these	issues	as	to	strike	a	balance	between	the	
regulatory	approaches	aimed	at	nurturing	the	generation	of	further	technological	
variety	by	the	control	by	IP	owners	over	proprietary	knowledge	and	the	regulatory	
 225 
approaches	 that	 nurture	 wider	 distribution	 into	 the	 public	 sphere	 of	 new	
knowledge.	
However,	 this	 study	 challenged	 the	 proposition	 that	 IP	 and	 standards	 are	
always	 in	 conflict.	 It	 argued	 that	 this	 conflict	 is	mainly	potential	 and	 that	 these	
instruments	should	instead	be	understood	as	complementary	regulatory	measures.	
As	 such,	 it	 was	 claimed	 that	 the	 incentive	 function	 of	 IPRs	 and	 the	 role	 of	
reducing	 uncertainty	 usually	 associated	 with	 standards	 work	 collectively	 in	 the	
interest	of	 all	 stakeholders.	Working	 in	 tandem	allows	 these	mechanisms	 to	 set	
the	foundations	for	sustainable	innovation.		
Such	conclusions,	i.e.,	standards	and	IP	as	a	joint	regulatory	tool	conducive	
to	innovation,	find	support	in	the	conceptual	framework	that	construes	economic	
development	 as	 a	 “catching-up”	 process	 in	which	 a	 developing	 country	narrows	
the	gap	in	productivity	and	income	relative	to	a	leading	country.798	In	this	regard,	
my	analysis	relied	upon	the	theoretical	outline	assessing	the	relationship	between	
innovation,	competition	and	standards	developed	by	Joseph	Schumpeter’s	theory	
on	capitalism	as	an	evolutionary	process	of	creative	destruction.799		
2. STRATEGIC PATENTING AND INDIGENOUS INNOVATION: TWO 
ALTERNATIVE INDUSTRIAL POLICY TOOLS 
Drawing	 on	 this	 theoretical	 framework,	 the	 study	 sought	 to	 contextualize	
standardization	in	a	globalizing,	technology-driven	economy,	addressing	the	view	
of	 latecomers	 and	 zooming	 on	 China.	 Major	 literature	 on	 divergence	 and	
convergence	 in	 the	 innovation	 path,	 especially	 that	 involving	 inter-country	
comparison,	has	evidenced	that	in	China,	irrespective	of	the	endless	FDI	flow	and	
ensuing	 technology	 transfer	 occurring	 since	 the	 80s,	 domestic	 manufacturers	
have	long	been	“technology	trapped”,	that	is,	finding	themselves	in	a	situation	of	
heavy	dependence	on	foreign	proprietary	technology.	This	has	made	China	prone	
to	 the	 impact	 of	 international	 technology	 standards	 and	 the	 different	 strategic	
patenting	 strategies	 used	 by	 patent	 holders	 to	 capitalize	 on	 their	 de	 facto	
                                                
798	H.	ODAGIRI,	A.	GORO,	A.	TSUNAMI,	R.	R.	NELSON	(EDS.),	INTELLECTUAL	PROPERTY	RIGHTS,	DEVELOPMENT,	
AND	CATCH-UP	(	LONDON:	OXFORD	UNIVERSITY	PRESS,	2012),	Chapter	1.	
799	JOSEPH	SCHUMPETER,	CAPITALISM,	SOCIALISM	AND	DEMOCRACY	(GEORGE	ALLEN	&	UNWIN,	1976),	p.	82.	
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standards	 and	 associated	 royalties.	The	 study	 sought	 to	 show	 that	 ICT	 strategic	
patenting	is	often	employed	as	a	weapon	to	engage	in	anti-competitive	behavior	
by	a	plethora	of	conducts,	such	as	patent	hold	ups,	patent	ambush	and	strategic	
injunctive	reliefs.	In	particular,	patent	holders	can	boost	their	market	power	when	
they,	 in	 violation	 of	 FRAND	 commitments,	 “demand	 ‘unreasonable’	 royalties	 for	
their	patents	that	are	embedded	in	standards”.800	
Facing	 the	dull	 scenario	of	 finding	 itself	 isolated	as	a	 subordinate	actor	 in	
the	 innovation-driven	 market,	 China,	 since	 2006,	 has	 started	 promoting	 the	
development	 of	 national	 standards	 incorporating	 self-owned	 IP,	 supporting	
“Indigenous	Innovation”	(in	Chinese,	“自主创,	pinyin	Zìzhǔ	chuàngxīn)	as	a	main	
policy	 as	 well	 as	 a	 strategic	 tool	 in	 the	 hand	 of	 late-industrializing	 countries,	
representing	 a	 response	 to	 the	 strategic	 patenting	 carried	 out	 by	 advanced	
countries	 aimed,	 in	 due	 course,	 at	 overcoming	 the	 natural	 disadvantage	 on	 the	
global	market.801		
I	argue	that	both	strategic	patenting	carried	out	by	IP-rich	advanced	nations	
and	China’s	indigenous	innovation	are	two	alternative	industrial	policy’s	strategic	
tools	 to	 achieve	 an	 optimal	 positioning	 in	 a	 market	 segment	 that	 represents	
today’s	 leading	 sector	 in	 the	global	political	 economy,	 that	 is	 to	 say,	 innovation	
technology.	
However,	my	analysis	goes	a	step	further	from	previous	literature,	claiming	
that	the	investigation	of	standards	and	competition	cannot	forgo	a	scrutiny	from	
the	international	trade	regulatory	standpoint.	Here	is	the	core	of	my	assumption:	
the	 apparently	 protectionist	 stance	 taken	 by	 latecomers,	 such	 as	 China,	 is	 a	
response,	rectius,	a	consequence,	and	not	the	triggering	cause,	of	the	widespread	
opportunistic	 conduct	 of	 patent	 holders	 who	 own	 patents	 on	 a	 technology	
essential	to	a	standard.		
A	gap	in	current	literature,	needing,	of	course,	further	investigation,	is	thus	
spotted:	how	and	under	which	circumstances	diverging	policies	concerning	IPRs	
                                                
800	Y.	A.	Pai,	The	international	dimension	of	proprietary	technical	standards:	Through	the	lens	of	trade,	
competition	 law	 and	 developing	 countries,	 LAW,	 POLICY	 &	 ECONOMICS	 OF	 TECHNICAL	 STANDARDS	
EJOURNAL	(2013),	p.	5.	
801Ibid.	
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in	 standards,	 and	 the	 inter-jurisdictional	normative	conflict	 caused	by	diverging	
legal	 and	 policy	 treatment	 of	 SEPs	 in	 different	 jurisdictions	 through	 the	
application	 of	 competition	 law,	 negatively	 impact	 trade?	 The	 study	 approached	
this	issue	through	the	focus	on	China,	which	makes	for	an	outstanding	case	study,	
although	 the	 problems	 that	 are	 being	 raised	 are	 global	 and	 reach	 beyond	 the	
single	 case	 adjudicated	 or	 the	 single	 jurisdiction	 as	 they	 impact	 on	 the	 global	
trade	arena.		
3. THE BLURRED LINES OF COMPETITION   
This	 study	 also	 singled	 out	 and	 analyzed	 the	 inconsistencies	 in	 the	
treatment	of	IPRs	in	standards,	focusing	on	the	EU	and	Chinese	approaches	to	ex	
ante	 disclosure	 of	 SEPs	 and	 FRAND	 terms,	 appreciating	 their	 role	 as	
precautionary	regulatory	measures	aimed	at	deterring	anticompetitive	conduct.		
On	the	EU	side,	the	analysis	first	investigated	the	Commission’s	approach	to	
injunctions	for	SEPs.	What	emerged	is	a	confused	and	unpredictable	scenario.		
In	the	2014	Motorola	and	2013	Samsung	decisions,	the	Commission	outlined	
a	 “safe	 harbor”	 for	 prospective	 licensees	 who	 are	 “willing”	 to	 take	 a	 license	 on	
FRAND	 terms.	 The	 Commission	 recognized	 that	 asserting	 SEPs	 by	 seeking	 an	
injunction	or	simply	threatening	to	do	so	might	infringe	article	102	TFEU	in	case	
the	patent	holder	had	committed	to	a	standardization	body	to	grant	 licenses	on	
FRAND	terms,	and	the	injunction	is	directed	against	a	licensee	genuinely	willing	
to	negotiate	a	license	on	FRAND	terms.	
However,	 the	 decisions	 does	 not	 offer	 any	 clarification	 on	 the	 notion	 of	
“willing”	 prospective	 licensee	 in	 cases	 falling	 outside	 the	 context	 of	
FRAND-pledged	 patents,	 simply	 calling	 for	 a	 case-by-case,	 fact-specific	
assessment	as	to	whether	the	defendant	has	been	willing	to	negotiate	a	license	in	
good	faith.	
The	 analysis	 of	 these	 decisions	 suggest	 that	 the	 standard	 of	 good	 faith	
adopted	by	the	Commission	advocates	for	a	far-reaching	application	of	article	102	
TFEU	to	injunctions	brought	by	SEP	holders	and	could	be	defined.	This	approach	
appears	 to	 be	 quite	 licensee-friendly,	 given	 that	 the	 assertion	 of	 SEPs	 is	 by	 and	
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large	deemed	abusive,	as	long	as	the	would-be	licensee	is	in	good	faith	or	willing	
to	negotiate	a	license	on	FRAND	terms.	
Interestingly,	 the	 Commission’s	 stance	 differs	 from	 the	 standard	 of	 good	
faith	 or	 willingness	 adopted	 by	 some	 national	 courts,	 for	 instance,	 the	 German	
Federal	Court,	which	in	the	2009	Orange-Book-Standard	case,	concerning	Philips	
and	 Sony’s	 de	 facto	 recordable	 CD	 standard,	 embraced	 a	much	more	 patentee-
friendly	approach	by	posing	a	high	burden	on	alleged	infringers.	
Finally,	 an	 attempt	 towards	 striking	 a	 balance	out	 of	 different	 approaches	
brought	 forward	 by	 the	 Commission	 and	 national	 courts	 is	 made	 by	 the	 latest	
CJEU	 case	 law.	 The	 2015	 preliminary	 ruling	 delivered	 in	 the	Huawei/ZTE	 case,	
pending	before	the	Düsseldorf	Regional	Court,	imposes	important	obligations	on	
SEP	 users	 (notably,	 to	 make	 a	 counter-offer	 on	 FRAND	 terms	 and	 to	 provide	
appropriate	 security	 for	 the	 prior	 use	 of	 the	 SEP),	 while	 SEP	 holders	 are	 in	 a	
stronger	position	than	they	appeared	to	be	under	the	Commission’s	decisions	 in	
Motorola	and	Samsung.		
The	 study	 also	 addressed	 the	 SSOs	 licensing	 requirements	 imposing	 that	
SEP	holders	license	their	patent	on	FRAND	terms.	It	emerged	that,	irrespective	of	
the	 fundamental	 significance	 of	 the	 FRAND	 undertaking,	 no	 competition	
authority	has,	up	to	the	present	day,	defined	the	notion	of	FRAND	terms	within	
the	 standardization	 context.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 the	 “fair	 and	 reasonable”	
components	 of	 FRAND	 have	 been	 interpreted	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 ways,	 often	
divergently	and	inconsistently.	
In	my	 view,	 the	 hesitancy	 towards	 a	more	 clear-cut	 definition	 of	 what	 is	
“fairness”	 and	 “reasonableness”	 may	 carry	 the	 advantage	 in	 letting	 companies	
freely	operate	while	securing	the	margin	of	maneuver	of	the	Commission	to	tackle	
anticompetitive	conduct.	
This	 suggests	 that	 in	 the	assessment	of	whether	 license	 terms	are	 fair	and	
reasonable,	all	the	components	forming	the	economic	context	at	issue	should	be	
taken	 into	account	 looking	at	 the	circumstance	and	position	of	 the	 licensor	and	
licensee,	 as	 the	 same	 General	 Court	 has	 held.	 This	 balanced,	 case-specific	
approach	 is	 arguably	 advisable	 in	 the	 context	 of	 competition	 law,	where	 a	 rigid	
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distinction	 between	 anticompetitive	 and	 procompetitive	 conduct	 would	 not	 be	
desirable.	 Indeed,	 it	 would	 thwart	 courts	 and	 competition	 authorities	 from	
sanctioning	anti-competitive	conduct	which	does	not	fall	within	the	profile	of	the	
established	 anticompetitive	 behavior.	 Contrariwise,	 it	 may	 also	 thwart	
commercial	conducts	which	do	not	carry	any	harm	to	effective	competition.	For	
instance,	the	barring	of	SEP	holders	from	injunctions	would	likely	“tip	the	scale	in	
favor	 of	 implementers	 which	 would	 then	 have	 little	 incentive	 to	 actively	 seek	 a	
license	–	a	form	of	reverse	hold-up”.802		
While	acknowledging	the	rationale	underpinning	a	blurry,	broad	definition	
of	FRAND,	 this	 study	 suggests	 that	 legal	 certainty	 remains	 an	 issue,	 and	a	 legal	
definition	of	FRAND	may	arguably	be	useful	in		allowing	competition	authorities	
to	assess	whether	licensing	terms	are	FRAND	or	not,	as	the	absence	of	any	precise	
definition	 naturally	 results	 in	 limiting	 antitrust	 intervention	 concerning	 SEPs’	
licensing	obligations.	
The	uncertain	and	evolving	EU	legal	scenario	concerning	SEPs	 injunctions	
and	 FRAND	 licensing	 is	 corresponded,	 in	 China,	 by	 a	 seemingly	 confused	 legal	
background.	The	already	articulated	Chinese	legal	framework	is	exacerbated	by	a	
notable	 amount	 of	 uncertainty	 stemming	directly	 from	 the	 2008	AML	as	 to	 the	
treatment	 of	 IPRs	 and	 FRAND-related	 concerns.	 This	 ambiguity,	 moreover,	 is	
conducive	to	aggravating	the	inconsistency	of	China’s	standardization	policy	vis-
à-vis	 its	 WTO	 commitments.	 It	 is	 thus	 clear	 that	 the	 encouragement	 of	
Indigenous	Innovation	–	by	use	of	competing,	alternative,	domestic	technologies	
that	 can	 indeed	 serve	 the	 purpose	 of	 forcing	 royalties	 concessions	 –	 affects	 the	
way	Chinese	standard-setting	agencies	deal	with	patents	in	standards.	
This	statement	is	reinforced	by	an	in-depth	analysis	of	the	few	judicial	cases	
concerning	the	antitrust	issues	raised	by	FRAND	commitments	in	the	context	of	
the	2008	AML.	In	fact,	given	the	absence	of	a	specific	guidance	on	patent	royalties	
and	given	the	not	always	coherent	SAC	and	SAIC’s	series	of	guidelines	on	national	
standards	 and	 IP	 enforcement,	 the	 study	 argues	 that	 the	 Chinese	 approach	 to	
FRAND	 appears	 to	 be	 quite	 aggressive	 and	 more	 advantageous	 to	 patent	
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(KLUWER	LAW	INTERNATIONAL,	2014),	p.	235.	
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implementers,	thus	differing	from	a	general	global	trend	toward	better	protection	
for	patent	holders	 (at	 least,	 as	 far	 the	EU	 is	 concerned,	 given	 the	 latest	Huawei	
preliminary	 ruling).	 It	 follows	 that	 China	 seems	 determined	 to	 support	 an	
interpretation	 of	 FRAND	 aiming	 at	 plummeting	 royalty	 rates,	 coupled	with	 the	
Government-led	support	for	the	development	and	implementation	of	competing	
home-grown	standards.	
This	 assumption	 appears	 to	 be	 supported	 by	 the	 examination	 of	 the	
Huawei/InterDigital	 cases	 concerning	 the	 interpretation	of	 FRAND	 royalty	 rates	
in	China.	This	judicial	saga	confirms	a	trend	within	the	Chinese	context	towards	a	
pretty	 rigid	 approach	 to	 FRAND	 determination,	 aimed	 at	 setting	 extremely	
reduced	 royalty	 rates.	 Again,	 this	 ratifies	 my	 previous	 postulation:	 this	 austere	
stance	 towards	 FRAND	 represents	 a	 plausible	 reaction	 to	 excessive	 pricing	
charged	by	advanced	countries’	patent	holders.	By	pushing	FRAND	royalty	rates	
down,	the	Chinese	judges,	to	a	certain	extent	not	genuinely	independent	from	the	
government’s	 industrial	 policy,	 pauperize	 patentees’	 leverage,	 while	 patent	
implementers	 would	 eventually	 find	 themselves	 in	 a	 much	 better	 position.	
Ultimately,	 the	 study	 suggests	 that	 this	 licensing	paradigm	represents	 a	 form	of	
shaping	 industrial	 regulation	 through	 economic	 regulation	 and	 selective	
competition	enforcement.			
However,	my	analysis	also	points	out	that	this	strategy	could	ultimately	be	
detrimental.	 Indeed,	 although	 an	 aggressive	 stance	 to	 FRAND	 has	 arguably	
allowed	 China	 to	 attain	 the	 critical	 goal	 of	 reduction	 of	 royalties	 within	 its	
domestic	 market,	 this	 might	unintentionally	 lead	 to	 a	 systemic	 slow-down	 in	
innovation	as	reduced	FRAND	would	disincentive	foreign	SEP	holders	to	enter	the	
Chinese	 market.	 Such	 strategy	 would	 ultimately	 shield	 domestic	 competition	
from	genuine	global	competition.	Moreover,	reduced	economic	incentives	for	SEP	
holders	may	 also	 encourage	 patent	 implementers	 to	 engage	 in	 reverse	 hold-up	
conducts,	thus	stifling	even	more	investments.	
The	effort	in	shaping	industrial	regulation	through	economic	regulation	and	
selective	competition	enforcement	is	also	evident	in	the	attempt	made	by	Chinese	
competition	 authorities	 and	 courts	 in	 regulating	 the	 pricing	 practices	 of	 patent	
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holders.	 This	 sets	 a	 stark	 difference	 from	 the	 trend	 in	 the	 EU,	where	 there	 is	 a	
general	reluctance	to	review	excessive	pricing.	
This	is	what	happened	with	the	Qualcomm	case,	which	was	decided	in.	2015	
by	 the	 NDRC.	 According	 to	 this	 decision,	 SEP	 licensors	 of	 Chinese	 patents	 are	
now	 obliged	 to	 pay	 reasonable	 rates	 for	 cross-licenses	 of	 Chinese	 patents,	 and	
cannot	insist	on	a	cross-license	of	non-SEPs	as	a	condition	for	an	SEP	license.	This	
case	 suggests	 that	 the	 NDRC	 interpreted	 and	 applied	 AML	 aggressively	 and	
expansively	 against	 foreign	 companies	 in	 order	 to	 shield	 domestic	 smartphone	
producers.	 This	 lends	 strong	 credence	 to	 the	 circumstance	 that	 “[h]itting	
Qualcomm	and	other	 international	companies	may	contribute	to	the	development	
of	 the	 nation’s	 semiconductor	 industry:	 the	 infant-industry	 argument	 meets	
competition	policy”.803	
In	 conclusion,	 my	 review	 of	 China’s	 AML	 enforcement	 activities	 in	 the	
standardization	sector	lends	strong	credence	to	the	allegations	that	China	is	using	
competition	 enforcement	 as	 an	 opportunity	 for	 protectionism	 and	 industrial	
policy	to	influence	decisions.		
4. SELECTIVE LIBERALIZATION THROUGH ECONOMIC NATIONALISM? 
Having	 explored	 the	 idiosyncrasies	 of	 China’s	 competition	 regulation	 and	
its	 instrumental	 role	 in	 the	 country’s	 development	 agenda	 as	 a	 whole,	 a	
preliminary	 conclusion	 can	 be	 drawn.	 There	 seems	 to	 be,	 to	 a	 certain	 extent,	 a	
sort	 of	 subordination	 of	 the	 AML	 to	 national	 policy	 objectives:	 economic	
regulation,	specifically	through	competition	enforcement,	is	used	to	shape	a	novel	
industrial	policy,	 favoring	selected	national	champion	 firms	as	part	of	objectives	
other	 than	 just	 ensuring	 competition,	 remarkably	 concerning	 enhancing	 the	
overall	 economy,	 national	 prestige	 or	 political	 advantage.	 Ultimately,	 economic	
regulation	advances	industrial	policy	and	matches	its	goals.804	
This	conclusion	is	supported	by	recent	statist	literature,	which	submits	that	
state	action,	far	from	being	retreating,	still	largely	recur,	although	through	novel	
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804	Although	several	definitions	of	‘industrial	policy’	exist,	at	their	core	lies	the	concept	that	the	state	
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forms	 and	measures,	 allowing	 the	 state	 to	 continue	 supporting	 domestic	 firms,	
regardless	of	liberalized	markets.805	Framing	the	issue	this	way,	China	appears	to	
be	 implementing	 a	 selective	 liberalization,	 notwithstanding	 the	 internationally	
open	 economic	 markets	 preached	 by	 the	 WTO	 regime,	 pursuing	 policies	 that	
favor	selected	domestic	firms	and	shield	them	from	global	competition,	either	by	
infusing	competition	or	by	impeding	it,	806	engaging	in	what	has	been	defined	as	
“economic	nationalism”	or	“economic	patriotism”.807		
Overall,	this	conclusion	should	be	framed	in	the	bigger	picture	concerning	
the	design	of	China’s	competition	policy,	which	is,	taking	a	distance	from	the	EU	
and	 US	 stances	 on	 competition,	 less	 worried	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 keeping	 a	 level	
playing	field	and	more	with	nurturing	its	own	interests,	i.e.,	protecting	the	public	
interest	 and	promoting	 the	 socialist	market	 economy.	This	 goal	 clearly	 emerges	
from	 the	 text	of	 the	AML	 (notably	articles	 1	 and	4),	which	 specifically	 identifies	
the	 protecting	 of	 the	 public	 interest	 and	 the	 effect	 on	 the	 Chinese	 national	
economy	as	key	objectives.	
5. RE-FRAMING THE ISSUE: DETECTING THE MISSING INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
PERSPECTIVE 
A	further	conclusive	 remark	should	be	drawn,	which	represents	more	of	a	
logic	linkage	towards	the	section	of	the	study	focusing	on	the	international	trade	
implication	of	standardization.	Indeed,	the	EU/China	comparative	examination	of	
the	competition	enforcement	regarding	standards	and	SEPs	has	highlighted	that	
the	 current	 economic	 reality	 of	 globalization	 has	 not	 been	 translated	 into	 a	
globally	 uniform	 legal	 framework	 applicable	 to	 competition	 and	 IP	 law-related	
issues.	
However,	 the	 international	 scope	 of	 the	 trade	 and	 connected	 disputes	 on	
standards	 and	 SEPs	 urge	 local	 courts	 to	 adopt	 a	 more	 global,	 consistent	 and	
harmonized	approach	to	assess	complex	transboundary	conduct	and	disputes.	On	
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the	 one	 side,	 markets	 are	 growing	 more	 global	 in	 nature	 and	 the	 contour	 of	
national	trade	is	more	blurred.	It	 is	thus	clear	that	the	analysis	of	standards	and	
competition	 cannot	 do	 without	 an	 appreciation	 of	 the	 international	 trade	
regulatory	 perspective.	 On	 the	 other	 side,	 however,	 upon	 closer	 scrutiny,	 there	
appear	 to	 remain	 major	 differences	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 application	 of	 legal	
doctrine	to	the	concrete	circumstances	of	the	case.		
It	 follows	a	 typical	 catch-22	 situation:	 as	 long	as	 the	diverging	approaches	
concerning	patents	incorporated	into	standards	and	their	use	as	trade	barriers	are	
not	 resolved	at	a	normative	 level,	 latecomer	countries	will	be	enticed	 to	 fashion	
competing	 and	 complementary	 standards,	differing	 from	 international	ones	 and	
which,	 consequently,	 are	 susceptible	 to	 posing	 significant	 non-tariff	 barriers	 to	
international	trade	and	to	open	markets.	
My	study	thus	insists	on	the	fact	that	current	scholarship	on	standards	and	
competition	law	cannot	do	without	a	thorough	analysis	of	the	trade	implications,	
as	 both	 aspects	 are	 mutually	 causing	 one	 another:	 diverging	 approaches	 to	
competition	 issues	 related	 to	 standards	 and	 IP	 allow	 for	 a	 widespread	 use	 of	
strategic	 patenting;	 this	 is	 perceived	 by	 IP-poor	 countries	 as	 an	 unfair	 trade	
barrier,	which	 in	 return	 triggers	 latecomers	 to	adopt	protectionist	 stances	and	a	
use	of	competition	 law	and	enforcement	subjugated	 to	political	goals,	economic	
development	and	industrial	policy.		
It	 follows	 that	 international	 trade	 could	 be	 hindered	 by	 governmental	
measures	 that	distort	domestic	markets,	ultimately	having	substantial	effects	on	
trade	outside	the	jurisdiction	that	imposes	the	restrictions.	That	is,	a	plethora	of	
acts	of	governments	can	hamper	international	trade,	directly	and	indirectly.	
This	situation	is	likely	to	happen,	as	the	notion	of	selective	liberalism	shows,	
even	 when	 competition	 is	 imposed	 by	 law,	 for	 instance,	 shaping	 and	 limiting	
competition	 through	 domestic	 standards,	 which	 favored	 national	 champions,	
while	others,	especially	foreign	companies,	found	such	standards	demanding	and	
costly	to	comply	with.	Arguably,	standards	have	performed	as	influential	tools	in	
supporting	 national	 champions	 in	 many	 industries.	 The	 present	 study	 thus	
advances	 the	 scholarship	 and	 arguments	 brought	 forward	 by	 recent	 statist	
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literatures808	by	 suggesting	 and	 examining	 which	 regulatory	 instruments	 have	
arisen	 in	 the	 state	 toolkit	 aiming	 at	 shaping	 the	 liberalization	 and	
internationalization	of	markets.			
6. BEYOND PLAIN-VANILLA PROTECTIONISM  
The	 analysis	 then	 investigated	 how	 competition	 interacts	 with	 the	WTO	
regime	 and	 whether	 an	 integration	 of	 competition	 policy	 within	 the	 WTO	 is	
advisable	 to	 address	 the	 trade-restrictive	 measures	 implemented	 by	 latecomers	
and	 caused,	 at	 least	 partially,	 by	 the	 differences	 in	 views	 and	 uncertainty	 that	
characterized	the	tensions	between	patents	and	standards,	as	well	as	the	strategic	
use	of	IP	to	extract	higher	royalties	on	par	with	advanced	countries.		
Expanding	 recent	 scholarly	 literature,	 the	 study	 focused	on	China’s	 stance	
on	standardization	and	the	use	of	standards	as	a	protectionist	regulatory	tool	to	
countervail	 strategic	patenting	by	 advanced	 countries.	The	US	and	 the	EU	have	
recurrently	 raised	 critiques	 claiming	 China’s	 support	 of	 domestic	 standards	
amounts	 to	 a	 national	 policy	 of	 protectionism,	 in	 violation	 of	 the	 WTO/TBT	
commitments.	As	a	response,	the	Chinese	delegation	to	the	WTO	has	persistently	
raised	 the	 argument	 that	 mandatory	 imposition	 of	 proprietary	 technology	
standards	fetters	international	trade.		
My	analysis	investigated	this	perception	of	unfairness	concerning	standards,	
and	embarked	on	an	examination	of	the	efforts	made	by	the	Chinese	government	
to	use	standards	as	a	protectionist	tool.	
Assessing	a	number	of	study	cases,	namely	the	WAPI	case,	the	TD-SCDMA	
case	 and	 the	 EVD	 case,	 my	 analysis	 eventually	 suggested	 that	 Indigenous	
Innovation	is	not	the	ultimate	aim	of	China’s	strategy.	Rather,	sheltering	specific	
domestic	 industries	 represents	only	one	 aspect	of	 a	 greater	 strategy	designed	at	
increasing	Chinese	firms’	status	within	the	world’s	supply	chain	and	trade	arena.	
It	emerges	as	a	many-sided	effort	towards	modifying	international	norms	towards	
a	paradigm	closer	to	China’s	economic	interests	and,	arguably,	more	in	harmony	
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with	 Chinese	 approaches	 towards	 proprietary	 technology. 809 	This	 conclusion	
seems	to	be	confirmed	by	the	EDV	case,	whose	empirical	evidences	have	shown	
that	 the	 development	 of	 the	 EVD	 triggered	 a	 spark	 of	 royalty	 concessions	 from	
major	IP-rich	Western	companies	who	held	patents	vital	to	the	DVD	standard.		
However,	 incorporating	 competition	 in	 the	 WTO	 regime	 as	 well	 as	
standards	is	not	an	easy	task,	as	a	number	of	challenges	arise.	
The	 first	challenge	 to	be	addressed	concerns	 the	absence	of	a	competition	
regime	at	 the	multinational	 level.	 Indeed,	developing	countries	opposed	 fiercely	
the	integration	of	a	competition	policy	within	the	WTO	regime.	Their	concerns	at	
having	 their	 policy	 margin	 of	 maneuver	 limited	 prevailed	 on	 the	 interests	 of	
establishing	 a	 more	 consistent	 international	 level	 playing	 field	 touching	 upon	
competition	concerns.	WTO	members	have	then	failed	to	come	to	a	decision	on	
whether	the	WTO	should	start	looking	at	some	new	issues	such	as	competition.		
However,	my	 study	highlights	 that	 the	WTO	already	 features	 a	 bundle	 of	
provisions	which	address	a	number	of	measures,	such	as	NTBs,	that	could	ideally	
carry	a	protectionist	purpose	over	domestic	interests,	thus	impeding	competition	
from	imports.	Moreover,	several	obligations	set	forth	in	the	TBT	Agreement	come	
to	 play	 in	 an	 endeavor	 to	 address	 the	 main	 concerns	 related	 to	 the	 interplay	
between	 standardization,	 competition	 and	 international	 trade	 and	which	might	
constitute	a	 starting	point	 to	delineate	what	good	governance	canons	should	be	
relied	 on	 under	 competition	 rules,	 namely	 provisions	 tackling	 discrimination	
against	 like	 products	 from	 other	 countries	 by	 means	 of	 standards,	 SSOs	
protectionist	practices	backed	by	governmental	policies	and,	finally,	cases	where	
preference	 to	 international	 standards	 is	 not	 given,	 provided	 that	 recitals	 of	 the	
TBT	 Agreement	 point	 in	 favor	 of	 international	 solutions	 over	 national	 ones	
addressing	the	problem	of	fragmented	markets	due	to	standards.810	
The	 second	 challenge	 to	 be	 addressed	 concerns	 the	 notion	 of	 “relevant	
international	 standards”	 within	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 TBT	 Agreement.	 Actually,	
                                                
809 	Christopher	 McElwain,	The	 World's	 Laboratory:	 China's	 Patent	 Boom,	 IT	 Standards	 and	 the	
Implications	 for	 the	Global	 Knowledge	 Economy,	 14	SANTA CLARA JOURNAL	OF INTERNATIONAL	LAW	441	
(2016),	p.	452-453.	
810	See,	Recital	4	of	the	ТВТ	Agreement.	
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even	though	article	2.4	of	the	TBT	Agreement	commands	WTO	members	to	use	
“relevant	international	standards	as	a	basis	for”	settling	national	standards,	it	does	
not	 outline	 the	 notion	 of	 “international	 standards”,	whose	 individualization	has	
been	 far	 from	 unequivocal	 and	 has	 failed	 to	 result	 in	 legal	 certainty.	 The	
terminology	 matter	 is	 made	 yet	 even	 more	 equivocal	 by	 the	 spreading	 of	
numerous	 actors	 in	 the	 ICT	 standard-setting	 panorama,	 such	 as	 informal	 SSOs	
and	consortia,	which	aggravates	the	effort	in	setting	the	meaning	of	“international	
standardization	body”.		
The	answers	to	the	challenges	my	research	pointed	out	are	far	from	certain	
and	 required	 an	 examination	 of	 the	 pertinent	 case	 law	 applied	 to	 the	 ICT	
standardization.	It	 is	 thus	sensible	to	seek	guidance	 in	the	WTO’s	 jurisprudence	
on	technical	standards.		
Arguably,	the	TRIPs	Agreement,	given	that	it	touches	upon	the	issues	raised	
by	IP	in	standards,	also	raises	questions	as	to	whether	it	is	capable	of	addressing	
the	 international	 dimension	 of	 competition	 policy	 and	 IP	 rights	 in	
standardization.	
Analyzing	 the	 TRIPs	 provisions	 specifically,	 it	 emerged	 that	 this	 legal	
instrument	 could	 be	 particularly	 useful.	 Indeed,	 from	 a	 domestic	 perspective,	
litigation	on	IPRs	in	standards	can	trigger	remedies	descending	from	competition	
and	patent	laws,	depending	on	the	national	laws	of	each	country.	These	remedies,	
however,	 barely	 tackle	 the	 issues	 raised	 by	 the	 use,	 certainty	 and	 efficiency	 of	
standards.	Against	this	background,	SSOs,	as	well	as	governments,	strive	to	design,	
adopt	and	implement	standardization	policies	capable	of	addressing	these	issues,	
focusing	on	 IP	misuse,	 and	anticompetitive	conduct,	 as	well	 as	 the	definition	of	
FRAND	 terms.	 Therefore,	 the	 appreciation	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 IPRs	 –	
mainly	having	a	domestic	scope	as	they	are	granted	nationally	–	and	standards	–	
which,	 in	 reverse,	 directly	 affects	 global	 trade	 –	 lags	 behind.	 For	 these	 reasons,	
TRIPs	could	be	the	right	tool	and	step	 in	to	tackle	the	relationship	with	IPRs	 in	
standards	and	international	trade	at	the	global	level.	However,	it	presents	several	
shortcomings	which	stem	directly	 from	an	analysis	of	the	main	articles	of	TRIPs	
my	study	scrutinized.		
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7. PERSPECTIVES: TOWARDS A PRELUDE TO GLOBAL COMPETITION POLICY 
OR TO ECONOMIC BALKANIZATION?  
The	conclusion	stemming	from	my	analysis	hints	to	the	conviction	that	it	is	
past	 time	 to	 embark	 on	 a	 new	 path	 of	 negotiations	 within	 the	WTO	 on	 issues	
such	as	competition	policy,	which	are	of	great	relevance	to	the	current	status	of	
international	 trade.	However,	 I	 do	not	neglect	 that	 this	 conclusion	 clashes	with	
the	 reality:	 competition	 policy	 at	 the	 international	 level	 is	 still	 disciplined	 in	 a	
fragmented	manner,	through	rules	diverging	in	every	single	country,	giving	raise	
to	 inter-jurisdictional	 conflicts.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 I	 am	 convinced	 that	 WTO	
members	will	 incur	 in	an	 irreparable	 loss	 if	 they	keep	showing	 indolence	to	this	
situation,	 as	 it	 is	 likely	 to	 create	 a	 substantial	 economic	 burden	 for	 operators.	
Paradoxically,	 ignoring	 the	competition	dimension	 in	 international	 trade,	 as	 the	
standardization	 saga	 is	 showing,	 will	 also	 not	 serve	 national	 protectionist	
industrial	policies	implemented	via	economic	regulation,	and	specifically,	among	
others,	by	means	of	competing	domestic	 technological	 standards.	These	policies	
might,	 in	 the	 long	 run,	 carry	 the	 risk	of	 isolating	 the	 states	 that	adopt	 them,	as	
selective	 liberalism	 translates	 into	 economic	 balkanization	 of	 the	 global	 trade	
arena,	and	will	be	more	detrimental	to	economic	development	than	useful.		
In	 an	 effort	 to	 outline	 a	more	 feasible	 approach,	 I	 also	 pondered	 a	more	
nuanced	approach.	Indeed,	provided	that	instituting	an	overarching	competition	
policy	within	the	WTO	regime	seems	to	be	a	goal	hard	to	be	attained	presently,	in	
light	of	the	oppositions	encountered	so	far,	the	focus	should	shift	to	emphasizing	
a	 “principle-based	 approach”.	 This	would	 call	 for	 an	 interpretation	 of	 the	WTO	
provisions	as	 to	guarantee	 the	core	values	of	 competition	policy.	As	a	matter	of	
fact,	although	there	 is	no	universally	accepted	competition	 law	nor	policy,	 there	
has	 been	 considerable	 agreement	 on	 some	 core	 principles,	 to	 be	 precise,	
transparency	and	non-discrimination	between	domestic	and	foreign	companies.	A	
principle-based	paradigm	 could	ultimately	 be	 leading	 towards	 a	 depoliticisation	
of	 competition	 law,	 excerpting	 and	 identifying	 industrial	 policy	 considerations	
from	 the	 competition	 law	 framework	 and	making	 them	highly	 visible,	 and	 thus	
recognizable.	 I	 substantially	 share	 the	 view	 that	 the	 focus	 should	 not	 be	 on	
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whether	or	not	industrial	policy	is	a	factor	in	a	competition	analysis,	but	rather	on	
determining	which	of	the	two	interests	should	prevail	where	conflict	arises.811	
However,	 my	 study	 acknowledges	 that	 internalizing	 the	 core	 values	 of	
competition	policy	and	law	within	the	international	trade	law	regime	would	–	still	
–	 call	 for	 a	 normative	 solution	 to	 the	 current	 divergences	 about	 IP	 and	
competition	notions	and	theories	stemming	from	inconsistent	competition	rules	
and	enforcement.	
On	a	different	and	complementary	level,	the	hitches	in	gauging	the	role	of	
WTO	 rules	 vis-à-vis	 anticompetitive	 conduct	makes	 a	more	 robust	 argument	 in	
favor	 of	 the	 development	 of	 a	 “global	 competition	 policy”	 based,	 among	 other	
things,	 on	 competition	 advocacy	 and	 soft	 legal	 tools.	 This	 could	 foster	 greater	
harmonization	 in	 competition	 theories	 and	 enforcement	 at	 the	 global	 level,	 as	
well	 as	promotion	of	 soft	 law	practices	 and	best	practices	 addressing	a	 series	of	
anticompetitive	actions,	put	in	place	by	both	private	companies	and	governments	
to	restrict	competition	and	support	anticompetitive	measures	which	are	aimed	at	
favoring	a	certain	industry.812		
As	a	matter	of	facts,	the	present	study	has	shed	light	on	the	fact	that	there	is	
no	 one-size-fits-all	 solution	 responding	 to	 all	 and	 every	 competition	 policy	 and	
international	trade,	let	alone	in	the	ever-evolving	standardization	context.		
Zooming	 into	 the	contemporary	 time,	 it	 seems	 that	 future	 research	 in	 the	
field	should	also	increasingly	focus	on	uncovering	how	different	competition	and	
trade	regulation	approaches	will	impact	China’s,	EU’s	and	the	US’s	trade	policies	
in	a	not	too	distant	future.	
The	 alleged	Chinese	 protectionism	might	 indeed	have	 a	wider	 effect	 than	
expected.	Let’s	take	US	President	Trump’s	promises,	made	along	the	course	of	his	
presidential	 campaign	 and	 reiterated	 after	 his	 inauguration,	 to	 embrace	 a	
protectionist	 trade	 policy	 such	 as	 placing	 import	 duties	 on	 goods	 coming	 from	
                                                
811	Jonathan	Galloway,	The	Pursuit	 of	National	Champions:	The	 Intersection	of	Competition	Law	and	
Industrial	Policy,	EUROPEAN	COMPETITION	LAW	REVIEW	2007,	pp.	14-15.	
812	James	 C.	 Cooper,	William	 E.	 Kovacic,	 U.S.	 Convergence	 with	 International	 Competition	 Norms:	
Antitrust	 Law	 and	 Public	 Restraints	 on	 Competition,	 90	BOSTON	UNIVERSITY	LAW	REVIEW	4	(2010),	 p.	
1582.	
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certain	 countries,	 with	 China	 being	 its	 chief	 objective,	 and	 promoting	 several	
regulatory	actions	in	support	for	domestic	companies.		
These	 announcements,	 whose	 becoming	 reality	 is	 far	 from	 clear,	 seem	 to	
echo	what	has	been	at	the	core	of	China’s	trade	policy	dynamic	for	the	past	three	
decades.	This	 further	supports	the	thesis	that	the	economy	must	be	expressive	of	
and	 conducive	 to	 the	 shaping	 of	 industrial	 policies	 and	 economic	 development	
goals.	 As	 such,	 the	 seemingly	 protectionist	 approach	 embraced	 by	 the	 new	 US	
administration	 could	 be	 construed	 as	 a	 response	 to	 the	 stance	 taken	 by	 China’s	
leadership	concerning	economic	nationalism	and	selective	liberalism.		
The	US’s	protectionist	backlash	and	constant	stance	that	China	is	to	be	held	
accountable	 for	 failing	 to	 honor	 its	 commitments	 is	 also	 paralleled	 in	 recent	
actions	taken	by	the	EU,	whose	Member	States	have	often	raised	critical	voices	on	
the	trade-restrictiveness	strategies	adopted	by	Beijing.		
In	 this	 vein,	 the	 EU	 denied	 market	 status	 to	 China	 in	 2016.	 Pursuant	 to	
Section	15	of	the	Chinese	WTO	Accession	Protocol,	China	can	be	treated	as	a	non-
market	 economy	 (“NME”)	 in	 anti-dumping	 investigations	 in	 case	 Chinese	 firms	
cannot	 demonstrate	 that	 they	 operate	 under	 criteria	 required	 to	 qualify	 as	 a	
market	 economy.	 This	 NME	 status	 is	 especially	 relevant	 in	 anti-dumping	
proceedings	 where	 it	 allows	 the	 use	 of	 non-standard	 methodologies	 for	 price	
comparisons	 in	 assessing	 the	 normal	 value	 of	 the	 goods,	 rather	 than	 using	
domestic	 prices	 to	 compute	 the	 dumping	 margin.	 This	 aspect	 is	 particularly	
relevant	to	China,	as	NME	methodologies	to	calculate	normal	value	have	generally	
led	to	more	onerous	anti-dumping	duties.813	China	has	contended	that,	pursuant	to	
Section	15(d)	of	the	WTO	Accession	Protocol,	the	Section	15	provision	allowing	for	
NME	 methodology	 terminated	 after	 11	 December	 2016,	 giving	 rise	 to	 a	 legal	
obligation	 to	 award	 market	 economy	 status	 to	 China	 after	 that	 date.	 The	
interpretation	of	this	section,	however,	remains	highly	contentious.	Moreover,	the	
EU	and	US	have	resisted	China’s	bid	for	market	economy	status,	triggering	Beijing	
                                                
813 	United	 States	 Government	 Accountability	 Office,	 US-China	 Trade	 –	 Eliminating	 Non-Market	
Economy	Methodology	would	lower	Antidumping	duties	for	some	companies,	January	2006.	
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to	launch	action	before	the	WTO	on	12	December	2016	by	requesting	consultations	
with	the	EU.814	
Moreover,	 in	February	2017,	EU	member	 states	officially	 requested	 that	 the	
European	 Commission	 create	 a	 legal	 basis	 for	 blocking	 Chinese	 investments	 in	
high-tech	 industries.815	Specifically,	 Germany,	 France	 and	 Italy	 have	 called	 on	
Brussels	 to	 grant	 them	a	 right	of	 veto	over	Chinese	high-tech	 takeovers,	 in	what	
appears	to	be	a	mounting	protectionist	backlash	against	Chinese	investment	in	the	
EU’s	most	sensitive	industries.816	
The	 request	 was	 triggered,	 inter	 alia,	 by	 China’s	 ambitious	 plan,	 termed	
“Made	in	China	2025”	(in	Chinese,	“中国制造2025”),	aimed	at	turning	the	country	
into	a	“manufacturing	superpower”	over	the	coming	decades.	This	industrial	policy	
targets	 virtually	 all	 high-tech	 industries	 that	 strongly	 contribute	 to	 economic	
growth	in	advanced	economies,	including	the	ICT	sector.	However,	Chinese	effort	
is	far	broader,	such	as	avoiding	being	clutched	by	both	recently	emerging	low-cost	
producers	 and	 more	 efficiently	 cooperating	 and	 competing	 with	 advanced	
industrialized	economies.		
Critics	have	argued	that	Made	in	China	2025	ultimately	aims	for	substitution:	
“China	seeks	to	gradually	replace	foreign	with	Chinese	technology	at	home	–	and	to	
prepare	 the	 ground	 for	 Chinese	 technology	 companies	 entering	 international	
markets”.	817	In	order	to	achieve	these	goals,	government	entities	at	all	levels	would	
provide	large,	low-interest	amounts	of	money	from	state-owned	investment	funds	
and	development	banks.		
                                                
814	DS516:	European	Union	—	Measures	Related	to	Price	Comparison	Methodologies.	
815 	See	 David	 Kleimann,	 Conferring	 ‘Market	 Economy	 Status’	 to	 China	 in	 the	 EU	 –	 A	 Mission	
Impossible?,	EJIL:	Talk!	(2016),	arguing	that	“Art.15	CAP	does	not,	after	December	11,	2016,	allow	for	the	
use	 of	 non-standard	 methodologies	 for	 price	 comparisons	 in	 anti-dumping	 investigations	 that	 are	
inconsistent	with	the	provisions	of	the	WTO	Anti-Dumping	Agreement.	[…]	In	order	to	comply	with	its	
WTO	obligations	after	December	 11,	 2016,	 […]	EU	 institutions	need	 to	bring	EU	secondary	 legislation	
and	 future	 anti-dumping	 measures	 against	 Chinese	 producers	 into	 conformity	 with	 the	WTO	 Anti-
Dumping	Agreement.	 It	 is	 beyond	doubt	 otherwise	 that	 the	EU	will	 be	 subject	 to	 a	 larger	 number	 of	
unfavorable	 legal	 decisions	 adopted	 by	 the	WTO	Dispute	 Settlement	Body.	 In	 the	 aftermath	 of	 these	
decisions,	 in	 case	 of	 non-compliance,	 the	 EU	 will	 be	 confronted	 with	 hefty	 retaliatory	 measures	
authored	by	China	and	authorized	by	the	WTO	Dispute	Settlement	Body”.	
816	The	Financial	Times,	Guy	Chazan,	EU	capitals	seek	stronger	right	of	veto	on	Chinese	takeovers,	14	
Feb.	2017.		
817 	JOST	 WUBBEKE	 ET	 AL.,	 MADE	 IN	 CHINA	 2025:	 THE	 MAKING	 OF	 A	 HIGH-TECH	 SUPERPOWER	 AND	
CONSEQUENCES	FOR	INDUSTRIAL	COUNTRIES,	MERCATOR	INSTITUTE	FOR	CHINA	STUDIES	(MERICS),	2016.	
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Indeed,	 the	 terms	 used	 in	 the	 plan	 –	 such	 as	 “indigenous	 innovations”	 –	
support	 this	 thesis,	 showing	 that	 the	 strategy	 intends	 to	 increase	 the	 domestic	
market	share	of	Chinese	suppliers	for	basic	core	components	and	important	basic	
materials	 to	 70	 per	 cent	 by	 the	 year	 2025.818	Examples	 especially	 telling	 of	 China	
turning	into	manufacturing	“self-sufficiency”	are	not	difficult	to	find.	For	instance,	
looking	 to	move	 away	 from	both	 the	US’s	Qualcomm	 and	Taiwanese	MediaTek,	
China’s	 Xiaomi	 is	 now	 exploring	ways	 to	make	 its	 own	 chipsets.819	Prospectively,	
this	 latest	 development	 directly	 involves	 standardization	 as	 it	 targets	 a	 large	
plethora	 of	 high-tech	 industries.	 It	 is	 also	 likely	 to	 involve	 competition	 and	
international	 trade	 issues.	 Notably,	 whilst	 Chinese	 companies	 take	 advantage	 of	
immense	 state	 assistance,	 their	 foreign	 rivals	 entering	 the	 Chinese	 market	 are	
likely	 to	 face	 a	 bundle	 of	 barriers	 and	 obstacles	 consisting	 of	 discriminatory	
practices	 and	 restriction	 of	 market	 access.	 Again,	 the	 concern	 raised	 is	 that	
Chinese	 smart	 manufacturing	 standards	 for	 key	 technologies,	 principally	 those	
strategically	central	technologies	with	solid	data	security	distresses,	will	present	a	
limited	 compliance	 with	 international	 standards.	 In	 the	 worst	 case	 scenario,	
domestic	standards	would	exclude	foreign	manufacturers	from	the	Chinese	market,	
unless	they	accept	switching	to	Chinese	indigenous	standards	and	paying	royalties	
for	offering	products	relying	on	Chinese	standards.	
The	 political	 positions	 cited	 above	 indicate	 that	 the	 process	 of	 bringing	
Chinese	legislation	and	practice	into	conformity	with	WTO	law,	as	well	as	ensuring	
a	 more	 uniform	 enforcement	 of	 competition	 rules	 deprived	 of	 industrial	 policy	
concerns,	could	prove	to	be	a	tough	mission,	given	that	the	EU	and	the	US	also	are	
showing	a	trend	towards	a	legally	impracticable	path	of	industry	protection.		
As	 we	 find	 ourselves	 in	 a	 time	 of	 uncertainty	 and	 are	 observing	 a	 strong	
escalation	 in	 populism,	 legal	 scholars	 must	 be	 cautious	 and	 adopt	 a	 balanced	
approach.	More	research	is	needed	to	understand	which	of	the	regulatory	patterns	
discussed	in	this	study	are	advisable	in	todays’	technology-driven	landscape.	
	 	
                                                
818	Id.	
819	The	Wall	Street	Journal,	China’s	Xiaomi	to	Take	On	Top	Tier	With	Smartphone	Chip	of	Its	Own,	Feb.	
9,	2017.	
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